Pindling v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: April 5, 2021
S21A0084. PINDLING v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
Michael Pindling was convicted of malice murder and other
crimes in connection with the shooting death of Robert Pett.1 On
1 Pett was found dead on July 13, 2013. In September 2013, a Lowndes
County grand jury indicted Pindling and Deron Wallace for malice murder,
felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, armed
robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and two
counts of theft by taking. The grand jury also indicted Kathryn Cortez for
armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
After Pindling and Wallace’s joint trial in May 2014, a jury found Pindling
guilty on all counts and Wallace guilty on all counts except malice murder. On
July 27, 2014, the trial court sentenced Pindling to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for malice murder, a consecutive life term for armed
robbery, and a consecutive five-year term for the firearm count; the trial court
initially entered sentences on the theft counts but later vacated the sentences
for these counts, and the remaining counts were vacated by operation of law or
merged for sentencing purposes. Pindling filed a motion for a new trial on July
14, 2014. Pindling filed a notice of appeal before his motion was decided, and
we dismissed his appeal as premature. Pindling thereafter amended his motion
for new trial, which the trial court denied on December 8, 2017, following a
hearing. Pindling timely appealed, and his case was docketed to this Court’s
term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
appeal, Pindling argues that the trial court plainly erred when
instructing the jury that a single witness’s testimony was sufficient
to prove a fact without also instructing the jury on the requirement
that an accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated. We agree and
reverse.2
1. The evidence at trial showed the following. 3 Pett met Deron
Wallace and Pindling in the ammunition section of an Academy
Sports store on July 2, 2013. On the afternoon of July 13, Pett and
his sister drove to a location where he said he was to meet some men
from New York that he had previously met at Academy Sports. On
the way to the meeting, Pett received a call from a woman (later
identified as Kathryn Cortez) saying that the meeting would be
delayed. Pett and his sister returned home. Pett left again later that
2 Pindling also enumerates another error. Given our reversal of his
conviction, we need not decide that other claim today because it is unlikely to
reoccur on retrial.
3 Because this case turns on whether an error likely affected the outcome
of the trial, we present the evidence as reasonable jurors would have viewed it,
rather than in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts.
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night but did not tell his sister where he was going. She never saw
him alive again.
That night, a police officer found Pett’s dead body on the back
porch of a house at 213 Walnut Street in Valdosta. Pett was shot
three times, once in the shoulder and twice in the back, and died as
a result of the gunshot wounds. One police officer examined the
contents of Pett’s cell phone and found text messages directing Pett
to the area; phone records showed that those text messages came
from a phone number linked to Wallace. The phone records also
showed a series of calls and text messages exchanged between
Wallace’s phone and Pett’s throughout July 13, and that Wallace’s
phone number made several calls to different rental car agencies on
July 12.
Further investigation revealed that Pindling and Wallace
visited a rental car agency on July 12, and Pindling completed an
application for a rental car, which Cortez paid for in part. Police
officers obtained and executed a search warrant for the address
Pindling listed on the application. Police officers found, among other
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things, a gun that belonged to Pett in a rear living room that
connected to Pindling’s bedroom; police officers found a
disassembled, silver-colored handgun hidden in a chimney in
Pindling’s bedroom. The gun recovered from Pindling’s bedroom
was later reassembled for ballistics testing and discovered to be the
same gun used to shoot and kill Pett.
Police tracked the rental car using the vehicle’s GPS device,
noting that the vehicle traveled to New York. Police conducted a stop
of the car once it returned to Georgia. Inside the car were Pindling,
Wallace, Cortez, and another woman from New York. Police
searched the rental car but did not find any of Pett’s possessions.
Pindling and Wallace were arrested. Wallace waived his Miranda4
rights and agreed to speak to a detective. Wallace admitted being
involved in crimes against Pett, but claimed that he was not the
shooter and did not know anyone else was going to shoot Pett.
Cortez was also arrested following the traffic stop but was soon
released. She later agreed to be interviewed by the police, initially
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
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denied participating in the armed robbery of Pett, but later admitted
that she was the “bait” that lured Pett to the back of the house for
the purpose of robbing him. Cortez said that she took direction from
Wallace.
