Deborah Kaye Parker v. St. Anne Conference of the Society of St. Vincent De Paul ( 2007 )

Opinion filed September 27, 2007

Opinion filed September 27, 2007

                                                                        In The

    Eleventh Court of Appeals

                                                                 ____________

                                                          No. 11-06-00162-CV

                                                    __________

                               DEBORAH KAYE PARKER, Appellant

                                                             V.

                          ST. ANNE CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIETY

OF ST. VINCENT DE PAUL Appellee

                                         On Appeal from the 385th District Court

                                                        Midland County, Texas

                                                 Trial Court Cause No. CV44839

                                              M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Deborah Kaye Parker filed suit against several defendants seeking personal injury damages arising out of an automobile accident.  Three defendants B who are not parties to this appeal B filed a motion for summary judgment contending that Parker=s suit was barred by limitations because it was filed more than two years after the accident.  Parker responded that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 16.064 (Vernon 1997) tolled limitations because she timely filed suit against these same defendants in bankruptcy court, timely re-filed suit in federal district court when her adversary proceeding was dismissed, and then timely re-filed suit in state court when her federal action was dismissed.  The trial court disagreed, granted the motion for summary judgment, and severed the moving defendants from the litigation.  This court affirmed, finding that Section 16.064 did not toll limitations because the factual allegations in Parker=s adversary complaint affirmatively established that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction.  Parker v. Cumming, 216 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App.CEastland 2007, pet. denied).

St. Anne Conference of the Society of St. Vincent De Paul,^[1] filed a similar motion for summary judgment that the trial court granted.  On appeal, Parker argues th4at the trial court erred because our prior holding is incorrect.  Parker contends that the bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court and that federal law mandates only that a personal injury trial occur in district court.  See 28 U.S.C. '' 151, 157(b)(5).  Parker concludes that, because only the trial must occur in district court, she was not prohibited from filing her adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court.  Parker argues, therefore, that the bankruptcy court had at least limited jurisdiction over her claim and that limitations was tolled.

Parker conceded that she could find no reported case where a personal injury suit was filed in bankruptcy court and was later transferred to the district court for trial.  Nor could we.  In our prior holding, we explained that personal injury suits are outside a bankruptcy court=s core jurisdiction because they do not involve a right created by federal bankruptcy law and do not arise only in a bankruptcy proceeding.  See Wood v. Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987) (defining core jurisdiction).  We acknowledged that, if a debtor recovers personal injury damages, this recovery could be subject to the bankruptcy trustee=s administration, but we held that this merely establishes that a debtor=s personal injury claim is within the bankruptcy court=s Arelated to@ jurisdiction.  See IRS v. Prescription Home Health Care, Inc. (In re Prescription Home Health Care, Inc.), 316 F.3d 542, 547 (5th Cir. 2002) (defining Arelated to@ jurisdiction).

The bankruptcy court=s ability to administer an asset is not synonymous with a general grant of jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to that asset.  The Supreme Court in N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 62 (1982), held that a prior version of the bankruptcy act was unconstitutional because it vested Article III^[2] power in judges who did not enjoy Article III=s protections or safeguards.   Congress responded by adding Section 157(b)(5). This provision gave district courts jurisdiction over personal injury and wrongful death actions, while preserving for bankruptcy courts the jurisdiction to deal with bankruptcy-related matters.  Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 831 (5th Cir. 1993).  Consequently, the bankruptcy court has authority to control a debtor=s disposition of a personal injury award but not the authority to adjudicate a personal injury claim.

Parker acknowledged during oral argument that under her construction of Section 157(b)(5), if a personal injury action is filed as an adversary proceeding, a bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction over all pretrial matters including dispositive motions.  This construction would render the current bankruptcy act unconstitutional because there is no practical distinction between the authority to resolve dispositive pretrial motions and the authority to conduct a trial.  We must, if possible, construe statutes to avoid constitutional infirmities. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996).  This requires that we reaffirm our prior analysis.  Because bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges, the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over Parker=s personal injury suit.  Moreover, because Parker=s own complaint established the bankruptcy court=s lack of jurisdiction, Section 16.064=s tolling provision does not apply.  The trial court, therefore, correctly held that Parker=s claim was barred by limitations.

Parker=s issues are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

PER CURIAM

September 27, 2007

Panel consists of:  Wright, C.J.,

Strange, J., and Hill, J.^[3]

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^[1]The trial court=s order reflects that St. Anne Conference of the Society of St. Vincent De Paul was designated as Society of St. Vincent De Paul, Catholic Diocese of Midland, Texas, in the petition.

^[2]U.S. Const. art. III.

^[3]John G. Hill, Former Justice, Court of Appeals, 2nd District of Texas at Fort Worth sitting by assignment.