Dillard Land Investments, LLC v. Fulton County , 295 Ga. 515 ( 2014 )


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  • In the Supreme Court of Georgia
    Decided: July 11, 2014
    S13G1582. DILLARD LAND INVESTMENTS, LLC v. FULTON COUNTY.
    NAHMIAS, Justice.
    We granted certiorari to decide whether a condemnor may voluntarily
    dismiss a condemnation action, without the consent of the court or the
    condemnee, after a special master has entered his award valuing the property at
    issue but before the condemnor has paid the amount of the award into the court
    registry or to the condemnee. We conclude that a condemnor is not entitled to
    voluntarily dismiss a condemnation action unilaterally once the special master
    renders his award, and we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the
    contrary.
    1.    On January 18, 2012, the Fulton County Commission adopted a
    resolution declaring that the County needed more than 12 acres of land on
    Hollywood Road for the expansion of library facilities. The resolution said that
    negotiations to purchase the property from its owner, appellant Dillard Land
    Investments, LLC (“Dillard”), had thus far failed, and authorized the filing of
    a lawsuit using the “special master” method of condemnation to acquire the
    property if the negotiations continued to falter. See Special Master Act of 1957,
    Ga. L. 1957, p. 387 (codified as amended at OCGA 22-2-100 to 22-2-114).1 On
    February 24, 2012, the County filed a petition for condemnation, alleging that
    “all questions of necessity and public convenience with respect to said
    expansion and the necessity of acquiring the land herein described have been
    determined” by the County and that the County had “provided, appropriated and
    made available sufficient funds to pay the adequate and just compensation . . .
    that may be awarded by this Court.”
    On March 27, the trial court appointed a special master, and on April 27,
    Dillard filed an acknowledgment of service. After a May 10 hearing, which was
    not transcribed, the special master filed an award indicating that he had “heard
    evidence under oath, both oral and documentation [sic],” and finding that the
    actual market value of the property was $5,187,500. On May 15, Dillard filed
    1
    The special master method is one of the three primary Georgia statutory procedures for
    condemning property. The other two are the much older “assessors” method, see Ga. L. 1894, p. 95
    (codified as amended at OCGA §§ 22-2-1 to 22-2-86), which is discussed below, and the
    “declaration of taking” method, see Ga. L. 1961, p. 517 (codified as amended at OCGA §§ 32-3-4
    to 32-3-20). See Windsor v. City of Atlanta, 
    287 Ga. 334
    , 334 n.1 (695 SE2d 576) (2010).
    2
    its answer, defenses, and counterclaims to the County’s condemnation petition.2
    On May 16, the trial court entered a judgment declaring that the property was
    “necessary for the functioning of [the County] and is for a public use”; vesting
    title to the property in the County upon its payment of the $5,187,500 award into
    the court registry; and directing the County and Dillard to evenly split the
    special master’s fees and costs.
    The County did not pay the award into the registry. Instead, on May 18,
    the County filed a voluntary dismissal of the condemnation action. See OCGA
    § 9-11-41 (a).3 On June 12, Dillard filed a motion to vacate the County’s
    2
    Dillard alleged that the County agreed to buy the property in June 2011 for a certain price
    but then breached the agreement and instituted the condemnation action to acquire the property for
    a lower amount. Dillard sought a judgment for just and adequate compensation plus damages “for
    abuse and misuse of eminent domain powers, breach of contract and bad faith, including an award
    of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.”
    3
    OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) says:
    (a)     Voluntary dismissal; effect:
    (1)    By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of subsection
    (e) of Code Section 9-11-23, Code Section 9-11-66, and any statute,
    an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff, without order or
    permission of court:
    (A)     By filing a written notice of dismissal at any time before the
    first witness is sworn; or
    (B)     By filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
    have appeared in the action.
    (2)    By order of court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this
    subsection, an action shall not be dismissed upon the plaintiff’s
    motion except upon order of the court and upon the terms and
    3
    voluntary dismissal, and on June 15, the County filed a motion to vacate the
    court’s judgment on the special master’s award. After a July 17 hearing, the
    trial court issued an order on August 14 granting Dillard’s motion on the ground
    that the County could not voluntarily dismiss the action without the consent of
    the court or the condemnee once the special master entered his value award.
