HEATHER WRYE v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2005-2 ( 2020 )


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  • Court of Appeals
    of the State of Georgia
    ATLANTA,____________________
    November 09, 2020
    The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
    A21A0607. HEATHER WRYE v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT
    LOAN TRUST 2005-2 et al.
    Heather Wrye filed this appeal pursuant to OCGA § 38-3-64, seeking to
    challenge the constitutional application of the judicial emergency orders issued by the
    Georgia Supreme Court pursuant to OCGA § 38-3-611 in this garnishment action.
    Specifically, Wrye contends that her rights have been adversely affected because the
    stay orders unlawfully expanded the trial court’s in rem subject-matter jurisdiction to
    reach and include wages earned outside the period of garnishment established by
    OCGA § 18-4-4 (c) (providing that in a continuing garnishment action, the
    garnishment period shall begin on the day of service of the summons of garnishment
    and shall include the next 179 days).2 However, we conclude that this appeal should
    be transferred to the Georgia Supreme Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over
    “[a]ll cases involving the construction of . . . the Constitution of the State of Georgia
    or of the United States and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance,
    or constitutional provision has been drawn in question.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI,
    Sec. VI, Par. II (1); see also Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 
    266 Ga. 657
    ,
    1
    See Chief Justice Melton’s Supreme Court Order Declaring Statewide Judicial
    Emergency (Mar. 14, 2020), as extended on April 6, May 11, and June 12, 2020, and
    as extended in part on July 10, August 6, and September 10, 2020, available at
    www.gasupreme.us.
    2
    Effective January 1, 2021, the garnishment period will be extended to 1,095
    days.
    657 (1) (469 SE2d 22) (1996).
    The Georgia Court of Appeals has only “limited jurisdiction to review
    constitutional questions,” which arises when the facts of the case “do not involve
    construction of some constitutional provision directly in question and doubtful either
    under its own terms or under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the
    Supreme Court of the United States.” State v. Davis, 
    303 Ga. 684
    , 687-688 (1) (814
    SE2d 701) (2018) (punctuation omitted). The instant appeal involves the construction
    of the garnishment statutes and how the statutes should be construed in the context
    of comporting with the Supreme Court’s judicial emergency orders, which,
    unsurprisingly, has not previously been addressed in this State. See 
    id.
     (holding that
    the Georgia Supreme Court had jurisdiction over a “constitutional question of first
    impression,” when the constitutional provision in question with respect to sex
    offender registration had not previously been addressed); State Dept. of Corrections
    v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co., 
    295 Ga. 741
    , 742 n. 2 (763 SE2d 868) (2014) (“An
    appeal requiring a first impression construction of the sovereign immunity provision
    of the Georgia Constitution is within [the Georgia Supreme] Court’s exclusive
    appellate jurisdiction.”). Indeed, implicit in Wrye’s appeal is the contention that the
    Supreme Court’s judicial emergency orders cannot toll the garnishment period
    provided in OCGA § 18-4-4 (c).
    Consequently, it appears that jurisdiction over the instant appeals lies in the
    Georgia Supreme Court. While we acknowledge that the question of appellate
    jurisdiction is subject to differing reasonable conclusions, we note that the Supreme
    Court has “the ultimate responsibility for construing the constitutional provisions
    regarding appellate jurisdiction.” Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Med. Clinic, 
    267 Ga. 177
    , 178 (476 SE2d 587) (1996). We also acknowledge that OCGA § 38-3-64 (c)
    provides in pertinent part that an appeal of an order declaring the existence of a
    judicial emergency “shall be heard immediately by the Georgia Court of Appeals
    under the procedure of emergency motions.” Nevertheless, we have reviewed this
    appeal in an expedited manner, and note that even if OCGA § 38-3-64 (c) and the
    provision of the Georgia Constitution regarding appellate jurisdiction over
    constitutional questions are in conflict, the latter would control. See MARTA v. Buho,
    
    353 Ga. App. 466
    , 468 (838 SE2d 130) (2020) (to the extent a statutory rule
    contradicts a constitutional rule, the constitutional rule prevails). Here, the
    constitutionality regarding the Supreme Court’s judicial emergency orders’ ability to
    toll the time period provided in OCGA § 18-4-4 (c) has been brought into question,
    and jurisdiction therefore appears to be proper in the Georgia Supreme Court.
    For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is hereby TRANSFERRED to the
    Georgia Supreme Court for disposition.
    Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
    Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________
    11/09/2020
    I certify that the above is a true extract from
    the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
    Witness my signature and the seal of said court
    hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
    , Clerk.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A21A0607

Filed Date: 11/17/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/17/2020