United States v. Aldridge , 340 F. App'x 167 ( 2009 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-5074
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TRAVIS MCARTHUR ALDRIDGE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
    Chief District Judge. (3:08-cr-00036-JPB-DJJ-1)
    Submitted:    July 14, 2009                 Decided:   July 28, 2009
    Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Brendan S. Leary, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Wheeling,
    West Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, United States
    Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Travis         McArthur        Aldridge 1      pleaded      guilty     to
    distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)
    (2006).     The district court sentenced Aldridge to 135 months of
    imprisonment.            His   attorney    has    filed    a    brief   pursuant    to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), raising one issue but
    stating     that    there      are    no   meritorious         issues   for   appeal.
    Aldridge filed a pro se supplemental brief raising additional
    issues. 2   We affirm.
    In     the    Anders     brief,     counsel    questions    whether    the
    district court erred in accepting Aldridge’s guilty plea.                        Prior
    to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with
    the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that
    he understands, the nature of the charges to which the plea is
    offered,    any    mandatory       minimum      penalty,   the    maximum     possible
    penalty he faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by
    pleading guilty.          Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).              The court also must
    determine whether there is a factual basis for the plea.                          Id.;
    United States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
    The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure that the plea
    1
    The Appellant’s true name is Jerron Lamont Cephas.
    2
    We have considered the claims raised in Aldridge’s pro se
    brief and conclude the claims lack merit.
    2
    of guilt is entered into knowingly and voluntarily.                           See United
    States v. Vonn, 
    535 U.S. 55
    , 58 (2002).
    Because Aldridge did not move in the district court to
    withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is
    reviewed for plain error.               United States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 525 (4th Cir. 2002).               “To establish plain error, [Aldridge]
    must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and
    that     the    error       affected     his    substantial       rights.”        United
    States v. Muhammad, 
    478 F.3d 247
    , 249 (4th Cir. 2007).                          Even if
    Aldridge satisfies these requirements, “correction of the error
    remains    within         our   discretion,     which    we    should    not    exercise
    . . .     unless      the       error   seriously       affect[s]       the    fairness,
    integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”                              
    Id.
    Our review of the transcript reveals full compliance with the
    requirements of Rule 11, and we conclude that Aldridge pleaded
    guilty knowingly and voluntarily.
    We have examined the entire record in accordance with
    the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
    for appeal.         We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
    court.     This court requires that counsel inform Aldridge, in
    writing,       of   the    right   to   petition    the       Supreme   Court    of   the
    United States for further review.                  If Aldridge requests that a
    petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
    would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
    3
    leave to withdraw from representation.          Counsel’s motion must
    state that a copy thereof was served on Aldridge.              We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately   presented   in   the   materials   before   the    court   and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4