SCOTT K. CAMP v. RYAN CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS ( 2022 )

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
Case No. S23A0073
September 30, 2022
The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.
The following order was passed:
SCOTT K. CAMP v. RYAN CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS et al.
Upon consideration, it appearing that the attached opinion
decides an election issue, which must be handled in an expedited
manner, any motion for reconsideration must be received in the
Supreme Court E-Filing/Docket (SCED) System by 12:00 p.m. on
Friday, October 7, 2022.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta
I certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.
, Clerk
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 30, 2022
S23A0073. CAMP v. WILLIAMS et al.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
This case is a dispute over who can run for Chief Magistrate
Judge of Douglas County in the November 2022 election. After the
incumbent successfully challenged the qualifications of the only
person who qualified to run for the Democratic nomination, the
Douglas County Democratic Party Executive Committee purported
to name a replacement. That led to another challenge, this one by
the incumbent’s husband (a registered voter eligible to vote in the
election), contending that the substitution was improper. The
superior court agreed that the Douglas County Board of Elections
and Registration (the “Board”) was not legally authorized to allow
the substitution, but ruled that the statutory vehicle through which
the challenge was asserted — OCGA § 21-2-6 — covers only
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challenges to a candidate’s qualifications to hold office (like age,
residence, and bar membership), not whether the candidate fulfilled
the necessary prerequisites to seek office (like a proper
substitution).
We granted an application for discretionary appeal, expedited
consideration in the light of the rapidly approaching election, and
now reverse. Code section 21-2-6 allows the challenge here because
“qualifications,” as that term is used in the statute, includes all of
the prerequisites for seeking and holding office. The substitute
candidate did not properly qualify to seek office, so the Board lacked
authority to put him on the ballot. And because electors have an
interest in having the community’s government offices filled by duly
qualified officials, the Board’s decision allowing an unqualified
candidate on the ballot violated a substantial right of an elector.
Accordingly, the decision below must be reversed.
1. This controversy began when the incumbent Chief
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Magistrate Judge (and Republican nominee), 1 Susan Camp,
successfully challenged in superior court the qualifications of her
would-be-opponent, Sylvia Baker, on the grounds that Baker is not
a member of the State Bar of Georgia. Baker was the only
Democratic candidate who qualified to run for Chief Magistrate, so
her removal from the Democratic Primary ballot meant that Camp
would run without a Democratic challenger in the general election.
In response, the Douglas County Democratic Party purported
to substitute a new candidate before the primary election — Ryan
Christopher Williams — who had qualified to run for superior court
judge. Scott Camp, Susan Camp’s husband and a registered voter
eligible to vote in the election for Chief Magistrate, challenged that
action in a written submission to the Board.
After a hearing, the Board dismissed the challenge, despite the
fact that Williams was not on the list of certified Democratic
candidates for the chief magistrate seat. See OCGA § 21-2-154 (b).
1 Unlike many other judicial offices across Georgia, this Douglas County
office is a partisan office.
4
The Board announced that Williams would appear on the general
election ballot as the Democratic nominee for Chief Magistrate
Judge. Camp sought judicial review under OCGA § 21-2-6, naming
Williams, the Board, the Board’s members, and its director, Milton
Kidd, as respondents.
The superior court agreed that the Board should not have
replaced Baker with Williams, but refused to reverse the Board’s
decision. The challenge allowed by OCGA § 21-2-6, the court said,
“does not encompass the process by which [a candidate is] placed on
the ballot — it is limited to challenges upon his qualifications to hold
the office.” The court reasoned that subsection (a) of the statute
refers to “the constitutional and statutory qualifications for holding
the office being sought,” which the court took to mean personal
characteristics like residence, age, citizenship, voter registration,
and education. See OCGA § 21-2-6 (a); see also OCGA § 15-10-22
(identifying the “Qualifications of magistrates”). The court therefore
believed that reversing the Board’s decision to allow Williams’s
substitution “would require it to add language to the statute that is
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simply not there.”
Following that decision, Camp sought and obtained
discretionary review from this Court. We directed the parties to
address one question: “[d]id the Superior Court err in concluding
that OCGA § 21-2-6 did not authorize the court to reverse the
decision of the Superintendent and the Douglas County Board of
Elections?”
