Boles v. State ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 2, 2023
S23A0171. BOLES v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Torres Boles appeals his convictions for felony murder and
other charges in connection with the death of his three-year-old
daughter, Andraia Boles.1 He argues on appeal that the evidence
Andraia was found dead on February 27, 2013, and on May 23, 2013, a
1
Liberty County grand jury indicted Boles and his wife, Candice Boles, who was
Andraia’s mother, in connection with the child’s death, charging them both
with malice murder (Count 1); felony murder based on cruelty to children in
the first degree (Count 2); cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 3);
cruelty to children in the second degree (Count 4); and contributing to the
deprivation of a minor, a misdemeanor (Count 6). Boles also was indicted
individually on a second count of cruelty to children in the first degree in
connection with an earlier incident involving Andraia (Count 5). He was tried
separately before a jury in September 2014 and found guilty of all counts
except malice murder (Count 1). Boles was sentenced as follows: Count 2 – life
in prison without the possibility of parole; Count 4 – ten years to run
consecutively to Count 2; Count 5 – twenty years to run consecutively to Counts
2 and 4; and Count 6 – twelve months to run concurrently with the other
sentences. The charge of cruelty to children in the first degree under Count 3
was merged into Count 2 for sentencing purposes. The charges against Candice
Boles are not a part of this appeal.
Boles filed a timely motion for new trial on October 8, 2014, which was
was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court
erred in admitting into evidence statements he made to “Ms.
Middleton,”2 a protective services investigator and case manager
with the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services
(“DFCS”) and to Renee Sylvester, a private-sector counselor hired by
DFCS in connection with the agency’s investigation into placing
Boles’s other daughter into foster care. 3 Boles asserts that the two
DFCS investigators were acting as agents of law enforcement when
they interviewed him and their failure to give him warnings under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966),
renders his statements inadmissible. We conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to support Boles’s convictions, there was no error in
the admission of Boles’s statement to Middleton, and any error in
amended on June 24, 2020. Boles waived a hearing on the motion, and the trial
court issued an order denying the motion on June 17, 2022. Boles appealed
that order on July 1, 2022, and the matter was docketed to the term of this
Court beginning in December 2022 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2 This witness introduced herself on the stand as “Ms. Middleton,” and
that is how she is listed and referred to by the trial judge and counsel in the
trial transcript.
3 Middleton and Sylvester are collectively referred to herein as the
“DFCS investigators.”
2
the admission of his statement to Sylvester was harmless, as such
evidence was cumulative of other, properly admitted evidence. We
therefore affirm.
1. The evidence at trial showed the following. 4 In February
2013, Boles and his wife, Candice Boles, lived in Hinesville with
their two daughters: D. B., who was four years old, and Andraia,
who was three. At 7:56 a.m. on the morning of February 27, 2013,
Boles placed a call to 911 to report that Andraia was not breathing
and had no pulse.
A first responder, who arrived on the scene a short time later,
testified that when she entered the house, she saw Andraia lying on
a blanket in the hallway just outside a bathroom. The carpet
underneath the blanket was “soaking wet.” The child had visible
bruising to her face, and her head and eyes were swollen. Andraia
was not breathing, had no pulse, and was cold to the touch. The first
4 Because we undertake a harmless-error analysis in Division 3 of this
opinion, we review the record in this case “de novo, and we weigh the evidence
as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so as opposed to viewing it
all in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Fletcher v. State, 303 Ga.
43, 47 (II) (810 SE2d 101) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).
3
responder and her partner began CPR, while they waited for an
ambulance to transport Andraia to the hospital. A paramedic who
arrived with the ambulance testified that he observed “one big
bruise” from Andraia’s cheekbones to the top of her head and said
that he was never able to detect any cardiac activity despite his
efforts to revive the child.
The emergency room physician who treated Andraia at the
hospital said that when the child arrived, she had obvious trauma,
with a lot of swelling and discoloration of the head and face, and no
vital signs. She was not moving, appeared lifeless, and had no
spontaneous respiration or heart tones. During the physician’s
examination of the child, he discovered other injuries to her body,
including to her buttocks. Andraia’s body temperature was 84º,
which the physician testified was “incompatible with life,” and the
child was pronounced dead at 8:30 a.m.
Meanwhile, Boles told Hinesville Police Department officers
who had responded to his 911 call that, after he woke up that
morning, he put Andraia on the toilet and then got ready for work.
4
He said Andraia was fine when he left the house, but his wife later
called him to say that Andraia was not breathing and that he should
come home. Boles said that he found his wife with Andraia when he
arrived home, and he could not understand what had happened.
