State v. Williams. ( 2020 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
15-JUN-2020
09:41 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
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________________________________________________________________
STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSHUA R.D. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CR. NO. 12-1-0425)
June 15, 2020
McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.,
WITH NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING, IN WHICH RECKTENWALD, C.J. JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILSON, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Joshua R.D. Williams
(“Williams”) was charged with the attempted murder in the second
degree of David Quindt, Jr. (“Quindt”).
On certiorari, we conclude the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit (“circuit court”) erred by precluding Williams
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from testifying to the jury about what he believed Quindt said
to him that caused him to act in self-defense. By so doing, the
circuit court prohibited Williams from presenting state of mind
evidence relevant to his self-defense claim, thus violating his
due process right to be accorded a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.1
II. BACKGROUND
The attempted murder charge arose from an altercation
between Williams and Quindt on the night of March 12, 2012. The
primary disputed issue at trial was whether Williams acted in
self-defense.
A. Pre-Trial: Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence 404(b) Notice of
Prior Bad Acts
Prior to trial, Williams filed a Hawaiʻi Rules of
Evidence (“HRE”) Rule 404(b)2 notice of prior bad acts
1
Our holding makes unnecessary consideration of Williams’ second
issue, concerning whether Williams waived his initial aggressor claim.
2
HRE Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible where such evidence is probative of any other
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or
absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases, the
proponent of evidence to be offered under this subsection
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the date, location, and general nature of
any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
2
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(“notice”). Williams sought to present to the jury Quindt’s
statements to him, in which Quindt told Williams about Quindt’s
violent past. Williams proffered the statements as relevant to
his claim that he feared for his life during the altercation.
The notice stated that “[d]uring the 2-3 week time period prior
to the date of the incident” Quindt would “boast and brag” about
the following seven acts:
a. Doing time for the crime of murder in California[;]
b. That he did hard time in California;
c. That he knows how to fight because of the time he
spent in jail and that he had to learn to fight to
survive;
d. That he knows about gang-bangers and gang-members;
e. That he has experience with violence from spending
time in jail;
f. That he “got away” with murder by beating the charge
- because someone else took credit for it;
g. That he did the crime but got off on a technicality.
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaiʻi (“State”) then
filed a motion in limine, opposing admission of the evidence.
In its motion, the State sought to preclude “an allegation that
[Quindt] has been arrested for murder and was incarcerated on
murder charges” and “[a]ny and all references to David Quindt as
being [a] ‘[h]ard criminal’, ‘gang banger’, or any other similar
references.” The State contended that “[s]uch evidence is . . .
irrelevant because it does not go to David Quindt’s credibility
as to the instant offense that Defendant is charged with.”
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At the hearing on Williams’ notice and the State’s
motion, defense counsel explained that the statements included
in the notice “have to do with my client’s state of mind and the
things that were in his head as a result of statements made by
Mr. Quindt that caused him to then be concerned for his personal
safety. So they go directly to his state of mind.” 3
The State objected to Williams testifying that Quindt
told him Quindt was convicted of murder. The State further
objected to Williams revealing to the jury that Quindt claimed
he was subsequently exonerated of murder; according to the State
such evidence would “create a lot of confusion for the jury[.]”
The State argued that it would be too prejudicial and too
confusing to the jury for Williams to present the proffered
statements.
The circuit court granted the government’s request and
thus prevented Williams from offering his chosen testimony to
the jury. The circuit court ordered Williams not to testify to
the jury that Quindt would boast and brag about having done time
for the crime of murder in California; nor could he testify that
Quindt would boast and brag about having done hard time in
California; and Williams was precluded from offering in his
defense his eyewitness testimony that Quindt told him “he knows
3
The Honorable Karen S.S. Ahn presided.
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how to fight because of the time he spent in jail and that he
had to learn to fight to survive[.]”
Instead, the circuit court curtailed the testimony the
defendant could offer in his own defense. As to statement (a),
that Quindt would boast and brag about having done time for the
crime of murder in California, and statement (b), that Quindt
would boast and brag about having done hard time in California,
the circuit court concluded that the statements were “one and
the same.” Thus, the circuit court prohibited Williams from
telling the jury that Quindt would boast and brag about having
done time for the crime of murder, and Williams was not
permitted to explain to the jury that Quindt told him he did
hard time in California.