2. The answer to that question is yes. Code section 21-2-6 does
authorize voters to challenge a candidate who has not satisfied the
procedural prerequisites to appearing on the ballot. As explained
below, the word “qualifications” is not as a semantic matter limited
to the prerequisites for holding office. Moreover, the permission to
challenge a candidate’s qualifications to “seek” office indicates that
prerequisites to appearing on the ballot are included in the
challengeable qualifications. And this understanding is confirmed
by subsection (d) of the statute, which provides that failure to satisfy
one particular procedural prerequisite — payment with a valid
check — requires an automatic finding of failure to meet the
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“qualifications” (albeit for “holding” the office) even without any
challenge.
Code section 21-2-6 provides that “[e]very candidate for county
office who is certified by the county executive committee of a political
party or who files a notice of candidacy . . . shall meet the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for holding the office
being sought.” OCGA § 21-2-6 (a). “[A]ny elector who is eligible to
vote for any such candidate may challenge the qualifications of the
candidate . . . giving the reasons why the elector believes the
candidate is not qualified to seek and hold the public office for which
the candidate is offering.” OCGA § 21-2-6 (b). And if that happens,
“[t]he superintendent shall determine if the candidate is qualified to
seek and hold the public office for which the candidate is offering.”
OCGA § 21-2-6 (c).
“When we consider the meaning of a statute, ‘we must presume
that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it
meant.’” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337)
(2013) (quoting Arby’s Restaurant Group, Inc. v. McRae, 292 Ga. 243,
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245 (1) (734 SE2d 55) (2012)). “To that end, we must afford the
statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the
statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read
the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an
ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. at 172-173 (1)
(a) (citations and punctuation omitted).
(a) Starting with the text, the ordinary meaning gleaned from
a review of dictionary definitions of “qualification” offers little
support for Williams’s and the Board’s argument that the word as
used in the statute can refer only to the attributes required to hold
office. And although examination of dictionary definitions of a single
word is not a substitute for a broader consideration of context and
history, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 602 (3) (820 SE2d 696)
(2018) (declining to apply dictionary definitions when an argument
based on them “views one word in isolation and ignores the
context”), “reviewing dictionaries from the era of the statute’s
enactment may assist in determining its meaning.” State v. Henry,
312 Ga. 632, 637 (3) (a) (864 SE2d 415) (2021) (citing Sandifer v.
8
U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227-228 (134 SCt 870, 187 LE2d 729)
(2014)).
So understood, contemporary dictionaries do not indicate a
limited scope to the meaning of “qualifications.” Instead,
contemporary dictionaries show that the ordinary meanings of
“qualifications” and “qualified” both encompass necessary pre-
requisites generally — not merely traits or attributes.
Around the time the statute was enacted, see Ga. Laws 1980 p.
312, 313-314, § 2, “qualification” was commonly defined to mean
things like “the act of qualifying or the state of being qualified”; “any
quality, knowledge, ability, experience, or acquirement that fits a
person for a position, office, profession, etc.” or “a condition that
must be met in order to exercise certain rights.” Webster’s Deluxe
Unabridged Dictionary, 1473 (2d ed. 1983); see also Webster’s Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary, 963 (1985); Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, 1858 (1976).
Along the same lines, “qualified” was commonly defined to
mean things like “having met conditions or requirements set”; and
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“having the necessary or desirable qualifications.” Webster’s Deluxe
Unabridged Dictionary, supra at 1473; see also Webster’s Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary, supra at 963; Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, supra at 1858.
As a matter of ordinary meaning, therefore, there is no reason
to believe that the General Assembly’s use of the words
“qualifications” or “qualified” compels the conclusion that OCGA §
21-2-6 allows challenges only to attributes like age, residency, and
bar status.