At the house, police observed that the carpet was wet from the
bathroom into the living room. When an officer asked Boles about
the wet carpet, Boles replied that he had cleaned the carpet the
night before. The officer said that Boles kept repeating, “[M]y life is
over, my life is over.” Inside the bathroom, police located blood
splatter in the bathtub, and water and blood on the floor. There was
a bowl containing crackers and cereal on the back of the toilet and a
sippy cup. Blood samples taken from the bathtub, toilet, and
bathroom door, and from a man’s shoe found at the house were all
later determined to be a match for Andraia’s blood.
After receiving news that Andraia had died, the lead detective
relayed that information to Boles and told him that hospital staff
had discovered signs that the child had been abused. Boles admitted
that he sometimes gave his children spankings but said that no one
5
had given Andraia a spanking that morning. Boles agreed to a
request from the lead detective to go to the police station, and on the
way there, Boles told the lead detective that any scratch marks on
Andraia’s neck were self-inflicted,5 and the scab on her bottom was
from when they put Vaseline on her skin, along with a diaper, and
the skin came off. He said he did not recall what initially caused the
scab. The lead detective made audio recordings of his conversations
with Boles at the house and in the car, and those recordings were
played for the jury. 6
While the lead detective obtained information from other
officers, a different detective stayed with Boles in accordance with
Hinesville Police Department policy not to leave visitors alone in the
police station. The second detective did not ask Boles any questions,
but he testified that Boles was “rambling a little bit” and said that
5 Boles later explained that when Andraia would become upset, she
would scratch herself.
6 Boles challenged the admission of all of his statements to law
enforcement at a pre-trial hearing held pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). The trial court ruled that the
statements were admissible, and Boles does not raise an issue on appeal
regarding the admission of these statements.
6
he had made a mistake, but quickly changed it to “my life is a
mistake.”
After the lead detective returned, Boles was given a Miranda
warning and formally interviewed. The audio recording of this
interview was played for the jury. Boles told the lead detective that
while D. B. attended pre-school and stayed with a neighbor after
school until her parents got home from work, three-year-old Andraia
was left at home alone during the day with cartoons playing on the
television and with crackers, dry cereal, and a sippy cup with Kool-
Aid or water. Boles said that he knew it was wrong to leave a child
at home alone, but he explained that they could not afford day care
for Andraia. Boles would come home at lunch to check on Andraia
and clean up any messes she had made, but he did not stay home
long or eat while he was there. He then returned in the evening
about 5:30 p.m. in time to pick up D. B.
Boles said that on February 26, 2013, the day before he placed
the 911 call, he followed his usual routine of waking up at 5:30 a.m.
and putting Andraia on the toilet while he got ready for work. After
7
checking on Andraia and waking his wife to tell her where Andraia
was, he left for work, where he was required to arrive by 6:15 a.m.
Boles came home at around 11:47 a.m. that day to check on Andraia
and left again at around 12:15 p.m. to return to work. He did not
notice any injuries to Andraia at that time, other than the scratches
on her neck.
Boles again left work at 5:00 p.m. that day and returned home
in time to pick up D. B. from the neighbor’s house. When they
entered their house, Boles discovered that Andraia had put extra
toilet paper in the toilet, causing it to overflow and flood the
bathroom and the carpet just outside the bathroom. He was “ticked”
and put Andraia in the bathtub where she could watch him clean up
the water. He began to scoop up the water on the bathroom floor and
mop up the wet carpet with towels, discarding the scooped water and
wringing the towels in the bathtub. He then decided to shampoo the
carpet, but the shampooer apparently leaked, soaking the carpet
into the living room. Boles initially told the lead detective that he
did not physically discipline Andraia that night, but he made her
8
stay awake until he finished cleaning, sending her to bed at 11:00
p.m. Boles said that the next morning, February 27, he woke up and
put Andraia on the toilet before he went to work. His wife called
later that day to say Andraia was not breathing, and he returned
home. Boles said that he did not know what had happened, but he
blamed himself because he guessed that she had slipped and hit her
head on the wet floor.
However, Boles changed his story after the lead detective told
him that Andraia’s injuries were “severe,” resulting from multiple
impacts to her head and showed him pictures taken at the hospital
of the child’s body. Although Boles denied striking Andraia, he
admitted that he was angry when he saw that she had caused the
toilet to overflow. Boles said that he put Andraia in the bathtub and
threw the water he scooped up from the floor on her. He also wrung
the towels out near her “where she would feel the water.” Boles
would not let Andraia get out of the bathtub because he wanted her
to see how much work it was to clean up the mess. When Andraia
tried to get out, he would “smack” her hands away from the edge of
9
the bathtub. He said that “a lot of times,” she would slip and fall in
the tub, “I guess, because I slapped her hands away.” Boles said that
when Andraia hit her head on the bathtub, he “didn’t care” and
“didn’t think about how hard she hit the tub or whether she was
hurt.” He noticed that Andraia’s face was swollen, but not as much
as in the pictures, and she was slumped against the side of the
bathtub, where he left her to spend the night when he went to bed.
