Bobby Schroeder, III v. Dekalb County, Georgia , 341 Ga. App. 748 ( 2017 )

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
BRANCH and BETHEL, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 14, 2017
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A17A0551. SCHROEDER v. DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA et al.
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
Bobby Schroeder, III alleges that the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court falsely
reported to the Georgia Department of Driver Services that his driver’s license should
be suspended because he had failed to pay a traffic ticket and had failed to appear in
court. This false report, he alleges, led to his being arrested and jailed. He also alleges
that the practice of the court communicating false information to the department was
routine.
Schroeder filed this action for damages, asserting claims under state law and
42 USC § 1983 against the county, the chief judge of the recorder’s court, the court
administrator, and three John Doe defendants. The trial court granted the defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Schroeder filed this appeal.
We agree with the trial court that Schroeder’s ante litem notice was not timely,
so he cannot pursue his state law claims against the county and the individual
defendants in their official capacities. But we find that the trial court erred in
dismissing Schroeder’s other claims because the defendants have not shown that they
are clearly entitled to judgment. So we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial
court’s order of dismissal.
1. Allegations in the complaint.
In considering the trial court’s decision on a . . . motion for
judgment on the pleadings, we apply a de novo review and thus owe no
deference to the decision of the court below. Moreover, we must
consider all well-pled material allegations on [Schroeder’s] complaint
as true, with all doubts resolved in [his] favor. We may also consider any
exhibits attached to and incorporated into the complaint and the answer,
also construing them in the appellant’s favor. Nevertheless, . . . a motion
for judgment on the pleadings should be granted only if the moving
party is clearly entitled to judgment.
Shelnutt v. Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah, 333 Ga. App. 446 (776 SE2d
650) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted). Simply put, a defendant is entitled
to a “grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under OCGA § 9-11-12 (c) . .
. only where there is a complete failure to state a cause of action[.]” Hall v. Sencore,
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Inc., 302 Ga. App. 367 (691 SE2d 266) (2010). In this case, the defendants’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings is the equivalent of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim because the defendants did not introduce affidavits, depositions, or
interrogatories in support of their motion. Southwest Health & Wellness, LLC v.
Work, 282 Ga. App. 619, 623 (2) (639 SE2d 570) (2006) (citation and punctuation
omitted). For this reason, “[t]he motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the
averments in the complaint disclose with certainty that the plaintiff[] would not be
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of [his]
claim.” Id.According to Schroeder’s complaint, Schroeder received a traffic ticket in
DeKalb County in 2013. He alleged that he appeared in recorder’s court and was
ordered to pay a fine and that he timely paid the fine, but the staff of the recorder’s
court failed to close his case. Moreover, he asserted, the court staff falsely informed
the Georgia Department of Driver Services that Schroeder had failed to appear for his
hearing, that he had failed to pay his fine, and that his driving privilege should be
suspended. See OCGA § 17-6-11 (b) (Providing in part: “The court in which the
charges are lodged shall immediately forward to the Department of Driver Services
of this state the driver’s license number if the person fails to appear and answer to the
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charge against him or her. The commissioner of driver services shall, upon receipt of
a license number forwarded by the court, suspend the driver’s license and driving
privilege of the defaulting person until notified by the court that the charge against
the person has been finally adjudicated.”)
In his complaint, Schroeder alleged that on August 9, 2013, an officer with the
Rockdale County Sheriff’s Office arrested Schroeder for driving on a suspended
license and took him into custody. Schroeder asserted that he spent significant time
in custody before bonding out. He alleged that on September 26, 2013, an officer with
the Newton County Sheriff’s Office arrested Schroeder for driving on a suspended
license and took him into custody. According to Schroeder, at the time of his
Rockdale and Newton County arrests, he was on first offender probation; and the
Rockdale and Newton County arrests led to the initiation of probation revocation
proceedings for which Schroeder was arrested and jailed from November 12, 2013,
until December 10, 2013.
According to Schroeder’s complaint, at some point, the recorder’s court
realized that it had provided the Department of Driver Services with incorrect
information. Schroeder alleged in the complaint that the court sent a notice of
suspension withdrawal to the department. This led to the dismissal of the Rockdale
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and Newton County charges and the withdrawal of the probation revocation petition,
according to Schroeder. Nonetheless, Schroeder claimed, he lost his job because of
these events.
Schroeder alleged in his complaint that at the relevant time, Nelly Withers was
the chief judge of the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court and Troy Thompson was the
court administrator. According to Schroeder, Judge Withers and Thompson were
aware that the recorder’s court was understaffed, dysfunctional, and unable to process
its cases, and Judge Withers also knew that the court’s computer systems produced
unreliable data because the systems were flawed or because employees routinely
entered data incorrectly, and that employees routinely failed to communicate correct
information to the Department of Driver Services.