Cortez provided more details about the crimes at the joint trial
of Pindling and Wallace, testifying as follows. Soon after Pindling
and Wallace began working at the same restaurant where Cortez
worked, she began a relationship with Wallace. Pindling and
Wallace said they were both from New York and described
themselves as cousins. They lived at the same property address.
Cortez said that Wallace lived in quarters separate from the main
house that Pindling shared with his father. Cortez had seen Wallace
and Pindling shoot a silver-colored gun at their residence.
Cortez also testified that to help pay for their planned trip to
New York, she, Pindling, and Wallace devised a plan to rob Pett,
who previously had sold marijuana to Pindling and Wallace. Wallace
called Pett under the guise of purchasing marijuana and directed
Pett to meet at an abandoned house located at 213 Walnut Street.
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Cortez, Wallace, and Pindling went to the location, but when they
saw a woman standing nearby, they decided to cancel the meeting.
Cortez talked to Pett, but did not give him another time to meet. The
trio returned home, and Pindling went to the liquor store. Later,
Wallace called Pett to meet, and Cortez, Wallace, and Pindling again
went to the abandoned house on Walnut Street.
Cortez waited in front of the house for Pett and directed him to
the back porch; Wallace was on the back porch waiting and Pindling
was inside the house. Pett gave her marijuana, and as she looked at
it, she heard gunshots. Cortez ran back to the car. Wallace took
Pett’s bag that contained Pett’s wallet and a handgun and left the
scene with Cortez and Pindling. Cortez did not see who shot Pett,
but assumed that Pindling was the shooter because Wallace did not
have a gun and Pindling was the only other person with them. When
Pindling returned to the car, he said that he “kicked [Pett’s] lights
out because he was making noises.”
After leaving the scene, the trio returned to Pindling and
Wallace’s residence. Cortez and Wallace sat in the living room
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connected to Pindling’s bedroom, while Pindling hid the guns in his
bedroom and changed, placing his clothes and Pett’s wallet in a
trash bag. The trio left for New York; while there, Wallace would not
let Cortez talk to her mother privately. Cortez said initially that
both Pindling and Wallace threatened to kill her if she told anyone
what happened, but later testified that only Wallace had threatened
to kill her.
Pindling testified in his own defense. He said that Wallace
stayed in Pindling’s father’s house and was allowed to use Pindling’s
gun whenever he wanted. On July 13, Pindling had been drinking
liquor to celebrate his birthday and did not know that Wallace and
Cortez had been texting Pett. In the evening, Wallace asked for keys
to the rental car so he and Cortez could meet someone who owed
Cortez money. Pindling continued to drink, fell asleep, and was
awakened when Cortez and Wallace returned. Wallace and Cortez
said they got the money and were ready to leave for New York, and
Wallace gave Pindling’s gun back to Pindling. Before leaving for
New York, Pindling hid the gun, explaining that he did not want to
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take it to New York and did not want his father to find it. Pindling
claimed not to have seen Pett’s gun.
2. Pindling argues that the trial court plainly erred in failing
to instruct the jury on the need for an accomplice’s testimony to be
corroborated. Pindling asserts that the error affected the outcome of
his trial because Cortez was the sole testifying witness with personal
knowledge of the events that led to Pett’s death and was the only
witness who implicated Pindling as the shooter. We agree that the
trial court’s error requires reversal.
As Pindling concedes, because he did not request this
instruction and failed to object to its omission, his claim of error is
reviewed only for plain error. See Wilson v. State, 301 Ga. 689, 693
(3) (804 SE2d 54) (2017). To establish plain error, Pindling must
demonstrate that (1) the failure to give the instruction was not
affirmatively waived, (2) the failure was an obvious error beyond
reasonable dispute, (3) the error likely affected the outcome of the
proceedings, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Hood v.
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State, 303 Ga. 420, 425-426 (2) (a) (811 SE2d 392) (2018). “Satisfying
all four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should be.” Id. at
426 (2) (a) (citation omitted).
