Bailey v. Duvauchelle. , 135 Haw. 482 ( 2015 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-14-0000883
29-JUN-2015
03:35 PM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
ZACHARY FRED BAILEY,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BURRELLE DAVID DUVAUCHELLE, TRUSTEE UNDER
DUVAUCHELLE FAMILY TRUST U/D/T DATED AUGUST 14, 2008,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-14-0000883
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-14-0000883; CIV. NO. 06-1-0218(1))
JUNE 29, 2015
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
In Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, 76
Hawai#i 115, 869 P.2d 1334 (1994) (per curiam), this court set
forth principles for determining whether an order or other
decision of the circuit court is appealable. Id. at 119, 869
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P.2d at 1338. Those principles were rooted in our “policy
against piecemeal appeals[,]” and were intended to “simplify and
make certain the matter of appealability.” Id. at 118-19, 869
P.2d at 1337-38.
This case requires us to determine the applicability of
those principles in the context of motions brought under Hawai#i
Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 60(b).
Specifically, this case requires us to determine
whether an order deciding a motion that was purportedly filed
pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b) is appealable, where the underlying
ruling from which the party sought Rule 60(b) relief was not
appealable. We hold that such an order is not appealable.
I. Background
This case arises from a dispute over a flag lot parcel
of land in Puko#o, located on the Island of Moloka#i, County of
Maui, State of Hawai#i (Parcel 27 or the “parcel”).
On February 13, 2009, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee
Zachary Fred Bailey alleged in an amended complaint that
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Burrelle David Duvauchelle,
Trustee Under Duvauchelle Family Trust U/D/T Dated August 14,
2008 (hereinafter, “Duvauchelle”), was violating Bailey’s “right,
title and interest in and to, and use, possession, occupancy,
control, and full enjoyment” of Parcel 27, including the flagpole
portion. Bailey alleged that Duvauchelle, owner of an adjacent
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parcel (Parcel 59), “unlawfullly, trespassed, ousted and
prevented Bailey’s access to Parcel 27, improperly used the
flagpole portion of Parcel 27, and appropriated the flagpole
portion of Parcel 27 for [his] own private use and purpose.”
Bailey alleged that he was the fee simple owner of
Parcel 27, including the flag pole portion. Specifically, Bailey
alleged that on December 11, 1990, Laurence H. Dorcy, Jr.,
conveyed Parcel 27 to Bailey by warranty deed. Bailey also
alleged that on October 2, 1984, William F. Petersen and Mary
Kekahaualani Petersen (collectively, the “Petersens”) conveyed
Parcel 27 to Dorcy by agreement of sale, and on December 14,
1990, the Petersens conveyed Parcel 27 to Dorcy by warranty deed.
In the amended complaint, Bailey named Dorcy as a defendant, but
did not name the Petersens.
Bailey raised eight claims for relief, as follows:
ouster (Count I), declaratory relief (Count II), temporary
restraining order/injunctive relief (Count III), appropriation
(Count IV), trespass (Count V), easement by necessity (Count VI),
breach of warranty against Dorcy (Count VII), and punitive
damages (Count VIII).
With respect to Count II, Bailey alleged, in pertinent
part, that:
51. Bailey is entitled to a judicial determination of
his rights in and to all of Parcel 27, including the
flagpole portion; to wit, that: (a) Bailey is the
rightful owner of Parcel 27, including the flagpole
portion; (b) Defendants Duvauchelle have no right,
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title or interest in or to any portion of Parcel 27,
including the flagpole portion; and (c) Defendants
Duvauchelle’s acts and omissions constitute an
unlawful, improper and unreasonable interference with
Bailey’s ownership, use, possession, occupancy,
development and full enjoyment of Parcel 27. This
determination is necessary and appropriate to
ascertain the rights, duties and obligations of
Defendants Duvauchelle and Bailey.
Dorcy’s answer to Bailey’s amended complaint contained
a third-party complaint against Mary Petersen for breach of
warranty, which the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (circuit
court) later dismissed for lack of service.1
After numerous filings by the parties, the circuit
court entered orders granting Bailey’s motions for summary
judgment regarding record title and adverse possession, which
related specifically to Bailey’s claim for declaratory relief in
Count II.