    Also on August14, the court issued an order denying the County’s motion on the
    ground that the court’s entry of a judgment on the award was premature but not
    void. This order abrogated the prior judgment, authorized the parties to file any
    non-value objections to the award within 13 days after service of the order, and
    indicated that the court would thereafter enter a new judgment. Both August 14
    orders included a finding that neither party had filed an appeal for a jury trial
    under OCGA § 22-2-112 (a) to dispute the amount of the award and that the
    time to file such an appeal had expired. On August 23, 2012, the trial court
    issued a certificate of immediate review.
    conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
    pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him or her of the
    plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against
    the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
    for independent adjudication by the court.
    (3)   Effect. A dismissal under this subsection is without prejudice, except
    that the filing of a second notice of dismissal operates as an
    adjudication upon the merits.
    4
    The Court of Appeals then granted the County’s application for an
    interlocutory appeal and reversed. See Fulton County v. Dillard Land Invs.,
    LLC, 
    322 Ga. App. 344
    (744 SE2d 880) (2013). The Court of Appeals began
    its analysis by focusing on OCGA § 22-1-12, a statute enacted in 2006 as part
    of the Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection Act, Ga. L.
    2006, p. 39, which entitles property owners to recover their attorney fees and
    other expenses when a condemnor abandons a condemnation action.4 See
    
    Dillard, 322 Ga. App. at 345
    . The court then examined the only prior reported
    decision citing § 22-1-12, Gramm v. City of Stockbridge, 
    297 Ga. App. 165
    (676 SE2d 818) (2009).5 The court recognized that the condemnation action in
    4
    OCGA § 22-1-12 says:
    In all actions where a condemning authority exercises the power of eminent domain,
    the court having jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted by a condemnor to acquire
    real property by condemnation shall award the owner of any right or title to or
    interest in such real property such sum as will in the opinion of the court reimburse
    such owner for his or her reasonable costs and expenses, including reasonable
    attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of the
    condemnation proceedings, if:
    (1)      The final judgment is that the condemning authority cannot acquire the real
    property by condemnation; or
    (2)      The proceeding is abandoned by the condemning authority.
    5
    In Gramm, the special master filed his award, the trial court entered judgment on the
    award, the condemnor deposited the award into the registry, and the funds were disbursed. 
    See 297 Ga. App. at 165
    . The condemnee filed a timely appeal for a jury trial on value, see OCGA § 22-2-
    112 (a), but before trial the condemnor determined that it no longer needed the property and filed a
    notice of voluntary dismissal. 
    See 297 Ga. App. at 165
    . The condemnee filed a motion to set aside
    5
    Gramm was filed prior to the effective date of § 22-1-12, making that statute
    inapplicable to that case, but nevertheless found the decision in Gramm
    “instructive” for this case. 
    Dillard, 322 Ga. App. at 346
    n.4. Noting that, unlike
    the condemnor in Gramm, Fulton County did not pay the special master’s award
    or take title to the land for any period of time, and filed its voluntary dismissal
    only two days after the premature entry of the trial court’s judgment, the Court
    of Appeals held that “[u]nder these circumstances, the trial court erred by
    concluding that Fulton County could not dismiss its condemnation action”
    unilaterally. 
    Dillard, 322 Ga. App. at 347
    . Finally, the court rebuffed the cases
    Dillard cited as “inapposite,” since those cases were “decided under the
    assessor’s [sic] method of condemnation, and they all preceded OCGA § 22-1-
    12,” adding that “assessors’ rulings on condemnation cases [are] self-executing”
    whereas “the legislature required that special master’s awards be adopted by the
    trial judge.” 
    Dillard, 322 Ga. App. at 347
    .
    We granted Dillard’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
    the voluntary dismissal, which the trial court denied, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground
    that title to the property vested in the condemnor upon entry of the court’s judgment and payment
    of the special master’s award, see OCGA §§ 22-2-107 (g), 22-2-110 (b), 22-2-111, precluding the
    condemnor from voluntarily dismissing the action. See 
    Gramm, 297 Ga. App. at 166
    .