Schroeder sent the county ante litem notice of his claims on November 14,
2014. He filed this action for damages alleging that the defendants failed to perform
their ministerial duties with due care and that their actions led to Schroeder’s
unlawful arrests. In addition to his state law claims, Schroeder asserted claims under
42 USC § 1983, alleging that the county, through Judge Withers, the final
policymaker, and Thompson, had violated his constitutional rights by maintaining
customs and policies that caused his deprivation of liberty. These customs included
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chronically understaffing and underfunding the recorder’s court; failing to adequately
train employees; failing to implement an audit system that would have caught
mistakes; hiring pursuant to a quota system, which increased the rate of errors in the
court’s communications with the Department of Driver Services; and failing to
adequately discipline and terminate employees. And they knew that these customs
and practices repeatedly had led to innocent persons being arrested, yet they failed to
correct the problems.
2. State law claims against the county and the defendants in their official
capacities.
Schroeder argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his state law claims
against the county and the individual defendants in their official capacities. He argues
that his OCGA § 36-11-1 notice to the county was timely because his claims did not
accrue until the Rockdale and Newton County charges were dismissed in December
2013. We disagree.
OCGA § 36-11-1 provides, “All claims against counties must be presented
within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or the same are barred. . . .”
Generally, “the date the claim accrues [is] the date that suit on the claim can first be
brought.” Hoffman v. Ins. Co. of North America, 241 Ga. 328, 329 (245 SE2d 287)
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(1978). Specifically, a negligence cause of action “accrues . . . when there is a
negligent act coupled with a proximately resulting injury.” U-Haul Co. of Western
Georgia v. Abreu & Robeson, Inc., 247 Ga. 565, 566 (277 SE2d 497) (1981) (citation
omitted). At the latest, Schroeder’s cause of action accrued when he was damaged by
his August 9, 2013, arrest in Rockdale County resulting from the recorder’s court
allegedly misinforming the Department of Drivers Service that Schroeder’s driving
privilege should be suspended. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388 (II) (127 SCt
1091, 166 LE2d 973) (2007) (plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief for wrongful
arrest “as soon as the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred”). Thus Schroeder’s
November 14, 2014, ante litem notice, presented more than 12 months after the
Rockdale County arrest, was too late, and his state law claims against the county are
barred. Moreover, “[a] lawsuit against a county official in her official capacity is
considered a suit against the county, and the official is entitled to assert any defense
or immunity that the county could assert[.]” Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga.
App. 416, 419 (2) (759 SE2d 269) (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). So the
trial court properly dismissed Schroeder’s state law claims against the county and the
individual defendants in their official capacities. However, because the ante litem
notice requirements of OCGA § 36-11-1 do not apply to state law claims against
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defendants in their individual capacities, see Coweta County v. Cooper, 318 Ga. App.
41, 44 (733 SE2d 348) (2012), or to actions filed pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, see
White v. City of Atlanta Police Dept., 289 Ga. App. 575, 576 (3) (657 SE2d 545)
(2008); Majette v. O’Connor, 811 F2d 1416, 1418 (11th Cir. 1987), we address the
dismissal of those claims below.
3. State law claims against the defendants in their individual capacities.
Schroeder argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his state law claims
against the defendants, including the John Doe defendants, in their individual
capacities on the ground of official immunity, because he alleged the negligent
performance of ministerial acts. We agree.
[A] public officer or employee may be personally liable for
ministerial acts negligently performed. . . . A ministerial act is
commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the
execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act, however, calls for the
exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails
examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them
in a way not specifically directed. The determination of whether an
action is discretionary or ministerial depends on the character of the
specific actions complained of, not the general nature of the job, and is
to be made on a case-by-case basis. The single overriding factor is
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whether the specific act from which liability allegedly arises is
discretionary or ministerial.
Pearce v. Tucker, 299 Ga. 224, 227 (787 SE2d 749) (2016) (citations, punctuation,
and emphasis omitted). “At this early stage of the case, it was premature for the trial
court to conclude that [the defendants’] duties were discretionary rather than
ministerial,” Marshall, 327 Ga. App. at 420 (3) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted),
because
it cannot be said that the allegations of the complaint disclose with
certainty that [Schroeder] would not be entitled to relief under any state
of provable facts asserted in support. For example, there conceivably
could be evidence of some explicit detailed laundry list of discrete tasks
each individual defendant was required to perform . . . . [I]t does not
matter that the existence of such a laundry list is unlikely.
