State v. Riveira. ( 2021 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
31-AUG-2021
08:34 AM
Dkt. 9 OPA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RALPH CURTIS RIVEIRA, JR.,
also known as Ralph C. Riveira, Jr.,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1PC121001439)
AUGUST 31, 2021
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.
The prosecution injected victim impact evidence into Ralph
Riveira’s burglary trial. And during opening statement and
closing argument, the State spotlighted the crime’s effect on
the burglarized family. It also told the jurors that defense
counsel tried to “trick” them.
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The prosecution’s narrative arc focused on the victims’
emotional state and actions after the crime. This constituted
prosecutorial misconduct. So did the comment besmirching
defense counsel. But the evidence overwhelmingly established
Riveira’s guilt. We conclude that the misconduct was harmless
and affirm Riveira’s conviction. 1
I.
A burglary happened at a Kailua house. The homeowner
returned home. She saw a man running in her backyard. He was
carrying a black object with black cords hanging from it. The
homeowner ran after him to get “a good visual.” She did not see
his face. But she had an unobstructed view of the man from
about twenty-five feet. The fleeing man was heavy-set and had
short hair. He wore a neon green construction shirt, dark
boots, and plaid shorts. The man hopped the backyard fence.
The homeowner later realized that her laptop and her
children’s gaming devices were taken. A towel she had laid on
the floor for her dog had a boot print.
1 Riveira also challenges the ICA’s holding that (1) the circuit court
did not err by denying his motion to suppress field show-up identifications;
(2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a full-body
arrest photograph of Riveira and another photograph of him found in a truck
connected to the burglary; and (3) the circuit court did not err by
instructing the jury on accomplice liability. We do not find error in the
ICA’s analysis covering these issues. Riveira’s allegations of improper
statements by the prosecution that are not addressed here also lack merit.
We consider Riveira’s claim that the trial court plainly erred in allowing
the burglarized family’s impact testimony as part of the prosecutorial
misconduct analysis.
2
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After the burglar jumped the fence, the homeowner called
911. She described “what [the man] looked like, what he was
wearing, and what he was carrying.”
The homeowner also told the 911 operator about a red Toyota
Tundra parked by her mailbox. She recited the truck’s license
plate number. And she relayed that a woman was sitting inside.
The woman’s feet rested on the dashboard; her toenails were
painted. Shortly after, the truck left.
Within ten minutes, the police stopped a red Toyota Tundra
about a mile and a half from the burglarized home. The truck
matched the license plate number given by the homeowner.
Riveira sat in the front passenger seat. The truck’s owner, a
woman with painted toenails, was the driver. 2 Both were
arrested. The police impounded the truck and got a search
warrant.
About ten minutes before the burglary’s end, the
homeowner’s neighbor spotted a similar Toyota Tundra parked on a
nearby street. He told the police he saw a man sitting in the
truck. The neighbor had “a clear visual.” The man had short
hair and wore a yellow construction shirt. They made eye
contact; the man gave him a shaka. About five minutes later,
2 The female driver died before trial. The court read a stipulation to
the jury: “. . . [The driver] has passed away. Her passing is in no way
related to this case in any way whatsoever.”
3
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the neighbor saw the truck again. This time it drove down his
and the homeowner’s street.
After Riveira’s detention, the police drove the homeowner
and neighbor separately to Riveira’s location for a field show-
up. Both identified Riveira as the man they had seen. At
trial, the homeowner testified: “[h]e was wearing the same plaid
shorts, he had the same build, he had the same [dark boots].”
She said, “[t]he only thing [that] was different [at the field
show-up] was [Riveira’s] shirt; he was not wearing the
construction neon shirt.” The neighbor identified Riveira
partly based on his tattoos. The homeowner identified the
female driver as the woman in the truck by her mailbox; the
toenails matched.
The police recovered the stolen property – a black laptop
with a black cord and gaming devices - from the impounded truck.
Officers also retrieved Riveira’s photograph from a bag in the
truck.
At trial, the homeowner and neighbor testified. 3 They
detailed their encounters with the suspect and the truck. They
also discussed how they identified Riveira. Police officers
testified about the arrest, field show-ups, and truck search.
The jury viewed scene photographs depicting Riveira, the home,
3 The Honorable Rom A. Trader presided.
4
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the truck, and the stolen property found in it.