He also noticed red areas in the bathtub, but assumed the red color
came from the dye in Andraia’s pajamas.
The next morning, Boles found Andraia still in the bathtub,
and she looked “alright” to him. He said her face was swollen “a lot,”
but she was able to open one eye, and she took a sippy cup from him.
Boles said he “felt really bad about the whole thing,” and he took off
her wet clothes and put dry things on her. He then got ready and
told his wife that Andraia was okay and added, “If you see red, it’s
from the clothes; it’s not blood.” The last time he saw Andraia before
he left for work, she was slumped in the bathtub.
Boles also told the lead detective that the scab on Andraia’s
10
bottom was from a spanking he gave her with a belt months ago,
although he said that the spanking did not break the skin. He
explained that the scab was still there because he and Candice used
petroleum jelly to treat the “sore” resulting from the spanking. They
then put her diaper on, and the sore never had the chance to “get
air” to help it heal in the intervening months. Boles and his wife did
not take Andraia to the doctor for the sore, and, in fact, Andraia had
not seen a doctor since August 2011.
Based on this interview and a separate interview with Candice
by another detective, the police decided to charge both Boles and
Candice at that time with cruelty to children. The police afforded
Boles and Candice an opportunity to speak to one another in the
detectives’ presence before they were transported to jail. That
meeting was recorded and played for the jury, but some of the audio
was difficult to hear. The lead detective testified that at one point
during the meeting, Boles told Candice, “I f***ed up. I did this s**t.
I left her in the bathtub.”
Boles later gave similar accounts in separate interviews with
11
Sylvester and Middleton at the jail. Boles told Sylvester that he and
his wife left Andraia home alone all day, and because she was not
potty-trained, the parents agreed to keep her in the bathroom until
she was. Boles admitted to each of the DFCS investigators that he
became upset and angry when he saw that Andraia had caused the
toilet to overflow on February 26, 2013. Boles told them that he put
Andraia in the bathtub as he began to mop up the water with towels.
When the towels became “sopping” wet, he would wring them out in
the bathtub, and Boles told Sylvester that he wrung the towels over
Andraia’s head.
During this process, Andraia kept trying to get out of the
bathtub, but Boles would not let her. When Andraia put her hands
on the edge of the bathtub to climb out, Boles knocked her hands out
from under her, and she continued to fall and hit her head. He told
Sylvester that at one point, he stopped cleaning to make dinner for
the children, and he brought a bag of frozen french fries to put on
Andraia’s face because it was swollen. Boles told Middleton that he
put Andraia on the toilet that night before going outside to smoke a
12
cigarette and did not return to the bathroom before he went to bed.
Boles told Sylvester that no one sought medical help for Andraia,
and she spent the night in the bathtub. Boles said he checked on
Andraia in the morning and then went to work.
Additionally, in his interview with Sylvester, Boles stated that
he used corporal punishment on both girls and that the injuries to
Andraia’s buttocks occurred approximately six months earlier when
he used a belt on her, and then applied Vaseline because the area
had turned red, which caused the skin to peel off. Boles conceded
that the resulting scab had never healed.
The medical examiner who performed Andraia’s autopsy
testified that he found “56 evidences of recent external injury,” some
of which had begun to heal, including injuries to the head, face, and
buttocks, and 64 healed injuries. The medical examiner also
discovered a number of internal injuries, including a hemorrhage
over the entire surface of the child’s skull, a skull fracture at the
back of the head, and a brain bruise on the front of the head. The
medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was cranial
13
cerebral injuries to the skull and brain, due to blunt-force trauma.
The medical examiner further testified that Andraia would have
been dead at least six to ten hours before her temperature was
recorded as 84º at the hospital.
The defense presented evidence from Boles’s mother and a
family friend that they had not seen anything abnormal or any
injuries to Andraia when they had seen the family several months
before Andraia’s death. 7 A forensic pathologist, who testified as an
expert for the defense, said that she agreed with the medical
examiner’s conclusion as to cause of death and said that the manner
of death was homicide. But she disagreed with the time of death.
Relying on the body’s blood chemistry, she believed that Andraia
was “recently dead” and had not been dead “for a prolonged period
of time,” because the potassium, chloride, and sodium levels in her
blood would have been different if she had been dead as long as six
to eight hours.
7 However, Candice’s mother testified for the State that she had seen
bruising on Andraia’s face when she visited the family in December 2012.
