State v. Woodhall. , 129 Haw. 397 ( 2013 )

*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-11-0000097
31-MAY-2013
09:33 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
________________________________________________________________
STATE OF HAWAI#I,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GEOFFREY WOODHALL, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
SCWC-11-0000097
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-11-0000097; 3P7-10-00945)
May 31, 2013
NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, MCKENNA, AND POLLACK, JJ.,
WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING SEPARATELY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MCKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
A medical marijuana patient was arrested for possessing
medical marijuana while passing through airport security at Kona
International Airport. He was later convicted of Promoting a
Detrimental Drug in the Third Degree. We are called upon to
determine whether (1) the defendant presented sufficient evidence
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
to trigger a medical marijuana affirmative defense in a
stipulated fact trial, in which the parties stipulated that the
defendant possessed a valid medical marijuana certificate and
that the marijuana he possessed was medical marijuana; and (2),
if so, whether the conflict between a statute that allows medical
use of marijuana, including transportation of such marijuana, and
another statute that prohibits transportation of medical
marijuana through any place open to the public, creates an
irreconcilable conflict that must be resolved in favor of the
defendant.
Based on the analysis below, we answer both questions in the
affirmative. We therefore vacate the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal,
and remand this case to the district court to enter a judgment of
acquittal, consistent with this opinion.
II. Background
A. The Trial1
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Geoffrey Woodhall
(“Woodhall”) was charged by Complaint with “knowingly
possess[ing] marijuana or a Schedule V substance, that is,
marijuana, in any amount, thereby committing the offense of
Promoting a Detrimental Drug in the Third Degree, in violation of
Section 712-1249(1), Hawai‘i Revised Statutes, as amended.” HRS
1
The Honorable Joseph P. Florendo, Jr. presided.
2
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
§ 712-1249(1)(1993) provides, “A person commits the offense of
promoting a detrimental drug in the third degree if the person
knowingly possesses marijuana or any Schedule V substance in any
amount.”2
The charge stemmed from an incident in which marijuana in a
clear plastic baggie was discovered in Woodhall’s possession at
the Kona International Airport. Woodhall was arrested and
prosecuted despite presenting a valid Medical Marijuana Registry
Patient Identification Certificate.
Woodhall apparently filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge
against him, as referenced in the State’s Response to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss. Based on the counter-argument raised by the
State, it would appear that Woodhall argued that an ambiguity in
the medical marijuana statutes required dismissal of the charge
against him.
In this regard, HRS § 329-121 (2010) provides, with emphasis
added:
“Medical use” means the acquisition, possession,
cultivation, use, distribution, or transportation of
marijuana or paraphernalia relating to the administration of
marijuana to alleviate the symptoms or effects of a
qualifying patient’s debilitating medical condition. For
the purposes of “medical use[,”] the term distribution is
2
Woodhall was prosecuted under state law. We note that possession of
marijuana is still subject to criminal prosecution and civil penalties under
the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1999). In
contrast to numerous state medical marijuana laws, the federal government
continues to list marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance because it
considers marijuana to have “no currently accepted medical use treatment in
the United States.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1); Schedule I (c)(10).
3
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
limited to the transfer of marijuana and paraphernalia from
the primary caregiver to the qualifying patient.
It also appears that Woodhall argued that HRS § 329-121’s
authorization of transportation as a medical use is inconsistent
with HRS § 329-122 (2010)’s prohibition on the medical use of
marijuana in public places, creating an ambiguity in the medical
marijuana laws. HRS § 329-122 provides, with emphasis added:
(c) The authorization for the medical use of marijuana in
this section shall not apply to: . . . .
(2) The medical use of marijuana:
(A) In a school bus, public bus, or any moving vehicle;
(B) In the workplace of one’s employment;
(C) On any school grounds;
(D) At any public park, public beach, public recreation
center, recreation or youth center; or
(E) Other place open to the public. . . .
It appears that the crux of Woodhall’s argument was that the only
prohibited “use” of marijuana in a public place is “smoking.”
The State, on the other hand, argued that “medical use” in
HRS § 329-121 includes possession, transportation, and
acquisition, and that the prohibition on medical use in public
places under HRS § 329-122 includes possession, transportation,
and acquisition. Further, the State argued that Chapter 329,
Part IX generally, and the phrase “medical use” specifically,
should be strictly construed, in line with the legislature’s
stated purpose: “[T]he legislature does not intend to legalize
marijuana for other than medical purposes. The passage of this
Act and the policy underlying it does not in any way diminish the
legislature’s strong public policy and laws against illegal drug
4
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
use.” See 2000 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 228, § 1 at 596. The Motion
to Dismiss appears to have been denied, as the parties proceeded
to a bench trial.