The prosecution’s trial narrative featured evidence and
remarks about the crime’s impact on the homeowner’s family. The
prosecution bookended its case with commentary regarding this
impact. During opening statement, the deputy prosecuting
attorney previewed the case: “[T]his is a case about a Kailua
family who was burglarized. And more so than just losing
electronics, the evidence will show that they lost their sense
of security and ability to feel safe in their home. . . .”
(Emphasis added.)
During the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the
prosecuting attorney showcased the victim impact evidence he had
presented. The State’s argument ended with a plea to convict
Riveira for what he had done to the family:
Do you remember what [the homeowner] said about this whole
experience? It’s affected me deeply. It’s affected me
deeply. You know, the evidence does show they got the
electronics back. She still uses the laptop. The kids
still play with the Nintendo devices. But more than
electronics, the defendant took something else from them
that they didn’t get back, that’s the ability to feel safe
and secure in their own home.
For most people, burglary is just something that happens to
other people until it happens to them, and in this case it
happened to the [family]. [The homeowner] had the
unfortunate experience of interrupting the defendant in the
middle of burglarizing her home, but she had the fortunate
circumstance of having the sound mind to immediately
realize it and do her best to get a description of the
defendant, to get a description of the vehicle he would use
to get away, to even get a description of the black object
with the cord in his arms as he ran away. And, again, look
at all the photos of the interior of that truck taken on
February 24th, 2012, when they execute the search warrant,
and you will see the only item in that truck that is black
with a cord hanging off is her laptop. You saw [the
5
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homeowner] testify. The [family was] not trespassed, they
were burglarized.
Ladies and gentlemen, I ask that you hold the defendant
accountable for what he did to that family and find him
guilty as charged of Burglary in the First Degree.
(Emphases added.)
The State called the eyewitness homeowner’s husband to
testify. He wasn’t home during the crime. The deputy
prosecuting attorney asked a few questions relating to consent;
the burglar did not have permission to enter or take any
property from the family home. The prosecuting attorney then
asked: “how did it make you feel after you had learned that you
had been burglarized?” “Violated,” he told the jury. Defense
counsel failed to object.
The prosecution similarly questioned the homeowner about
how the burglary affected her:
[Prosecuting Attorney:] . . .[H]ow did it make you feel
having your home burglarized on February 17th, 2012?
[Homeowner:] Very violated. I’m a mother of children, and
to have someone in my home, where my children sleep, this
person has been in my property, and it's a very personal
feeling, and I had a hard time sleeping afterwards. I was
very concerned for my safety, for the safety of my family.
And to this day I make sure that I put all electronics --
before I leave the home, I make sure I hide them because of
-- of this occurrence. So it's affected me deeply.
Defense counsel again failed to object. He later cross-examined
the homeowner about the crime’s impact. 4
4 Defense counsel’s questions included:
6
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Defense counsel objected to the prosecution’s remarks
relating to victim impact evidence only once, after the State’s
rebuttal closing argument. At the bench, counsel objected “to
the last couple of sentences” in the State’s rebuttal argument.
These sentences seemingly relate to the prosecutor’s plea to
hold Riveira accountable for what he did to the family. The
court overruled the objection.
Defense counsel asked the court to reconsider its ruling,
advancing a broader argument that the prosecuting attorney “went
to the passion of the jury by saying imagine how [the homeowner
felt] based upon what had happened, not about the items that
were taken, [but] about . . . [the family’s] security.” The
prosecuting attorney denied making any “suggestion to the jury
to place themselves in the [homeowners’] shoes.” 5 The court
• “Like you just testified, it's not a good feeling to go
home where you're supposed to be safe and secure,
correct?”;
• “I bet you that even when -- for example, when you hear
a noise, you start looking out, right, you start getting
a feeling, right, that maybe somebody's here, right?”;
• “So is it safe to say that sometime time -- you know,
when they say time heals a broken heart, that passage of
time actually makes things a little bit better?”; and
• “And passage of time makes you look back and reflect as
to what actually happened and makes you have a better
sense of what actually occurred; isn't that right?”
5 The prosecuting attorney mentioned that during closing argument defense
counsel had stated “imagine how they felt.” Indeed defense counsel told the
jury, “Imagine yourself in [the homeowner’s] position driving home with
children in your van.”
