Chadrus Lequardra Brown v. State , 346 Ga. App. 245 ( 2018 )

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
RAY and RICKMAN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 13, 2018
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A18A0064, A18A0065, A18A0066. BROWN v. THE STATE (three
cases).
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
Chadrus Brown has filed three pro se appeals challenging his convictions for
multiple sexual offenses. The evidence is sufficient to sustain those convictions.
Brown complains that his indictment was not returned in open court, but he did not
raise that argument in the trial court, so it is waived.
Brown also contends, in multiple enumerations of error, that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over him and was an improper venue. He contends that he is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for crimes he committed in this
state. In other words, Brown is — or more accurately purports to be — a “sovereign
citizen.” These arguments are entirely without merit, and we take this opportunity to
adopt federal case law directing our trial courts to summarily reject them, however
presented.
Brown’s briefs in all three appeals fail to comply with this court’s rules.1
Among other deficiencies, the briefs do not contain succinct and accurate statements
of the proceedings below and the material facts, do not contain adequate citations to
the parts of the record or transcript essential to a consideration of the alleged errors,
do not state how each enumerated error was preserved for consideration, and do not
state the applicable standards of review. See Court of Appeals Rule 25. Brown’s “pro
se status does not excuse him from compliance with the substantive and procedural
requirements of the law, including the rules of this [c]ourt.” Clemmons v. State, 340
Ga. App. 57, 58 (1) (796 SE2d 297) (2017) (citation omitted). These rules “were
created, not to provide an obstacle, but to aid parties in presenting their arguments in
a manner most likely to be fully and efficiently comprehended by this court.” Orange
v. State of Georgia, 319 Ga. App. 516, 517 (1) (736 SE2d 477) (2013) (punctuation
omitted). “While we will nonetheless review [Brown’s] claims of error to the extent
we are able to ascertain them, he will not be granted relief should we err in construing
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We note that in Case No. A18A0065, in addition to his brief, Brown has also
filed a “Motion for Post-Trial Judgment of Acquittal.” That motion is hereby denied.
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his nonconforming appellate brief[s].” Clemmons, supra. For reasons stated below,
we affirm.
1. Facts and procedural posture.
Construed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, see Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence shows that Brown
sexually assaulted his minor daughter by licking her breasts and vagina, and by
inserting his penis into her mouth, vagina, and anus. The jury found Brown guilty of
rape, incest, three counts of aggravated sodomy, and child molestation. The trial court
entered judgments of conviction, imposed sentences, and denied Brown’s motion for
a new trial. He filed these separate appeals, which have been consolidated for
consideration in this opinion.
2. Indictment.
Brown contends that the indictment was not returned in open court. But he has
failed to point to any evidence supporting this contention or that he objected to the
indictment on this specific ground before trial. “A demurrer to the indictment, motion
to quash or plea in abatement must be entered before trial. [Brown] therefore waived
this alleged error by going to trial under the indictment without raising the objection
that the indictment was not returned in open court.” Thomas v. State, 331 Ga. App.
3641, 655-656 (4) (771 SE2d 255) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accord
Peppers v. Balkcom, 218 Ga. 749, 750-751 (2) (b) (130 SE2d 709) (1963) (defendant
waived claim that indictment was not returned in open court by failing to raise the
issue before trial).
3. Jurisdiction and venue.
In several different enumerations of error, Brown challenges his convictions
on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and
was an improper venue. The challenges are without merit.
“It is the policy of this state to exercise its jurisdiction over crime and persons
charged with the commission of crime to the fullest extent allowable under, and
consistent with, the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United
States.” OCGA § 17-2-1 (a). “Pursuant to this policy a person shall be subject to
prosecution in this state for a crime which he commits, while either within or outside
the state, by his own conduct . . . if . . . [t]he crime is committed either wholly or
partly within the state[.]” OCGA § 17-2-1 (b) (1). “The superior courts . . . shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over trials in felony cases[.]” Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV,
Para. I. “Generally, a criminal action must be tried in the county in which the crime
was committed, and the [s]tate may establish venue by whatever means of proof are
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available to it, including direct and circumstantial evidence.” Borders v. State, 299
Ga. App. 100 (682 SE2d 148) (2009) (citation omitted). See also Ga. Const. 1983,
Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI; OCGA § 17-2-2 (a).
In this case, it is undisputed that Brown’s crimes took place in Fulton County,
Georgia, and that he was tried in Fulton County Superior Court. “Consequently,
[Brown] has failed to demonstrate that his [convictions] are void for lack of
jurisdiction [or improper venue].” Goodrum v. State, 259 Ga. App. 704 (578 SE2d
484) (2003).
4. Sovereign citizen.
In several enumerations alleging, among other things, bias, fraud, monopoly,
and violations of due process and equal protection, Brown makes arguments that
amount to a “sovereign citizen” claim that he is not subject to governmental
jurisdiction. He failed to cite factual support in the record for any of his claims, and
his arguments are meritless.
Brown points, without meaningful analysis, to various provision of the United
States Constitution, the Constitution of the State of Georgia, the Declaration of
Independence, as well as decisions of the appellate courts of our sister states,
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(occasionally) of this state, and of the federal courts — including Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
The state replies that the claims of “sovereign citizens” that they are beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts have no conceivable validity and should be rejected
summarily, however presented. We agree.
“Defendants claiming to be ‘sovereign citizens’ assert that the . . . government
is illegitimate and insist that they are not subject to its jurisdiction. The defense has
no conceivable validity in American law.” United States v. Jonassen, 759 F3d 653,
657, n. 2 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Courts “have repeatedly
rejected [such] theories of individual sovereignty, immunity from prosecution, and
their ilk. Regardless of an individual’s claimed status of descent . . . as a ‘sovereign
citizen,’ . . . that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories
should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.” United States v. Benabe,
654 F3d 753, 767 (II) (B) (1) (7th Cir. 2011) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Judgment affirmed in all three cases. Ray and Rickman, JJ., concur.
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