In a later filing, a Memorandum of Law Regarding [sic] in
Support of Stipulated Facts for Bench Trial (“Memorandum”),
Woodhall argued he was authorized to possess marijuana for
medical use as a qualifying patient. He argued that “medical
use” includes transportation; therefore, he should be acquitted
of the charge because he had a medical use of marijuana
affirmative defense. Second, Woodhall argued that “H.R.S. §§
329-121 and 329-122, when read in concert are ambiguous and
therefore, mak[e] it impossible for defendant to formulate the
required knowing state of mind.” He argued the following:
[T]ransportation for medical use is specifically allowed,
however, a person [cannot] transport medical marijuana in
any “place open to the public.” A plain meaning reading of
these two statutory provisions leads to an absurd result
because it seemingly requires a qualifying patient’s
marijuana to somehow magically appear wherever he may be so
that it may be used.
He argued that strict compliance with these ambiguous statutes
produced an absurd result:
[A] qualifying patient would seemingly always be in
violation of H.R.S. § 329-122(c)(2)(E) when transporting
their marijuana unless they were walking/transporting in
their own home, on private property, etc. How the
qualifying patient would be able to get their medical
marijuana to their own home or to private property seems a
near impossibility since they would arguably have to walk
somewhere open to the public, such as a sidewalk, to get to
their home or private property.
5
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Woodhall further argued that the “legislative history
does not indicate a specific or general intent to prohibit
the medical use of marijuana in all places open to the
public,” and that there is no specific legislative history
explaining how HRS § 329-122(c)(2)(E)’s “open to the public”
prohibition came about.
Thus, before trial, the fact that the marijuana was
medical marijuana was accepted by both parties, with the
only issue in dispute being a legal one: whether Woodhall
could have possessed and transported the marijuana through
Kona International Airport, a place open to the public.
Therefore, the parties agreed to a bench trial on
stipulated facts. Their agreement and the stipulated facts
follow:
Defendant GEOFFREY WOODHALL (“DEFENDANT”), by and through
and on the advice of counsel SHERI S. LAWSON, Deputy Public
Defender, having waived his right to trial, and the STATE OF
HAWAI‘I, by and through JEFFREY BURLESON, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, having agreed with the Defendant to a trial before
the Court on stipulated facts, do now submit those facts
which they agree upon and hereby stipulate to as follows:
1. On the [sic] March 8, 2010 in Kona, County and State of
Hawaii Geoffrey Woodhall knowingly possessed marijuana
measuring 2.12 grams at the Kona International Airport. The
marijuana was contained in a clear plastic baggie.
2. The Kona International Airport is a place open to the
public.
3. The marijuana in Defendant’s possession is marijuana as
defined pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) 329-1
and 712-1240.
6
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
4. Defendant possessed a valid medical marijuana
certificate, Registration No. MJ14476, on March 8, 2010.
See Exhibit “A”.3
5. Defendant possessed the medical marijuana to transport
it through airport security at the Transportation Security
Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint. TSA employees discovered
the medical marijuana in his possession. Defendant provided
his valid medical marijuana certificate to TSA officials as
well as Hawaii County Police Department officer David T.
Matsushima.
6. Defendant was not smoking, inhaling, or ingesting the
medical marijuana.
7. The Defendant has been informed that he has the right to
have a trial. The Defendant has also been informed that at
trial he has the right to confront and cross[-]examine the
witnesses who testify. The Defendant hereby waives his
right to a trial in this matter and agrees to have the
question of his guilt or innocence determined by the Court
alone based upon the above facts, exhibits and subsequent
submissions of counsel. The Defendant also waives his right
to cross[-]examine the witnesses and agrees to submit the
above facts, attached exhibits, and submissions of counsel
without cross-examination.4
The stipulation called upon the trial court to determine the
legal effect (i.e., whether medical marijuana can be transported
in a place open to the public) of the two facts agreed to by the
parties: (1) that Woodhall’s marijuana was medical marijuana
(Stipulated Facts 4, 5, and 6); and (2) that the Kona
International Airport was a place “open to the public.”
(Stipulated Fact 2). The district court continued the matter for
further argument and judgment.
At the continued hearing, the district court heard closing
3
A copy of Woodhall’s Medical Marijuana Registry Patient Identification
Certificate was included with the stipulation.
4
The district court also twice colloquied Woodhall regarding whether his
agreement to enter the Stipulated Facts for trial was knowing and voluntary.
7
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
arguments. The State did not argue or present any evidence that
the marijuana Woodhall possessed and transported did not qualify
as medical marijuana. The State argued only that the prohibition
on transport in public places should be strictly construed:
[W]e believe that the statute on medical marijuana regarding
the permitted use of – medical marijuana is very clear. The
statutes particularly define what the definition of medical
use is. It includes things like possession, acquisition,
distribution, and transportation, and the statutes clearly
state that those activities are prohibited in places that
are open to the public like an airport in this case. And I
don’t think there’s any dispute that the Kona International
Airport in this case is a place open to the public. It’s a
stipulated fact. And we believe the statute is restrictive,
but we believe that it was done purposely and deliberately
by the legislature.
Similarly, in closing arguments, the defense focused on
whether transport could be prohibited at the Kona International
Airport, a place open to the public, in light of the ambiguity in
the interrelationship between HRS §§ 329-121 and -122. Defense
counsel argued the statutes were ambiguous, “because you cannot
allow for transportation under the definition of medical use but
yet have no ability to transport [medical marijuana] anywhere
open to the public.”