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affirmed its ruling. It believed that the jury instructions,
including a command to avoid being influenced by passion or
prejudice, would ensure fairness. 6
“Wasn’t me” was Riveira’s defense. It was a case of
misidentification, he argued. Riveira did not testify. Through
cross-examination, Riveira hoped to undermine the homeowner and
neighbor’s identifications. He also questioned the State’s
police officer witnesses regarding the burglary investigation,
field show-up procedures, and truck search. Highlighting the
lack of fingerprint evidence, the defense stressed in closing
argument the absence of direct evidence showing that Riveira
entered the home.
The deputy prosecuting attorney questioned defense
counsel’s truthfulness during rebuttal argument. He told the
jury: “the folks [defense counsel is] trying to trick are you
6 Before the parties’ closing arguments, the court read a series of jury
instructions, including:
• “Statements or arguments made by lawyers are not evidence. You
should consider their arguments to you, but you are not bound
by their memory or interpretation of the evidence.”;
• “Keep in mind, however, that closing arguments are not
evidence, okay. What the attorneys say in closing arguments
do not constitute evidence, all right.”; and
• “You must not be influenced by pity for the defendant or by
passion or prejudice against the defendant.”
8
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with his interpretation of the evidence.” 7 (Emphasis added.)
Defense counsel failed to object.
The jury found Riveira guilty of burglary in the first
degree. 8
II.
Riveira challenges several remarks the deputy prosecuting
attorney made during closing argument. Prosecutorial
misconduct, he contends, necessitates vacating his conviction.
We find two instances worthy of review: (1) the prosecuting
attorney’s references to the burglary’s impact on the
homeowner’s household, followed by a plea to hold Riveira
accountable “for what he did to that family”; and (2) the
prosecuting attorney’s comment accusing defense counsel of
trickery.
The State concedes that these remarks were improper. 9 But
it argues that they were not reversible prosecutorial
7 The prosecuting attorney prefaced his remark by referring to defense
counsel’s comment to two prosecution witnesses during cross-examination that
he wasn’t trying to trick them.
8 The court instructed the jury that it could convict Riveira as a
principal or accomplice. The court did not give a special interrogatory. So
whether the jury convicted him as a principal or accomplice is unknown. On
appeal, Riveira argued that the evidence failed to support an accomplice
instruction. We agree with the ICA. It did.
9 During oral argument, the State acknowledged: “When we come to the
victim impact testimony, I think it’s pretty clear that we shouldn’t be
bringing this out in the case in chief or . . . before the jury. I do find
that [it] . . . would be irrelevant; it is prejudicial.” The State also
recognized that the prosecutor’s insinuation that defense counsel attempted
to trick the jury was “something that [prosecutors] shouldn’t be doing.”
9
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misconduct. We agree.
Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under
the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. State v.
Klinge, 92 Hawaiʻi 577, 584, 994 P.2d 509, 516 (2000). After
considering the nature of the prosecuting attorney’s conduct,
promptness or lack of a curative instruction, and strength or
weakness of the evidence against the defendant, a reviewing
court will vacate a conviction if there is a reasonable
possibility that the conduct might have affected the trial’s
outcome. State v. Senteno, 69 Haw. 363, 366, 742 P.2d 369, 372
(1987) (citing State v. Marsh, 68 Haw. 659, 661, 728 P.2d 1301,
1303 (1986)); State v. Rogan, 91 Hawaiʻi 405, 412, 984 P.2d 1231,
1238 (1999). 10
The nature of the challenged conduct – what it was and how
it entwined with the whole case – starts the inspection.
Beginning with the first allegation of prosecutorial misconduct,
injecting victim impact evidence into the trial and touting that
evidence to hold the defendant accountable for what he did to
the victim’s family amounted to severe misconduct.
10 If a defendant fails to object to a prosecutor’s improper conduct,
“appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the prosecutor's
alleged misconduct amounted to plain error” that affected the defendant’s
substantial rights. State v. Iuli, 101 Hawaiʻi 196, 204, 65 P.3d 143, 151
(2003). In determining plain error relating to prosecutorial misconduct,
courts have considered the same three factors. Id. at 208, 65 P.3d at 155.