On October 25, 2010, the circuit court entered a final
judgment in favor of Bailey on Count II (declaratory relief).
The circuit court declared that Bailey was “the rightful owner in
fee simple” of Parcel 27, including the flag pole portion;
Duvauchelle did “not own or have any legal or equitable right,
title or interest to any portion of Parcel 27, including the flag
pole portion by deed, devise or adverse possession”; and Bailey
was entitled to “immediate and exclusive use, right and
possession of all of Parcel 27[.]” The circuit court further
stated “[t]here is no just reason for delay in the entry of a
1
The Honorable Joel E. August presided.
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judgment with respect to [Count II] as it fully and finally
resolves the question of title to and ownership of Parcel 27 and
the flag pole portion.”2
Duvauchelle appealed, and the Intermediate Court of
Appeals (ICA) affirmed and entered a judgment on appeal on
August 14, 2012. Duvauchelle did not seek certiorari review.
Subsequently, Bailey attempted to obtain a stipulation
from Duvauchelle for voluntary dismissal of the remaining claims
for relief, i.e., Counts I, and III through VIII, pursuant to
HRCP Rule 41(a)(1),3 but was unsuccessful. Bailey next moved for
2
HRCP Rule 54(b) (2000) provides as follows:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order
or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall
not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.
(Emphases added).
3
HRCP Rule 41(a)(1) (2012) provides:
An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court (A) by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before the return date as provided in Rule
12(a) or service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (B) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated
in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the
(continued...)
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a court order of voluntary dismissal of those claims pursuant to
HRCP Rule 41(a)(2)4 (Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal).
After an April 18, 2013 hearing on the Motion for Order
of Voluntary Dismissal,5 the circuit court entered an order
granting the Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal on June 26,
2013.
On July 16, 2013, the circuit court entered a purported
final judgment on the Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal,
which stated as follows:
In accordance with Rule 58 of the Hawai#i Rules
3
(...continued)
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice
of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of the United States, or of any
state, territory or insular possession of the United
States an action based on or including the same claim.
(Emphases added).
4
HRCP Rule 41(a)(2) (2012) provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon that
defendant of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s
objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph is without prejudice.
(Emphasis added).
5
The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo presided from that point forward.
At the hearing, Duvauchelle, appearing pro se, stated that he
opposed the Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal because he planned to file
a Rule 60(b) motion to present new evidence that would void the October 25,
2010 judgment.
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of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to the Order Granting
Plaintiff Zachary Fred Bailey’s Motion for Order of
Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice the First Claim for
Relief, and the Third Through Eighth Claims for Relief
of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed
February 13, 2009, Filed March 20, 2013 (“Order of
Dismissal”), filed herein, which dismissed the First
Claim for Relief, and the Third through Eighth Claims
for Relief with prejudice, those being the only
remaining claims in the First Amended Complaint, filed
by Plaintiff Zachary Fred Bailey on February 13, 2009,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Final
Judgment is hereby entered on the Order of Dismissal.
No other claims, parties or issues remain in this
case.
Duvauchelle appealed from the July 16, 2013 judgment,
and on January 15, 2014, the ICA entered an order dismissing the
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction (First Dismissal
Order). The ICA held that the July 16, 2013 judgment did “not
satisfy the requirements for an appealable final judgment” under
Hawai#i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-1(a),6 HRCP Rule 58,7 and the
holding in Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, 76 Hawai#i
115, 869 P.2d, 1334 (1994) (per curiam). As discussed in further
detail below, Jenkins set forth specific requirements for appeals
6
HRS § 641-1(a) (Supp. 2014) provides, as it did at the time of
Duvauchelle’s appeal, that “[a]ppeals shall be allowed in civil matters from
all final judgments, orders, or decrees . . . .”
7
HRCP Rule 58 (2010) provides:
Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to the
provisions of Rule 54 of these rules and Rule 23 of
the Rules of the Circuit Courts, the prevailing party
shall prepare and submit a proposed judgment. The
filing of the judgment in the office of the clerk
constitutes the entry of the judgment; and the
judgment is not effective before such entry. The
entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the
taxing of costs. Every judgment shall be set forth on
a separate document.
