Com. v. Reeder, T. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S22015-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    TODD O. REEDER
    Appellant                 No. 977 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 21, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-31-CR-0000627-2013
    BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                             FILED MARCH 09, 2016
    Appellant, Todd O. Reeder, appeals from the May 21, 2015 aggregate
    judgment of sentence of three and a half to twelve years’ incarceration,
    imposed after the trial court convicted Appellant of robbery, theft by
    unlawful taking, possession of a weapon, and simple assault.1 Upon review,
    we affirm.
    The certified record reveals that Appellant was arrested and charged
    with the aforementioned crimes arising from the armed robbery of a Rite-Aid
    Pharmacy in Mount Union Borough, Pennsylvania, on November 19, 2013.
    Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on May 20, 2014, in which, inter
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701, 3921, 907 and 2701, respectively.
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    alia, he sought to suppress statements he made to police on November 21,
    2013, on the basis that he was “highly intoxicated.” On October 16, 2014,
    the trial court convened an evidentiary hearing, and subsequently issued an
    order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.      On January 21, 2015, the
    trial court filed a memorandum in support of its order denying suppression.
    The case proceeded to a bench trial on March 17, 2015, after which the trial
    court rendered its guilty verdicts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an
    aggregate sentence of three and a half to twelve years of incarceration on
    May 21, 2015.
    Appellant filed a timely appeal on June 9, 2015. The following day, the
    trial court ordered Appellant to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 1925(b).        Appellant filed his concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal on June 29, 2015, and the trial court filed a
    responsive memorandum on July 9, 2015, in which it referenced its January
    21, 2015 memorandum, stating it was “satisfied that in that adjudication we
    adequately explained our reason for denying the motion to suppress.”
    Memorandum, 7/9/15, at 3.
    On appeal, Appellant presents his suppression issue for our review as
    follows.
    1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion
    in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress statements
    made upon his arrest?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
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    Appellant specifically contends that the statements he made to police
    should have been suppressed because “the police impermissibly questioned
    him” when “he was too intoxicated to legally waive his rights to remain
    silent.” 
    Id. at 9.
    Our standard of review from an order denying a suppression motion is
    as follows.
    [W]e may consider only the Commonwealth’s
    evidence and so much of the evidence for the
    defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
    context of the record as a whole. Where the record
    supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are
    bound by those facts and may reverse only if the
    legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
    Commonwealth v. Russo, 
    934 A.2d 1199
    , 1203 (Pa. 2007) (citation
    omitted).2
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Our Supreme Court recently clarified our scope of review when considering
    a challenge to a trial court’s suppression ruling as it relates to “the extent of
    the record that the appellate court consults when conducting that
    review.” In re L.J., 
    79 A.3d 1073
    , 1080 (Pa. 2013). The Supreme Court
    held that such review is limited to the suppression hearing record, and “it is
    inappropriate to consider trial evidence as a matter of course, because it is
    simply not part of the suppression record, absent a finding that such
    evidence was unavailable during the suppression hearing.” 
    Id. at 1085.
    Because prior cases held that a reviewing court could consider the
    trial record in addition to the suppression record, our Supreme Court
    determined that the more limited scope announced in In re L.J. would apply
    prospectively to cases where the suppression hearing occurred after October
    30, 2013. 
    Id. at 1088-1089.
    Instantly, the subject suppression hearing
    was held on October 16, 2014. Accordingly, our scope of review is confined
    to the suppression hearing record.
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    Here, our independent review of the record reveals that four witnesses
    testified   at   the   suppression   hearing.   The   Commonwealth    called
    Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael Davis, while Appellant called two of his
    attorneys and took the stand on his own behalf.
    Trooper Davis testified to responding to a call “that the Rite Aid in
    Mount Union had been robbed by an individual wearing a mask, brandishing
    a gun.” N.T., 10/16/14, at 6. Trooper Davis received a tip that Appellant
    was a “person of interest,” and obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s
    home, where police found evidence “linking [Appellant] to the robbery.” 
    Id. Appellant was
    “taken into custody and transported back to state police
    Huntington where he was met by [Attorney] Newfield of the Public
    Defender’s Office.” 
    Id. at 6-7.
    After Appellant met with Attorney Newfield,
    he was interviewed by Trooper Davis and Trooper Aungst. 
    Id. at 7.
    Trooper
    Davis testified that prior to interviewing Appellant, he “read the whole
    Miranda to him.” 
    Id. Trooper Davis
    further stated that Appellant “relayed
    that he understood and chose to speak with me.”         
    Id. Trooper Davis
    proceeded to interview Appellant in the presence of Attorney Newfield. 
    Id. Trooper Davis
    described Appellant’s demeanor as follows.
    [TROOPER DAVIS:]      He was cognizant of his
    surroundings. He knew where he was. While we
    were on scene at his house, we attempted to speak
    with him there.    At that point he requested an
    attorney so we set up the meeting with Mr. Newfield
    for that night. He had the presence of mind to ask
    for an attorney.
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    THE COURT:           Was he intoxicated?
    [TROOPER DAVIS:]       I would say that he
    was under the influence of some pills, but I don’t
    think he was intoxicated to the degree that he could
    not make a sound decision.
    [COMMONWEALTH:]
    Q.    What indicia       of   intoxication   did   you
    notice?
    A:    Pinpoint pupils.
    Q:    Was he staggering?
    A:    No.
    Q:    Slurring his words?
    A:    No.
    Q:    Did he seem aware and lucid during the
    interview?
    A:    Yes, he did.
    
