Kight v. McG Health, Inc. , 296 Ga. 687 ( 2015 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 2, 2015
S14G0603. KIGHT v. MCG HEALTH, INC.
MELTON, Justice.
In MCG Health, Inc. v. Kight, 325 Ga. App. 349 (750 SE2d 813) (2013),
the Court of Appeals held that MCG Health, Inc. (Hospital) was not precluded
from filing a hospital lien, see OCGA § 44–14–470 et seq., in order to collect
charges associated with the treatment of Christopher Kight. Specifically, the
Court of Appeals found that, as a matter of fact, the trial court erred in its
determination that the lien was invalid because there was no debt owing at the
time it was filed. Concomitantly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s
related grant of attorney fees to Kight pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 was in error.
We granted certiorari in order to determine “[w]hether the Court of Appeals
erred when it reversed the award of partial summary judgment, attorney fees and
expenses of litigation to [Kight]?” Under the facts of this case, we affirm.
In relevant part, the record shows that, following a car wreck caused by
an allegedly intoxicated driver, Kight received treatment at MCG.
Kight was a member of the Blue Cross[/Blue Shield] managed
health care insurance plan, and the hospital care furnished to Kight
for injuries he suffered in the accident was covered under a contract
between the Hospital and Blue Cross. Under the contract, the
Hospital agreed to discount its billed charges for covered hospital
care and accept the discounted amount as “payment in full” for the
covered care provided to Blue Cross members. The contract
allowed the Hospital to bill Kight directly for deductibles and
co-pays owed by Kight to the Hospital, but the Hospital agreed
under the contract not to balance-bill Kight for the difference
between the Hospital's billed charges and the discounted amount
due under the contract.
Id. at 350-351 (1). On March 21, 2007, the Hospital filed a $36,177.68 lien
against Kight’s cause of action pursuant to OCGA § 44–14–470 for the
“reasonable charges” of hospital care furnished to Kight from February 4 to
February 20, 2007.1 At that time, the Hospital had been compensated by
insurance payments for the bulk of its discounted charges, but, as found by the
Court of Appeals, “the amount still owed to the Hospital under the Blue Cross
contract for care furnished from February 4 to February 20 was $261.10 in
unpaid discounted payments due from Blue Cross, and $186.48 in unpaid
1
This represented the standard charge for Kight’s treatment, not the
discounted rate under the Blue Cross insurance contract.
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deductibles or co-pays due from Kight.” Id. at 352 (1). Following the filing of
the lien, Kight continued to receive care, and, as of April 5, 2007, Kight owed
the Hospital a total of $863.10 in deductibles or co-pays. The Hospital has
modified its lien to reflect this amount, and has stated that this is the only
amount that it wishes to recover.2
By considering the purpose of the lien statute, it becomes clear that, based
on the facts of this case, the Hospital’s lien was valid at the time that it was
filed.
At its most basic level, [OCGA § 44–14–470 et seq.] recognizes
that a hospital is entitled to directly bill the patient for its services
and to rely solely on the patient to pay for medical services
rendered. To ensure payment to the hospital, the statute grants the
hospital a lien against a patient's cause of action. This cause of
action refers to the patient's recourse against a tortfeasor for causing
the patient's injuries. This recourse is represented by a claim
brought against a tortfeasor for personal injuries and associated
economic damages, such as a hospital bill. In turn, the tortfeasor,
where insured, may look to his insurance company to make liability
payments to the patient to cover the patient's economic damages.
These liability payments, in turn, are subject to the hospital's lien
seeking reimbursement for services directly billed to the patient. In
short, the lien allows the hospital to step into the shoes of the
insured for purposes of receiving payment from the tortfeasor's
On September 24, 2008, the Hospital filed an amended lien pursuant to
2
OCGA § 44–14–470 et seq. in the amount of $863.10.
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insurance company for economic damages represented by the
hospital bill.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 288 Ga. 315, 317-318 (702 SE2d 898)
(2010).
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court and Kight’s arguments to this
Court, the Hospital was owed money on the date that the lien was filed. As a
result, Kight’s principal argument that there was no debt on which to base any
lien must fail. Likewise, Kight’s corollary argument that the Hospital waived its
right to impose a lien also fails based on the facts of this case. The Hospital’s
contract with Blue Cross explicitly reserves the Hospital’s right to collect
deductibles and co-pays directly from Kight, irrespective of the agreement to
hold Kight responsible only for a discounted price of treatment. Contrary to
Kight’s argument, this is not a situation in which the Hospital has agreed to no
recourse whatsoever except against the patient’s insurer. For that reason, Kight’s
reliance on cases such as MCG Health, Inc. v. Owners Ins. Co., 288 Ga. 782(707 SE2d 349) (2011) is misplaced. Finally, Kight’s tertiary argument that the
Hospital’s lien was required to be exact on the date it was filed or be considered
void ab initio also fails. There is nothing in OCGA § 44–14–470 et seq.
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imposing such a requirement, and we will not judicially legislate one. See
Abdulkadir v. State, 279 Ga. 122, 124 (2) (610 SE2d 50) (2005) (“A court of
law is not authorized to rewrite the statute by inserting additional language that
would expand its application....”). Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly
determined that the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment to
Kight on this issue.
We note that the Court of Appeals opinion, in dicta, discusses wide-
ranging applications of the hospital lien law which simply are not relevant to the
facts of the case currently before this Court. This opinion affirms the Court of
Appeals for the reasons given above, and we neither reach nor adopt any of the
dicta and reasoning except as set forth herein.
2. Because we affirm the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the Hospital’s lien
was valid, we also affirm the ruling that the award of attorney fees against MCG
pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 was improper.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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