United States v. Calvin Nesmith , 866 F.3d 677 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-40196        Document: 00514107321         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/08/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 16-40196
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 8, 2017
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff–Appellee,
    v.
    CALVIN NESMITH,
    Defendant–Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    Before KING, JOLLY, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.*
    EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:
    Defendant–Appellant Calvin Nesmith pleaded guilty to the sexual
    exploitation of a minor after investigators found an explicit image of Nesmith
    and the fourteen-year-old daughter of his girlfriend. In calculating Nesmith’s
    Guidelines sentencing range, the district court applied a four-level
    enhancement because the image purportedly depicted sadistic conduct.
    Nesmith appeals the district court’s application of the sadism enhancement.
    We VACATE and REMAND for resentencing.
    *   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge, concurs in the judgment only.
    Case: 16-40196    Document: 00514107321     Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/08/2017
    No. 16-40196
    I. BACKGROUND
    In June 2015, Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) agents began
    investigating Calvin Nesmith after he responded to an undercover agent’s
    online ad posing as the mother of two young girls. Nesmith arranged to meet
    with the agent and one of her underage daughters for a “three-way sexual
    encounter,” and was arrested at the scene of the meeting. DHS agents searched
    his home the following day. During the search, agents discovered a thumb
    drive containing pictures of Nesmith and Jane Doe, the then fourteen-year-old
    daughter of a woman whom Nesmith had been dating and living with for over
    five years. One image on the thumb drive, the image at issue, depicted Nesmith
    “standing by [Doe’s] bed with his erect penis on the minor’s lips.”
    In November 2015, Nesmith pleaded guilty to the sexual exploitation of
    a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). The presentence report
    (“PSR”) recommended a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4),
    which applies “[i]f the offense involved material that portrays sadistic or
    masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.” Nesmith objected to
    application of the sadism enhancement, arguing that the image in question did
    not depict “purposeful, violent, [or] aggressive conduct.” In its response, the
    Government conceded that the image did not depict physical violence but
    argued that the image had inflicted emotional pain on the victim. Apparently,
    “[d]uring the course of the government’s investigation, the victim learned of
    the existence of the image and exactly what it depicts.” After learning about
    the image, the victim felt “humiliated and degraded,” which, according to the
    Government, sufficed as the sort of infliction of emotional pain that justifies
    application of the sadism enhancement.
    During Nesmith’s sentencing hearing, Doe testified that she had been
    asleep when the picture was taken and “had no idea the picture [existed] until
    court.” After being told about the content of the picture, Doe said she felt
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    embarrassed, humiliated, and worried because she didn’t “know who’s seen it
    or if it will ever get out and how it will affect [her] later.” Based on Doe’s
    testimony, the Government reurged application of the enhancement. Nesmith
    objected, arguing that the image did not portray sadistic or masochistic
    conduct because it did not depict anyone inflicting or receiving pain. The
    district court overruled Nesmith’s objection, and sentenced him to 360 months’
    imprisonment. This appeal followed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A.    Standard of Review
    The parties first dispute the applicable standard of review. The
    Government contends that Nesmith’s argument on appeal differs from his
    objection below and argues that plain error review should therefore apply.
    Nesmith counters that the objection he made before the district court contained
    the gist of his argument on appeal; he therefore urges us to apply de novo
    review.
    “Generally, this Court reviews the district court’s application of the
    Sentencing Guidelines de novo. . . .” United States v. Garcia-Perez, 
    779 F.3d 278
    , 281 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Medina-Anicacio, 
    325 F.3d 638
    , 643 (5th Cir. 2003)). However, “[w]hen a defendant objects to his sentence
    on grounds different from those raised on appeal, we review the new
    arguments raised on appeal for plain error only.” 
    Id. (quoting Medina-Anicacio,
    325 F.3d at 281). But the objection and argument on appeal need not be
    identical; the objection need only “‘g[i]ve the district court the opportunity to
    address’ the gravamen of the argument presented on appeal.” 
    Id. at 281–82
    (quoting United States v. Ocana, 
    204 F.3d 585
    , 588–89 (5th Cir. 2000)). In other
    words, the “objection must be sufficiently specific to alert the district court to
    the nature of the alleged error and to provide an opportunity for correction.”
    
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Neal, 
    578 F.3d 270
    , 272 (5th Cir. 2009)); see also
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    United States v. Hernandez-Montes, 
    831 F.3d 284
    , 290 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Key is
    whether the objection is specific enough to allow the [district] court to take
    evidence and receive argument on the issue.”).