14
The State called another expert in forensic pathology in
rebuttal. That expert questioned the methodology employed by the
defense expert and stated that the body temperature was consistent
with a death that had occurred seven hours before Andraia’s
temperature was taken at the hospital.
Boles argued at trial that his wife, Candice, had inflicted the
fatal injuries to Andraia.
2. Boles asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to
support his convictions under the standard set out in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). That standard requires that
[w]hen we consider the sufficiency of the evidence as a
matter of federal due process, our review is limited to
whether the trial evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdicts, is sufficient to authorize a
rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.
Moore v. State, 311 Ga. 506, 508 (2) (858 SE2d 676) (2021). And
although Boles is questioning whether some of the evidence at trial
was properly admitted, when this Court reviews the sufficiency of
15
the evidence, “we consider all the evidence admitted at trial,
regardless of whether the trial court erred in admitting some of that
evidence.” Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 397 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 83)
(2020) (emphasis in original). 8
The charge of felony murder in Count 2 of the indictment was
based on the crime alleged in Count 3, which charged Boles with
cruelty to children in the first degree in that he “did maliciously
cause Andraia Boles . . . cruel and excessive physical pain by
inflicting blunt force trauma to her head.” See OCGA §§ 16-5-1 (c),
16-5-70 (b).9
8 Boles further asserts that the trial court “could have (and should have)
exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror” to grant Boles’s motion for new
trial. See generally OCGA §§ 5-5-20; 5-5-21. It is well settled that a “thirteenth
juror” argument is “not properly addressed to this Court as such a decision is
one that is solely within the discretion of the trial court.” Smith v. State, 300
Ga. 532, 534 (1) (796 SE2d 671) (2017). “Therefore, when a defendant appeals
the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial, an appellate court does not
review the merits of the general grounds.” Myers v. State, 313 Ga. 10, 13 (1)
(867 SE2d 134) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).
Moreover, the record supports that the trial court exercised its discretion in
denying Boles a new trial on the general grounds, so this assertion presents
nothing for us to review.
9 “A person commits the offense of [felony] murder when, in the
commission of a felony, he or she causes the death of another human being
irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). “Any person commits the offense of
cruelty to children in the first degree when such person maliciously causes a
16
For purposes of the crime of cruelty to children in the first
degree,
malice in the legal sense, imports the absence of all
elements of justification or excuse and the presence of an
actual intent to cause the particular harm produced, or
the wanton and willful doing of an act with an awareness
of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may
result. Intention may be manifest by the circumstances
connected with the perpetration of the offense. Intent is a
question of fact to be determined upon consideration of
words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other
circumstances connected with the act for which the
accused is prosecuted.
Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 222 (1) (a) (830 SE2d 143) (2019)
(punctuation and citation omitted). See also Brewton v. State, 266
Ga. 160, 161 (2) (465 SE2d 668) (1996).
Boles admitted that he was angry when he discovered that
Andraia had caused the toilet to overflow and that he knocked
Andraia’s arms out from under her when she tried to climb out of
the bathtub, causing her to hit her head multiple times and leaving
her head swollen and bruised. Boles further admitted that as he took
child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.” OCGA §
16-5-70 (b).
17
these actions, he had no concern as to whether Andraia was injured
in the process. The medical examiner testified that the injuries to
Andraia’s head resulted in her death and that Andraia could have
been dead at least six to ten hours before her temperature was
recorded at the hospital the next day. Boles also admitted that he
left the injured child overnight in the bathtub.
This and other evidence at trial was more than sufficient to
support Boles’s conviction under Count 2. See Williams v. State, 312
Ga. 386, 391 (1) (b) (863 SE2d 44) (2021) (evidence sufficient to
support conviction for cruelty to children in the first degree by
drowning where defendant admitted that he was angry at his son’s
misbehavior and that he held the child beneath the water in bathtub
twice for prolonged periods); Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 699 (1) (838
SE2d 305) (2020) (defendant’s admissions to causing child’s injuries
along with medical evidence regarding the cause of death and the
severity and timing of the child’s injuries were sufficient to support
defendant’s convictions for murder and child cruelty); Delacruz v.
State, 280 Ga. 392, 396 (3) (627 SE2d 579) (2006) (“Malice, as an
18
element of the crime of cruelty to children, can be shown by
intentionally and unjustifiably delaying necessary medical attention
for a child, as that delay may cause the child to suffer from cruel and
excessive physical pain.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Count 4 of the indictment charged Boles with cruelty to
children in the second degree in that he and Candice “did with
criminal negligence, cause Andraia Boles . . . cruel and excessive
mental pain by locking her in a bathroom while they were at work.”
