Stone v. Free Bridge Auto Sales ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2156
LINDA JEANETTE STONE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
FREE BRIDGE AUTO SALES, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. B. Waugh Crigler,
Magistrate Judge. (CA-04-87-3)
Submitted: May 30, 2006 Decided: June 15, 2006
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henry W. McLaughlin, III, CENTRAL VIRGINIA LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC.,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jonathan T. Wren, MARTIN &
RAYNOR, P.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Linda Jeanette Stone appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Free Bridge Auto Sales, Inc. (Free Bridge) on
her claim that Free Bridge violated the Truth In Lending Act
(TILA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq. (West 1998 & Supp. 2006). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
On November 4, 2003, Stone entered into a Retail Installment
Sales Contract (Contract) with Free Bridge to finance the purchase
of a used 1999 Pontiac Grand Am. The Contract was a preprinted
form that Free Bridge obtained from the Virginia Independent
Automobile Dealers Association, and it included blanks for
information particular to each automobile sale, such as the type
and price of the vehicle and financing information. Free Bridge
filled in these blanks with information relevant to Stone’s
purchase. The first clause of the Contract informed Stone that she
could buy the Grand Am for cash or credit, with the cash price
being listed later in the contract as “Cash Price” and the credit
price being listed as the “Total Sale Price.” Stone elected to buy
the car on credit. The Contract had a “Federal Truth-In-Lending
Disclosures” section (TILA section) which informed Stone that she
was financing $10,311.12 (“Amount Financed”) at an Annual
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Percentage Rate of 29.9% for a total Finance Charge of $3,692.97
and a Total Sale Price of $14,004.09.
Immediately beneath the TILA section was a section entitled
“Itemization of Amount Financed.” According to that section, the
Amount Financed was the sum of the “Cash Price (including any
accessories, services, and taxes)” of $8,998.00 and certain “Other
Charges.” As relevant to Stone’s contract, these Other Charges
included a Business License Tax of $14.59, a Title Tax of $274.32,
a Transfer Fee of $2.00, a Certificate of Title Fee of $10.00, a
Processing Fee of $149.00, and the negative equity of $858.46 for
Stone’s trade-in.* These Other Charges totaled to $1,308.37, and
when added to the Cash Price resulted in a Amount Financed of
$10,311.12.
Nearly a year later, on November 3, 2004, Stone filed a civil
action against Free Bridge seeking statutory damages for violation
of TILA. The gravamen of her complaint was that Free Bridge
violated TILA by misrepresenting the Other Charges as part of the
Amount Financed when they were actually finance charges. She
contended that the Other Charges were finance charges because the
Contract stated that the Cash Price included “any accessories,
services, and taxes.” Stone’s complaint alleged that “[b]y
*
As part of the transaction, Stone traded-in a 1996 Saturn.
But Stone owed more for that car than its trade-in value, so Free
Bridge added the trade-in’s negative equity of $858.46 to the Total
Sale Price of the Contract.
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advising Stone she could purchase the vehicle for a cash price of
$8,995.00 that included all taxes, Free Bridge agreed to include
within that $8,995.00" the amount listed in the Other Charges for
taxes and processing fees.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On
September 9, 2005, the district court denied Stone’s motion and
granted Free Bridge’s motion. Stone timely noted an appeal.
II.
We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, “viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Am.
Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 221
(4th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). In this case, there is no dispute about material facts.
The sole dispute is whether, as a matter of law, the Contract
complied with TILA.
Stone contends that the Contract did not comply with TILA
because it misrepresented the finance charge. In particular, she
argues that because the Cash Price was followed by the
parenthetical “including any accessories, services, and taxes,” the
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taxes and fees separately itemized and added to the Cash Price to
reach the Amount Financed should have been listed as financing
fees. In her view, if she could have purchased the car for the
Cash Price of $8,955.00 and yet paid the credit price of
$14,004.09, then the actual finance charge was $5,049.09, not
$3,692.97 as listed on the contract.
We do not agree with Stone’s reading of the Contract. In
general, contracts must be read as a whole. Hitachi Credit Am.
Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d 614, 625 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing
Berry v. Klinger, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Va. 1983). Although the
Contract specified a “Cash Price (including any accessories,
services, and taxes)” as $8,995.00, it does not follow that the
Cash Price included all services and taxes. “Any” can mean “one,
some, or all indiscriminately of whatever quantity.” Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 56 (11th ed. 2004).
When the contract is read as a whole, it is clear that in the
phrase “any accessories, services, and taxes,” the Contract did not
use “any” to mean “all” such charges. A few lines below that
phrase were itemized charges for, inter alia, a business license
tax, a title tax, and a processing fee. Because these taxes and
fees were listed separately as Other Charges, it is clear that they
were not part of the Cash Price. Reading the Contract as a whole,
we therefore conclude that the most natural reading of “any
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accessories, services, and taxes” is “any” of those charges that
Free Bridge chooses to include within the Cash Price.
Because these Other Charges were not part of the Cash Price
for the car, Free Bridge complied with TILA by adding these charges
to the Cash Price to determine the Amount Financed. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 1638 (stating that the “Amount Financed . . . shall be
computed” by adding to the Cash Price “any charges which are not
part of the principal amount of the loan and which are financed by
the consumer”). The district court therefore correctly concluded
that the Contract did not violate TILA.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Free Bridge. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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