(b) Moreover, “[a]s we have said many times before when
interpreting legal text, ‘we do not read words in isolation, but rather
in context.’” City of Guyton v. Barrow, 305 Ga. 799, 805 (3) (828 SE2d
366) (2019) (quoting Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 573 (3) (a) (731
SE2d 731) (2012)). Indeed, “[t]he primary determinant of a text’s
meaning is its context[.]” City of Guyton, 305 Ga. at 805 (3). So
“‘[e]ven if words are apparently plain in meaning, they must not be
read in isolation and instead, must be read in the context of the
regulation as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 187
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(II) (B) (824 SE2d 265) (2019)). To discern that context, “we may look
to the provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of
the whole statute, and other law — constitutional, statutory, and
common law alike — that forms the legal background of the
statutory provision in question.” Langley v. State, 313 Ga. 141, 143
(2) (868 SE2d 759) (2022) (quoting Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589,
591 (1) (774 SE2d 688) (2015)). Indeed, “all statutes relating to the
same subject matter are to be construed together, and harmonized
wherever possible.” Langley, 313 Ga. at 143 (2) (quoting Hartley v.
Agnes Scott College, 295 Ga. 458, 462 (2) (b) (759 SE2d 857) (2014)).
(i) Beginning with immediate context, two features of OCGA §
21-2-6 show that “qualifications” are best understood to include (and
“qualified” is best understood to mean that a person has satisfied)
the pre-requisites for seeking and holding office—including any
necessary procedural steps.
First, subsections (b) and (c) contemplate a challenge to the
candidate’s qualifications to “seek and hold” office. If the word “seek”
is not superfluous, then it suggests that an elector may show that
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the candidate is not “qualified” to run for office — not merely that
he would not be qualified to serve, if elected. See Hill v. Owens, 292
Ga. 380, 383 (2) (a) (738 SE2d 56) (2013) (“this Court avoids
interpreting statutes in a manner that renders any portion of them
surplusage or meaningless”).
Take OCGA § 15-10-22: that section defines the
“[q]ualifications of magistrates” upon “taking office.” Those are
requirements for “hold[ing]” the office. See OCGA § 21-2-6 (b)-(c). So
if that was all OCGA § 21-2-6 was concerned with, then there would
be no need to specify that voters may challenge whether the
candidate is eligible to “seek” the office. Compare “Seek,” Webster’s
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, supra, at 1063 (“to ask for”; “to try
to acquire or gain”; “to make an attempt”); Webster’s Deluxe
Unabridged Dictionary, supra at 1643 (“to make pursuit; to attempt
to find or take”) with “Hold,” Webster’s Deluxe Unabridged
Dictionary, supra at 866 (“to have and keep as one’s own; to be in
possession of; own; occupy; as, he holds the office of mayor”)
(emphasis in original). And the only apparent meaning of “seek[ing]
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office” is running for office, at least in the context of a statute about
elections. See OCGA § 21-2-130 et seq. (detailing the ways in which
a candidate may “qualify” for an election). Thus, if the use of “seek”
in this statute does not mean that a voter can challenge whether a
candidate is duly qualified to run for office, it means nothing at all,
given that the statute uses the word “hold” separately.
Williams and the Board disagree. They point out that
subsection (b) points back to the qualifications of any candidate
“referred to in subsection (a)” — and they conclude that this means
“qualifications” refers only to the requirements for holding the office.
OCGA 21-2-6 (b).
But even that misreads the statute. Subsection (b) does not
simply refer to the “qualifications” mentioned in subsection (a), it
makes clear that one may challenge “the qualifications of any
candidate referred to in subsection (a).” OCGA § 21-2-6 (b)
(emphasis supplied). Thus, the cross reference limits which
candidates can be challenged under section 21-2-6; it does not limit
or modify the operative language of subsections (b) and (c).
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Second, subsection (d) uses the word “qualifications” to refer to
a procedural pre-requisite: if a candidate pays his qualifying fee with
a check that is returned for insufficient funds, “the superintendent
shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the
qualifications for holding the office being sought[.]” OCGA § 21-2-6
(d). Williams and the Board suggest that this is merely an exception
that proves their rule (i.e., that qualifications are purely
substantive), but subsection (d) gives no sense that it is providing an
exception or even that it is using “qualifications” in an unusual
sense. Instead, it seems plain enough that paying one’s qualifying
fee with a bad check is singled out because the superintendent must
“automatically find that such candidate has not met the
qualifications” — i.e., no challenge under (b) or (c) is necessary, and
the superintendent has no discretion to overlook the failure. See id.
(emphasis added).
Thus, like the ordinary meaning of the words themselves, the
context of OCGA § 21-2-6 confirms that a candidate meets the
“qualifications” to seek and hold office only if he has satisfied all of
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the pre-requisites, including procedural requirements.
