Suzuki v. American Healthways, Inc ( 2023 )


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  •    *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
    Electronically Filed
    Supreme Court
    SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
    08-MAR-2023
    08:26 AM
    Dkt. 9 OPPC
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
    ---o0o---
    ________________________________________________________________
    LOLA L. SUZUKI,
    Petitioner/Claimant-Appellant-Appellant,
    vs.
    AMERICAN HEALTHWAYS, INC.,
    Respondent/Employer-Appellee-Appellee,
    ST. PAUL TRAVELERS,
    Respondent/Insurance Carrier-Appellee-Appellee,
    and
    LORNE K. DIRENFELD, M.D., GARY N. KUNIHIRO, ESQ.,
    and SHAWN L.M. BENTON, ESQ., Respondents/Appellees-Appellees.
    ________________________________________________________________
    SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
    CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NOS. AB 2007-497(S) AND AB 2007-498(S);
    DCD NOS. 2-06-14727 AND 2-07-04617)
    MARCH 8, 2023
    RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.
    PER CURIAM
    In this workers’ compensation case,
    Petitioner/Claimant-Appellant-Appellant Lola L. Suzuki
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    (Petitioner) asserts that the Intermediate Court of Appeals
    (ICA) erred when it dismissed the appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction.       According to the ICA, the order appealed from
    does not constitute an appealable final order.
    However, Petitioner’s motion that requested leave to
    appeal acknowledged that the order was not an appealable final
    order, and instead sought an appeal under the preliminary ruling
    language of Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14(a) (Supp.
    2016).1   The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB)
    granted this request.
    For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the ICA
    erred when it dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    We thus vacate the ICA’s November 3, 2022 dismissal order and
    remand this appeal to the ICA for further consideration.
    I.
    Petitioner reported a work-related injury on
    December 18, 2006, claiming that her injury occurred while
    1     HRS § 91-14(a) states in pertinent part:
    (a) Any person aggrieved by a final decision
    and order in a contested case or by a preliminary
    ruling of the nature that deferral of review pending
    entry of a subsequent final decision would deprive
    appellant of adequate relief is entitled to judicial
    review thereof under this chapter; but nothing in
    this section shall be deemed to prevent resort to
    other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de
    novo, including the right of trial by jury, provided
    by law.
    (Emphasis added.)
    2
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    employed as a registered nurse with her employer,
    Respondent/Employer-Appellee-Appellee American Healthways Inc.
    (Employer).    The date of this injury was November 28, 2006.
    Following a March 30, 2007 independent medical
    examination (IME), Petitioner alleged her left forearm was
    injured during this IME.
    At a hearing held on September 6, 2007, in the
    Disability Compensation Division of the Department of Labor and
    Industrial Relations (DCD), Petitioner claimed she also
    sustained a neck injury and sleep disorder due to the March 30,
    2007 IME.
    On October 24, 2007, the Director of the DCD
    (Director) determined that Petitioner sustained compensable
    work-related injuries, but denied Petitioner’s claim for
    compensation relating to her alleged neck injury and sleep
    disorder.
    Petitioner appealed the Director’s decision to the
    LIRAB.   The consolidated cases consist of the Director’s
    Decisions concerning the November 28, 2006 injury (2-06-14727)
    and March 30, 2007 injury during the IME (2-07-04617).
    Following years of further proceedings before the
    LIRAB and DCD, on July 24, 2018, the LIRAB filed a Third Amended
    Pretrial Order that specified six issues to be addressed, which
    included:     (1) Whether Petitioner sustained a personal injury
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    involving her neck on March 30, 2007, arising out of and in the
    course of employment; and (2) whether Petitioner sustained or
    suffered a sleep disorder injury or condition on or about March
    30, 2007, arising out of and in the course of employment.
    On November 9, 2021, Petitioner was notified that she
    was scheduled for two additional IMEs, each with a different
    doctor.