In ruling, however, the court stated that the phrase
“relating to the administration of marijuana to alleviate the
symptoms or effects of the patient’s debilitating medical
condition,” found in HRS § 329-121’s definition of “medical use”
qualified “transportation.” The court also opined that the term
“distribution” in the phrase “medical use” was further “limited
8
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
to the transfer of marijuana and paraphernalia from the primary
caregiver to the qualifying patient.” HRS § 329-121.
Defense counsel seemed taken aback by the district court’s
qualification. Defense counsel argued that the purpose of
Woodhall’s medical marijuana was to alleviate the symptoms or
effects of the patient’s debilitating medical condition, as
evidenced by his valid medical marijuana license. Defense
counsel also argued that Woodhall was traveling for personal
purposes with the medical marijuana to treat his condition.
Defense counsel then asked the district court if it would like
Woodhall to testify. The district court then stated, “I don’t
know. You submitted me these facts, stipulated facts. . . . And
I’m going to rule based upon these stipulated facts.”
The district court then concluded that the facts of the case
did not show that Woodhall transported the marijuana to alleviate
the symptoms or effects of a debilitating medical condition (or
that the transport involved a transfer of marijuana from a
primary caregiver to Woodhall). Accordingly, the district court
adjudged Woodhall guilty, imposed a $50 fine, $30 criminal injury
fee, and $250 drug reduction assessment fee. The execution of
sentence was stayed pending appeal.
The district court did allow Woodhall to make a statement.
The following exchange occurred:
9
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
MR. WOODHALL: Well, I would like to ask how, if someone’s
diagnosed with this problem and given a license by a doctor
and the state, how do they ever obtain any medicine to begin
with if they can never have it brought to them or they can
never acquire it?
THE COURT: Maybe you didn’t understand or hear what I was
saying. Okay? Where do you get your marijuana from?
MR. WOODHALL: Actually, I grow it.
THE COURT: You grow it. Okay. So you’re not – you don’t
need to transport it from one place to the other. You have
it at home. I think the statute allows transportation if
you have to get it from someone else and bring it to your
home. That’s what I think is a reasonable interpretation of
the statute. Otherwise, it would be somewhat beyond the
control of the police if everyone were allowed to transport
it wherever they wanted, whenever they wanted and --
MR. WOODHALL: Right. But the day you leave your doctor’s
office and you have your recommendation and you receive your
license, how do you actually get the marijuana to begin
with?
THE COURT: I don’t know. How do other people get it? You
know, some people have what they call caregivers. I’ve
heard of people growing marijuana under permit for other
people. I don’t think the State of Hawaii has pharmacies
that hand out prescribed marijuana, but I think that the
statute, in order for it to be a reasonable interpretation,
would mean that from your primary caregiver, you could go
there, get your marijuana, and then take it home and
transport it home, and that would be okay.
MR. WOODHALL: What if you don’t have a caregiver?
THE COURT: You said you grow it at home. You don’t have to
transport it anywhere. It’s there.
MR. WOODHALL: But at some point during the process of me
acquiring marijuana, I must have broken the law then. So
the basis of the law would be how do you get it? Unless the
stork flies over your house and drops it on your land, how
would you acquire it legally?
THE COURT: Pardon me?
MR. WOODHALL: I mean you could never go somewhere to get it
from someone to start the whole process if you’re breaking
the law just by doing that.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess I can’t explain myself to
you, and I’m sorry about that.
10
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
B. The ICA Appeal
Woodhall timely appealed.5 The ICA affirmed the district
court’s Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order. Woodhall, SDO
at 7. The ICA held, “Woodhall failed to carry his burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his affirmative
5
While Woodhall’s appeal was before the ICA, the district court filed its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment (“FOFs/COLs”). The ICA
concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter its FOFs/COLs
once Woodhall filed his Notice of Appeal. State v. Woodhall, CAAP-11-0000097
(App. Sept. 25, 2012)(SDO), at 5-6. The ICA, therefore, did not address
Woodhall’s challenge to the district court’s Conclusion of Law Number 5, which
stated that as a matter of law, medical marijuana cannot be transported in any
place open to the public. Id. at 2-6.
At oral argument, the State argued that the district court did have
jurisdiction to enter its FOFs/COLs under Rules of the District Court (“RDCH”)
Rule 21 (2011).
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/courts/oral_arguments/archive/oasc_11_97.html.
That rule provides, in relevant part, “The party who prevails after the
presentation of evidence shall upon request submit to the court proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52, District Court
Rules of Civil Procedure.” District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (“DCRCP”)
Rule 52(c)(2011) in turn provides, in relevant part, “Notwithstanding the
filing of the notice of appeal, the court shall retain jurisdiction to make
and file such findings and conclusions and to amend the judgment to conform
thereto, if necessary.”
These rules do not apply to the instant criminal proceeding. See DCRCP
Rule 1 (2011)(“These rules govern the procedure in the district courts of the
State in all suits of a civil nature. . . .”) The Hawai‘i Rules of Penal
Procedure (“HRPP”) “govern the procedure in the courts of the State in all
penal proceedings. . . .” HRPP Rule 1 (2011). HRPP Rule 23(c)(2011) states:
In a [bench trial] the court shall make a general finding
and shall in addition, on request made at the time of the
general finding, find such facts specially as are requested
by the parties. Such special findings may be . . . in
writing at any time prior to sentence.