    6
    2.      (a)     It has long been established that a condemnor may not
    voluntarily dismiss a condemnation action unilaterally after the assessors have
    made their award as to the value of the property at issue, that is, the amount of
    just compensation that the condemnor must pay the property owner for taking
    the property. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cent. of Ga. R., 
    169 Ga. 269
    , 270 (
    149 S.E. 884
    ) (1929); Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Mercer, 
    123 Ga. App. 38
    , 43-44 (179
    SE2d 275) (1970) (citing additional cases). The County argues, and the Court
    of Appeals held, that this principle does not apply to this case because the
    special master method of condemnation differs from the assessors method in
    that the condemnation action does not end with the special master’s filing of his
    award determining the amount of compensation due to the condemnee, since
    OCGA § 22-2-111 requires the superior court to enter a judgment on the award
    after addressing any non-value objections.6
    6
    OCGA § 22-2-111 says:
    Upon the entry of the award of the special master or the special master panel, if such
    a panel exists, and the presentation of the award to the judge of the superior court, the
    judge shall enter a proper order and judgment of the court condemning the described
    property or other interest in rem to the use of the condemnor upon the condemnor’s
    paying into the registry of the court the amount provided in the award.
    By contrast, where no appeal to the superior court is filed in an assessors method case, the
    court does not enter a judgment on the assessors’ award; instead, within ten days, the award is “filed
    7
    It is true that § 22-2-111 requires the court in all special master
    condemnation cases to enter a formal judgment condemning the property to the
    condemnor’s use, something that is required for an assessors award only if there
    is an appeal to the court either to hold a jury trial on value or to issue a ruling on
    any non-value questions of law that the assessors did not refer to the court
    before entering their award. See OCGA § 22-2-40 (c); 
    Thomas, 169 Ga. at 272
    .7
    and recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county where the property . . . is
    situated.” OCGA § 22-2-65. The assessors’ award is nevertheless treated as a “judgment rendered
    by a tribunal which is competent to fix the rights and liabilities of the parties to the proceedings with
    reference to the matters and things involved.” 
    Thomas, 169 Ga. at 271
    .
    7
    OCGA § 22-2-40 says:
    (a)     The condemnor and the condemnee shall each select an assessor, and the two
    assessors so selected shall select a third assessor. No person shall be selected
    as an assessor unless such person is a real estate appraiser . . . .
    (b)     The assessors . . . shall have no authority to decide questions of law
    including, but not limited to, issues of compensability.
    (c)     The assessors . . . shall have the authority to refer questions of law to the
    appropriate superior court prior to entering an award. Neither party shall be
    prohibited from appealing a question of law to the superior court after the
    entry of the assessor’s award.
    Thus, assessors, who are real estate appraisers, are prohibited from deciding questions of law, while
    special masters are competent attorneys appointed by the court who are authorized to decide legal
    questions in the first instance. See OCGA § 22-2-103 (“The special master . . . shall be appointed
    by the judge or judges of the superior courts of each judicial circuit and shall discharge the duties
    provided for in this article. . . . The special master so appointed must be a competent attorney at law,
    be of good standing in his profession, and have at least three years’ experience in the practice of law.
    His relation and accountability to the court shall be that of an auditor or master in the general
    practice existing in this state. . . .”); City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Champion, 
    244 Ga. 620
    , 622 (261
    SE2d 343) (1979).
    8
    Whether rendered by assessors or by a special master, however, the award
    determining the value of the property has the same dispositive effect on that
    fundamental issue in the condemnation action. Under both methods, the value
    award can be changed only by a jury, if either party files a timely and proper
    appeal for a de novo jury determination of value. See OCGA §§ 22-2-82
    (assessors method), 22-2-113 (c) (special master method). The court has no
    discretion to change the value awarded under either method. If there are no non-
    value legal objections, the court takes no action as to an assessors’ award or
    simply makes a special master’s award the judgment of the court. See OCGA
    § 22-2-111 (“Upon the entry of the award of the special master . . . and the
    presentation of the award to the judge of the superior court, the judge shall enter
    a proper order and judgment of the court condemning the described property . . .
    upon the condemnor’s paying into the registry of the court the amount provided
    in the award.”). Moreover, the Special Master Act does not purport to affect the
    operation of the voluntary dismissal rule of the Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-
    11-41 (a) (1).