In reference to statement (c), that Quindt “knows how
to fight because of the time he spent in jail and that he had to
learn to fight to survive,” the circuit court did not explain
why it prohibited Williams from informing the jury that Quindt
learned to fight “to survive.”
As to statement (d), the circuit court ruled that the
defense could not reference Quindt’s familiarity with “gang-
bangers and gang-members” because the statement was “too
general.” The circuit court rejected defense counsel’s position
that Williams interpreted the term “gangbanger” as “something
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beyond just . . . minor gang activity” but rather as “something
a little bit more serious and involv[ing] more violence.”
The circuit court also prevented Williams from
offering statement (e), that Quindt “has experience with
violence from spending time in jail.” The circuit court
concluded without explanation that the statement was “too
general.” The circuit court did not elaborate as to why
statement (e) was too general.
The circuit court also excluded as irrelevant
statement (f), that Quindt would boast and brag about getting
away with murder, and statement (g), that Quindt would boast and
brag that he “got off on a technicality[.]” According to the
circuit court, exoneration “is irrelevant to violent conduct”
because the “question is what [Williams] believed this man could
do.”
In sum, the circuit court would not permit Williams to
testify fully about what Quindt told him, which Williams
contended caused him to fear Quindt and to use violence to
protect himself. In place of his proffered testimony about
Quindt’s statements to him, the circuit court ordered Williams
to testify only that Quindt said he was convicted of murder and
that “[Quindt] knows how to fight. He learned how to fight in
jail.”
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B. Circuit Court Proceedings
A three-day jury trial commenced on January 17, 2013.
1. The State’s Case in Chief
Quindt testified as follows:
On March 10, 2012, Williams was renting a room from
Quindt. Williams and his son moved in with Quindt approximately
three weeks prior to the altercation.
Before the altercation, Quindt felt “tired,”
“exhausted,” and “frustrated.” His planned tasks for the day
were taking up more time than he anticipated. Quindt had been
working on a tattoo for Williams that took longer than expected.
Quindt was also scheduled to perform a piercing for a friend of
Williams following the tattoo appointment. Quindt and Williams
went to Williams’ friend’s house to do the piercing. On the way
to Williams’ friend’s house, Quindt picked up Williams’ son and
dropped him off at Quindt’s home.
When they arrived at Quindt’s home, Quindt’s
frustration grew. Quindt waited in the car for two to three
minutes while Williams took his son into the home. Quindt felt
frustrated because he was doing a favor for Williams by doing a
piercing for his friend, and he asked Williams to hurry because
he wanted to “get home and rest and work on some drawings [for
tattoos].” Quindt also had previously had back surgery and
“long, strenuous sitting” hurt his back.
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When Williams returned to the car, Quindt and Williams
began arguing about the wait. Williams “got irritated, started
kind of yelling at [him].” Quindt told Williams, “please don’t
disrespect me.” As Quindt drove down the street, Williams
jumped out of the vehicle. Quindt then stopped the vehicle and
told Williams to get back in the car. Quindt did not push
Williams to the ground while trying to get him back into the car
and did not throw him into the car. Williams reentered the
vehicle to sit in the right passenger backseat, which Quindt
thought “was a little weird.”
Once Williams returned to the backseat of the car,
Quindt became more upset on the drive because Williams began
talking on his phone to his ex-girlfriend. 4 Quindt told Williams
that he should not be speaking with his ex-girlfriend because
Williams had a restraining order against her. Quindt had been
helping Williams with his custody case, and he told Williams,
“You’re going to mess your case up of getting custody for [your
son.]”
Quindt and Williams were yelling and swearing at each
other. Quindt told Williams to “get the fuck out of my house.”
4
Quindt testified on cross-examination that he was not sure if
Williams spoke with his girlfriend or merely told Quindt that he was trying
to talk to her.