In this case, sentencing occurred on January 20, 2011. Although the
FOFs/COLs were dated nunc pro tunc to January 20, 2011, they were filed on
March 17, 2011, nearly two months after sentencing. Therefore, the district
lacked jurisdiction to enter its FOFs/COLs.
In any event, the district court’s Findings of Fact largely restated the
stipulated facts. Its Conclusions of Law set forth the applicable statutes
and culminated in Conclusion of Law Number 5, which stated, “The Court finds,
as a matter of law, [that] HRS § 712-1249(1) prohibits any person from
possessing any amount of marijuana, and that HRS § 329-122 does not permit the
medical use of marijuana in any place open to the public.” We interpret the
applicable statutes as a question of law in any event, regardless of whether
the district court’s Conclusions of Law were properly filed.
11
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
defense of medical use as defined in HRS § 329-121.” Id. at 4.
Specifically, the ICA stated that the stipulated facts “do not
specify that Woodhall was transporting marijuana to alleviate
symptoms or the effects of a debilitating medical condition.”
Id. It further held, “The written certification does not create
a presumption as to Woodhall’s purpose for possessing marijuana
at the Kona Airport.” Id. For those reasons, the ICA concluded
that the district court did not clearly err in its January 20,
2011 oral findings of fact. Id. at 4-5. Woodhall challenges
only this part of the ICA’s SDO on certiorari.
III. Discussion
A. Statutory Interpretation
In interpreting a statute, we adhere to certain well
established principles:
First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain
and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
statutory construction is our foremost obligation to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an
ambiguity exists. And fifth, in construing an ambiguous
statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
examining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to
ascertain their true meaning.
State v. Silver, 125 Hawai‘i 1, 4, 249 P.3d 1141, 1144
(2011)(citations omitted). “In construing an ambiguous statute,
12
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
this court may consider ‘[t]he reason and spirit of the law, and
the cause which induced the legislature to enact it . . . to
discover its true meaning.’” 125 Hawai‘i at 4-5, 249 P.3d at
1144-45 (citation omitted).
B. Question Presented
Woodhall’s sole question presented is:
The ICA gravely erred in holding that in a prosecution under
HRS § 712-1249, promoting a detrimental drug in the third
degree, Woodhall’s valid medical marijuana certification was
insufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Woodhall possessed the marijuana for medical
purposes pursuant to HRS §§ 329-122 and 712-1240.1, medical
use of marijuana and defense to promoting, respectively.
C. Woodhall’s Argument
In support of his argument, Woodhall states the following:
The stipulation to the valid medical marijuana certificate
subsumes that Woodhall fulfilled the requirements under HRS
§ 329-122(a)(1) and (a)(2). Specifically, the State agreed
that Woodhall had been diagnosed by a physician as having a
debilitating medical condition and that his physician
certified that the medical use of marijuana would likely
outweigh the health risks in treating Woodhall’s condition.
The stipulated facts did not indicate that Woodhall
possessed the marijuana for any purpose other than for
medicinal use.
As such, Woodhall argues that it is not necessary for him to
“recite that he was in possession of or transporting the
marijuana ‘to alleviate the symptoms or the effects of a
debilitating medical condition,’” in order to avail himself of
the affirmative defense. Further, Woodhall argues that the ICA’s
“limited interpretation of the medical marijuana statute is
contrary to the purpose of the law as illuminated by the
13
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
legislative history.” Specifically, Woodhall points to Section 1
of Act 228, which states that the purpose of Chapter 329, Part IX
was “to ensure that seriously ill people are not penalized by the
State for the use of marijuana for strictly medical purposes when
the patient’s treating physician provides a professional opinion
that benefits of medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh
the health risks for the qualifying patient.” 2000 Haw. Sess.
Laws Act 228, § 1 at 596. Woodhall argues that his failure to
“utter that he . . . was transporting the marijuana ‘to alleviate
symptoms or effects of the qualifying patient’s debilitating
medical condition’” should not nullify the medical use defense,
which would be an absurd reading of the medical marijuana
statutes that the legislature could not have intended.
Woodhall also argues that if this court finds that it was
necessary for him to have qualified his transportation of
marijuana as necessary “to alleviate symptoms or effects of the
qualifying patient’s debilitating medical condition,” then he
asks that the rule of lenity be exercised in his favor, “given
the lack of clarity in the statute of this requirement.”
Lastly, Woodhall argues that the State presented no evidence that
Woodhall was transporting the marijuana for any purpose other
than medical use. In fact, the State stipulated that Woodhall
possessed and was in the process of transporting “medical
14
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
marijuana” with a valid medical marijuana certificate. In light
of these stipulated facts, Woodhall argues that “the ICA gravely
erred in holding that Woodhall failed to carry his burden” of
proving the medical use affirmative defense.