    Id. at 7-8.
    Trooper Davis added that Appellant had the dexterity to write his
    signature, and did not slur his words or seem confused. 
    Id. at 9.
    He further
    testified that he did not think that Appellant was under the influence of
    alcohol, and did not smell any alcohol. 
    Id. at 10.
    Trooper Davis could not
    recall Appellant saying anything about being under the influence during the
    interview, although Appellant did mention “during his interview at the
    barracks of how intoxicated he was during the robbery itself.” 
    Id. at 11.
    Next, Appellant waived his attorney-client privilege and called Attorney
    Nicholas Newfield, who testified to being a public defender and meeting with
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    Appellant prior to his interview with police. Attorney Newfield stated, “When
    I first walked in the room, when I first walked in, he said he planned on
    talking to the police and if I was going to tell him otherwise, I can leave
    now. … I told him, ‘Relax. Let me talk to you. Sit down. Let’s just kind of
    talk between me and you.’” 
    Id. at 14.
    Attorney Newfield further explained,
    “First I told him talk to me and then we will go from there. Just tried to get
    him to kind of ease down and give me information or at least talk to me as
    his counsel and we will see where it goes from there. I think I did a good
    job of having him just talk to me about it.” 
    Id. at 15.
    Attorney Newfield
    “told him wait until Tuesday.      I assumed there would be a preliminary
    hearing the following week. … I said, ‘Let me go out and talk to the D.A. to
    see if we can get some kind of offer if you’re gonna talk.’”            
    Id. at 16.
    Specifically, Attorney Newfield advised Appellant as follows.
    I told him not to [talk to the police]. I advised
    him it would be better just to wait until Tuesday and
    sleep on it, think about it, give [him] some more
    time. At that time point he was still adamant on
    speaking. … He said he was talking. He said, again,
    if I told him not to, I could leave now; he didn’t need
    me there; he was going to talk to them and give
    them a statement.
    
    Id. at 16-17.
    Regarding    Appellant’s   demeanor,     Attorney    Newfield      described
    Appellant as “appearing tired.” 
    Id. at 17.
    He said “[t]hat stood out more so
    than anything.    He just appeared tired.    Speaking-wise, though, we were
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    able to hold a conversation. He understood what I was explaining to him.
    Coherent.” 
    Id. Appellant next
    waived his attorney-client privilege and called Attorney
    Jennifer Habel, who also was a public defender, and who had been appointed
    to represent Appellant at his preliminary hearing. 
    Id. at 20.
    Attorney Habel
    testified that Appellant “was very adamant that he did not want Attorney
    Newfield to be with him for that particular pre-trial conference … and
    [Appellant] was extremely upset at Attorney Newfield because he believed
    that he had been promised State Intermediate Punishment and that was the
    reason he gave a statement. … [Appellant] said he was extremely messed
    up that night. … I believe he had been a heavy [drug] user for a number of
    years, and he was coming off of something.” 
    Id. at 22-23.
    Attorney Habel
    explained as follows.
    He was very angry at Attorney Newfield during
    that meeting.    That might have been his exact
    words. He has said to me on numerous occasions he
    believed he was extremely messed up. I wasn’t
    there. Any conversation I have had with Attorney
    Newfield was that he believed he was fine.
    
