United States v. Bellamy , 336 F. App'x 285 ( 2009 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-5094
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MARK BELLAMY, a/k/a Big Mark,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Florence.   C. Weston Houck, Senior District
    Judge. (4:03-cr-00474)
    Submitted:    May 21, 2009                    Decided:   July 2, 2009
    Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Steven Michael Hisker, Duncan, South Carolina, for Appellant.
    Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States
    Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Mark Bellamy appeals his amended judgment convicting
    him of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to
    distribute     fifty    grams      or   more   of    cocaine     base    and     five
    kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(A), 846 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009).                    Bellamy’s counsel
    filed a brief under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    asserting    there     were   no    meritorious      issues    for     appeal,      but
    raising for the court’s consideration whether the district court
    erred sentencing Bellamy as a career offender and whether it
    erred denying counsel’s request for a downward departure based
    on   Bellamy’s   post-conviction         rehabilitation        and     his    minimal
    participation    in     the   conspiracy.           Bellamy    filed     a    pro   se
    supplemental brief raising several issues.                    The Government did
    not file a brief.       We affirm.
    With respect to the challenges to the career offender
    designation, we find no error with the type of state convictions
    used by the district court to reach that designation.                        See U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2002) (defining career
    offender).       Insofar      as    Bellamy    claims     one     of    the     prior
    convictions should not have been considered because it did not
    become final until after he withdrew from the conspiracy, we
    note he did not raise this issue in the district court and
    review is for plain error.              United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S.
                       2
    725, 732 (1993).           We find no plain error because Bellamy cannot
    show    prejudice.         His   base   offense      level   of    thirty-eight     and
    criminal history category VI were also based on drug quantity
    and the points accumulated for prior convictions and would not
    have changed even if he was not considered a career offender.
    In addition, Bellamy had at least one other felony conviction
    that could have been considered.
    Counsel’s claim that the court erred by not granting
    the motion for a downward departure is not reviewable by this
    Court.    See United States v. Brewer, 
    520 F.3d 367
    , 371 (4th Cir.
    2008).
    With respect to the remaining issues Bellamy raises in
    his pro se supplemental brief, we note that his post-offense
    rehabilitation       was    taken   into   consideration          when   his    offense
    level was reduced for acceptance of responsibility.                        We find no
    error in the court’s failure to specifically address this issue
    when     it   imposed       sentence.          See    USSG   §     3E1.1,      comment.
    (n.1(b),(g)).      Bellamy’s claim that the district court erred by
    not reducing his offense level for being only a minor player in
    the conspiracy is without merit.                 Review of this issue is for
    plain    error    because        Bellamy   did       not   raise    this    issue    at
    sentencing.      Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.              Bellamy bought, sold, and
    transported controlled substances and he admitted to converting
    cocaine to crack.          He was found responsible for eleven kilograms
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    of crack cocaine.         We find no error in the court’s decision not
    to consider whether Bellamy was a minor participant.                         See United
    States v. Brooks, 
    957 F.2d 1138
    , 1149 (4th Cir. 1992) (A seller
    possesses      “a   central     position            in    a    drug     distribution
    conspiracy,” even if he participated in the conspiracy for a
    relatively brief period of time.); see also United States v.
    Daughtrey, 
    874 F.2d 213
    , 218-19 (4th Cir. 1989).
    We review a sentence for abuse of discretion.                      Gall v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , __, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007).                           The
    first   step   in   this    review    requires           us   to    ensure    that    the
    district court committed no significant procedural error, such
    as improperly calculating the Guidelines range or treating the
    Guidelines as mandatory.        
    Id.
           We then consider the substantive
    reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the
    totality of the circumstances.                
    Id.
        When reviewing a sentence
    on appeal, we presume a sentence within a properly calculated
    Guidelines range is reasonable.                 United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir. 2007).            There was no procedural error at
    sentencing and we find Bellamy’s sentence within the Guidelines
    was reasonable.
    Accordingly, we affirm.            In accordance with Anders, we
    have    reviewed    the    record    in   this       case     and    have     found    no
    meritorious issues for appeal.                We therefore affirm Bellamy’s
    conviction and sentence.        This court requires counsel inform his
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    client, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
    of the United States for further review.              If he requests a
    petition be filed, but counsel believes such a petition would be
    frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
    withdraw from representation.        Counsel=s motion must state that a
    copy   thereof   was   served   on   Bellamy.   We   dispense   with   oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would
    not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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