D. Analysis
1. The Medical Marijuana Affirmative Defense
Woodhall’s arguments are persuasive. Medical use of
marijuana pursuant to Chapter 329, Part IX is an affirmative
defense to HRS § 712-1249, promoting a detrimental drug in the
third degree. “A defense is an affirmative defense if . . . [i]t
is specifically so designated by the Code or another statute.”
HRS § 701-115(3)(1993).
The part of the code specifically designating medical use of
marijuana as an affirmative defense is HRS § 712-1240.1(2)(1993 &
Supp. 2000), which provides, “It is an affirmative defense to
prosecution for any marijuana-related offense defined in this
part that the person who possessed or distributed the marijuana
was authorized to possess or distribute the marijuana for medical
purposes pursuant to part IX of chapter 329.” Another statute
also specifically designates medical use of marijuana as an
affirmative defense. HRS § 329-125(a)(2010) provides, in
relevant part, “A qualifying patient . . . may assert the medical
use of marijuana as an affirmative defense to any prosecution
15
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
involving marijuana under this [part] or chapter 712; provided
that the qualifying patient . . . strictly complied with the
requirements of this part.”
“If the defense is an affirmative defense, the defendant is
entitled to an acquittal if the trier of fact finds that the
evidence, when considered in light of any contrary prosecution
evidence, proves by a preponderance of the evidence the specified
fact or facts which negative penal liability.” HRS § 701-
115(2)(b)(1993). In this case, the only evidence presented was
Woodhall’s Medical Marijuana Registry Patient Identification
Certificate and the stipulated facts.
“[I]n any criminal case, the burden of proof falls on the
prosecution to prove each element of the crime for which the
defendant is charged. It is only after the prosecution meets
this burden that any offered affirmative defense becomes
relevant.” State v. Pratt, 127 Hawai‘i 206, 212, 277 P.3d 300,
306 (2012). In this case, Woodhall and the State stipulated to
all of the elements of the offense of Promoting a Detrimental
Drug in the Third Degree, in violation of HRS § 712-1249. The
elements of that offense are that a person (1) knowingly (2)
possesses any marijuana in any amount. Stipulated Fact 1 states,
“Woodhall knowingly possessed marijuana measuring 2.12 grams.”
16
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Thus, the prosecution met its burden and triggered the assertion
of Woodhall’s affirmative defense.
In determining whether a defendant has proven his
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, this
court has stated, “The preponderance of the evidence standard
directs the factfinder to decide whether ‘the existence of the
contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.’” State
v. Romano, 114 Hawai‘i 1, 8, 155 P.3d 1102, 1109 (2007)(citations
omitted). “Accordingly, ‘[t]o prevail, [the defendant] need only
offer evidence sufficient to tip the scale slightly in his or her
favor, and [the prosecution] can succeed by merely keeping the
scale evenly balanced.” Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, however, the district court preempted any
consideration of Woodhall’s affirmative defense by questioning
facts in the stipulation. The parties stipulated to the
following facts: (1) that Woodhall was transporting medical
marijuana; and (2) that the transport occurred at the Kona
International Airport, a place open to the public. In criminal
cases, “stipulations are ordinarily binding. . . .” State v.
Murray, 116 Hawai‘i 3, 13, 169 P.3d 955, 965 (2007). The facts
within a stipulation are taken to be “conclusive . . . [and]
binding upon the parties, the trial judge and [the appellate]
court.” See Hogan v. Watkins, 39 Haw. 584, 586 (Haw. Terr.
17
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
1952). Stipulations are particularly useful where the parties
wish to narrow the issues for trial.
The parties in this case stipulated to the essential
elements of the offense of promoting a detrimental drug in the
third degree so that they could put the affirmative defense
squarely at issue. They then stipulated that Woodhall’s
marijuana was medical marijuana (presumably to meet the
definition of “medical use” under HRS § 329-121), and that Kona
International Airport was a place open to the public (presumably
to fit the prohibition under HRS § 329-122(c)(E)), in order to
further narrow the issue at trial to the legal effect of those
facts: should HRS §§ 329-121 and -122 be strictly construed in
favor of the State, or should strict construction of these
statutes be set aside as ambiguous and producing an absurd result
the legislature could not have intended?
The district court did not give full effect to the
stipulation, however, and re-opened for factual determination
Woodhall’s “medical use” of marijuana under HRS § 329-121. The
stipulated facts show, however, that the parties intended to be a
conclusive and binding fact that the marijuana was for “medical
use.” First, the parties stipulated that Woodhall “possessed a
valid medical marijuana certificate.” This fact indicates, inter
alia, that the “qualifying patient has been diagnosed by a
18
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
physician as having a debilitating medical condition,” and that
the “qualifying patient’s physician has certified in writing
that, in the physician’s professional opinion, the potential
benefits of the medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh
the health risks for the particular qualifying patient.” HRS §§
329-122(a)(1) and (2).