    (b)    Since the original enactment of the Civil Practice Act and §
    9-11-41 (a) in 1966, this Court has repeatedly held that
    9
    “the plaintiff’s right to dismiss cannot be exercised after a verdict,
    or a finding by the judge, which is equivalent thereto, has been
    reached . . . . The principle at the foundation of these decisions is
    that, after a party has taken the chances of litigation, and knows
    what is the actual result reached in the suit by the tribunal which is
    to pass upon it, he cannot, by exercising his right of voluntary
    dismissal, deprive the opposite party of the victory thus gained.”
    Cooper v. Rosser, 
    233 Ga. 388
    , 388-389 (211 SE2d 303) (1974) (quoting
    Peoples Bank of Talbotton v. Exchange Bank of Macon, 
    119 Ga. 366
    , 368 (
    46 S.E. 416
    ) (1904)).8 See, e.g., Wall v. Thurman, 
    283 Ga. 533
    , 533 (661 SE2d 549)
    (2008) (“In numerous cases, we have held that, under our voluntary dismissal
    statute, OCGA § 9-11-41 (a), a trial court’s announcement of its decision on the
    merits of the case precludes a voluntary dismissal.”); Lakes v. Marriott Corp.,
    
    264 Ga. 475
    , 476-477 (1994) (explaining that, “in addition to the express limits
    in OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) regarding the timing of dismissal and regarding cases
    in which a counterclaim has been asserted,” the right to voluntarily dismiss a
    8
    We generally had held the same for more than a century before the Civil Practice Act was
    enacted, see, e.g., Merchants’ Bank of Macon v. Rawls, 
    7 Ga. 191
    , 200 (1849), although there were
    a few rulings to the contrary, see, e.g., Macon, Dublin & Savannah R. Co. v. Leslie, 
    148 Ga. 524
    ,
    524 (
    97 S.E. 438
    ) (1918) (“It is not error to permit a plaintiff to dismiss his case after the trial judge
    has announced in open court the direction of a verdict for the defendant, and while the verdict
    directed is being written, but before it is actually signed.”). The contrary cases were formally
    overruled or disapproved in Jones v. Burton, 
    238 Ga. 394
    (233 SE2d 367) (1977), which reiterated
    that a plaintiff could not voluntarily dismiss its case unilaterally “after [it] had ascertained the factual
    result reached by the fact-finder,” even if the verdict or judgment had not yet been formally entered.
    
    Id. at 396.
    10
    case unilaterally has always been subject to a prohibition on its exercise, “even
    prior to trial, where there has already been an announcement by the court of its
    intention to rule in favor of the defendant” (footnote and citation omitted)).9
    Under these precedents, it is the plaintiff’s knowledge of the “actual, as
    opposed to possible, conclusion of the litigation [that] precludes filing a
    voluntary dismissal.” Leary v. Julian, 
    225 Ga. App. 472
    , 473 (484 SE2d 75)
    (1997). But that does not require the finding, judgment, or decision to have
    been memorialized or filed in a written order; the oral announcement of a
    dispositive ruling in open court, for example, ends the time for filing a unilateral
    voluntary dismissal. See 
    id. at 474
    (holding that the parties’ announcement of
    their settlement in open court, which the court adopted in an oral ruling,
    precluded a subsequent voluntary dismissal). See also Kilby v. Keener, 
    249 Ga. 667
    , 668 (293 SE2d 318) (1982) (“This principle also has been applied to
    9
    As mentioned in footnote 2 above, Dillard filed counterclaims to the County’s petition
    before the County filed its notice of voluntary dismissal, to which Dillard formally objected. OCGA
    § 9-11-41 (a) (2) provides that, “[i]f a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
    service upon him or her of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against
    the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication
    by the court.” See Avnet, Inc. v. Wylie Labs., Inc., 
    265 Ga. 716
    , 718 (461 SE2d 865) (1995)
    (discussing this provision). Because we conclude that the County was not authorized to unilaterally
    dismiss this case under § 9-11-41 (a) (1) following the special master’s award, we need not decide
    whether any of Dillard’s counterclaims also might have precluded a unilateral dismissal.
