In re: The Adoption of C.G.C., M.T. v. C.C. and S.C. (mem dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                       FILED
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                        Oct 31 2017, 8:55 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
    Steven Knecht                                            George G. Ponton
    Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C.                               Frankfort, Indiana
    Lafayette, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In re: The Adoption of C.G.C.,                           October 31, 2017
    Court of Appeals Case No.
    M.T.,                                                    12A02-1607-AD-1759
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Appeal from the Clinton Circuit
    Court
    v.                                               The Honorable Bradley K. Mohler,
    Judge
    C.C. and S.C.,                                           Trial Court Cause No.
    Appellees-Petitioners.                                   12C01-1505-AD-7
    Bradford, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1607-AD-1759 | October 31, 2017           Page 1 of 7
    Case Summary
    [1]   On May 27, 2015, Appellees-Petitioners C.C. and S.C. (collectively, “the
    Appellees”) filed a petition to adopt C.G.C. On May 14, 2016, Appellees filed
    a motion for summary judgment, requesting that the trial court find that
    Appellant-Respondent M.T. had given his irrevocable implied consent to the
    adoption by failing to register with the Putative Father Registry (“the Registry”)
    as required by Statute. Following a hearing on the Appellees’ motion, the trial
    court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. M.T. appeals from
    this order, arguing that the trial court erred in doing so. Concluding otherwise,
    we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   C.G.C. was born on April 8, 2013. O.C. is the biological mother of C.G.C. It
    is believed that M.T. is the biological father of C.G.C., but M.T. has never
    established paternity or registered as C.G.C.’s putative father.
    [3]   C.G.C. tested positive for opiates at birth and was removed from O.C.’s care.
    C.G.C. was placed with the Appellees in September of 2013. They became
    C.G.C.’s legal guardians on June 23, 2014. On May 27, 2015, Appellees filed a
    petition to adopt C.G.C. Appellees subsequently filed a motion for summary
    judgment, requesting that the trial court find that M.T. had given his
    irrevocable implied consent to the adoption by failing to register with the
    Registry as required by Statute. Following a hearing on the Appellees’ motion,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1607-AD-1759 | October 31, 2017   Page 2 of 7
    the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. This
    appeal follows.
    Discussion and Decision1
    I. Overview of Relevant Authority
    A. Standard of Review
    [4]           Summary judgment is appropriate only where no genuine issues
    of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Settles v.
    Leslie, 
    701 N.E.2d 849
    , 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Genuine issues
    of material fact exist where facts concerning an issue which
    would dispose of the litigation are in dispute. 
    Settles, 701 N.E.2d at 852
    . The moving party has the initial burden of
    demonstrating, prima facie, the absence of genuine issues of
    material fact. 
    Id. If the
    moving party does so, the burden then
    falls upon the non-moving party to identify a factual dispute
    which would preclude summary judgment. 
    Id. Upon appeal
    of a
    grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the
    trial court, resolving any factual disputes or conflicting inferences
    in favor of the non-moving party. 
    Id. We consider
    only those
    portions of the record specifically designated to the trial court.
    
    Id. Upon appeal
    , the non-moving party bears the burden of
    persuasion and must specifically point to the disputed material
    facts and the designated evidence pertaining thereto. 
    Id. We will
                  liberally construe the designated evidence in favor of the non-
    movant, so that he is not improperly denied his day in court. 
    Id. 1 We
    note that our review of the instant matter was initially hindered because the Table of Contents filed
    with Appellant’s Appendix is inaccurate as it contains the wrong caption and does not correctly reflect the
    documents contained therein. We remind M.T.’s counsel that one should exercise caution when submitting
    documents to the court to make sure that such submissions are accurate.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1607-AD-1759 | October 31, 2017          Page 3 of 7
    Nevertheless, we will not become an advocate for a party, and
    the trial court’s entry of summary judgment will be affirmed if it
    may be sustained upon any theory or basis found in the
    evidentiary material designated to the trial court. 
    Id. Meisenhelder v.