The State rightfully concedes that Pindling has satisfied the
first two prongs of the plain error test, in that it was a clear and
obvious error for the trial court to fail to give the accomplice-
corroboration instruction while giving the single-witness
instruction. The plain language of OCGA § 24-14-8 provides that in
“felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony
of a single witness shall not be sufficient” to establish a fact, but
“corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for
the testimony of a second witness[.]” Under this statute, if there is
evidence that could support a finding that a witness was an
accomplice to the crime, and that witness provides testimony that
directly links the defendant to the crime, it is a clear and obvious
error for the trial court to instruct the jury that the testimony of a
single witness is sufficient to establish a fact without also
instructing the jury that an accomplice’s testimony must be
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corroborated. See, e.g., Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 613 (2) (b) (837
SE2d 833) (2020); State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 240 (824 SE2d 317)
(2019). Here, the prosecutor relied heavily on the testimony of
Cortez, there was ample evidence from which the jury could have
found her to be an accomplice, and her testimony directly linked
Pindling to the crimes.
The parties dispute whether this error likely affected the
outcome of the trial. As Pindling points out, Cortez was the only
eyewitness who affirmatively linked him to the crimes and identified
him as the shooter. The State argues that Cortez’s testimony was
corroborated by Wallace’s statement, cell phone records, GPS
records, surveillance videos, eyewitness testimony, and forensic
evidence. But most of the evidence cited by the State corroborates
Cortez’s statements only as to her and Wallace’s involvement in the
crimes. And although it is not disputed that Pindling once met Pett
at an Academy Sports, Pett’s sister did not identify Pindling as one
of the men that Pett had planned to meet (but did not) several hours
before his death. Eyewitness testimony and other evidence do show
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that Pindling was with Wallace and Cortez for periods before and
after the crimes, but other than Cortez’s testimony, there was no
direct evidence ⸺ no cell phone records, forensic evidence, or
eyewitness testimony ⸺ placing Pindling at the scene of the murder.
The evidence cited by the State was legally sufficient to meet the
“slight” requirement for corroboration to support a finding that
Pindling was involved in the crimes against Pett. See Raines v.
State, 304 Ga. 582, 587-588 (2) (a) (820 SE2d 679) (2018) (explaining
that under Georgia statutory law, to sustain a conviction based on
accomplice testimony, the independent corroborating evidence only
has to be “slight” and can be entirely circumstantial). But that
evidence was far from overwhelming.
Because almost all of the evidence incriminating Pindling came
from Cortez, and the jury was never told that her testimony may
have required corroboration or instructed how to evaluate properly
the other evidence in this context, the outcome of the proceedings
was likely affected by the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on
the accomplice-corroboration requirement. See Doyle, 307 Ga. at
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613-614 (2) (a)-(b) (failure to give charge likely affected outcome of
the trial where the testimony of a witness who could be found to
have been an accomplice was the only eyewitness to identify the
defendant as a participant in the shooting, no other evidence placed
the defendant in the vicinity of the crimes, and independent
evidence was not strong enough to connect the defendant to the
crimes); Johnson, 305 Ga. at 241 (“[B]ecause virtually all of the
incriminating evidence flowed from [the accomplice], the outcome of
the trial court proceedings was likely affected by the trial court’s
failure to provide an accomplice corroboration charge to the jury[.]”
(punctuation omitted)); Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125, 131 (2) (786
SE2d 672) (2016) (the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice-
corroboration charge likely affected the outcome of the trial when
the accomplice “was the only witness who affirmatively identified
[the defendant] as the second man” inside the house where the
victim was robbed and shot); see also Finney v. State, ___ Ga. ___,
___ (3) (b) (__ SE2d ___) (Case No. S20A1469, decided March 1, 2021)
(reversing based on cumulative effect of evidentiary errors and
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failure to give accomplice-corroboration charge while giving the
single witness charge because the strongest evidence of guilt came
from accomplice’s hearsay statements that were improperly
admitted and the jury was effectively told it could find the defendant
guilty based on the accomplice’s statements alone).
Having found that the first three prongs of the plain error test
have been met, we must next decide whether the error affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See
Hood, 303 Ga. at 425-426 (2) (a). We have concluded in similar
circumstances that the failure to give the accomplice-corroboration
charge undermines the fairness of the proceedings. See Doyle, 307
Ga. at 615 (2) (b) (“Affirming [the defendant’s] conviction on this
record with a jury that was authorized to find him guilty solely on
[the accomplice’s] testimony would render the accomplice-
corroboration requirement meaningless.”). We reach the same
conclusion here. Because Pindling has established plain error, we
reverse.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
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