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Williams said “I’ll get out. You can keep everything that’s
there, the food, all the stuff, clothes.”
While driving, Quindt felt Williams hit him on the
side of his face. At first, Quindt thought he had been punched,
but then he felt blood running down his neck. 5 Williams had
struck Quindt with a knife. Quindt then “started fighting,
gassing the car, hitting the brake, gassing the car, trying to
throw [Williams] off balance.”
Quindt continued to drive the car until he reached the
Waianae Mall parking lot. Quindt then put the vehicle in park,
jumped out, and ran in front of it into the headlights.
Williams was on his phone, and Quindt overheard Williams calling
his mother.
Quindt then attempted to call 911 to get help to take
him to the hospital, but when he tried to dial 911, the blood on
the telephone’s screen prevented him from doing so. Quindt went
to the car and told Williams, “[I]f I die, you’re going to get
in more trouble. I need you to take me to the hospital.”
Williams then drove Quindt to Waianae Coast Comprehensive Health
Center.
5
Quindt testified that his injuries were: a stab wound through his
nose and out through his top lip, a 3-4 inch laceration on his left arm, a
laceration extending from the right side of his face down to his Adam’s
apple, and cuts on his fingers and on his chest from fighting with Williams.
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Quindt told Williams “don’t worry, I won’t get you
into trouble” because he was “afraid for [his] life.” Quindt
never told Williams to get rid of the knife or to make up a
story of being attacked. After arriving at the health center,
Williams said he was going to get rid of the knife and ran
toward the ocean.
Before Williams struck him, Quindt did not threaten to
kill or hurt Williams. On the day of the incident, Quindt was
carrying a folded knife in his back pants pocket. Quindt did
not take out his knife or threaten Williams with it.
Quindt never directly mentioned to Williams that
Quindt had been convicted of a murder. According to Quindt,
Williams may have overheard him discussing the conviction with a
member of the Hawaiʻi Innocence Project. Quindt explained that,
although he had been convicted of murder, he was later
exonerated.
During cross-examination, the circuit court gave a
limiting instruction to the jury concerning the statements the
court admitted from Williams’ notice of prior bad acts. The
circuit court explained to the jury that it could only use
evidence concerning Quindt’s murder conviction and his learning
how to fight in jail to evaluate Williams’ state of mind. On
cross-examination, Quindt denied that he spoke to Williams about
the murder conviction. But, after his memory was refreshed by a
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transcript of what he previously told a detective, Quindt agreed
that he was “up front” with Williams about his criminal history.
After Quindt’s testimony, the State also introduced
testimony by Ernest Robello, a detective with the Honolulu
Police Department. Detective Robello testified that Williams
initially told him that he and Quindt went to a beach park and
had a confrontation with three unknown men, one of whom stabbed
Quindt. After Detective Robello confronted Williams about
discrepancies in his statement, Williams explained that Quindt
suggested that they come up with a story and admitted to
striking Quindt. Initially, Williams claimed he threw the knife
in the ocean and it was not recoverable, but later stated that
he hid the knife near Waianae Coast Comprehensive Health Center.
Detective Robello testified that Williams stated he
struck Quindt “in self-defense.” Williams told Detective
Robello that “he thought that Mr. Quindt was reaching for his
back pocket,” and that he knew Quindt “normally carries a knife
in that pocket.” Detective Robello explained that he asked
Williams whether striking Quindt was “kind of a preemptive
strike” and whether Williams “stabbed [Quindt] with the intent
to kill him before he could kill you.” Williams answered “yes”
to both questions.
Detective Robello also testified that Williams shared
with him some of Quindt’s criminal history. According to
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Detective Robello, Williams stated that “the night before the
stabbing, during an argument between the two of them, he said
that Mr. Quindt had said that he had been incarcerated. He had
killed somebody in the past and gotten away with it.”
2. The Defense’s Case
Williams testified in his own defense at trial in
compliance with the restrictions placed upon his testimony by
the trial judge. He explained that his relationship with Quindt
was adversarial, with Quindt being the “[a]lpha male.” Williams
said that he did not spend much time with Quindt but when he
did, they “would kind of butt heads.” Williams elaborated that
Quindt “would tell me things to do, and if I did them a
different way, he would, I guess, bash me down on it.” Williams
testified that when Quindt and he got into a “few arguments”, he
would “scare” Williams because Quindt was “really jumpy.”
