Norris v. State ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 21, 2023
S22A1166. NORRIS v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
Appellant Jaquest Deeric Norris challenges his 2018
convictions for felony murder and cruelty to children in the first
degree in connection with the beating death of a child, eight-month-
old Monte Jones.1 Appellant contends that the evidence was legally
1The crimes occurred on November 9, 2015. On February 26, 2016, a
Fulton County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, three counts
of felony murder, one count of cruelty to children in the first degree for causing
blunt force trauma to the head, one count of cruelty to children in the first
degree for causing blunt force trauma to the leg, aggravated battery,
aggravated assault, and aggravated sexual battery. At a trial from February
26 to March 1, 2018, the jury found him guilty of three counts of felony murder,
cruelty to children in the first degree for causing blunt force trauma to the
head, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault. The jury acquitted
Appellant of malice murder and the other count of cruelty to children in the
first degree, and the aggravated sexual battery count was dead docketed. The
trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison without parole for felony
murder predicated on aggravated battery and a concurrent twenty-year
sentence for cruelty to children in the first degree. The trial court merged
aggravated assault with aggravated battery, merged aggravated battery with
felony murder, and vacated the remaining felony murder counts.
insufficient to support his convictions. Appellant also contends that
trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by
failing to impeach one of the State’s expert witnesses, Dr. Deborah
Young, with evidence that Monte had two healed fractures in his left
leg after Dr. Young testified that she recalled Monte having only
recent fractures. Because we conclude that the evidence was legally
sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions, and because Appellant
fails to show prejudice from any alleged deficiency in trial counsel’s
This Court dismissed Appellant’s first appeal on October 19, 2021,
because Appellant had not followed the interlocutory appeal procedures, which
were required because the dead-docketed count remained pending in the trial
court. See Seals v. State, 311 Ga. 739 (860 SE2d 419) (2021). Also on October
19, 2021, the State filed, and the trial court granted, a motion to nolle pros the
dead-docketed count. On November 9, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to vacate
and reenter the orders denying the motion for new trial and granting the
motion to nolle pros the dead-docketed count, arguing that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction. On November 12, 2021, the trial court vacated both orders
and then reentered the order denying the motion for new trial. However, the
trial court did not reenter the order granting the motion to nolle pros the dead-
docketed count until November 16, 2021. An appeal was docketed for a second
time with this Court, but we dismissed that appeal on May 17, 2022, as the
order denying the motion for new trial was not legally valid because it was
entered while the dead-docketed count remained pending. See Southall v.
State, 300 Ga. 462, 466 (796 SE2d 261) (2017); Pounds v. State, 309 Ga. 376,
380 (846 SE2d 48) (2020). On June 13, 2022, the trial court vacated its order
denying the motion for a new trial and reentered the order on June 14, 2022.
The case was docketed in this Court to the August 2022 term and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
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actions, we affirm.
1. Although the Attorney General raises a question regarding
the Court’s jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we have previously
decided that issue. In dismissing Appellant’s second appeal, this
Court’s order stated that “[i]f, upon the return of remittitur, the trial
court enters an order denying the appellant’s motion for new trial,
the judgment of conviction will stand, and the previously filed notice
of appeal will ripen.” Order at 2, Norris v. State, Case No. S22A0797
(May 17, 2022). Under the law-of-the-case rule, the Court’s prior
determination is binding here. See OCGA § 9-11-60 (h).
2. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following. In early October
2015, Appellant began staying at his mother’s home in the Deerfield
Garden Apartments in Fulton County with his two children and five
siblings. His mother lived downstairs from the home of Jasmine
Jones and her three children, including Monte. Shortly after his
arrival, Appellant and Jasmine struck up a relationship, and
Appellant and his children occasionally began staying overnight at
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Jasmine’s apartment.