    Here, Nesmith’s objection to the sadism enhancement before the district
    court preserved the argument he makes on appeal. Below, Nesmith essentially
    argued that § 2G2.1(b)(4) was inapplicable because the image at issue does not
    portray sadism—i.e., the conduct depicted did not inflict pain on the victim.
    The core of Nesmith’s argument on appeal remains the same. On appeal,
    Nesmith contends that the sadism enhancement should apply only where an
    image portrays conduct that contemporaneously inflicts either physical or
    emotional pain on the victim. Because Doe was asleep in the image at issue
    and was thus unaware that the image was taken, Nesmith reasons that his
    conduct did not inflict contemporaneous pain on Doe. Although Nesmith’s
    argument is somewhat refined on appeal, the crux of his objection is the same:
    the image does not depict the infliction of pain. Given that the “essence [of
    Nesmith’s argument] was fairly presented to the district court,” we apply de
    novo review. See 
    Garcia-Perez, 779 F.3d at 282
    .
    B.    Analysis
    We begin our consideration of the merits by determining the proper
    standard by which to judge whether the image portrays sadistic conduct within
    the meaning of § 2G2.1(b)(4). The parties disagree on two primary issues:
    (1) whether the test for application of the sadism enhancement is subjective or
    objective; and (2) whether an image must depict conduct that would
    contemporaneously inflict physical or emotional pain on a victim to qualify as
    sadistic.
    Our starting point for interpretation is the plain text of the Guidelines.
    United States v. Lyckman, 
    235 F.3d 234
    , 238 (5th Cir. 2000). The plain text of
    § 2G2.1(b)(4) weighs in favor of an objective analysis. The Guidelines provide
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    that the sadism enhancement applies “[i]f the offense involved material that
    portrays sadistic     conduct     or    other     depictions    of   violence.”    U.S.S.G.
    § 2G2.1(b)(4) (emphases added). Thus, according to § 2G2.1(b)(4)’s plain text,
    the inquiry should focus on an observer’s view of the image—what is portrayed
    and depicted—rather than the viewpoint of either the defendant or the victim. 1
    In other words, the text emphasizes what objectively appears to be happening,
    not what actually occurred.
    In line with the text, the six other circuits to consider this issue have
    held that the determination of whether the sadism enhancement applies is an
    objective inquiry. See United States v. Johnson, No. 16-4005, 
    2017 WL 775856
    ,
    at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2017) (per curiam) (“Whether a particular image
    portrays sadistic conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines is, indeed, ‘an
    objective determination.’” (quoting United States v. Corp, 
    668 F.3d 379
    , 389
    (6th Cir. 2012))); United States v. Johnson, 
    784 F.3d 1070
    , 1074 (7th Cir. 2015)
    (“[T]he proper question is whether the image itself would be objectively
    considered sadistic.”); United States v. Corp, 
    668 F.3d 379
    , 389 (6th Cir. 2012)
    (“[W]hether a particular image can be classified as portraying sadistic or
    masochistic conduct under § 2G2.1(b)(4) is an objective determination.”);
    United States v. Maurer, 
    639 F.3d 72
    , 80 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “this
    factual inquiry is an objective one”); United States v. Freeman, 
    578 F.3d 142
    ,
    146 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he determination of whether an image is sadistic . . . is
    an objective one.”); United States v. Raplinger, 
    555 F.3d 687
    , 694 (8th Cir.
    1 Nesmith counters that an objective inquiry cannot be proper given this Court’s
    statement in United States v. Cloud, that the “effect on the victim has often been the inquiry
    in our case law.” 630 F. App’x 236, 238 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). But even if Cloud, an
    unpublished opinion, were binding, it did not determine whether the sadism-enhancement
    inquiry is subjective or objective. In making the statement relied upon by Nesmith, the Court
    was simply refuting the proposition that it was the defendant’s intent, not the effect on the
    victim, that mattered. 
    Id. 5 Case:
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    2009)       (“The   enhancement . . . applies       to    material     depicting     sadistic,
    masochistic, or violent conduct even if those pictured were not truly engaging
    in painful activities.”). 2 Because Nesmith has not provided a compelling reason
    to create a circuit split, we likewise hold that an objective standard governs
    the assessment of whether an image portrays sadistic conduct under
    § 2G2.1(b)(4).
    Nesmith also argues that the sadism enhancement should only apply if
    an image depicts conduct that an objective observer would view as causing a
    victim emotional or physical pain contemporaneous to creation of the image.