(ii) Turning to broader statutory context, this understanding
also comports with the use of related terminology and related
provisions in the Elections Code.
For candidates, “[q]ualifications” are the pre-requisites
(whether things like residency and bar membership or procedural
steps and processes) to seek and hold office. See OCGA § 21-2-130
(dealing with the methods of “Qualification of candidates”:
“Candidates may qualify for an election” by nomination, a notice of
candidacy, special rules for presidential electors, or substitute
nomination under OCGA § 21-2-134); OCGA § 15-10-22 (setting the
qualifications of magistrates, including residence, age, citizenship,
voter registration, high school diploma, and other qualifications
imposed by local law); OCGA § 15-7-21 (setting the qualifications of
state court judges, including residence, age, length of time admitted
to practice law, and good standing within the State Bar); OCGA §
15-18-3 (setting the qualifications of district attorneys, including
residence, age, and bar status); see also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI
15
Sec. VII, Par. II (imposing as qualifications for various judicial office
requirements such as length of time admitted to practice law and
residency in the relevant location, and empowering the General
Assembly to impose additional requirements by law); OCGA § 21-2-
216 (a) (an “Elector’s qualifications” include being “[r]egistered as
an elector in the manner prescribed by law”).
“Qualifying,” in turn, is the process by which a person
demonstrates to election officials that he or she possesses or satisfies
the necessary prerequisites. See, e.g., OCGA § 21-2-130 et seq.2; see
also OCGA §§ 21-2-153 et seq., 21-2-172, 21-2-181 et seq., 21-2-214.
And completing qualifying makes a person “eligible” to seek
2 Several provisions use “qualified” as the past tense of “qualifying,”
OCGA §§ 21-2-131 (c) (1); 21-2-132 (e) (5); 21-2-134 (e); 21-2-137; 21-2-138; 21-
2-153 (c) (1) (D), (d) (1); 21-2-153.1 (c), (e); 21-2-154 (a), (b); 21-2-155; 21-2-171
(a). Many others refer to the qualifying process with words like
• “qualify,” OCGA §§ 21-2-9 (d); 21-2-130; 21-2-132 (d) (5), (j) (1); 21-2-
132.1 (b); 21-2-134 (b) (1) (B), (b) (1) (C), (b) (1) (D); 21-2-137; 21-2-153
(a) (1) (B), (b), (c), (f), (g) (1); 21-2-153.1 (a), (c); 21-2-157 (b); 21-2-214
(b); 21-2-217 (a); or
• “qualifies,” OCGA §§ 21-2-131 (b) (1), (c) (3)-(5); 21-2-135 (a) (1); 21-2-
153 (d) (1); 21-2-154 (a); and even
• “qualification(s).” OCGA §§ 21-2-131 (c) (1)-(2); 21-2-153, 21-2-153.1;
21-2-182.
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office. See OCGA § 21-2-132 (b)-(d); see also OCGA § 21-2-133 (a)
(“No person elected on a write-in vote shall be eligible to hold office
unless notice of his or her intention of candidacy was filed and
published” at the prescribed time before the election). 3 Of course, an
otherwise eligible candidate can lose eligibility under certain
circumstances — which, depending on the situation, is sometimes
described in terms of ineligibility and sometimes in terms of
disqualification. See OCGA §§ 21-2-8, 21-2-133 (d); 45-2-1
(ineligibility); OCGA §§ 21-2-8, 21-2-134 (d)-(e), 21-2-153 (d) (2)
(disqualification).4
3 In other contexts, the Elections Code sometimes uses the word “eligible”
to refer to the mere potential to hold office, see OCGA § 21-2-153 (b) (2), (e) (7);
OCGA § 21-2-153.1 (d) (7); OCGA § 21-2-132 (f) (7).