Second, the stipulation characterizes the marijuana as
“medical marijuana” numerous times, further indicating the
parties’ intent to satisfy the “medical use” definition. Lastly,
the amount of marijuana in Woodhall’s possession was 2.12 grams,
or 0.074781 ounces. 2.12 grams is within the three-ounce limit
designated by HRS § 329-121 as an “adequate supply,” or “not more
than is reasonably necessary to assure the uninterrupted
availability of marijuana for the purpose of alleviating the
symptoms or effects of a qualifying patient’s debilitating
medical condition. . . .” Any amount over three ounces could be
considered not for medical purposes. Therefore, none of the
stipulated facts suggested that Woodhall possessed the medical
marijuana for any purpose other than a “medical use.”
As such, Woodhall proved he “was authorized to possess . . .
the marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to part IX of chapter
329,” as HRS § 712-1240.1(2) requires. There was no contrary
prosecution evidence indicating that the marijuana was not for
19
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
medical use. Therefore, the district court erred in so finding.
The district court heard no further testimony; the credibility of
witnesses was not at issue. Under HRS § 701-115(2)(b), then,
Woodhall was “entitled to an acquittal if the trier of fact finds
that the evidence, when considered in light of any contrary
prosecution evidence, proves by a preponderance of the evidence
the specified fact or facts which negative penal liability.” HRS
§ 701-115(2)(b).
2. Transportation of Medical Marijuana
Having shown that the marijuana he possessed was for
“medical purposes pursuant to part IX of Chapter 329,” Woodhall
still had the burden of proving the rest of his affirmative
defense, by a preponderance of the evidence, under HRS § 329-125,
which requires that “the qualifying patient . . . strictly
complied with the requirements of [Chapter 329, Part IX].” In
other words, Woodhall still had the burden of proving that his
“medical use,” which includes “transportation” under HRS § 329-
121 could nevertheless take place at the Kona International
Airport, a place “open to the public,” in which, pursuant to HRS
§ 329-122(c), “[t]he authorization of medical use of marijuana
. . . shall not apply. . . .” In light of the tension between
HRS §§ 329-121 and -122, it is not clear what “strict compliance”
with Chapter 329, Part IX fairly means.
20
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Before the ICA, the State argued that Chapter 329, Part IX
should be “restrictively” construed to effect the legislature’s
“strong public policy and laws against illegal drug use.”
However, “[e]ven the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed does not permit a court to ignore the legislative
intent, nor does it require the rejection of that sense of the
words used which best harmonizes with the design of the statute
or the end in view.” State v. Murray, 63 Haw. 12, 621 P.2d 334(1980)(citing State v. Prevo, 44 Haw. 665, 669, 361 P.2d 1044,
1047 (1961)); see also HRS § 701-104(1993)(“[I]n order to promote
justice and effect the objects of the law, all of [the Hawai‘i
Penal Code] provisions shall be given a genuine construction,
according to the fair import of the words, taken in their usual
sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the
purpose of the provision.”).
In creating Chapter 329, Part IX by Act 288 of the 2000
Legislative Session, the legislature’s “end in view” or “purpose
of the provision” was to protect medical marijuana users from
prosecution:
[T]he purpose of this Act is to ensure that seriously ill
people are not penalized by the State for the use of
marijuana for strictly medical purposes when the patient’s
treating physician provides a professional opinion that the
benefits of medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh
the health risks for the qualifying patient.
21
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
2000 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 228, § 1 at 596. This purpose seems to
envision protection from prosecution for medical users like
Woodhall, who have valid Medical Marijuana Registry Patient
Identification Certificates.
Chapter 329, Part IX, as enacted, does not clearly carry out
its purpose, leaving qualified patients vulnerable to
prosecution. It is especially unclear how medical marijuana is
transported to the homes of qualified patients in the first
instance, or by qualified patients anywhere outside their homes.
First, Chapter 329, Part IX envisions only home cultivation as
the manner in which a qualifying patient obtains medical
marijuana. HRS § 329-121’s definition of “adequate supply”
demonstrates that medical marijuana comes only from plants
cultivated in the home:
“Adequate supply” means an amount of marijuana jointly
possessed between the qualifying patient and the primary
caregiver that is not more than is reasonably necessary to
assure the uninterrupted availability of marijuana for the
purpose of alleviating the symptoms or effects of a
qualifying patient’s debilitating medical condition;
provided that an “adequate supply” shall not exceed three
mature marijuana plants, four immature marijuana plants, and
one ounce of usable marijuana per each mature plant.
Second, Chapter 329, Part IX makes no provision for how
medical marijuana would even arrive at the qualifying patient’s
home. Although HRS § 329-121 defines “medical use” to include
“transportation,” and although HRS § 329-121 defines
“distribution” to mean the “transfer of marijuana and
22
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
paraphernalia from the primary caregiver to the qualifying
patient,” HRS § 329-122(c)(E) prohibits “medical use” (to include
“transportation” and “distribution”) in “place[s] open to the
public.” Presumably, medical marijuana could not be transported
or distributed on sidewalks, see Hawai‘i County Code § 22-
3.8(2002)(requiring that permitted uses on sidewalk “not impede
or endanger the public’s use”), and on “[a]ll roads, alleys,
streets, ways, lanes, bikeways, bridges, and all other real
property highway related interests in the State, opened, laid
out, subdivided, consolidated, and acquired and built by the
government,” as HRS § 264-1(2007 & Supp. 2008) declares these to
be “public highways,” i.e., places open to the public. In other
words, a qualifying patient’s medical marijuana cultivation and
consumption can only happen at home, yet there is no mechanism by
statute by which the qualifying patient could ever legally bring
the medical marijuana to his or her home.