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from circuit court rulings. Jenkins, 76 Hawai#i at 119, 869 P.2d
at 1338.
The ICA first concluded that the July 16, 2013 judgment
did not need to resolve Count II (declaratory relief) because the
circuit court entered a HRCP Rule 54(b) certified judgment with
regard to that count on October 25, 2010. The ICA next concluded
that, nevertheless, the July 16, 2013 judgment was required to
but did not “resolve all remaining claims in the case” because
the judgment did not: (1) “expressly enter judgment in favor of
or against the appropriate parties on [Counts I, and III through
VIII]” or “expressly dismiss those claims”; (2) “address, much
less resolve” claims against the third parties, i.e., Dorcy or
Mary Petersen; or, alternatively, (3) contain the language
necessary for HRCP Rule 54(b) certification.
Duvauchelle did not seek certiorari review. Further,
there is no indication in the record that after the ICA’s First
Dismissal Order, the circuit court amended, or that the parties
requested that the circuit court amend, the circuit court’s
July 16, 2013 judgment so as to make it appealable.
On April 3, 2014, Duvauchelle moved to vacate the
July 16, 2013 judgment and June 26, 2013 order pursuant to HRCP
Rule 60(b)(1)-(4)8 (Rule 60(b) Motion). Duvauchelle argued that
8
HRCP Rule 60(b) (2006) provides:
(continued...)
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the circuit court “reversibly erred dismissing the remainder of
[Bailey’s] claims where Duvauchelle was in the process of moving
to vacate the [October 25, 2010] final judgment based on newly
discovered evidence proving the judgment was void.” Duvauchelle
appeared to argue that the circuit court’s dismissal of Counts I,
and III through VIII with prejudice was error because it
precluded Duvauchelle from moving to vacate the October 25, 2010
judgment, pertaining to Count II (declaratory relief), based on
newly discovered evidence. Bailey alleged that he intended to
8
(...continued)
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of
coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of
review and bills in the nature of a bill of review,
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
(Emphases added).
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introduce “new survey evidence [that] came to light only after
the [ICA] decided this case,” which would establish that Bailey’s
survey of Parcel 27 was “defective” and that “mistakes [were]
made on the boundaries and misrepresentation made on the meets
[sic] and bounds of the disputed properties.” Duvauchelle did
not request that the circuit court amend the July 16, 2013
judgment to be appealable, in accordance with the ICA’s First
Dismissal Order.
In opposition, Bailey first argued that Duvauchelle was
“time-barred” by HRCP Rule 60(b) from challenging the October 25,
2010 final judgment. Bailey contended that Duvauchelle’s time to
file a Rule 60(b)(2) (new evidence) motion to vacate the
October 25, 2010 final judgment had expired on October 25, 2011.9
Bailey next argued that the ICA’s affirmance of the
October 25, 2010 final judgment in its August 14, 2012 judgment
on appeal was “the law of the case.” (Initial capitalizations
omitted). Bailey contended that the October 25, 2010 final
judgment and August 13, 2012 judgment on appeal established that
“(1) Bailey is the fee simple owner of Parcel 27, including the
flag pole portion, and (2) the Duvauchelles had not acquired
9
Under HRCP Rule 60(b), motions based on “(1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); [and] (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party,” must be made “within a reasonable time” and “not more than one year
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.”
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title to the flag pole portion by adverse possession.” Bailey
contended that although a trial court is “free to hear” a Rule
60(b) motion, it must accord deference to the rulings of the
appellate court.
Bailey also argued that “Duvauchelle’s purported ‘new
evidence’ is insufficient to warrant [HRCP] Rule 60(b)(2) relief”
to vacate either the October 25, 2010 final judgment or the
July 16, 2013 judgment. (Initial capitalizations omitted).
Bailey contended that relief under Rule 60(b)(2) was “time-
barred” and that Duvuachelle’s purported new evidence, i.e., “a
summary of various, previously 0used surveys, . . . deeds, and
maps” was “really belated ‘expert’ opinion that Duvauchelle could
have obtained years ago.”
Finally, Bailey argued that relief under HRCP Rules
60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect)
and 60(b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party) was “time-barred,” and that in any event, Rules
60(b)(1), 60(b)(3), and 60(b)(4) (void judgment) were
inapplicable.