10
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Victim impact evidence concerns a crime’s effect on the
person harmed by the crime or others, especially the person’s
family members. It includes evidence regarding the physical,
psychological, or economic effect of a crime. See Hawai‘i
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-602(1)(c) (2014) (instructing that
victim impact statements in the sentencing context include “any
physical or psychological harm or financial loss suffered”).
During a trial, a crime’s after-effects are rarely allowed.
Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rules 401, 403. 11 In State v.
Lora, 147 Hawaiʻi 298, 307-09, 465 P.3d 745, 754-56 (2020), this
court disallowed victim impact evidence to counteract a cross-
examination undermining a witness’s credibility. “We reject[ed]
an approach that would permit the admissibility of the impacts
of an alleged offense on a complaining witness in order to
bolster the witness's credibility after it has been impeached or
attacked.” Id. at 309, 465 P.3d at 756. While observing that
impact evidence is generally irrelevant to a defendant’s guilt,
we recognized that establishing an element of a crime could
11 Sentencing hearings, by contrast, routinely feature victim impact
testimony. HRS §§ 706-602(1)(c), 706–604(3) (Supp. 2016). “The victim
impact statement is often made a part of the [presentence report] and the
victim or the victim’s family is given the opportunity to be heard in open
court at the hearing itself.” State v. Hussein, 122 Hawaiʻi 495, 523, 229
P.3d 313, 341 (2010).
11
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justify the prosecution’s introduction of the evidence. Id. at
309, n.14, 465 P.3d at 756, n.14. 12
Here, the prosecution’s narrative arc promoted evidence
spotlighting the crime’s impact on the homeowner’s family. The
prosecution flanked its case with commentary regarding the
burglary’s aftermath. During opening statement, the deputy
prosecuting attorney introduced the theme: “the evidence will
show that [the family] lost their sense of security and ability
to feel safe in their home.”
To back its promise, the prosecution asked the eyewitness
homeowner how the burglary made her feel. She felt “very
violated,” experienced a “very personal feeling” because the
burglary happened in her home where her children slept, was
“very concerned” for her family’s safety, had difficulties
sleeping, and hid the family’s electronics when she left home.
She ended her answer by saying that the crime “affected [her]
deeply.”
The prosecution also called the homeowner’s husband to
testify. The State asked him a few questions about consent,
12 See Hartwell v. State, 476 S.W.3d 523, 535 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015)
(holding that questions regarding the extent of the victim’s injuries were
relevant because the state had to prove that she suffered serious bodily
injury and the questions did not address the effect of the crime on the
victim or her family). Impeaching a victim’s credibility is another purpose
justifying victim impact evidence. See Lora, 147 Hawaiʻi at 309, n.14, 465
P.3d at 756, n.14 (observing that impact evidence can be introduced at trial
“to impeach a victim’s credibility”). Like all evidence, this purpose must
satisfy HRE Rules 401 and 403.
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though the homeowner later established the same point. The
deputy prosecuting attorney then asked, “how did it make you
feel after you had learned that you had been burglarized?”
“Violated,” he told the jury.
At the trial’s end, the prosecuting attorney circled to the
opening statement’s preview regarding what the case was about –
a family’s inability to feel safe and secure in their home.
Then, after briefly recapping the evidence, the State had the
last word; it urged the jury to “hold the defendant accountable
for what he did to that family and find him guilty as charged of
Burglary in the First Degree.”
The victim impact testimony presented and highlighted by
the prosecution lacked probative value. Riveira claimed he was
misidentified. The prosecution said he was not. The
homeowners’ post-event feelings and actions did not help prove
an element. The crime’s aftermaths did not have a tendency to
make a fact of consequence more or less probable. HRE Rule 401 13
should have blocked the testimony.
The victim impact testimony’s highly prejudicial nature
13 HRE Rule 401 reads: “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”
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also made it inadmissible under HRE Rule 403. 14 The evidence
generated sympathy for the family and impelled hostility toward
Riveira. See HRE Rule 403 cmt. (recognizing “potential for
engendering juror prejudice, hostility, or sympathy” as a factor
in Rule 403 determinations). The need for the victim impact
evidence was nil. By contrast, the testimony had great
potential to unfairly prejudice Riveira.
