Hall v. Holsmith , 340 F. App'x 944 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-6288
KENNETH CARLOS HALL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ANNA HOLSMITH, Med. Tech.; CHUCK JENKINS, Sheriff,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District
Judge. (1:08-cv-00301-BEL)
Submitted: July 7, 2009 Decided: July 21, 2009
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kenneth Carlos Hall, Appellant Pro Se. Mary Malloy Dimaio,
POWERS & FROST, LLP, Towson, Maryland; Kevin Bock Karpinski,
KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Carlos Hall, a former inmate at the Frederick
County Adult Detention Center, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983(2006) civil rights action against medication technician Anna
Holtzman 1 and Sheriff Chuck Jenkins, alleging that Holtzman
intentionally denied him medication on December 17, 2007,
violating his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Hall appeals the district court’s denial of his motions to
appoint counsel and grant of summary judgment in Holtzman’s
favor. 2 Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
On appeal, Hall first challenges the district court’s
denial of his motions for appointment of counsel. Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2006), “[t]he court may request an
attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”
However, there is no absolute right to appointment of counsel; a
plaintiff must present “exceptional circumstances.” Miller v.
Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987). Exceptional
1
Hall’s action incorrectly names “Anna Holsmith” as a
defendant. The defendant/appellee’s name is Anna Holtzman.
2
Hall does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of
Jenkins as a party in his informal brief. Therefore, Hall has
forfeited appellate review of the issue. See Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).
2
circumstances exist where “a pro se litigant has a colorable
claim but lacks the capacity to present it.” Whisenant v. Yuam,
739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted), abrogated
on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 298
(1989) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize
compulsory appointment of counsel). A district court’s denial
of a motion to appoint counsel is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Miller, 814 F.2d at 966. The claims presented in
Hall’s complaint are not complicated and Hall has demonstrated
the capacity to present those claims adequately in his numerous
court filings. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Hall’s motions for appointment of counsel.
II.
Hall also challenges the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in Holtzman’s favor and its denial of his
motion for summary judgment, arguing the decision was “based on
undisputed material facts that [do] not exist.” Hall alleges
that the district court could not have assessed the seriousness
of his medical condition because his medical records do not
contain a diagnosis. We review a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, “viewing the facts and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th
3
Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Additionally, “the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
governs a pretrial detainee’s claim of denial of medical care.
Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). However,
“[p]retrial detainees are entitled to at least the same
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as are convicted
prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.” Young v. City of Mount
Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, we use the
Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard of
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), in evaluating the
pretrial detainee’s claim. Id.The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment protects prisoners from the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,” which includes “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Thus, “[t]o succeed on an Eighth Amendment
4
. . . claim, a prisoner must prove two elements: (1) that
objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was
sufficiently serious, and (2) that subjectively the prison
officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The first element “is
satisfied by a serious medical condition,” while the second
element “is satisfied by showing deliberate indifference by
prison officials.” Id. Mere negligence does not constitute
deliberate indifference; “[b]asically, a prison official ‘must
both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994)).
We conclude that the symptoms Hall complained of 3 do
not amount to a serious medical need such that the temporary
deprivation of a dose of over-the-counter medication rises to
the level of deliberate indifference. Hall speculates that his
symptoms could have been indicative of “small pox, primary
influenzal viral pneumonia, aids, or a secondary bacterial
pneumonia [any] of which may have resulted in death from
3
Hall initially complained of fever, body aches, sinus
congestion, and sore throat, although his temperature was found
to be normal on examination.
5
hemorrhage within the lungs.” However, there is no indication
in the medical records that Hall’s condition had progressed
beyond his initial complaints. Pure speculation cannot create a
genuine issue of material fact. Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
Moreover, a dispute over whether Hall’s symptoms were cold-like
or flu-like 4 does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Therefore, we find that the
district court properly granted summary judgment in Holtzman’s
favor.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Hall’s motions to appoint counsel and grant of summary judgment
in Holtzman’s favor. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4
Hall attempts to create an issue from Holtzman’s statement
in her motion for summary judgment that Hall was suffering from
cold symptoms and Holtzman’s statement in her informal brief
acknowledging flu-like symptoms.
6