On the night of November 8, 2015, Tracie Bryant, who lived in
the unit across the hall from Jasmine, took her daughter to
Jasmine’s apartment and stayed there for 30 to 40 minutes. During
the visit, Monte laughed and did not appear to be in any pain. At
around 7:00 a.m. on the morning of November 9, Appellant went to
Jasmine’s apartment and fell asleep in bed with her and Monte. At
around 8:00 a.m., Appellant woke to the sound of Jasmine panicking
about an eviction notice that she found on her door. Appellant went
downstairs to talk with his mother about the notice, then returned
to Jasmine’s apartment and went back to sleep. At around 10:00
a.m., Jasmine awakened Appellant to tell him she was going to work
and leaving her children with him. Appellant fell back asleep in the
bed with Monte, and Jasmine went to her job at a CVS Pharmacy
about 18 miles away. CVS computer logs and surveillance footage
confirmed that Jasmine started work at 10:21 a.m. and took a lunch
break between 12:40 and 1:15 p.m.
At around 2:40 p.m., Appellant brought an unresponsive Monte
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downstairs and told Daeshonn Norris, Appellant’s sister, that Monte
had drowned. Although Appellant asked that she not call 911,
Daeshonn called 911 at 2:42 p.m. and told the operator that her
brother said Monte had swallowed water and was not breathing. The
911 operator walked Daeshonn and Appellant through performing
CPR on Monte. Appellant then called Jasmine at work and told her
that Monte had drowned. Emergency services responded to the
scene and took Monte to Children’s Hughes Spalding Hospital. At
the hospital, Monte was intubated to assist with breathing and,
after undergoing a physical examination and a chest x-ray,
transferred to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit at Scottish Rite
Hospital for further treatment. At Scottish Rite, Monte underwent
a CT scan and further x-rays, which revealed skull fractures, rib
fractures, two fractures in his left leg, a fracture in his right leg, a
fracture in his right wrist, and brain swelling. Two days later, on
November 11, Monte was pronounced brain dead and his life support
withdrawn.
On November 29, Appellant was taken into custody. He waived
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his rights under Miranda 2 and gave a video-recorded interview in
which he stated that, after waking up around 1:00 p.m., he
discovered Monte on the bed beside him with a diaper full of feces.
While attempting to clean Monte in the bathtub, Appellant left the
bathroom briefly after hearing a loud noise in the other room, which
turned out to be the other children kicking a door. Appellant claimed
that, upon his return to the bathroom, he found Monte face down in
the tub and that Monte spit up water when Appellant picked him
up.
At trial, multiple experts opined that Monte’s injuries stemmed
from blunt force trauma rather than drowning. Dr. Deborah Young,
a pediatric emergency room physician who treated Monte at Hughes
Spalding, testified that Monte’s injuries looked like nonaccidental
trauma, based on a physical examination and chest x-ray. Dr. Young
also testified that after reviewing the CT scan and x-rays performed
on Monte at Scottish Rite, she recalled only recent—less than two-
week-old—fractures among his injuries. Likewise, Dr. Tamika
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
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Bryant, a child abuse pediatrician who examined Monte at Scottish
Rite, testified that Monte had skull fractures and brain swelling
resulting from blunt force trauma.
Dr. Michael Heninger, the medical examiner who performed an
autopsy on Monte, opined that Monte’s cause of death was blunt
force trauma to the head. In addition, Dr. Heninger testified to the
presence of other injuries indicative of blunt force trauma but that
did not contribute to the cause of death, including rib fractures and
a fractured left tibia and fibula. Dr. Heninger concluded that the leg
fractures and some of the rib fractures occurred at the same time as
the blunt force trauma to the head. However, Dr. Heninger also
noted that some of the rib fractures had signs of healing, meaning
they were older than two weeks, and that Monte had a number of
old, healed scars on his lower back and buttocks that were unusual
for a child of his age. Dr. Heninger testified that injuries as severe
as Monte’s head injuries would normally cause immediate
symptoms and would have caused Monte to stop functioning
immediately.
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Jasmine testified that Monte was acting normally when she
left for work. Appellant elected not to testify in his own defense, but
the State played the video recording and entered into evidence a
transcript of his November 29 interview. The defense theory was
that Jasmine was abusive and caused Monte’s injuries before she
left for work. At trial, the defense did not call any witnesses or
introduce into evidence any exhibits. At a motion-for-new-trial
hearing, trial counsel testified, and appellate counsel entered one
exhibit into evidence, a page of Monte’s medical records describing
two healed fractures in his left leg.
3. Appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient
to support his convictions either as a matter of constitutional due
process under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61
LE2d 560) (1979), or because the circumstantial evidence presented
at trial did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of his
guilt as required by OCGA § 24-14-6. We disagree.