Complicating the case slightly, the defense failed to make
evidentiary objections. 15 This mattered to the ICA. Because
admitting the victim impact testimony from the eyewitness
homeowner and her husband was not plainly erroneous, the ICA
determined, the deputy prosecuting attorney’s “brief” comment
about the testimony during closing argument was not reversible
prosecutorial misconduct. Although we agree with the ultimate
14 HRE Rule 403 reads: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”
15 The ICA observed that the State did not directly rebut the defense’s
appellate argument maintaining that the victim impact testimony was
irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Instead, the State argued — and the ICA
agreed — that admitting the impact testimony did not amount to plain error
because it was “a result of trial strategy.” Although we agree that
admitting the irrelevant testimony was not plainly erroneous, we disagree
with the ICA’s rationale. The ICA concentrated on defense counsel’s decision
to ask the homeowner questions about the burglary’s impact during cross-
examination. It believed the failure to object was a conscious decision,
designed to challenge the reliability of the homeowner’s identification.
This reasoning is unpersuasive. Defense counsel’s meandering cross-
examination questions about the burglary’s impact, see supra n.4, didn’t
touch the homeowner’s identification. And it makes little sense that defense
counsel strategically greenlighted highly prejudicial testimony so that he
could query the victim about that highly prejudicial testimony.
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conclusion, this determination understated the centrality that
the inadmissible victim impact testimony played in the State’s
case.
When reviewing the nature of prosecutorial misconduct,
courts should inspect how the prosecution entwined its improper
conduct within the case’s contextual fabric. See State v.
Uyesugi, 100 Hawaiʻi 442, 460, 60 P.3d 843, 861 (2002) (focusing
in part on “whether and how [surviving family members’]
testimony was woven into the case” when analyzing whether the
testimony “inflame[d] the jury to the extent that the jury [was]
diverted from its objective considerations”).
Here, the prosecution previewed, injected, and highlighted
how the burglary affected the homeowner’s family. Asking the
jury to hold Riveira accountable for what he did “to that
family” did not merely conjure up the evidence about the
burglary. The prosecution’s entreaty likely evoked an emotional
reaction from the jury; it emphasized the crime’s effect on the
family. The way the State infused the irrelevant impact
evidence into its case and rebuttal argument amplified the
evidence’s prejudicial effect. See Lora, 147 Hawaiʻi at 310-11,
465 P.3d at 757-58 (“The admission of [the erroneously admitted]
testimony, the manner in which it was presented by the
[prosecution], and the reliance upon it during closing argument
all demonstrate that this error was highly prejudicial.”).
15
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The second instance of prosecutorial misconduct happened
when the deputy prosecuting attorney denounced defense counsel
for trying to deceive the jury: “the folks [defense counsel is]
trying to trick are you with his interpretation of the
evidence.” (Emphasis added.) The ICA downplayed the
prosecution’s conduct; it deemed the error “not of a repeated
nature.”
Impugning defense counsel’s principles is serious
misconduct. It undermines a trial’s fairness “because it is a
strik[e] at the [defendant] over the shoulders of his counsel in
an attempt to prejudice the jury against the [defendant].”
State v. Underwood, 142 Hawaiʻi 317, 327, 418 P.3d 658, 668
(2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
State v. Pasene, 144 Hawaiʻi 339, 370, 439 P.3d 864, 895 (2019)
(“A prosecutor’s comment is clearly misconduct where it
constitutes an impermissible attack on defense counsel’s
integrity and operates to denigrate the legal profession in
general.” (cleaned up)). Accusing defense counsel of trying to
“trick” the jury fits this mold. 16
We conclude that both sets of improper remarks amounted to
serious misconduct.
16 Defense counsel’s offhand references during cross-examination of two
prosecution witnesses that he was not trying to trick them, see supra n.7, do
not validate a declaration to the jury that counsel was trying to manipulate
them.
16
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Next, under the second factor examining claims of
reversible prosecutorial misconduct, we consider whether the
court gave prompt curative instructions. Here, the trial court
did not give curative instructions. The defense did not object
to the inadmissible victim impact evidence; it also did not
object to the “trick” comment. A curative instruction’s
probability drops without an objection. An instruction would
only be given if the trial court stepped in. But like here,
trial courts often do not intercede. Because the putative
misconduct lingers unimpeded by objection and curing, the second
factor rewards sloppy defense work; it seemingly makes a
successful appeal easier in a plain error prosecutorial
misconduct case.
