Clement v. VA Board of Exam ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    MARY J. CLEMENT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                                    No. 96-2479
    VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
    Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.
    (CA-96-363-3)
    Submitted: September 25, 1997
    Decided: October 10, 1997
    Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Carolyn P. Carpenter, CARPENTER & WOODWARD, P.L.C., Rich-
    mond, Virginia, for Appellant. Lee Melchor Turlington, Assistant
    Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Rich-
    mond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Mary J. Clement appeals from the district court's order granting the
    employer's motion for summary judgment in this Americans with
    Disabilities Act (ADA) claim under 
    42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12117
    (West 1995). Clement sued the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners
    (Board), claiming that they had discriminated against her on account
    of her learning disability. The district court concluded both that Clem-
    ent's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations* and
    that the Board was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the
    claim. The district court held that even assuming her suit was timely
    filed, the Board had made "reasonable accommodations" for Clem-
    ent's disability in administering the bar examination. Because she had
    not passed the bar examination notwithstanding those accommoda-
    tions, concluded the court, Clement could not show that she was oth-
    erwise qualified. As a result, the district court granted summary
    judgment in favor of the Board on Clement's ADA claim.
    To establish a violation of the ADA arising from her difficulties
    with the Bar examination, Clement was required to show that she was
    disabled; that she was otherwise qualified for Bar membership; and
    that the Board blockaded her from membership due to discrimination
    solely based on her disability. See Doe v. University of Maryland
    Med. Sys. Corp., 
    50 F.3d 1261
    , 1265 (4th Cir. 1995); Tyndall v.
    _________________________________________________________________
    *Clement also appealed the district court's ruling regarding the appli-
    cable statute of limitations. Clement contends the district court erred by
    following this court's opinion in Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton
    Roads, 
    1 F.3d 222
     (4th Cir. 1993), and applying a one-year period of
    limitations. Clement suggests that "`the most analogous' state statute of
    limitations" would be the Virginia statute for personal injuries because
    her claim most resembles a claim for tortious interference with a contrac-
    tual relationship. Wilson v. Garcia, 
    471 U.S. 261
    , 268 (1985); see
    Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 
    13 F.3d 823
    , 829 (4th Cir. 1994).
    Because we conclude that the Board provided Clement with reasonable
    accommodations with regard to the bar examination, we express no opin-
    ion on the merits of Clement's contention with regard to the statute of
    limitations.
    2
    National Educ. Ctrs., 
    31 F.3d 209
    , 212 (4th Cir. 1994). Given the
    existence of a disability, which is not at issue in this case, the next
    question is whether Clement was qualified for membership. See
    Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 
    101 F.3d 346
    , 349
    (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
    65 U.S.L.W. 3781
     (U.S., May 27, 1997)
    (No. 96-1521). Clement, as plaintiff in this ADA case, bears the bur-
    den of showing that she was capable of meeting the qualifications for
    membership with reasonable accommodation. To meet this burden,
    she must show that a reasonable accommodation by the Board would
    enable her to pass the bar examination. See Tyndall, 
    31 F.3d at 213
    .
    It is at this point that the district court concluded that Clement's
    claim could not survive summary judgment. The Board allowed
    Clement to take the bar examination six times. Each time, the Board
    granted Clement's requests for accommodations to minimize her dis-
    ability's effect on her performance. Moreover, the Board increased
    the accommodations each time Clement suggested that the prior
    accommodations had not been sufficient. The Board contacted her
    law school to determine what accommodations the school had made
    with regard to her examinations there. After doing so, the Board
    granted her more time and more rest than she received during law
    school examinations. Ultimately, on her final attempt to pass the bar
    examination, Clement was afforded twice the allotted time over a
    four-day period with three-hour rest periods between the two sessions
    on each day. The district court did not err in concluding that this was
    a "reasonable accommodation" of Clement's disability on the part of
    the Board.
    The thrust of Clement's contention on appeal is that the Board
    acted unreasonably in not granting every accommodation she
    requested. Before her final attempt at the examination, Clement sug-
    gested that she be allowed a full day of rest between each day of test-
    ing. The Board offered a reasonable compromise by granting Clement
    three times the ordinary amount of rest during a testing day combined
    with twice the total time allotted to other candidates.
    Clement also contends that the Board ignored the analysis of Clem-
    ent's needs performed by Dr. Wayne Pharr, a doctor of optometry,
    and Shyla Ipsen, the coordinator of the Virginia Commonwealth Uni-
    versity Reading/Child Study Center. Dr. Pharr submitted that Clement
    3
    needed "additional time spread out over additional days with rest
    breaks." Clement received that accommodation. Similarly, Ipsen rec-
    ommended that "consideration be given to extending the time . . .
    beyond the usual time and a half." Clement received more than that
    extension. The Board did not ignore the suggestions of individuals
    who had evaluated Clement's abilities.
    As a result, we have no difficulty concluding that the district court
    did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Board on
    the ground that they had provided Clement with "reasonable accom-
    modations." We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4