See OCGA § 16-5-70 (c).10 Boles admitted to police and Sylvester that
he and his wife left Andraia home alone while they were at work,
with only the television and cereal, crackers, and liquid in a sippy
cup to sustain her. In addition, police found a sippy cup in the
bathroom, a bowl with crackers and cereal on the back of the
bathroom toilet, and a key to the home’s interior doors in the
10 “Any person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the second
degree when such person with criminal negligence causes a child under the age
of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.” OCGA § 16-5-70 (c). “Criminal
negligence is an act or failure to act which demonstrates a willful, wanton, or
reckless disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to
be injured thereby.” OCGA § 16-2-1 (b).
19
bathroom sink, supporting an inference that Andraia was kept
locked in the bathroom during the day. 11 This and other evidence at
trial was sufficient to support Boles’s conviction under Count 4. See
Kain v. State, 287 Ga. App. 45, 47-48 (1) (650 SE2d 749) (2007)
(evidence sufficient to show criminal negligence constituting cruelty
to children in the second degree where woman regularly allowed her
small children to roam outside alone and left them home alone, and
where the children drowned one day while outside unattended).
Count 5 of the indictment charged Boles with cruelty to
children in the first degree in that he “did maliciously cause Andraia
Boles . . . cruel and excessive physical pain by spanking her with a
belt to the extent that her skin split open.” Boles admitted to the
lead detective that the injuries to Andraia’s buttocks were caused by
his spanking her with a belt months before her death, leaving a
11Although Count 4 specifically alleged that Andraia was confined in the
bathroom, some members of this Court question whether that allegation was
a material element of the offense charged or mere surplusage. See Fair v. State,
284 Ga. 165, 167 (2) (a) (664 SE2d 227) (2008) (“[a]n allegation in an indictment
that is wholly unnecessary to constitute the offense[s] charged is mere
surplusage.”). However, we need not resolve that issue because in this case
there was sufficient evidence to support that allegation.
20
visible sore that he and Candice attempted to treat with Vaseline
and that had not healed in the intervening months. This and other
evidence at trial was sufficient to support Boles’s conviction on
Count 5. See Gibson v. State, 277 Ga. 486, 487 (1) (591 SE2d 800)
(2004) (upholding conviction for cruelty to children where evidence
supported a finding that defendant struck his son with a belt with
“enough force to possibly leave bruises”).
Count 6 charged Boles and Candice with contributing to the
deprivation of a minor, a misdemeanor, in that they “did willfully
fail to act such that said omission and failure to act resulted in
Andraia Boles . . . being a deprived child . . . by leaving the child at
home, unsupervised, while they were at work.” Boles’s conviction on
this charge was supported by the same evidence supporting his
21
conviction on Count 4.12 See former OCGA § 16-12-1 (b) (3) (2011). 13
Accordingly, Boles’s claim that the evidence at trial was
insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his
convictions is without merit.
3. Boles further appeals the denial of his motion to suppress
the statements he made to the DFCS investigators while he was in
custody, asserting that because the DFCS investigators were acting
12 Although Counts 4 and 5 were based on the same evidence, the crimes
do not merge as each crime has at least one distinct element. See Gomez v.
State, 301 Ga. 445, 468 n.21 (801 SE2d 847) (2017) (second degree cruelty to
children and contributing to the deprivation of a minor do not merge because
contributing to the deprivation of a minor required proof that the defendant
caused a child to be deprived of parental care and child cruelty required proof
that the defendant caused a child cruel or excessive physical or mental pain).
13 When the crime at issue was committed, former OCGA § 16-12-1 (b)
(3) provided that the crime of contributing to the delinquency, unruliness, or
deprivation of a minor occurred when a person “[w]illfully commits an act or
acts or willfully fails to act when such act or omission would cause a minor to
be found to be a deprived child as such is defined in Code Section 15-11-2.” See
2011 Ga. L. p. 470 § 3, eff. July 1, 2011. The version of OCGA § 15-11-2 (8) (A)
in effect at the time of the crime defined a “deprived child” to include a child
who “[i]s without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as
required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child’s physical,
mental, or emotional health or morals.” In the Interest of M. F., 298 Ga. 138,
139 n.1 (780 SE2d 291) (2015) (noting that the Juvenile Code “was
substantially revised in 2013,” see 2013 Ga. Laws, p. 294, § 1-1, eff. Jan. 1,
2014, and current law “no longer speaks of a ‘deprived child,’ but instead refers
to a ‘dependent child’”).
22
as agents of law enforcement when they questioned him, Miranda
warnings should have been given and that the lack of warnings
means that his statements should have been excluded. However, in
denying Boles’s motion to suppress, the trial court found that the
DFCS investigators were not acting as agents of law enforcement
and, in any event, the statements Boles gave to them largely
provided cumulative evidence of matters already known to law
enforcement.