Even if the defense had objected and the court had given a
mitigating instruction, the instruction would not have remedied
the misconduct’s prejudicial effects. Court instructions often
serve as an unsatisfactory, ineffectual fix when prejudicial
matters surface at trial. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation
omitted) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury . . . [is] unmitigated
fiction.”).
The State argued that the trial court’s general
instructions, like directing the jury not to be influenced by
17
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passion or prejudice, cured any prejudice caused by the
prosecuting attorney’s improper remarks. We disagree. The
general instructions given to Riveira’s jury before closing
arguments did not neutralize the prosecutor’s harmful conduct.
See Underwood, 142 Hawaiʻi at 327-28, 418 P.3d at 668-69 (holding
that an instruction stating, “[s]tatements or remarks made by
counsel are not evidence,” was “an ineffective remedy to the
improper remarks” partly because it was general in nature and
was delivered to the jury along with many other standard
instructions before closing arguments began).
The case’s resolution then pivots on the strength of the
evidence showing Riveira’s guilt. “When evidence is so
overwhelming as to outweigh the inflammatory effect of the
improper comments, reviewing courts will regard the impropriety
as ultimately harmless.” State v. Williams, ___ Hawaiʻi ___, 491
P.3d 592, 607 (2021) (citation omitted). We conclude that the
evidence against Riveira was sufficiently overwhelming. There
was no reasonable possibility that the misconduct contributed to
the trial’s outcome.
Two eyewitnesses placed Riveira at or near the burglarized
home minutes before and after the burglary. The homeowner saw
the burglar running away in her backyard. She also saw a red
Toyota Tundra truck parked next to her mailbox. She described
the suspect and the truck to the 911 operator. At trial, the
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homeowner detailed the burglar’s physical features (his heavy-
set body and short hair). She also remembered his distinctive
attire (a neon construction shirt, plaid shorts, and dark
boots). She later identified Riveira at the field show-up as
the person she saw running in her backyard based on his heavy-
set build, plaid shorts, and dark boots. The homeowner told the
jury that she saw a boot print in her house after the burglary.
The neighbor largely corroborated the homeowner’s
testimony. He said that he spotted a red Toyota Tundra truck
and a man sitting in it about ten minutes before the homeowner
saw the burglar. He described the suspect as having short hair
and wearing a yellow construction shirt, similar to what the
homeowner observed. The neighbor later identified Riveira
partly based on his tattoos. The jury saw Riveira’s arrest
photograph. It fairly matched both eyewitnesses’ descriptions. 17
The State presented other evidence connecting Riveira to
the crime. The homeowner saw the burglar carrying a black
object with cords hanging from it. The stolen items - the
homeowner’s black laptop with its cord and her children’s gaming
17 We recognize the perils of eyewitness identifications. See State v.
Kaneaiakala, 145 Hawaiʻi 231, 233, 450 P.3d 761, 763 (2019) (quoting United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967)) (observing that “[t]he vagaries of
eyewitness identification are well-known; [and] the annals of criminal law
are rife with instances of mistaken identification”). Here, the trial court
directed the jury to determine “whether an eyewitness gave accurate testimony
regarding identification”; it instructed the jury based on Hawaiʻi Pattern
Jury Instruction - Criminal 3.19, listing thirteen factors to consider in
evaluating identification testimony.
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devices - were found in the truck that the police stopped. The
police did so because its license plate matched the alphanumeric
information recited by the homeowner. Riveira was in that
truck, along with the female suspect. And officers recovered
his photograph from the truck. After reviewing the record, we
conclude that the State presented overwhelming evidence
establishing Riveira’s guilt.
Serious prosecutorial misconduct invaded Riveira’s trial.
But considering the strength of the evidence against Riveira, we
hold that the misconduct had no reasonable possibility of
contributing to his conviction. The misconduct was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. 18
III.
We affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit
court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
Harrison L. Kiehm, /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Stephen K. Tsushima,
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
18 The defense failed to object to the comment disparaging defense
counsel. So it is reviewed for plain error. Because we hold that this
remark was harmless, it cannot be plain error. See State v. Ui, 142 Hawaiʻi
287, 297, 418 P.3d 628, 638 (2018) (internal quotation omitted) (observing
that “a reviewing court has discretion to correct plain error when the error
is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).
20