    11
    attempts to dismiss made by plaintiffs between the time when the court
    announces judgment and the time judgment actually is entered. The principle
    we apply in this case is not new.” (citation omitted)). Importantly, the principle
    applies even if the decision is on the merits of only one of the claims involved
    in the case. See, e.g., Groves v. Groves, 
    250 Ga. 459
    , 460 (298 SE2d 506)
    (1983) (declining to recognize a voluntary dismissal filed in a divorce and
    custody action after the announcement by the trial court of its decision regarding
    temporary child custody); Guillebeau v. Yeargin, 
    254 Ga. 490
    , 492 (330 SE2d
    585) (1985) (holding that the award of summary judgment to one of three
    defendants was a ruling on the merits of the case that cut off the plaintiff’s right
    to voluntarily dismiss unilaterally). See also Moore v. Moore, 
    253 Ga. 211
    , 212
    (317 SE2d 529) (1984) (holding that a plaintiff who obtains partial summary
    judgment in her favor “cannot then dismiss the complaint so as to deprive the
    court of jurisdiction over issues preserved by the order granting partial summary
    judgment”).
    The holdings in Groves and Guillebeau were criticized. See 
    Groves, 250 Ga. at 460-461
    (Gregory, J., dissenting); 
    Guillebeau, 254 Ga. at 493
    (Gregory,
    J., dissenting). But the principle supporting those holdings is sensible and has
    12
    been applied consistently by this Court since the enactment of the Civil Practice
    Act nearly a half-century ago, and the General Assembly has not seen fit to
    abrogate those precedents, even when repeatedly amending § 9-11-41 (a) to
    advance the deadline for a unilateral voluntary dismissal without a prior merits
    announcement. Compare Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (a) (allowing voluntary
    dismissal “at any time before verdict”), with Ga. L. 1985, p. 546, §1 (amending
    the rule to make the deadline “the submission of the case to the jury”), Ga. L.
    1986, p. 816 (amending the rule to make the deadline when “the plaintiff rests
    his case”), and Ga. L. 2003, p. 820, § 4 (amending the rule to make the deadline
    when “the first witness is sworn”). We therefore adhere to our precedents.
    The principle expressed in our general voluntary dismissal cases accords
    with and undergirds the cases refusing to allow the unilateral voluntary
    dismissal of a condemnation action after the assessors have rendered their value
    decision as the fact-finders in the action. See, e.g., 
    Thomas, 169 Ga. at 272
    ;
    
    Mercer, 123 Ga. App. at 42
    . And the principle applies with equal force to
    condemnation actions under the special master method, once the special master
    has rendered his value decision as the fact-finder in the action – a decision on
    the merits of the case that the superior court has no discretion to alter. See
    13
    OCGA § 22-2-111. The plaintiff condemnor may voluntarily dismiss its action
    without the agreement of the condemnee or the permission of the court before
    the special master announces his value award, even if the result appears
    preordained from what happened at the valuation hearing or from other
    developments in the case. See 
    Lakes, 264 Ga. at 478
    . After the special master
    has announced his award, the condemnor may appeal for a de novo jury trial on
    value or file non-value objections in the superior court – neither of which the
    County did here. What the condemnor may not do, once it knows how the key
    issue in its case will be resolved – the value the special master, and necessarily
    then the court, will place on the property being condemned – is to “‘deprive the
    opposite party of the victory thus gained’” by voluntarily dismissing the action
    unilaterally and without prejudice, allowing the condemnor to re-litigate the
    same issue in a newly filed action in hopes of a better result. See 
    Cooper, 233 Ga. at 389
    (citation omitted).