Third, assuming the medical marijuana arrives at a
qualifying patient’s home, Chapter 329, Part IX makes no
provision for its possession outside the home, even though
qualifying patients, like other ordinary people, may be absent
from the home for many hours at a time; travel for extended
periods of time; move residences; reside in more than one
residence; evacuate their homes during emergencies like tsunami
23
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
warnings, floods, and fires; and become homeless. Chapter 329,
Part IX unrealistically envisions a qualifying patient to be
permanently homebound.6 This is the situation the district court
seemed to accept when he told Woodhall, “You grow it. Okay. So
you’re not – you don’t need to transport it from one place to the
other. You have it at home.”
The confusion within Chapter 329, Part IX is apparent, such
that the meaning of HRS § 329-125’s requirement of “strict
compliance” is uncertain. An examination of the legislative
history of Act 228 of the 2000 Legislative Session, which was
later codified as Chapter 329, Part IX, provides little guidance.
The legislative history reveals that home cultivation, transport,
and public medical use of marijuana were debated, but without
resulting clarification of those provisions. First, multiple
6
The Concurrence/Dissent acknowledges that “the legislature[’s failure]
to adequately provide a mechanism by which a qualifying patient could receive
their initial supply of marijuana is an absurdity that this court can address,
since failing to do so would completely frustrate the legislature’s purpose in
enacting the statute.” Concurrence/Dissent at 8. The Concurrence/Dissent
also asserts, however, that “there is no absurdity in construing [HRS § 329-
122(c)(2)(E)] as prohibiting transportation for other purposes,” the “other
purposes” being any transportation other than the “transportation through
public places for the purpose of obtaining an initial supply of medical
marijuana. . . .” Concurrence/Dissent at 4, 5. However, the definition of
“medical use” in HRS § 329-121 includes “transportation” in general, and it
would be absurd to limit the medical use of marijuana to one’s home only,
which would in effect require a medical marijuana patient to be completely
homebound, given the many legitimate reasons a seriously ill person might need
his or her medication outside the home. In so observing, we do not, as the
Concurrence/Dissent asserts, “engage[] in policy judgments reserved for the
legislature.” Concurrence/Dissent at 8. We simply note that the same
statutory inconsistency between HRS §§ 329-121 and -122, which would prohibit
the initial transport of medical marijuana to the home, exists with respect to
subsequent acts of transport of medical marijuana from the home. There
appears no rational basis to distinguish between transport to versus transport
from the qualifying patient’s home.
24
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
legislators had misgivings about home cultivation as the sole
means by which qualifying patients obtain medical marijuana.
Representative Whalen stated:
Distribution is one thing, growing [marijuana] on your
property is something else. [The bill] limits distribution.
It doesn’t limit the cultivation of it. To get to the main
point here, if we really wanted to treat [marijuana] as a
drug we would treat it just as we treat cocaine, heroine
[sic], morphine, the opiate families, we would treat it as
such and allow doctors to prescribe it. But what we are
doing is we are allowing people to grow their own and smoke
it if they can get their doctor to sign a piece of paper.
2000 House Journal, at 580 (Statement of Rep. Whalen). Senator
Anderson also had concerns about home cultivation. He stated he
would rather “designate a grower from each island . . .
designated as people you could buy from,” as that was the trend
on the mainland. 2000 Senate Journal, at 282 (Statement of Sen.
Anderson). See also 2000 Senate Journal, at 283 (Statement of
Sen. Anderson)(“[T]he way the bill is written, anybody and his
brother could grow marijuana wherever they wanted to. . . .
That’s why I said we should designate an area and allow someone
to be able to enforce this bill that we have.”); 2000 Senate
Journal, at 556 (Statement of Sen. Anderson). Senator Matsuura
similarly opposed “only one part of this bill and that is on the
cultivation.” 2000 Senate Journal, at 284 (Statement of Sen.
Matsuura).
Two other senators challenged how, if home cultivation were
the only method of medical marijuana production, acquisition and
25
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
transport could even occur. Senator Sakamoto had “questions
[about] planting, cultivation, distribution and how one acquires
marijuana since it’s illegal to grow.” 2000 Senate Journal, at
282-83 (Statement of Sen. Sakamoto). Senator Inouye echoed
Senator Sakamoto’s questions about how patients were to receive
marijuana plants, stating, “Where are the plants to come from?
Perhaps using the airlines to send the plants over from the Big
Island or Kauai or wherever. That’s a great concern.” 2000
Senate Journal, at 559 (Statement of Sen. Inouye). This is the
same concern raised by Woodhall in his exchange with the district
court:
MR. WOODHALL: But at some point during the process of me
acquiring marijuana, I must have broken the law then. So
the basis of the law would be how do you get it? Unless the
stork flies over your house and drops it on your land, how
would you acquire it legally? . . . . I mean you could never
go somewhere to get it from someone to start the whole
process if you’re breaking the law just by doing that.