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 775 (755 SE2d 796) (2014) (citation omitted; emphasis
in original). Schroeder’s “complaint alleging that [his] injuries were caused by the
individual defendants’ negligent performance of ministerial duties satisfies the
minimal requirements of notice pleading as set forth in our case law, allowing this
lawsuit to survive a motion [for judgment on the pleadings] based on official
immunity and to proceed into discovery.” Id. at 776 (Nahmias, J., concurring).
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Schroeder’s allegations do not show that the defendants in their individual capacities
are clearly entitled to judgment on the ground of official immunity and the trial court
erred in dismissing these claims.
4. Judicial immunity.
Schroeder argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint against
Judge Withers on the ground of judicial immunity. We agree.
“Judicial immunity shields judicial officers from liability in civil actions based
on acts performed in their judicial capacity that are not undertaken in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Considine v. Murphy, 297 Ga. 164, 170, n. 4 (3) (773
SE2d 176) (2015) (citations omitted); see also Earl v. Mills, 275 Ga. 503, 504 (1)
(570 SE2d 282) (2002). As both this court and the United States Supreme Court have
explained, judicial immunity “‘applies even when [a] judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly[:] it is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or
corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of
consequences.’” Maddox v. Prescott, 214 Ga. App. 810, 813 (1) (449 SE2d 163)
(1994), quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (87 SCt 1213, 18 LE2d 288)
(1967). The same immunity also applies to “officers appointed by the court if their
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role is simply ‘an extension of the court.’” Considine, 297 Ga. at 169, n. 4, quoting
West End Warehouses v. Dunlap, 141 Ga. App. 333, 334 (233 SE2d 284) (1977)
(special masters are entitled to judicial immunity).
The amended complaint does not allege that the Recorder’s Court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it adjudicated his original citation. The question we face, then, is
whether the acts of which Schroeder complains are “judicial acts” to which absolute
judicial immunity should apply. It is well-established that whether an act by a judge
is “judicial” depends on “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether
they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349,
362 (II) (98 SCt 1099, 55 LE2d 331) (1978). The United States Supreme Court has
held, however, that judges may not claim absolute immunity for acts taken in an
administrative rather than adjudicatory capacity, such as “supervising court
employees and overseeing the efficient operation of a court,” because such acts “were
not themselves judicial or adjudicative.” Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 229 (IV)
(108 SCt 538, 98 LE2d 555) (1988).
This complaint alleges that the judge and staff of the Recorder’s Court failed
in their respective job duties when they set court policy and maintained court customs
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that they knew to result in the systematic arrest of innocent persons and that actually
resulted in the improper processing of Schroeder’s original traffic citation and his
later arrest for driving with a suspended license. It is true that under the Code of
Judicial Conduct, judges “shall perform judicial and administrative duties
competently, diligently, and without bias or prejudice[,] shall maintain professional
competence in judicial administration, and shall cooperate with other judges and court
officials in the administration of court business.” Canon 2, Rule 2.5 (A) and (B)
(emphasis supplied). Rule 2.12 (A) provides that judges “shall require their staffs,
court officials and others subject to their direction and control to observe the
standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judges[.]” But even if these
administrative actions are functions “normally performed by a judge,” neither Judge
Withers nor her administrators can claim absolute judicial immunity as to them. This
amended complaint successfully pleads that Judge Withers and Thompson were
performing “non-judicial” acts when they engaged in administrative functions at the
Recorder’s Court. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against
Judge Withers on the ground of judicial immunity.
5. Claims under 42 USC § 1983.
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Schroeder enumerates as error the dismissal of his claims under 42 USC § 1983against DeKalb County, the individual defendants in their official capacities, and the
individual defendants, including the John Doe defendants, in their individual
capacities.
(a) John Doe defendants.
Although he enumerates as error the dismissal of his 42 USC § 1983 claims
against the John Doe defendants, Schroeder’s complaint does not allege claims under
42 USC § 1983 against the John Doe defendants. Nor does Schroeder support his
enumeration of error regarding the John Doe defendants with argument. See Ct. App.
Rule 25 (c) (2). Therefore, Schroeder has abandoned any claim of error pertaining to
the trial court’s dismissal of any § 1983 claims against the John Doe defendants, and
we address only his arguments regarding the county, Judge Withers, and Thompson.
(b) DeKalb County and Judge Withers and Thompson in their official
capacities.
A local government such as the [c]ounty may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead,
it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
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entity is responsible under § 1983. This rule also applies to local
government officials sued in their official capacities.