The proper standard of review for sufficiency of evidence as a
matter of constitutional due process is whether any rational trier of
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fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. This Court views the evidence
in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the
jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”
Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013) (cleaned up).
Further, “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence,
the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of
guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that
of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. The evidence presented
at trial “need not exclude every conceivable inference or
hypothesis—only those that are reasonable.” Merritt v. State, 285
Ga. 778, 779 (683 SE2d 855) (2009). “[W]hether an alternative
hypothesis raised by the defendant is reasonable is a question
committed principally to the jury, and . . . we will not disturb [a
jury’s] finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.” Long v.
State, 309 Ga. 721, 726 (848 SE2d 91) (2020) (cleaned up).
Here, there was sufficient evidence as a matter of
constitutional due process to support Appellant’s convictions for
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felony murder and cruelty to children in the first degree. Tracie
Bryant testified that Monte laughed and played the night of
November 8, and Jasmine testified that Monte was acting normally
when she left for work. Further, despite Appellant spending the
night at Jasmine’s apartment, waking up several times, leaving the
apartment at one point and returning, and sleeping in the same bed
as Monte, Appellant never mentioned noticing anything unusual
about Monte before Jasmine left for work. After Jasmine left for
work, computer logs and surveillance footage showed her working at
a CVS 18 miles from her home, with only a 35-minute lunch break,
until Appellant called her that afternoon to claim that Monte had
drowned. Appellant has never disputed that he had sole
responsibility for Monte from the time that Jasmine left for work
until he brought Monte downstairs to Daeshonn for help (though
Appellant asked his sister not to call 911), at which point Monte had
suffered the blunt force trauma to the head that led to his death.
Although Appellant argues that he told a consistent story that
should be credited over Jasmine’s inconsistent testimony and
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supports the reasonable hypothesis that Jasmine caused Monte’s
injuries, the jury was authorized to weigh the credibility of
Appellant and Jasmine in light of the evidence and exclude that
alternative hypothesis. Because the jury’s finding was not
“insupportable as a matter of law,” Long, 309 Ga. at 726, the
evidence also was sufficient under OCGA § 24-14-6 for a rational
trier of fact to have found Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of felony murder and cruelty to children in the first degree.
4. Appellant next contends that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by not impeaching Dr. Young with the
evidence of two healed leg fractures potentially predating
Appellant’s arrival in Georgia. Because Appellant cannot show
Strickland prejudice, we disagree.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Appellant must show both that “his counsel’s performance was
professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.”
Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (873 SE2d 132) (2022) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
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674) (1984)). To prove that his lawyer’s performance was
professionally deficient, an appellant “must demonstrate that the
lawyer performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,
considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
professional norms.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 182-183 (787 SE2d
221) (2016). To prove prejudice, Appellant must show “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 183. A
reasonable probability is one that is “sufficient to undermine
confidence in the [trial’s] outcome.” Neal v. State, 313 Ga. 746, 751
(873 SE2d 209) (2022). If an appellant “fails to make a sufficient
showing on one part of the Strickland test, we need not address the
other part.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773.
Pretermitting whether trial counsel acted deficiently in failing
to impeach Dr. Young with evidence of the healed leg fractures,
Appellant fails to show the required prejudice. Dr. Heninger
testified extensively as to the type, extent, and timing of Monte’s
injuries, including newer fractures in Monte’s left leg. Dr. Heninger
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also testified to older injuries, namely rib fractures and unusual
scars on Monte’s back and buttocks, both of which predated
November 9. However, Dr. Heninger concluded that blunt force
trauma to the head caused Monte’s death. Thus, evidence that
Appellant did not cause any of the injuries to Monte’s legs would not
necessarily disprove that Appellant caused Monte’s death. Indeed,
the jury did acquit Appellant of cruelty to children in the first degree
by causing blunt force trauma to the leg. Additionally, although
Appellant argues that leg fractures older than two weeks would
support the broader theory that Jasmine abused Monte, Appellant
arrived in Georgia in early October, more than two weeks prior to
November 9, and had the opportunity to cause the leg fractures. The
mere assertion that Jasmine caused Monte’s healed leg fractures is
therefore not “sufficient to undermine confidence in the [trial’s]
outcome.” Neal, 313 Ga. at 751. Appellant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel also fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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