    On November 18, 2021, Employer and Respondent/
    Insurance Carrier-Appellee-Appellee St. Paul Travelers
    (Employer/Insurance Carrier) filed two second amended motions to
    compel Petitioner’s attendance at these two IMEs.
    On December 2, 2021, Petitioner filed a memo in
    opposition to Employer/Insurance Carrier’s two second amended
    motions to compel and a motion for partial summary judgment.
    Petitioner’s opposition objected to having to undergo another
    round of IMEs because good cause did not exist pursuant to
    HRS § 386-79 (Supp. 2017).
    On December 17, 2021, Employer/Insurance Carrier filed
    a reply that asserted that these two IMEs “are proper and good
    cause exists as provided in HRS § 386-79” because one IME was to
    examine Petitioner’s “alleged neck pain for purposes of this
    appeal” before the LIRAB, and the other IME was to examine
    Petitioner’s “alleged sleep disorder for purposes of this
    appeal” before the LIRAB.      Employer/Insurance Carrier’s reply
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    relied on HRS § 386-79(b), which states that an employer is
    limited to one IME per case “unless good and valid reasons exist
    with regard to the medical progress of employee’s treatment.”
    On December 28, 2021, the LIRAB filed an order
    granting Employer/Insurance Carrier’s two motions to compel and
    denying Petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment.
    On January 6, 2022, Petitioner filed a request for
    reconsideration or, alternatively, a request for “judicial
    review.”   Petitioner filed an addendum to this request on
    January 7, 2022.    In pertinent part, Petitioner acknowledged
    that the December 28, 2021 order was not a final appealable
    order, but sought judicial review under HRS § 91-14(a) because
    “deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision
    would deprive [Petitioner] of adequate relief.”
    On February 8, 2022, the LIRAB filed an order that
    denied Petitioner’s request for reconsideration, but granted her
    request for judicial review.      This order said:      “Claimant’s
    pleading filed January 6, 2022 shall be considered an appeal of
    the [LIRAB’s] December 28, 2021 order.”
    B.
    Petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed on February 9,
    2022, and consists of (1) Petitioner’s January 6, 2022 request
    for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for judicial review
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    that was filed in the LIRAB, (2) the LIRAB’s December 28, 2021
    order, and (3) the LIRAB’s February 8, 2022 order.
    On November 3, 2022, the ICA filed an order dismissing
    the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the
    LIRAB’s December 28, 2021 order does not constitute a final
    decision and order under HRS §§ 386-88 and 91-14(a).             The ICA
    explained:
    Here, the [December 28, 2021] Order: directs
    [Petitioner] to submit to medical examinations to
    ascertain the extent of her purported neck injury,
    declines to entertain her request for partial summary
    judgment, and denies her request for sanctions. It
    does not end the LIRAB proceedings, leaving nothing
    further to be accomplished, nor does it finally
    adjudicate any matter of medical and temporary
    disability benefits.
    On January 3, 2023, Petitioner timely2 filed an
    application for writ of certiorari that asserts that the ICA had
    jurisdiction under HRS § 91-14(a) to review the LIRAB’s December
    28, 2021 IME order and the ICA’s decision is inconsistent with
    Tam v. Kaiser Permanente, 94 Hawaiʻi 487, 
    17 P.3d 219
     (2001).3
    We agree.
    2     Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 40.1(a)(1) (2022)
    allows a party to file a certiorari application “within 30 days after the
    filing of the [ICA’s] . . . dismissal order[.]” See HRS § 602-59(c) (Supp.
    2017) (same). Petitioner timely requested a thirty-day extension of time to
    file the certiorari application on November 7, 2022. See HRS § 602-59(c);
    HRAP Rule 40.1(a)(3) (2022). January 2, 2023, was the New Year’s holiday.
    See HRAP Rule 26(a) (2022) (instructing that holidays are excluded from the
    computation of time).
    3     A response to the application was not filed.
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    II.