4 We note that this terminology is used in similar (but not always
identical) ways when describing voters (whom the Code calls “electors”). Like
candidates, voter qualifications encompass both substantive attributes and
procedural steps. See OCGA §§ 21-2-216 (a); 21-2-227. And, as with candidates,
a voter can be “disqualified.” See OCGA §§ 21-2-216 (b), (d), (f); 21-2-224 (d),
(e); 21-2-228 (b), (e); 21-2-229 (a); 21-2-230. But the Elections Code also uses
the term “qualified” in conjunction with “registered” to establish a voter’s
entitlement to vote or sign a petition (which is only sometimes called
eligibility), see OCGA §§ 21-2-132 (h) (1)-(2); 21-2-153 (a.1) (1)-(2); 21-2-182;
21-2-183 (b) (3); 21-2-211; 21-2-221.2, even though registration is one of the
express qualifications for an elector, see OCGA § 21-2-216 (a). “Eligible,” in
turn, can sometimes describe entitlement to vote in its own right, see OCGA
§§ 21-2-216 (g) (1); 21-2-220 et seq., but it is also sometimes used in conjunction
17
On this score, the Board argues that many of these examples
use “qualification” in isolation, rather than in the context of “holding
the office being sought.” OCGA § 21-2-6 (a). But again, that just
focuses on the terminology of subsection (a), which encompasses the
procedural pre-requisites referenced in subsections (b) and (c).
Williams, for his part, adds that the process or means of
qualifying is neither equivalent to nor interchangeable with a
candidate’s qualifications. That is true, so far as it goes, but (for the
reasons just discussed) it does not show that procedural hurdles are
not qualifications necessary “to seek and hold” office, OCGA § 21-2-
6 (b)-(c).
In short, our conclusion — that the “qualifications” referenced
in OCGA § 21-2-6 includes both the legally specified prerequisites
for holding office and the procedural requirements necessary to seek
with “registered” and/or “qualified” to narrow all registered voters to just those
able to vote in a particular election. See OCGA §§ 21-2-132 (h) (1); 21-2-153
(a.1) (1); 21-2-170 (b); 21-2-211. And because of that, it is used in various places
throughout the Elections Code for other things like tabulating the number of
signatures needed for qualifying petitions. See OCGA §§ 21-2-132 (h) (1); 21-2-
170 (b); 21-2-180. But, as with candidates, “eligible” is also sometimes used to
refer to the potential of being entitled to vote at some future time upon
fulfilling procedural requirements. See OCGA § 21-2-221.2 (b) (5).
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office — fits comfortably with the overall usage of that and related
terms throughout the Elections Code.
(c) Thus, OCGA § 21-2-6’s reference to the qualifications for
seeking and holding office is best read to include all pre-requisites
— including the procedural requirements to seek office — not just
the traits required to hold it.
That conclusion is enough to resolve this case. It is undisputed
that Williams did not qualify for the election through the Democratic
primary in the time prescribed by law. See OCGA § 21-2-154 (setting
the time for qualifying in a partisan primary); OCGA § 21-2-130
(describing the general pathways to qualify for an election). And
because Georgia law allows a political party to substitute one
candidate for another only after the original candidate has secured
the nomination, Williams could not qualify as a substitute
candidate. See OCGA § 21-2-134 (a), (b) (1). The Board’s only real
counterargument is that nothing in the Election Code prohibited
them from doing so. But this misunderstands the nature of the
Board’s power. The Board does not generally have power to do
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whatever is not prohibited; rather, the Board has only that power
granted to it by law. See OCGA § 21-2-40 (b); Glustrom v. State, 206
Ga. 734, 738 (58 SE2d 534) (1950) (“An administrative agency of
government . . . can have only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it[.]”).
Unfettered substitution of candidates is not one of those powers.
Thus, Williams did not “qualify for [the] election” under OCGA
§ 21-2-130, and he is not “qualified to seek and hold the public office”
of Chief Magistrate of Douglas County. See OCGA 21-2-6 (b)-(c). The
superior court erred in holding otherwise.
3. Williams and the Board also urge us to affirm the judgment
below under the “right for any reason” rule, arguing that Camp has
not shown that his “substantial rights” were prejudiced within the
meaning of the statute’s remedial section. See OCGA § 21-2-6 (e).
Camp responds that his substantial rights have been prejudiced
because the Superior Court’s mistaken reading of the statute made
a difference in the outcome of his challenge. We agree.
Code section 21-2-6 (e) provides that “[t]he [reviewing] court
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may reverse or modify the decision [of the county elections and
registration board] if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions
of the superintendent are” unlawful on one of several specified
bases. See also OCGA § 21-2-5 (companion statute for the
qualifications of candidates for federal and state office); OCGA § 50-
13-19 (h) (similar standard for judicial review of administrative
agency decisions). Although our past cases on the subject have
generally involved the right to seek elected office, see Handel v.