In reply, Duvauchelle argued that the Rule 60(b) Motion
was “not tardy, as the judgment was filed July 16, 2013 and the
Order filed June 26, 2013”; the law of the case doctrine was
inapplicable because Duvauchelle had “newly discovered evidence
which [would] change the result”; Duvauchelle’s new evidence
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satisfied the “new-evidence rules”; Rules 60(b)(1) (mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect) and 60(b)(4) (void
judgment) were applicable; and “the judgment was obtained by
illegitimate means and basically a fraud on the Court.”
After a May 1, 2014 hearing on the Rule 60(b) Motion,
the circuit court entered an order denying the motion on May 14,
2014.
Duvauchelle appealed to the ICA, and on October 10,
2014, the ICA entered an order dismissing the appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction (Second Dismissal Order). The ICA noted
that under Ditto v. McCurdy, 103 Hawai#i 153, 80 P.3d 974 (2003),
post-judgment orders are generally appealable without entry of a
separate judgment pursuant to HRCP Rule 58 and Jenkins, 76
Hawai#i 115, 860 P.2d 1334. The ICA concluded, however, that the
Order re Rule 60(b) Motion was not appealable because the circuit
court had not entered a valid final judgment on the underlying
claims at issue (Counts I, and III through VIII).
Referencing its First Dismissal Order, the ICA
concluded that neither the July 16, 2013 judgment nor the
June 26, 2013 order constituted an appealable final judgment and
therefore, the Order re Rule 60(b) Motion was “interlocutory” and
not appealable.
The ICA concluded that because there was no valid final
judgment on Counts I, and III through VIII, when Duvauchelle
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submitted the Rule 60(b) Motion, “he was not actually invoking
the circuit court’s authority under HRCP Rule 60(b) to grant
relief from a judgment, but, instead, . . . was invoking the
circuit court’s inherent authority to revise any and all
interlocutory orders prior to the entry of a judgment.”
The ICA noted that in the federal courts, the test for
determining whether a judgment is final for purposes of seeking
relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 60(b)
is usually the same as the test for determining whether a
judgment is final for purposes of a direct appeal. The ICA cited
to United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000), in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
explained that “[FRCP] Rule 60(b) . . . applies only to motions
attacking final, appealable orders[.]” Id. at 1048 n.8.
Finally, the ICA stated that the Order re Rule 60(b)
Motion is “an interlocutory order that is potentially eligible
for appellate review when and if a party asserts a timely appeal
from the entry of a future appealable final judgment that
resolves all remaining claims in the case” because under Ueoka v.
Szymanski, 107 Hawai#i 386, 114 P.3d 892 (2005), appealing from a
valid final judgment brings up all interlocutory orders that
otherwise would not be directly appealable.
Duvauchelle timely sought certiorari review, presenting
the following question:
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Whether the ICA gravely erred and the magnitude of
such error or inconsistency dictates the need for
further appeal where the ICA dismissed Duvauchelle’s
appeal based on lack of jurisdiction where the Circuit
Court filed a Final Judgment on all of the Bailey
claims against Duvauchelle holding no other claims,
parties, or issues remain in the case and denied
Duvauchelle’s post-judgment motions to vacate said
judgment.
II. Standard of Review
“The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law
that [this court] review[s] de novo under the right/wrong
standard.” Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawai#i 152, 158, 977 P.2d 160,
166 (1999).
III. Discussion
The question before us is whether an order deciding a
motion that was purportedly filed pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b) is
appealable, where the underlying ruling from which the party
sought Rule 60(b) relief was not appealable. We hold that such
an order is not appealable.
HRS § 641-1(a) provides that “[a]ppeals shall be
allowed in civil matters from all final judgments, orders, or
decrees . . . .” (Emphasis added).
HRCP Rule 54(a) (2000) defines “judgment” as follows:
“‘Judgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment shall not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of
prior proceedings.” (Emphases added).
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HRCP Rule 54(b), which applies to judgments involving
multiple claims or multiple parties, provides as follows:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order
or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall
not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.
(Emphasis added).
HRCP Rule 60(b), which provides for post-judgment
relief, states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of
coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of
review and bills in the nature of a bill of review,
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are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
(Emphases added).
