Whitten v. Wooten , 295 Ga. App. 281 ( 2008 )

Andrews, Judge.

Diana L. Whitten brought an action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 alleging that Sergeant John C. Wooten, Jr., and Sergeant Ulises Nieves violated her constitutional rights and caused serious injury to her leg by using excessive force against her while she was a pre-trial detainee at the Glynn County Detention Center. Whitten appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wooten and Nieves.¹ Because the trial court correctly found that qualified immunity protected Wooten and Nieves from these claims, we affirm.

Whitten was arrested for a probation violation and placed in a cell at the Detention Center. While alone in the eight by twelve-foot cell, Whitten threw her food on the cell floor, banged repeatedly on the cell window, screamed, cursed, removed all of her clothes, and smeared the cell window with food, toilet paper, and a bloody tampon. To stop Whitten’s disruptive behavior, the Detention Center physician ordered the nurse at the Detention Center to give her an injection of medication. Wooten and Nieves worked at the Detention Center as detention officers for the Glynn County Sheriffs Department. Wooten and Nieves entered the cell first, and each took hold of Whitten by an arm as they attempted to verbally calm her down so the nurse could administer the injection. Whitten violently resisted these efforts by pushing and struggling to get free while continuing to scream and curse. In the struggle, Wooten, Niéves, and Whitten started to slip around in the food that Whitten had thrown on the floor. As Wooten struggled to keep his footing, Whitten spit in his face and started flailing about with her arms. When Wooten took a step back and started to slip, Nieves decided to physically force Whitten onto a nearby mattress. Nieves said he feared that, unless he forced Whitten down to the mattress to end her aggressive struggle, someone was going to slip and fall onto the hard concrete floor. At that point, Nieves extended one leg in front of Whitten, placed his hand on Whitten’s shoulder, and turned Whitten over his extended leg and down onto the mattress. The nurse then administered the injection. After the nurse administered the injection, another detention officer noticed that one of Whitten’s legs appeared to be bowed or twisted backward at the knee. Although Whitten was repeating, “I’m okay, I’m okay,” the physician examined Whitten’s knee and sent her to the hospital. Whitten does not dispute these facts. She could recall nothing that occurred in the cell, and does not remember being taken to the hospital. Whitten recalled only that her injured knee was treated at the hospital, and that at some point thereafter her leg was amputated.

Whitten filed an action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 against Wooten and Nieves individually alleging that, acting under color of state law as detention officers, they violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force, which caused the leg injury and eventual amputation. On the present facts, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Wooten and Nieves on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity gives government officials performing discretionary functions complete protection from individual claims brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (102 SC 2727, 73 LE2d 396) (1982). Whether qualified immunity protects an official from suit is a question of law. Bell v. City of Albany, 210 Ga. App. 371, 376, n. 4 (436 SE2d 87) (1993). We review the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). Whitten does not dispute that Wooten and Nieves were performing a discretionary function when they used force against her in the cell. She claims the force was excessive and violated clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

A claim based on the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizure of the person applies where alleged excessive force was used to seize a person during the process of arrest, prior to actual detention on the charges. Bell, 210 Ga. App. at 374. In a Fourth Amendment claim, an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable — in other words, if a reasonable officer under the same circumstances would have believed the force used was not excessive. Id. at 374-375. The Fourth Amendment does not apply in the present case because the record shows that Whitten had already been arrested and placed in a detention cell when the alleged excessive force was used by detention officers in the cell.

A claim that excessive force was used against a person being held after arrest in pre-trial detention is governed by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005); Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007). The Fourteenth Amendment governs Whitten’s claim that excessive force was used against her in the detention cell. In excessive force claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same standard is applied to pre-trial detainees that is applied under the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to convicted prisoners. Danley v. Allen, 540 F3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2008); Bozeman, supra; Cockrell, supra. Under this standard, whether or not a prison guard or detention officer’s use of force is entitled to qualified immunity “turns on whether that force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bozeman, 422 F3d at 1271. The use of force in this context “will only violate substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when it is so egregious that it shocks the conscience.” Cockrell, 510 F3d at 1311. If force is used “maliciously [or] sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” then it necessarily shocks the conscience, and there is no qualified immunity. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Danley, 540 F3d at 1307.

To evaluate whether actions shock the conscience, we consider the following factors: (1) the need for force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; and (3) the extent of the resulting injury. In addition to those three factors we consider as fourth and fifth factors, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible official on the basis of facts known to them, and apy efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. When we consider whether the jailers’ use of force was excessive, we must give a wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.

Applying this standard, Wooten and Nieves were entitled to summary judgment -on the basis of qualified immunity. Whitten was creating a disturbance at the Detention Center so disruptive that the physician ordered the nurse to give her an injection of medication to calm her behavior. Wooten and Nieves entered the cell for the purpose of calming or restraining Whitten so the nurse could administer the injection. They first attempted to calm Whitten by verbal persuasion, but that failed. They attempted to simply hold her still by her arms, but that failed as Whitten continued to violently resist. When it appeared that they were all in danger of slipping on the food Whitten had thrown on the floor and falling dangerously onto the concrete floor, Nieves took Whitten down to a mattress by taking hold of her shoulder and pulling her off balance over his extended leg. There is evidence that this maneuver had the unfortunate effect of inflicting a severe injury to Whitten’s knee. Nevertheless, the force used was not disproportionate to the need, nor was the severe injury inflicted foreseeable. Wooten and Nieves were justified in using this force to put Whitten in a position to receive the injection. There being no evidence that Wooten or Nieves used force “maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” it follows that the force was not “so egregious that it shocks the conscience.” Rather, Wooten and Nieves used force in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline and security, and the wide range of deference given to detention officials so acting entitled them to qualified immunity. Bozeman, 422 F3d at 1271; Danley, 540 F3d at 1307.²

Although the trial court did not consider all the elements of the applicable standard in granting summary judgment to Wooten and Nieves, the court’s judgment is affirmed under the right for any reason rule. City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275 Ga. 834 (573 SE2d 369) (2002).

Judgment affirmed.

Johnson, P. J., Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. Barnes, C. J., concurs in the judgment only. Ruffin, P J., and Phipps, J., dissent.

1 Whitten did not contest the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants: Sheriff Wayne Bennett; the Glynn County Sheriffs Department; the Glynn County Detention Center; and Master Sergeant Sheila Moran.

2 Even analyzing Whitten’s claim under the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard, Wooten and Nieves would have been entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because a reasonable officer acting under the same circumstances would have believed that the force used to restrain Whitten was not excessive. See Bell, 210 Ga. App. at 374-375.