Jansen-Nichols v. Kinder Morgan Southeast Terminals, LLC , 295 Ga. 786 ( 2014 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 6, 2014
S14A0728. JANSEN-NICHOLS v. COLONIAL PIPELINE COMPANY.
BLACKWELL, Justice.
Colonial Pipeline Company maintains an underground liquid petroleum
pipeline that passes through DeKalb County near the home of Paige L. Jansen-
Nichols. In May and June 2013, a leak detection alarm system caused Colonial
to become concerned that its pipeline might have been compromised, and
Colonial twice used helicopters to inspect the pipeline. Alleging that these
helicopters flew too low over her home, Jansen-Nichols sued Colonial for
trespass, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se, seeking money damages
and permanent injunctive relief. She also sought an interlocutory injunction to
prohibit Colonial from flying helicopters low over her house for so long as her
lawsuit was pending. Following two evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied
the motion for an interlocutory injunction, and Jansen-Nichols appeals.1 We
affirm.
Jansen-Nichols contends that the denial of an interlocutory injunction was
error because it sanctioned low overflights of her home, thereby giving Colonial
a license to trespass upon her property, to maintain a nuisance, and to breach the
duty of care that it allegedly owes her in connection with aerial pipeline
inspections. That, however, is just not true. A tort is a tort, and if a wrongful act
is a tort, it is no less a tort simply because no court enjoined it. If low helicopter
overflights amount to a trespass, a nuisance, negligence, or negligence per se,
the denial of an interlocutory injunction forbidding such overflights has no
bearing upon the extent to which they are wrongful or whether one injured as
a result might recover damages. The denial of an injunction means only that
such overflights are not punishable as contempt. The denial of an interlocutory
injunction in this case is no license for Colonial to do anything unlawful.
Whether an interlocutory injunction is warranted is a matter committed to
the discretion of the trial court. Holton v. Physician Oncology Svcs., 292 Ga.
1The denial of interlocutory injunctive relief is appealable. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a)
(4).
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864, 866 (2) (742 SE2d 702) (2013). In exercising this discretion, a trial court
generally must consider whether:
(1) there is a substantial threat that the moving party will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) the threatened
injury to the moving party outweighs the threatened harm that the
injunction may do to the party being enjoined; (3) there is a
substantial likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the
merits of her claims at trial; and (4) granting the interlocutory
injunction will not disserve the public interest.
SRB Inv. Svcs. v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5 (3) (709 SE2d
267) (2011) (citation omitted). Although one seeking interlocutory injunctive
relief need not always “prove all four of these factors,” id. at 5 n.7 (3), a trial
court must keep in mind that “an interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, and the power to grant it must be prudently and cautiously exercised.”
Id. at 5 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In this case, the trial court properly considered each of the four factors,
concluding that Jansen-Nichols failed to prove any of them. We see no error in
these conclusions. Though the evidence may be disputed, there was some
evidence that Colonial does not routinely fly helicopters low over the pipeline
or homes near it, that Colonial did not, in fact, fly in May and June 2013 as low
over her home as Jansen-Nichols alleges, and in any event, that a helicopter
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overflight sometimes may be the most expedient way in which Colonial can
check for a compromise of its pipeline, an occurrence that potentially could pose
a danger to the public. In the light of this evidence, the trial court did not abuse
its considerable discretion when it denied an interlocutory injunction in this
case, and for that reason, we affirm the judgment below.2 See Cherokee County
v. City of Holly Springs, 284 Ga. 298, 301 (2) (667 SE2d 78) (2008); Treadwell
v. Investment Franchises, 273 Ga. 517, 519 (543 SE2d 729) (2001) (“Where the
evidence is conflicting[,] it cannot be said that the trial court abused its
discretion in either granting or denying the injunction.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.)).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
2
Jansen-Nichols argues as well that the denial of an interlocutory injunction was error
because it was based on a misapprehension of the distinction between public and private
nuisances and a misapplication of federal preemption doctrine. In its order denying an
interlocutory injunction, however, the trial court said nothing at all about the distinction
between public and private nuisance, and it likewise said nothing at all about preemption.
These claims of error are without merit, and they require no further discussion.
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