HRCP Rule 58, the separate judgment rule, provides
that:
Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to the
provisions of Rule 54 of these rules and Rule 23 of
the Rules of the Circuit Courts, the prevailing party
shall prepare and submit a proposed judgment. The
filing of the judgment in the office of the clerk
constitutes the entry of the judgment; and the
judgment is not effective before such entry. The
entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the
taxing of costs. Every judgment shall be set forth on
a separate document.
(Emphasis added).
In Jenkins, this court interpreted the requirements of
HRS § 641-1(a), and HRCP Rules 54 and 58, and explicitly stated
that the opinion was “intended to establish bright line rules so
there will be little doubt in most cases about when an appeal may
be taken.” Jenkins, 76 Hawai#i at 119, 869 P.2d at 1338.
Accordingly, this court held as follows:
(1) An appeal may be taken from circuit court orders
resolving claims against parties only after the orders
have been reduced to a judgment and the judgment has
been entered in favor of and against the appropriate
parties pursuant to HRCP 58; (2) if a judgment
purports to be the final judgment in a case involving
multiple claims or multiple parties, the judgment (a)
must specifically identify the party or parties for
and against whom the judgment is entered, and (b) must
(i) identify the claims for which it is entered, and
(ii) dismiss any claims not specifically identified;
(3) if the judgment resolves fewer than all claims
against all parties, or reserves any claim for later
action by the court, an appeal may be taken only if
the judgment contains the language necessary for
certification under HRCP 54(b); and (4) an appeal from
any judgment will be dismissed as premature if the
judgment does not, on its face, either resolve all
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claims against all parties or contain the finding
necessary for certification under HRCP 54(b).[10]
Id. at 119, 869 P.2d at 1338 (emphasis in original); see also
Carlisle v. One (1) Boat, 119 Hawai#i 245, 254, 195 P.3d 1177,
1186 (2008) (“[B]ased on Jenkins and HRCP Rule 58, an order is
not appealable, even if it resolves all claims against the
parties, until it has been reduced to a separate judgment.”).
The purpose of adopting the bright line rule in Jenkins
was to relieve the appellate courts of “the burden of searching a
voluminous record for evidence of finality . . . .” Jenkins, 76
Hawai#i at 119, 869 P.2d at 1338. This court considered and
rejected the approach utilized by federal courts, under which
parties can waive the FRCP Rule 58 separate judgment requirement.
Id. at 118, 119, 869 P.2d at 1337, 1338.
Subsequently, in Ditto, this court held that “the
separate judgment requirement articulated in Jenkins is
10
This court also provided model language for complying with these
“bright line rules,” as follows:
For example: “Pursuant to the jury verdict entered on
(date), judgment in the amount of $ __ is hereby
entered in favor of Plaintiff X and against Defendant
Y upon counts I through IV of the complaint.” A
statement that declares “there are no other
outstanding claims” is not a judgment. If the circuit
court intends that claims other than those listed in
the judgment language should be dismissed, it must say
so; for example, “Defendant Y’s counterclaim is
dismissed,” or “Judgment upon Defendant Y’s
counterclaim is entered in favor of
Plaintiff/Counter–Defendant Z,” or “all other claims,
counterclaims, and cross-claims are dismissed.”
Jenkins, 76 Hawai#i at 120 n.4, 869 P.2d at 1339 n.4.
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inapposite to the post-judgment context.” Ditto, 103 Hawai#i at
158, 80 P.3d at 979. This court further explained:
Clearly, the rule in Jenkins--to wit, that circuit
court orders resolving claims against parties must
generally be reduced to a judgment and the judgment
must be entered in favor of or against the appropriate
parties pursuant to HRCP Rule 58 before an appeal may
be taken--is limited to circuit court orders disposing
of claims raised in a circuit court complaint.
Id. at 159, 80 P.3d at 980 (emphasis in original).
Ditto held that “[a]n order denying a motion for post-
judgment relief under HRCP 60(b) is an appealable final order
under HRS § 641–1(a).”11 Id. at 160, 80 P.3d at 981.
Accordingly, the circuit court’s order denying the plaintiff’s
October 9, 2000 Rule 60(b) motion subsequent to entry of judgment
“was an appealable final order . . . .” Id. at 155, 160, 80 P.3d
at 981, 976.