Because the parties do not dispute the circumstances
surrounding Boles’s statements to the DFCS investigators, our
review of the trial court’s application of the law to such undisputed
facts is de novo. See Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 399 (5) (a) (850
SE2d 41) (2020). Moreover, we bear in mind that “[t]he State has the
burden of proving that evidence challenged in a motion to suppress
is admissible.” Awad v. State, 313 Ga. 99, 102 (2) (868 SE2d 219)
(2022).
(a) We start our analysis by setting out first principles. Under
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, no person
23
“shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” U. S. Const. Amend. V. To protect the right against self-
incrimination, the United States Supreme Court in Miranda
formulated procedural safeguards to ensure that the
inherently compelling nature of an in-custody
interrogation by the police will not undermine the
suspect’s will to resist and force him to speak “where he
would not otherwise do so freely.”
Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 825 (2) (514 SE2d 657) (1999), quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (III). Thus, “[t]he coercion proscribed by
Miranda must be caused by the police.” Id. at 826 (2). See also
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.”); Outlaw v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 403
(3) (b) (858 SE2d 63) (2021) (“It is the premise of Miranda that the
danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official
interrogation.” (punctuation omitted), quoting Illinois v. Perkins,
24
496 U.S. 292, 297 (II) (110 SCt 2394, 110 LE2d 243) (1990)).14
Accordingly, “Miranda warnings are not a prerequisite to the
admission of statements made by a defendant to persons other than
law enforcement officers or their agents.” Bethea v. State, 251 Ga.
328, 330-31 (7) (304 SE2d 713) (1983) (statements made to
defendant’s commanding officer admissible in absence of a Miranda
warning). See also Daddario v. State, 307 Ga. 179, 189 (3) (835 SE2d
181) (2019) (Miranda not applicable to defendant’s statements to a
CASA volunteer); Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 484 (IV) (c) (807
SE2d 350) (2017) (statements made by defendant in response to
questioning by an emergency room nurse not subject to Miranda);
Rucker v. State, 203 Ga. App. 358, 358 (2) (416 SE2d 871) (1992) (“It
14 Because the parties do not dispute the issue, for purposes of analysis,
we will assume, without deciding, that Boles was in custody for purposes of
Miranda at the time of the interviews, and we confine our analysis in this case
to the issue of whether the DFCS investigators were acting as agents of law
enforcement in interviewing Boles. But see Outlaw, 311 Ga. at 403-04 (3) (b)
(“‘Imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within the
meaning of Miranda.’ Rather, in determining whether a person is in custody,
‘the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances
of the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’”), quoting Howes v. Fields,
565 U.S. 499, 509-11 (III) (A) (132 SCt 1181, 182 LE2d 17) (2012)).
25
was not incumbent upon the [DFCS] caseworker to advise defendant
of his Miranda rights because she was not a law enforcement
officer.”).
(b) In considering whether the DFCS investigators were acting
as agents of law enforcement in this case, and thus whether Boles
was entitled to warnings under Miranda before speaking with them,
both the trial court and this Court are required to consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the interviews. See Cook,
270 Ga. at 827 (2) (concluding that the issue of whether a law
enforcement parent was acting as a parent or an agent of the state
in questioning his or her arrested child “must be resolved on a case-
by-case basis, by viewing the totality of the circumstances”); Ortiz v.
State, 306 Ga. App. 598, 599-600 (703 SE2d 59) (2010) (applying the
totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether a school
administrator acted as an agent of law enforcement). Cf. Clark v.
State, 315 Ga. 423, 434 (3) (b) (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (applying
totality-of-the-circumstances test to juvenile’s waiver of Miranda
rights). And “proper application of a totality-of-the-circumstances
26
test mandates inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation.” Clark, 315 Ga. at 434 (3) (b) (citation and
punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). In determining whether
a trial court properly denied a motion to suppress, “this Court can
consider all evidence of record, including that found in pretrial, trial
and post-trial proceedings.” George v. State, 312 Ga. 801, 803 (865
SE2d 127) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also
Wright v. State, 294 Ga. 798, 802 (2) (756 SE2d 513) (2014).
(c) Here, Boles’s motion to suppress asserted that the DFCS
investigators were acting as agents for law enforcement in
conducting their interviews with him, based on allegations of
meetings and communications they had with law enforcement, both
before and after the interviews. 15 Although the parties briefly
discussed the motion at a pretrial hearing and submitted post-
15The motion also contended that Boles’s statement to Sylvester was not
voluntary because one of the documents he signed before speaking with her
stated that the information gathered in the interview was to aid in the
reunification process with his daughter. Boles argued that this statement
improperly held out a hope of benefit, which rendered his statement
involuntary. However, the trial court also expressly denied the motion on this
ground at trial, and Boles does not raise the issue on appeal.