    The Government, on the other hand, suggests that an image can portray
    sadistic conduct even if, as here, the victim is unaware of the conduct when the
    picture was taken but would likely experience mental or emotional suffering if
    he or she later learned of it. The Government does not argue that the conduct
    caused the victim any pain contemporaneous with the image’s creation.
    As above, we begin with the text of the Guidelines. In Lyckman, this
    Court defined sadism as “the infliction of pain upon a love object as a means of
    obtaining sexual 
    release.” 235 F.3d at 238
    n.19 (quoting Sadism, Webster’s
    Third New International Dictionary (1986)). This interpretation suggests a
    causal relationship—the victim’s experience of contemporaneous physical or
    emotional pain is what prompts the sadist’s sexual release. In other words, a
    sadist would only experience sexual gratification while inflicting pain or
    humiliation on another; a sadist would not obtain sexual release from the
    2 Although some of these cases address § 2G2.2(b)(4) rather than § 2G2.1(b)(4), the
    language of these two provisions is identical. Cf. United States v. Shouse, 
    755 F.3d 1104
    , 1106
    (9th Cir. 2014) (considering issue involving application of § 2G2.1(b)(4) and finding “no reason
    to deviate from [Ninth Circuit] precedent with respect to identical language in
    § 2G2.2(b)(4) . . . both of which stem from the same [Guidelines] chapter on ‘sexual
    exploitation of a minor’”).
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    foreseeable, but uncertain, possibility that the victim will at some point in the
    future feel emotional pain.
    This Court has never faced application of the sadism enhancement in a
    scenario like this one—where the minor victim is completely unconscious and
    unaware of the sexual exploitation occurring at his or her expense. But in all
    the cases where we have found the sadism enhancement appropriate, the
    infliction of emotional or physical pain that was the basis for the enhancement
    has been contemporaneous with the creation of the image. See, e.g., United
    States v. Cloud, 630 F. App’x 236, 237–39 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); United
    States v. Comeaux, 445 F. App’x 743, 745–46 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam);
    United States v. Hewitt, 326 F. App’x 756, 759 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam);
    
    Lyckman, 235 F.3d at 238
    –40.
    Even aside from the guidance provided by our case law, it would be
    unwise to expand the sadism enhancement to apply in all situations where it
    is reasonably foreseeable that the conduct depicted in the image will later
    manifest itself in pain. As an initial matter, without a contemporaneousness
    requirement, § 2G2.1(b)(4) would apply in every child pornography case
    regardless of the content of the images in question. After all, it is foreseeable
    that any child who discovers that he or she was depicted in pornography would
    feel humiliated and debased. Like the plaintiff here, all child victims would
    likely find it “nerve-wracking” not knowing who had seen the images or if they
    would become public later and not knowing what effect that would have on
    their lives. Moreover, without requiring the pain inflicted on the victim to be
    contemporaneous with creation of the image in question, the sadism
    enhancement could apply even where a victim never becomes aware that he or
    she is the subject of child pornography. Any connection between the victim and
    the defendant would make it foreseeable that the victim would later learn of
    the conduct depicted in the images and consequently experience emotional
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    pain. In our view, it is inappropriate to apply an enhancement in such a broad
    manner that it essentially becomes part of the base offense level.
    Under the Government’s reasoning, even if § 2G2.1(b)(4) were only to
    apply where the victim actually became aware of the sexual exploitation
    depicted in the image, application of the enhancement would then turn on the
    conduct of individuals other than the defendant. If, as was the case here, the
    Government tells the victim that the image exists and describes its content,
    that victim will most likely testify to feeling humiliated and debased, and the
    sadism enhancement would apply. On the other hand, where the victim
    remains totally unaware of the image, a court could find that such humiliation
    and debasement are unlikely to happen in the future. Again, this is true
    regardless of the actual content of the image. In either situation, application of
    the enhancement would inappropriately be predicated on the conduct of
    individuals other than the defendant.
    Given the plain text of the Guidelines, our case law, and the strong policy
    reasons in favor of such an approach, we conclude that a contemporaneity
    requirement is appropriate. Accordingly, we hold that an image portrays
    sadistic conduct where it depicts conduct that an objective observer would
    perceive as causing the victim in the image physical or emotional pain
    contemporaneously with the image’s creation. Because the victim in this case
    was asleep when the image was taken, no objective observer would conclude
    that the image portrayed sadistic conduct—namely, the defendant obtaining
    sexual release through the infliction of physical or emotional pain on another.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE and REMAND for resentencing.
    8