Although Ditto held that a circuit court’s ruling on a
post-judgment motion, including a HRCP Rule 60(b) motion, is
appealable without entry of a Rule 58 separate judgment,12 Ditto
did not determine whether an order deciding a motion purportedly
filed pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b) is appealable, where the
11
Specifically, under Ditto, “a post-judgment order is an appealable
final order under HRS 641-1(a) if the order ends the proceedings, leaving
nothing further to be accomplished. Correlatively, an order is not final if
the rights of a party involved remain undetermined or if the matter is
retained for further action.” Ditto, 103 Hawai#i at 157, 80 P.3d at 978
(citation omitted).
12
Indeed, Ditto held that entering a separate judgment on the post-
judgment order at issue was “superfluous” and that the time to appeal started
upon entry of the post-judgment order, not upon later entry of the unnecessary
separate judgment. Ditto, 103 Hawai#i at 159-60, 80 P.3d at 980-81.
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underlying ruling from which the party sought Rule 60(b) relief
was not appealable.
Later, in Cho v. State, 115 Hawai#i 373, 382, 168 P.3d
17, 26 (2007), this court held that a HRCP Rule 60(b) motion “‘is
authorized only in situations involving final judgments.’” Id. at
382, 168 P.3d at 26 (2007) (citing Crown Properties, Inc. v. Fin.
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 6 Haw. 105, 112, 712 P.2d 504, 509 (App.
1985)); see also Tradewinds Hotel, Inc. v. Cochran, 8 Haw. App.
256, 262, 799 P.2d 60, 65 (1990) (“Rule 60(b) applies to motions
seeking to amend final orders in the nature of judgments. . . .
The order denying Plaintiff’s original motion to enjoin
Defendant’s alleged unauthorized practice of law was not a final
judgment or order.”). This court further “defined ‘final order’
to mean ‘an order ending the proceedings, leaving nothing further
to be accomplished.’” Cho, 115 Hawai#i at 383, 168 P.3d at 27
(citing Bobalcos v. Kapiolani Med. Ctr. for Women & Children, 89
Hawai#i 436, 439, 974 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1999)).
Cho held that the trial court’s order imposing
discovery sanctions was “merely interlocutory” because the order
was “not a final order” and because a “final judgment or order
had not yet been entered at the time the State filed its
[purported Rule 60(b)] motion for reconsideration.” Cho, 115
Hawai#i at 383, 168 P.3d at 27. “Accordingly, relief pursuant to
HRCP Rule 60(b) was not available[.]” Id. This court further
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concluded that regardless, the trial court had “inherent power”
to reconsider the order imposing discovery sanctions because “the
trial court has inherent power to reconsider interlocutory
orders.” Id. at 383-84, 168 P.3d at 27-28. Cho, however, did
not decide whether the principles of finality set forth in
Jenkins were applicable to judgments underlying HRCP Rule 60(b)
motions.
We now hold that relief under HRCP Rule 60(b) requires
an underlying judgment that comports with the principles of
finality set forth in Jenkins. Absent an underlying appealable
final judgment, the circuit court’s rulings on a purported Rule
60(b) motion are interlocutory and not appealable until entry of
such a judgment. Cho, 115 Hawai#i at 383-84, 168 P.3d at 27-28;
see Ueoka v. Szymanski, 107 Hawai#i 386, 396, 114 P.3d 892, 902
(2005) (“An appeal from a final judgment ‘brings up for review
all interlocutory orders not appealable directly as of right
which deal with issues in this case.’”) (quoting Pioneer Mill Co.
v. Ward, 34 Haw. 686, 694 (Haw. Terr. 1938)). Correlatively,
until entry of an appealable final judgment, the timing
requirements that would otherwise apply to HRCP Rule 60(b)
motions are inapplicable. See Carter v. Beverly Hills Savings &
Loan Ass’n, 884 F.2d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating, “the
time requirements of Rule 60(b) only commence running upon
‘entry’ of final judgment that complies with Rule 58,” and “[i]t
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follows that where a final judgment complying with Rule 58 was
never entered, a post-judgment motion may not be deemed
untimely.”).