27
hearing briefing, no evidence was presented on the issue before trial.
Before testimony began on the first day of trial and after
hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress. In explaining that ruling, the trial court stated that,
although there was cooperation between the police and DFCS, the
DFCS investigators were not acting “at the behest or the request of
law enforcement” when they interviewed Boles, because law
enforcement “had nothing to do with the questions that are asked or
the type information that’s gathered.”16 The trial court also noted
that by the time the DFCS investigators conducted their interviews,
“[l]aw enforcement had already interviewed the defendants, gotten
their statements, [and] advised them of their rights.” And the trial
court concluded that the information provided to DFCS was “almost
cumulative” of what law enforcement officers had already discerned
and what Boles had already told them. Therefore, the trial court
determined that the statements could not be excluded on the ground
16It is unclear from the record on what basis the trial court made these
findings in the absence of a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on the circumstances
under which the DFCS investigators interviewed Boles.
28
that the DFCS investigators were acting as law enforcement agents.
In its written order denying Boles’s motion for new trial on this
ground, the trial court reaffirmed its finding that the DFCS
investigators were not acting as agents for law enforcement based
on the evidence presented at trial, noting that both investigators
testified that they were not performing any investigation on behalf
of law enforcement; there was no evidence law enforcement
controlled the DFCS interviews in any manner, such as providing
specific questions; and law enforcement was not present at either
interview. The trial court further noted that Boles signed consent
forms before speaking with Sylvester in which he acknowledged that
his interview was voluntary and that confidentiality did not apply
to any matter that was the subject of a court action. The trial court
additionally determined that the statements made to the DFCS
investigators were cumulative of other statements Boles made,
noting that he told “multiple individuals, including law
enforcement, that he was the one who placed Andraia in the bathtub
and repeatedly pushed her down into the tub.”
29
(d) We turn now to the question of whether each of the DFCS
investigators was acting as an agent of law enforcement when they
interviewed Boles.
(i) Middleton’s Interview: The evidence at trial showed that
DFCS took custody of D. B. after Andraia’s death and opened an
investigation to determine the proper placement for the child. In
connection with that investigation, Middleton interviewed Boles on
March 7 at the Liberty County Jail where he was being held
following his arrest in a waiting area close to the facility’s control
room, with no law enforcement present. Middleton was not asked by
law enforcement to conduct the interview; rather, it was part of
DFCS’s own investigation. She testified that the purpose of her
conversation with Boles was two-fold: (1) to find out his assessment
of what had happened and (2) to determine if he had any relatives
with whom he wished the child to be placed. No evidence was
presented as to any communications between Middleton and law
enforcement before or after this interview. Although the State
represented in its briefing that Middleton contacted the lead
30
investigator to ask him if it would be “okay” to talk to Boles, no
evidence was presented regarding the content of any further
conversation between them. In addition, although the State’s
briefing represented that both DFCS investigators provided the lead
detective with copies of their interview summaries and that the
detective placed them in his case file “as he believed them to have
some evidentiary value,” no evidence was presented regarding when
or under what circumstances Middleton provided a copy of her
interview to law enforcement.
We conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances
surrounding Middleton’s interview as reflected in the evidence,
including any possible admissions to be gleaned from the State’s
briefing, that no basis exists for determining that Middleton was
acting as an agent for law enforcement in interviewing Boles. To the
contrary, the uncontradicted evidence shows that Middleton was
acting independently in the course of her work for DFCS and that
she communicated with the police before the interview only to get
permission to conduct that interview. There was no evidence
31
demonstrating that she spoke with any police officer about what had
happened to Andraia before interviewing Boles and no evidence
showing why or when she provided a copy of her interview summary
to the lead detective. Therefore, we see no error in the trial court’s
decision to admit Boles’s statement to Middleton. See Daddario, 307
Ga. at 189 (3) (“[W]here the official has not been given police powers,
Miranda has been held inapplicable to questioning by school
officials, welfare investigators, medical personnel, judges, prison
counselors, and parole or probation officers.” (punctuation omitted)),
quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.10 (c) (4th
ed. Nov. 2018 update)); In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 684 (513 SE2d 219)
(1999) (news reporter did not become a state agent simply by
questioning a defendant in the jail); Rucker, 203 Ga. App. at 358 (2).