Powell, 284 Ga. 550, 553 n.3 (670 SE2d 62) (2008); City of Greenville
v. Bray, 284 Ga. 641, 641-642 (670 SE2d 98) (2008), the statute itself
is not so limited.
Georgia law recognizes voters’ “interest in having the public
offices in their community held by legally qualified persons[.]” Lilly
v. Heard, 295 Ga. 399, 404-405 (2) (c) (761 SE2d 46) (2014) (citing
OCGA § 9-6-60 (a “person” interested in a public office may seek a
writ of quo warranto “to inquire into the right of any person to any
public office”), and McCullers v. Williamson, 221 Ga. 358, 360 (1)
21
(144 SE2d 911) (1965) (holding that residents and taxpayers of
Walton County had a sufficient “interest” in the offices of the local
board of education to give them standing to file a quo warranto
action)). No one doubts that a candidate has a substantial interest
in running for office, but electors have a substantial interest, too.
The Elections Code requires that candidates be duly qualified to run
for office, and OCGA § 21-2-6 is an express vehicle to vindicate
voters’ interest in ensuring that is so. Any other conclusion would
flatly contradict the General Assembly’s decision to give “any elector
who is eligible to vote” for a candidate the power to “challenge the
qualifications of [that] candidate[.]” OCGA § 21-2-6 (b).
Williams and the Board argue that we have described interests
like the one Camp attempts to vindicate here as a “public . . . as
opposed to a private right.” Lilly, 295 Ga. at 405 (2) (c). True enough.
But Lilly said so only in the context of explaining that one such
challenge had preclusive effect on a subsequent similar challenge to
the same candidate. Because the interest in qualified candidates is
common to the political community as a whole, voters “have an
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identity of interests” making them “in privity” for purposes of res
judicata. Id. at 404-405 (2) (c). That is all that Lilly meant by “public
right.”
Nothing about Lilly’s holding means that voters, as
individuals, do not have an interest sufficient for vindication under
this statute — quite the opposite. The first challenger in Lilly was
himself an individual voter — and his individual assertion of the
public right was both permissible (the relevant point here) and had
preclusive effect on the second set of challengers (the key point in
Lilly). Id. at 400 (1), 404-405 (2) (c). Indeed, we have held in other
contexts that voting rights are individually cognizable for litigation
purposes, even if they are shared among the general public. See
Manning v. Upshaw, 204 Ga. 324, 326-327 (2) (49 SE2d 874) (1948)
(plaintiff, as a “citizen and a voter” of Alpharetta, may maintain a
petition for mandamus to compel the mayor and city council
members to call for an election to elect their successors: “[i]t cannot
be said that this is not a personal right, the denial of which would
be an injury as an infringement of that right”).
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Thus, Camp, as an elector of Douglas County, has such a
substantial right — and the superintendent’s legally erroneous
decision to allow Williams to remain on the ballot prejudiced that
right. We therefore reverse the decision of the superior court, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.
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BETHEL, Justice, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in full.
I write separately to note and address a September 28, 2022,
filing in this Court by the Board and Kidd, which they styled as a
“Notice to Court.” While acknowledging that the information
contained therein is not part of the record in the case and thus does
not provide a basis for the Court’s decision, the Notice indicates that
before placing Williams on the ballot, the Board sought guidance
from the Elections Division of the Georgia Secretary of State’s office,
and was advised that “allowing . . . Williams’s candidacy was the
appropriate course of action given the novel situation and lack of
clear guidance in state statutes.” The Notice states that “[t]he Board
therefore took its obligations seriously . . . .”
I accept the representations made by the Board and Kidd
through their counsel (who are officers of the Court) and appreciate
the difficulty that government agencies often have in the absence of
a statute or court decision expressly on point. I also trust that the
Court’s opinion in this case will provide sufficient guidance in any
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future such situation and will reinforce that, for a government entity
whose authority on the relevant point is purely a creature of statute,
the absence of statutory authority is the absence of legal authority
to act.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs, Presiding
Justice Peterson, Justice Warren, and Justice Colvin join in this
concurrence.
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