This approach comports with the plain language of HRCP
Rules 54 and 60(b), and 58. Rule 54(a) defines “judgment” for
purposes of the rules as “any order from which an appeal lies.”
(Emphasis added). Rule 54(b) requires “entry of final judgment”
before a party may appeal from a ruling involving multiple claims
or multiple parties. (Emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 60(b)
provides that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” (Emphasis added). Rule
58 states that “[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate
document.” (Emphasis added). There is nothing in the plain
language of the rules to indicate that a “judgment” for purposes
of an appeal under Rule 54 and Rule 58 differs from a “judgment”
for purposes of seeking relief under Rule 60(b).
In addition, federal case law also supports this
approach. See United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048 n.8
(9th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 60(b), like Rule 59(e), applies only to
motions attacking final, appealable orders.”); United States v.
Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1119 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The stated test for
finality under Rule 60(b), like that of Rule 54, is whether the
judgment is appealable.”); see also 12 James W.M. Moore, et al.,
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Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.23 at 60-81 & n.6 (3d ed. 2014)
(stating that “[t]he standard test for whether a judgment is
‘final’ for Rule 60(b) purposes is usually stated to be whether
the judgment is sufficiently ‘final’ to be appealed,” and
“‘[f]inality’ for Rule 60(b) purposes is usually identical to
‘finality’ required for appeal”); id. § 60.03 at 60-25 (“[A]
party who contemplates filing a Rule 60(b) motion in litigation
that involves multiple claims or multiple parties must consult
Rule 54(b) to determine whether the judgment or order from which
relief is sought is ‘final.’”).
Further, interpreting a “judgment” for purposes of
seeking relief under HRCP Rule 60(b) differently from a
“judgment” for purposes of an appeal would complicate appellate
procedure and create the types of problems that Jenkins was
intended to eliminate. Similar to Jenkins, this decision is
intended to “simplify and make certain the matter of
appealability.” Jenkins, 76 Hawai#i at 118, 869 P.2d at 1337.
Without an underlying appealable final judgment, the
appellate court would bear the “burden of searching the often
voluminous circuit court record,” id. at 119, 869 P.2d at 1334,
to determine whether a HRCP Rule 60(b) motion was timely filed,
i.e., “within a reasonable time” or “not more than one year”
after the judgment. Relatedly, the appellate court would be
tasked with deciphering the nature and scope of the circuit
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court’s underlying non-final ruling for purposes of reviewing the
merits of an appeal from a ruling on a purported Rule 60(b)
motion.
In sum, relief under HRCP Rule 60(b) requires an
underlying judgment that comports with the principles of finality
set forth in Jenkins. Therefore, the ICA did not err in
concluding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the
Order re Rule 60(b) Motion.
This case illustrates the problems that can arise when
the requirements of finality set forth in Jenkins are not met.
The circuit courts are required to render appealable final
judgments that comport with the requirements of Jenkins, and
should resolve any material deficiency in a judgment that is
brought to their attention. Where a party requests that the
circuit court enter an appealable judgment after an appellate
court dismisses an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction
based on non-compliance with Jenkins, and the circuit court
intended its ruling to be final and appealable, the circuit court
must enter an appealable judgment.13 Also, upon learning of such
a dismissal and determining that there are no further proceedings
in the appellate courts, the circuit court should consider
appropriate steps to correct the deficiency, including directing
13
If the circuit court denies a party’s request to amend such
judgment, the party may seek relief in this court. See Hawai#i Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 21 (2010).
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the prevailing party to prepare and submit a proposed appealable
final judgment. See HRCP Rule 58. Lastly, we emphasize that the
parties should assist the courts in ensuring that appealable
final judgments are entered, including when an appellate court
dismisses an appeal on that basis.14
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ICA’s
October 10, 2014 “Order Dismissing Appeal for Lack of Appellate
Jurisdiction.”
R. Steven Geshell /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
and Hayden Aluli
for petitioner /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Jade Lynne Ching /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
and Melissa M. Uhl
for respondent /s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
14
Indeed, the lack of a final judgment can have adverse consequences
for the parties. As illustrated here, until entry of an appealable final
judgment, a non-final judgment may indefinitely be subject to a purported Rule
60(b) motion.
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