(ii) Sylvester’s interview: The evidence at trial showed that, in
connection with its investigation into D. B.’s placement, DFCS hired
Sylvester to perform a comprehensive child and family assessment
of the Boles family to determine placement options. Sylvester
testified that, on March 1, 2013, two days after Boles’s interrogation
32
by law enforcement, she met with the lead detective as a part of that
assessment to get permission to interview Boles and to get
information from him about what had happened at the Boles home. 17
Sylvester then interviewed Boles at the jail. Sylvester testified that
the sole purpose of her assessment was to determine D. B.’s history,
which required consideration of how the child had been treated and
what safety factors would need to be considered in finding her a
placement.
Sylvester’s interview with Boles took place in a visiting room
at the jail, with no law enforcement present. Boles signed a form
indicating that his participation in the meeting was voluntary, and
he was told that information from the interview could be used in
court proceedings and that Sylvester could be required to testify.
Boles also signed a Confidentiality Statement, in which he
17 Sylvester also testified that she went to the DFCS office on February
27 to begin her assignment, and a different detective was present when she
arrived, but no evidence was presented as to whether she discussed Andraia’s
case with that detective. Although the motion alleged that she met with the
second detective, a DFCS attorney, and Middleton that day, no evidence in the
record supports that any such meeting or meetings occurred.
33
acknowledged that he understood that “[t]he general requirement
that counselors keep information confidential does not apply when .
. . [i]nformation is made an issue in a court action.” Sylvester and
Boles then spoke for over three hours.
Sylvester testified that she did not coordinate her investigation
with the police but just collected information from them. Moreover,
she stated that the purpose of her assessment was not to do a
criminal investigation; rather, her purpose “was solely to examine
the circumstances related to the child.” Nevertheless, Sylvester
contacted the lead detective after her interview with Boles because
the detective “had asked that if anything relevant to the criminal
portion was revealed that I call him.” And the State represented in
its briefing that Sylvester supplied the lead detective with a copy of
her interview summary, which the lead detective considered to have
evidentiary value.
The trial court concluded that Sylvester did not act at the
request or behest of law enforcement because law enforcement did
not control the interview by “providing specific questions to be
34
asked,” law enforcement was not present at the interview, and Boles
signed forms acknowledging that the interviews were voluntary.
However, the trial court did not acknowledge that Sylvester had
requested information about the investigation prior to her interview
and that in that conversation, the lead detective requested that she
provide him any relevant information (presumably based on what
the lead detective had just relayed to Sylvester), and Sylvester did
just that.18 Proper application of the totality-of-the-circumstances
test requires consideration of all these circumstances in addressing
Sylvester’s interview, see Clark, 315 Ga. at 434 (3) (b), and the trial
court’s failure to consider Sylvester’s pre-interview agreement to
provide information helpful to law enforcement in conducting her
interview and in only considering factors that supported its ruling
is troubling.
However, even assuming that the trial court erred in denying
Boles’s motion to suppress the statements to Sylvester, we conclude
18The trial court was permitted to find Sylvester’s testimony on this
point not credible, but nothing in the record indicates that the trial court made
any such finding in reaching its conclusion.
35
that the admission of that evidence was harmless because the
information provided in Boles’s statements to Sylvester was largely
cumulative of evidence he had already provided in his statements to
police and Middleton and evidence gathered from the crime scene
that was properly admitted at trial.
“A constitutional error is harmless when the State proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is cumulative of other
properly-admitted evidence or when the evidence against the
defendant is overwhelming.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 616 (4) (878
SE2d 505) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). The evidence
shows that the statement Boles gave to Sylvester, including his
admissions regarding the injuries he caused to Andraia and his
practice of leaving Andraia home alone all day, was similar to
statements Boles made to law enforcement and Middleton, which
were admitted at trial. Moreover, the evidence against Boles was
strong and did not support his defense that Candice alone caused
Andraia’s death. In addition to Boles’s own admissions of repeatedly
36
knocking Andraia down, the medical examiner testified that
Andraia’s body temperature at the hospital supported that she could
have been dead at least six to ten hours before her temperature was
taken, which was consistent with her death having been caused by
Boles’s conduct and well before the time when Candice was supposed
to have found Andraia unresponsive.
Accordingly, even assuming arguendo, that Sylvester could be
considered to have acted as an agent for law enforcement in
interviewing Boles, the admission of evidence regarding Boles’s
statement to Sylvester was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712, 721 (2) (884 SE2d 310) (2023)
(admission of defendant’s non-Mirandized statements to deputy
coroner in presence of deputy sheriff was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt where defendant made similar statements
multiple times, both before and after speaking with the deputy
coroner and the other statements were properly admitted at trial);
Renfro v. State, 313 Ga. 608, 613-14 (2) (872 SE2d 283) (2022) (even
if the trial court erred in admitting the appellant’s statements, any
37
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was
cumulative of other properly admitted evidence).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
38