    The County contends that the special master’s award is not final or
    enforceable at the time it is announced, and that the property is not deemed
    “taken,” with title vesting in the condemnor, until the condemnor pays the award
    to the condemnee or into the court registry. See Orr v. Ga. Transmission Corp.,
    14
    
    281 Ga. 754
    , 757 (642 SE2d 809) (2007). But enforceability of the value award
    is not the question presented. The relevant question is when a plaintiff is
    entitled to dismiss the action without the approval of the court and over the
    objection of the opposing party. And the answer to that question, our precedents
    demonstrate, is before an actual finding, decision, or judgment on the merits of
    the action becomes known to the plaintiff, not when the ruling becomes
    enforceable by the defendant. After all, when a court orally announces its
    summary judgment decision, that ruling is not yet final or enforceable, but a
    plaintiff nevertheless cannot thereafter voluntarily dismiss his action
    unilaterally, see 
    Guillebeau, 254 Ga. at 491-492
    – and a special master’s value
    award is more binding on the court than its own oral announcement of how it
    expects to rule. See OCGA § 22-2-111.
    (c)   The Court of Appeals erred in deeming the assessors cases
    inapposite and relying instead on OCGA § 22-1-12. As noted previously, the
    precedents involving voluntary dismissal after assessors awards in
    condemnation cases accord with the precedents on voluntary dismissal in
    general, and the principle expressed in those cases applies equally to voluntary
    dismissal after a special master award. OCGA § 22-1-12 does nothing to change
    15
    that principle; indeed, it would be surprising if § 22-1-12 did so, since it was
    enacted as part of the 2006 “Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private Property
    Protection Act,” which expanded property owners’ protections against
    condemnation rather than limiting those safeguards. See 
    Gramm, 297 Ga. App. at 167
    .
    The new statute says nothing about when condemnors may abandon a
    condemnation proceeding. See 
    id. The General
    Assembly did not shorten or
    lengthen the time for a condemnor to file a voluntary dismissal, which remains
    governed by § 9-11-41 and this Court’s precedents. What the General Assembly
    did with § 22-1-12 is to reallocate the costs imposed on the condemnor and the
    condemnee if the condemnor abandons a condemnation action at any point. If
    entitled to voluntarily dismiss unilaterally and without prejudice, plaintiffs
    including condemnors generally may do so even if the dismissal is alleged to be
    in bad faith and causes “inconvenience and irritation to the defendant.” 
    Lakes, 264 Ga. at 476
    . But unlike most plaintiffs, condemnors that abandon their
    actions must now pay the property owner’s reasonable costs and expenses
    actually incurred because of the condemnation proceedings, including attorney,
    appraisal, and engineering fees. See OCGA § 22-1-12.
    16
    Moreover, Gramm is fully consistent with our decision today. It is clearly
    too late for a condemnor to voluntarily dismiss its action unilaterally after “the
    condemnor has obtained a condemnation judgment; the award has been paid and
    disbursed; the condemnee has filed no exceptions to the taking; and the
    condemnor has retained possession of the property for a significant period of
    
    time.” 297 Ga. App. at 168
    . But it does not follow that voluntary dismissal is
    allowed at any point before all of those events occur, as the Court of Appeals
    indicated in this case. Instead, our precedents establish that the relevant event
    is when the condemnor knows what the value award will be, and that event
    occurred in this case before the County moved to dismiss its action. Once the
    special master announces his award, if the condemnor believes that the value
    placed on the property is too high, the only remedy is to appeal the award for a
    de novo jury determination of value under OCGA § 22-2-112, a remedy that the
    County did not pursue in this case.
    (d)   Finally, we address the County’s contention that it is “absurd”
    to limit the condemnor’s time to abandon an action brought under the special
    master method to the period before the special master renders his award, which
    in this case was six weeks after the County filed its action. The County,
    17
    however, decided when it was ready to seek condemnation of the property at
    issue, and it also decided to use the special master method, knowing that such
    a proceeding is required to move quickly. See OCGA §§ 22-2-101 (special
    master method is designed to be “quick”), 22-2-102 (same), 22-2-102.1 (same),
    22-2-107 (g) (“The purpose of this [special master method is] to quicken and
    simplify the condemnation proceeding . . . .”). There is nothing “absurd” about
    requiring the County to live with the consequences of those litigation decisions,
    as other plaintiffs in civil actions do, after a dispositive ruling on value was
    announced in the defendant’s favor.
    Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
    18