    Zipp Exp., Inc., 
    788 N.E.2d 924
    , 926-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
    B. The Putative Father Registry
    [5]   Indiana established the Putative Father Registry (the “Registry”) in 1994. In re
    Adoption of K.G.B., 
    18 N.E.3d 292
    , 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing In re
    Paternity of G.W., 
    983 N.E.2d 1193
    , 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)). Statutes
    governing registration on the Registry apply to a putative father whenever:
    (1) an adoption under IC 31-19-2 has been or may be filed
    regarding a child who may have been conceived by the putative
    father; and
    (2) on or before the date the child’s mother executes a consent to
    the child’s adoption, the child’s mother has not disclosed the
    name or address, or both, of the putative father to the attorney or
    agency that is arranging the child’s adoption.
    Ind. Code § 31-19-5-1(a). However, the statutes governing registration on the
    Registry do not apply “if, on or before the date the child’s mother executes a
    consent to the child’s adoption, the child’s mother discloses the name and
    address of the putative father to the attorney or agency that is arranging the
    child’s adoption.” Ind. Code § 31-19-5-1(b).
    If, on or before the date the mother of a child executes a consent
    to the child’s adoption, the mother does not disclose to an
    attorney or agency that:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1607-AD-1759 | October 31, 2017   Page 4 of 7
    (1) is arranging; or
    (2) may arrange;
    an adoption of the child the name or address, or both, of the putative
    father of the child, the putative father must register under this
    chapter to entitle the putative father to notice of the child’s
    adoption.
    Ind. Code § 31-19-5-5 (emphasis added). To be entitled to notice of an
    adoption, a putative father must register with the Registry no later than:
    (1) thirty (30) days after the child’s birth; or
    (2) the earlier of the date of the filing of a petition for the:
    (A) child’s adoption; or
    (B) termination of the parent-child relationship
    between the child and the child’s mother;
    whichever occurs later.
    Ind. Code § 31-19-5-12(a). “A putative father who fails to register within the
    period specified by [Indiana Code section 31-19-5-12(a)] waives notice of an
    adoption proceeding. The putative father’s waiver under this section constitutes
    an irrevocably implied consent to the child’s adoption.” Ind. Code § 31-19-5-18
    (emphasis added). Further, a person whose consent to adoption is irrevocably
    implied “may not contest the adoption or the validity of the person’s implied
    consent to the adoption.” Ind. Code § 31-19-9-19.
    II. Analysis
    [6]   In filing their motion for summary judgment, the Appellees requested the trial
    court to rule that M.T. had given his irrevocable implied consent to the
    adoption by failing to timely register with the Registry. The trial court granted
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1607-AD-1759 | October 31, 2017   Page 5 of 7
    the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment after the Appellees designated
    evidence that M.T. had failed to either register with the Registry or establish
    paternity of C.G.C.
    [7]   M.T. contends that the trial court erred in granting the Appellees’ motion for
    summary judgment. In making this contention, M.T. argues that the statutes
    requiring registration on the putative father registry did not apply to him
    because (1) Mother did not consent to the adoption and (2) Mother provided
    Appellees’ counsel with his name and address. M.T., however, did not raise
    these arguments below and failed to designate any materials before the trial
    court to substantiate these factual claims.
    [8]   In reviewing an award of summary judgment, we consider only those materials
    designated before the trial court. See 
    Meisenhelder, 788 N.E.2d at 926-27
    . The
    Appellees designated materials before the trial court to support their assertion
    that M.T. was required to register with the Registry. They also designated
    materials before the trial court establishing that M.T. failed to do so. M.T. did
    not designate any materials to counter the Appellees’ designated materials. In
    fact, he merely responded to the Appellees’ submission of the designated
    materials by stating the following: “1. That the Father, [M.T.], has advised his
    counsel to take no further action and spend no additional time in responding to
    Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 53.
    Thus, given the record before us on appeal, we cannot say that the trial court
    erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1607-AD-1759 | October 31, 2017   Page 6 of 7
    [9]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    May, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1607-AD-1759 | October 31, 2017   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12A02-1607-AD-1759

Filed Date: 10/31/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/31/2017