    Id. at 23.
    Lastly, Appellant testified that he was “absolutely” under the influence
    of “Xanax, Adderall, percoset and heroin” when he made his statements to
    police. 
    Id. at 24-25.
    He claimed to have ingested “at least 10 pills” before
    he “walked out to see the police.” 
    Id. at 25.
    Appellant testified he had been
    using drugs “all that day.”   
    Id. He stated
    that he “wasn’t coherent” and
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    J-S22015-16
    “had no recollection of what actually happened.”       
    Id. at 26.
       Appellant
    averred, “I was extremely messed up.       My level of intoxication was very
    high. It’s possibly been the highest ever in my life.” 
    Id. at 27.
    Appellant
    elaborated as follows.
    I really don’t recall even speaking to Trooper
    Davis. I don’t recall speaking to Mr. Newfield. I
    don’t recall the investigation as it happened that
    night. The one thing I do recall is having a police
    officer asking me a question over my shoulder and
    me realizing I was speaking to the police and me
    stating I shouldn’t be speaking to anybody right now
    I’m so messed up on Xanax, percoset, Adderall; I
    haven’t slept in days; I shouldn’t be speaking to
    anybody.
    And that’s when I saw a person who I later
    found out was Mr. Newfield stand up, put his arms in
    the air, and tell me, “But I can get you SIP.” And I
    remember looking up and seeing District Justice Wilt
    and a court reporter, and that is my entire
    recollection of the night I was arrested.
    
    Id. at 27-28.
    After hearing from the four witnesses, the trial court denied Appellant’s
    suppression motion, stating that it would “file written findings and
    conclusions after the preparation of a transcript.” 
    Id. at 32.
    On January 21,
    2015, the trial court filed its memorandum in which it credited the testimony
    of Trooper Davis and Attorney Newfield, and concluded that Appellant “had
    sufficient mental capacity at the time of giving his statement to know what
    he was saying and to have voluntarily intended to say it.”      Memorandum,
    1/21/15, at 6, citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    291 A.2d 103
    (Pa. 1971).
    -8-
    J-S22015-16
    It is clear from our review that the trial court as factfinder did not
    abuse its discretion in accepting as credible the testimony of Trooper Davis
    and Attorney Newfield. As detailed above, the trial court’s factual findings
    are supported by the record. Furthermore, the trial court’s legal conclusions
    are not erroneous. 
    Russo, supra
    . We have explained as follows.
    [T]he law in Pennsylvania pertaining to the waiver of
    Miranda warnings while intoxicated is well-settled:
    The fact that an accused has been drinking
    does     not    automatically   invalidate   his
    subsequent incriminating statements. The test
    is whether he had sufficient mental capacity at
    the time of giving his statement to know what
    he was saying and to have voluntarily intended
    to say it. Recent imbibing or the existence of a
    hangover does not make his confession
    inadmissible, but goes only to the weight to be
    accorded to it.
    Commonwealth v. Adams, 385 Pa.Super. 513, 
    561 A.2d 793
    , 795 (1989) (citation omitted). “[W]hen
    evidence of impairment is present, it is for the
    suppression    court   to  decide     whether    the
    Commonwealth has established by a preponderance
    of the evidence that the suspect nonetheless had
    sufficient cognitive awareness to understand the
    Miranda warnings and to choose to waive his
    rights.” Commonwealth v. Britcher, 386 Pa.Super.
    515, 
    563 A.2d 502
    , 507 (1989) (citations omitted).
    Commonwealth v. Ventura, 
    975 A.2d 1128
    , 1137-38 (Pa. Super. 2009)
    (footnote omitted), appeal denied, 
    987 A.2d 161
    (Pa. 2009).
    Based on the foregoing, we find no merit to Appellant’s claim that the
    trial court erred and abused its discretion in determining that Appellant had
    sufficient mental capacity when he made his statements, and thus denying
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    Appellant’s suppression motion. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment
    of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/9/2016
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 977 MDA 2015

Filed Date: 3/9/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/9/2016