Johnson v. Randolph County, 301 Ga. App. 265, 267-268 (2) (a) (i) (687 SE2d 223)
(2009) (citations omitted). In other words, “a county is liable only when the county’s
official policy causes a constitutional violation.” Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F3d
1326, 1329 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 2003) (punctuation omitted). To establish the county’s
official policy, Schroeder must
identify either (1) an officially promulgated county policy or (2) an
unofficial custom or practice of the county shown through the repeated
acts of a final policymaker for the county. Because a county rarely will
have an officially-adopted policy of permitting a particular
constitutional violation, most plaintiffs, and [Schroeder], must show that
the county has a custom or practice of permitting it and that the county’s
custom or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional
violation. Under either avenue, a plaintiff (1) must show that the local
governmental entity, here the county, has authority and responsibility
over the governmental function in issue and (2) must identify those
officials who speak with final policymaking authority for that local
governmental entity concerning the act alleged to have caused the
particular constitutional violation in issue.
Id. at 1329-1330 (II) (A) (citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted).
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The trial court ruled that Schroeder did not allege facts that showed a county
policy or custom of widespread miscommunication with the Georgia Department of
Driver Services prior to his arrest and that he did not allege facts to show a deliberate
county policy or custom of failure to train. We disagree.
Schroeder alleged that the county, through Judge Withers’s actions as a final
policymaker, developed and maintained customs and policies that led to the deliberate
indifference to his due process rights and his liberty interest. These customs included
the chronic understaffing and underfunding of the court staff; the long-term failure
to adequately train the staff; and the failure to implement a system to check and
reduce error. He alleged that Judge Withers and Thompson had actual knowledge of
repeated instances where the actions of the recorder’s court clerks caused innocent
people to be arrested, yet they did virtually nothing to correct the problems. “[W]e
cannot say at this early pleading stage of the litigation that [Schroeder] will be unable
to present evidence demonstrating that” the allegedly wrongful suspension of his
driver’s license and violation of his liberty interest were caused by a county policy
or custom, as shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county.
Shelnutt, 333 Ga. App. at 454 (3). Compare Searcy v. Ben Hill County School Dist.,
22 FSupp3d 1333, 1341 (MD Ga. 2014) (plaintiffs failed to state a claim under §
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1983 against local government entity when their allegations concerned the customs
and practices of employees instead of the customs and practices that could be
attributed to the government entity or to a final policymaker of the government
entity).
(c) Judge Withers and Thompson in their individual capacities.
Schroeder argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his 42 USC § 1983claims in their individual capacities on the ground of qualified immunity. We agree.
Qualified immunity protects officials performing discretionary
functions from individual claims brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983,
if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
The test for determining entitlement to qualified immunity is applied by
considering the objective reasonableness of the official’s actions
(irrespective of his subjective beliefs) in light of legal rules which were
clearly established at the time the action was taken. The unlawfulness of
the action must be apparent to a reasonable official.
Johnson, 301 Ga. App. at 268-269 (2) (a) (ii) (citations omitted). The trial court ruled
that Judge Withers and Thompson were entitled to qualified immunity from
Schroeder’s 42 USC § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacities because
Schroeder failed “to allege specific prior incidents prior to his alleged injuries that
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could have put [them] on notice that widespread unconstitutional conduct was
occurring” and did “not plausibly allege[] that [they] were on notice that specific
additional training was necessary for [r]ecorder’s [c]ourt staff, much less that they
acted with deliberate indifference resulting in Mr. Schroeder’s arrests.” The court
applied the wrong standard.
Under current Georgia law, it is not necessary for a complaint to
set forth all of the elements of a cause of action in order to survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Rather, the Georgia Civil
Practice Act requires only notice pleading and, under the Act, pleadings
are to be construed liberally and reasonably to achieve substantial justice
consistent with the statutory requirements of the Act. . . . [I]f, within the
framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will
sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.
Campbell v. Ailion, 338 Ga. App. 382, 384 (790 SE2d 68) (2016) (citations omitted).
Schroeder alleged that
[Judge] Withers and Thompson had actual knowledge of repeated
instances where the recorder[‘]s court clerks cause[d] innocent persons
to be deprived of their liberty without probable cause. Despite having
actual knowledge that ordinary citizens were suffering deprivations of
liberty due to the repeated errors of the recorder[‘]s court clerks, [Judge]
Withers and Thompson did virtually nothing to eliminate or
substantially reduce the error rate among the recorder[‘s] court clerks.
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It is true, as the trial court held, that Schroeder failed to allege
specific incidents that occurred prior to his alleged injuries that could
have put Judge Withers and Thompson on notice. But at this early stage,
it cannot be said that Schroeder will not be able to introduce evidence
of the repeated incidents that he alleged, and the trial court erred in
dismissing this claim.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Branch and Bethel, JJ.,
concur.
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