As for the prohibition on medical use in public places, only
two legislators weighed in. Representative Lee’s comment was
less relevant to the instant appeal. She stated, “[T]his bill
has inadvertently left out access to marijuana for the sickest
and most needy terminal patients. Many terminally ill patients
spend their last days in hospice or receiving hospital care.
Marijuana would not be allowed in public places such as these.”
2000 House Journal, at 581 (Statement of Rep. Lee). Senator Chun
Oakland, however, made a point directly relevant to this appeal.
She stated her understanding was “[a]ny diversion [from the
26
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
cannabis laws then in place] would be punished and smoking
outside of one’s home would not be permitted.” 2000 Senate
Journal, at 553 (Statement of Sen. Chun Oakland)(emphasis added).
This legislative history reveals that even as Act 228 became
law, many of the details were left to future legislative action
but remained unclear over a decade later.7
The lack of clarity in the statute is apparent when we
consider what kinds of transport would be permissible under
Chapter 329, Part IX if transport cannot occur in any place open
to the public. At oral argument, the State argued that Chapter
329, Part IX would permit a qualified patient to transport
medical marijuana on foot (i.e., not utilizing any moving vehicle
like an automobile, airplane, ship, etc.), within the confines of
one’s private residence, on private roads, or through the
backyards of one’s neighbors (i.e., not in any place open to the
public). http://www.courts.state.hi.us/courts/oral_arguments/
archive/oasc_11_97.html This reading of HRS § 329-125’s strict
compliance requirement results in an impracticability that the
legislature could not have intended. “[A] departure from a
literal construction of a statute is justified when such
7
None of the subsequent amendments to Chapter 329, Part IX impacted the
“medical use” definition in HRS § 329-121 or the “public places” limitation in
HRS § 329-122. 2001 Haw. Sess. Laws. Act 55, § 15 at 91 (making punctuation
changes to HRS § 329-122); 2009 Haw. Sess. Laws. Act 11, § 43 at 26
(clarifying definition of “physician” in HRS § 329-121); 2009 Haw. Sess. Laws.
Act 169, § 7 at 674 (same); 2010 Haw. Sess Laws, Act 57, § 4 at 81 (same);
2011 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 73, § 6 at 193 (amending HRS § 329-123).
27
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
construction would produce an absurd result and . . . is clearly
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act. . . .”
Morgan v. Planning Dep’t, 104 Hawai‘i 173, 185, 86 P.3d 982, 994
(2004)(citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude only that,
under the circumstances of this case, where the defendant has
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) he was in possession of medical marijuana;
(2) the weight of the substance did not exceed an “adequate
supply” under the law;
(3) he was in possession of a valid medical marijuana
certificate;
(4) the marijuana was not being used, ingested or carried
in open view at the time it was discovered;
(5) the marijuana was found in an “other place open to the
public,” where transportation for medical use might
legitimately occur; and
(6) no evidence was adduced that the marijuana was
transported for anything but a medical use;
the rule of lenity applies. See State v. Bayly, 118 Hawai‘i 1,
15, 185 P.3d 186, 200 (2008) (“[W]here a criminal statute is
ambiguous, it is to be interpreted according to the rule of
lenity. Under the rule of lenity, the statute must be strictly
construed against the government and in favor of the accused.”)
(citations omitted). We do not address whether other
28
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
circumstances may similarly invoke the rule of lenity.8
V. Conclusion
We hold that the district court erred in re-determining the
fact of medical use in contrast to the parties’ stipulation, thus
preempting consideration of Woodhall’s affirmative defense. The
parties stipulated to the fact that Woodhall possessed and
transported “medical marijuana” under a valid Medical Marijuana
Registry Patient Identification Certificate. The State presented
no contrary evidence showing that the marijuana was for any use
other than a medical use. Thus, Woodhall proved that he was
authorized to possess the marijuana “for medical purposes
pursuant to part IX of Chapter 329[,]” for purposes of the
affirmative defense under HRS § 712-1240.1(2).
We further hold that the rule of lenity requires us, under
the specific facts of this case, to construe HRS §§ 329-121,
-122, and -125 against the government, as there is an
irreconcilable inconsistency between the authorized
transportation of medical marijuana under HRS § 329-121, and the
prohibition on transport of medical marijuana through “any . . .
place open to the public” under HRS § 329-122(c)(E).
8
We specifically do not address whether the rule of lenity would be
triggered if “transportation” were to occur through other locations or modes
of transport listed in HRS § 329-122(c)(2)(A)-(E).
29
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Therefore, under HRS § 701-115(2)(b), Woodhall was entitled
to an acquittal because his “evidence, when considered in light
of any contrary prosecution evidence, prove[d] by a preponderance
of the evidence the specified fact or facts which negative[d]
penal liability.” Accordingly, the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal is
vacated, and this case is remanded to the district court with
instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal, consistent with
this opinion.
Kirsha K. M. Durante /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
for petitioner
/s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr.
Linda L. Walton
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
30