    In Tam, the Director suspended the claimant’s workers’
    compensation benefits because the claimant refused to appear for
    an IME.   94 Hawaiʻi at 492-93, 
    17 P.3d at 224-25
    .         The LIRAB
    affirmed the Director’s decision.         Id. at 493, 
    17 P.3d at 225
    .
    In addressing the jurisdiction issue, this court said:
    [A]lthough the LIRAB’s decision does not end
    the proceedings in Tam’s case, it is clear that
    “deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent
    final decision would deprive appellant of adequate
    relief.” In fact, no relief is or will be available
    to Tam with respect to her challenge to the
    present suspension of her workers’ compensation
    benefits absent this court’s review. Of course, Tam
    could comply with the Director’s order and thereby
    have her benefits restored, but it is precisely the
    validity of that order and her right to ignore it
    that she asks this court to review in the present
    appeal. Given the parties’ positions, and
    particularly Tam’s claim that the order was unlawful,
    the option of complying with the Director's order is
    not “adequate relief.” Accordingly, pursuant to HRS
    § 91–14(a), we have jurisdiction over the present
    appeal.
    Id. at 494-95, 
    17 P.3d at 226-27
    .
    Later, in Gour v. Honsador Lumber, LLC, 134 Hawaiʻi 99,
    101, 
    332 P.3d 701
    , 703 (App. 2014), the Director deferred
    determination of the claimant’s compensation claim until the
    claimant complied with the ordered IME.         On appeal to the LIRAB,
    the LIRAB dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was no
    appealable decision or final order because compensability
    remained undetermined.     
    Id.
       Contrary to the LIRAB’s decision,
    the ICA relied on Tam to hold that the LIRAB had jurisdiction to
    consider the merits of the claimant’s appeal, as follows:
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    Based on Tam, we conclude that the LIRAB was
    required to exercise jurisdiction over Gour’s appeal
    because the LIRAB’s failure to review the Director's
    Decision until the entry of a final decision on
    Gour’s entitlement to benefits will deprive Gour of
    adequate relief. Similar to the circumstances
    in Tam, Gour wants to challenge the validity of the
    Director’s order compelling him to undergo an
    independent psychological examination in his appeal
    to the LIRAB. No adequate relief with respect to
    this challenge will be available to Gour if the LIRAB
    refuses to consider his challenge on the merits until
    he undergoes the psychological examination. As
    in Tam, Gour could comply with the Director’s order
    to undergo the psychological examination and thereby
    end the deferral imposed on the determination of his
    workers’ compensation claim. But this would require
    Gour to submit to the very psychological examination
    he claims is unjustified and was not ordered “in
    accordance with the law[,]” and to comply with the
    order of the Director for which he seeks review.
    Id. at 103, 332 P.3d at 705.
    Here, the ICA’s November 3, 2022 dismissal order
    relied on the final order language of HRS § 91-14(a) and case
    law applying that language.      However, Petitioner’s request to
    pursue judicial review, which the LIRAB granted, acknowledged
    that the appeal would be from a preliminary ruling under HRS §
    91-14(a), and not a final order.
    An order compelling a claimant to undergo an IME is
    sufficient to constitute the deprivation of adequate relief that
    is required under the preliminary ruling language of HRS § 91-
    14(a).   See Tam, 94 Hawaiʻi at 494-95, 
    17 P.3d at 226-27
    ; Gour,
    134 Hawaiʻi at 103, 332 P.3d at 705.        As such, the ICA should not
    have dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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    III.
    Based on the above, the ICA’s November 3, 2022
    dismissal order is vacated and this appeal is remanded to the
    ICA for further consideration.
    Lola L. Suzuki,                           /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
    Petitioner/Claimant-
    Appellant-Appellant Pro se                /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
    /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
    /s/ Michael D. Wilson
    /s/ Todd W. Eddins
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SCWC-22-0000044

Filed Date: 3/8/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/8/2023