According to Williams, Quindt “lost his temper very easily” and
“[w]hen he’d lose his temper, he would want to fight.” Williams
stated, “I don’t really like confrontation that much myself, and
I’m usually the type to just walk away from things.” Quindt,
however, was “more the type to instigate a fight and push for a
fight.” Williams said that a few times “it came very close to
an actual altercation” but “[t]here was never actually physical
blows thrown.” By the 17th or 18th day of living with Quindt,
he was getting “second thoughts” and was “getting scared.”
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Williams testified that he also feared Quindt because,
in the past, Quindt on several occasions had “nonchalantly . . .
bragg[ed] about an alleged attempted murder that he committed.”
According to Williams, Quindt “directly [spoke to Williams]
about the murder charge. He bragged about it multiple times. .
. . In my eyes, I just -- I was frightened by it really in the
long run.” Williams testified that this knowledge affected his
state of mind: “Anytime an altercation would happen, anytime
that he would lose his temper, it was the first thing in my
mind, was that that had happened and that he bragged about it.
So it was, I guess, a touchy subject or it -- it alarmed me.”
Williams testified that, on the date of the incident,
he attempted to avoid a confrontation with Quindt when they
began arguing in the car. Williams explained that when he
returned to Quindt’s car after settling his son in for the
night, he noticed that Quindt was “really upset.” Williams
stated that Quindt “started yelling at [him] asking what took
[him] so fucking long” and Quindt exclaimed that Williams “was
disrespectful for never appreciating his suggestions and just
cursing at [him] and yelling at [him].” Williams explained that
he does not like confrontation, and that when he is being yelled
at or called names, his coping mechanism is to pull “[himself]
from that situation, turn [his] back, walk away, whatever, just
to get away from the situation. Some people count to 10. [He]
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walk[s] away.” In an effort to avoid the confrontation with
Quindt, Williams jumped out of the car as Quindt slowed to a
stop sign.
After jumping out of Quindt’s car, Williams claimed
“next thing I know, I’m on the ground, and [Quindt] had came
[sic] up from behind me and pushed me about shoulder length with
both hands onto the pavement.” Williams said that Quindt was
yelling at him again, “fuck this shit, let’s do it, you know,
it’s time to fight. Do you think I’m afraid of you?” Williams
said that Quindt also yelled, “you think I’m afraid of you? I
learned how to fight in jail I’m not afraid of you. Let’s do
this, let’s throw.” According to Williams, Quindt was “getting
in a fight stance.” Williams told Quindt he did not want to
fight, turned his back to Quindt, and started to walk away.
Quindt came up behind Williams and said “if you don’t get in the
truck, I’ll make you get in the fucking truck,” then pushed
Williams toward the car. Quindt pushed Williams into the
backseat of the car. After Williams was in the car, Williams
stated that Quindt drove “erratically.” During this time,
Quindt told him “I’ve done nothing but try to help you out, why
have you been so disrespectful?” Williams described Quindt as
“screaming at me, flustered face, really expressive, and just
kind of overall scary.” Williams said that his voice may have
risen but that he was trying to “calm the situation down.”
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Williams testified that he attempted to jump out of
the car again, but the child safety locks were engaged and he
could not open the doors or the windows. Williams stated that
“[a]s I’m doing this, I look up and [Quindt is] looking at me in
the rear-view mirror, and he kind of smiles at me. The only way
I can explain it would be like a sardonic smile, like ha-ha, I
got you, you know, you’re not getting anywhere.” Williams
explained at this point he was thinking “holy shit, I’m trapped,
I’m stuck in this guy’s truck. He’s murdered before. He’s
yelling at me, screaming at me. What am I going to do?”
Williams testified that at one point during the drive, Quindt
looked at Williams and said, “when I stop this truck, I’m going
to fucking kill you.” Williams explained that after Quindt made
this statement, he was afraid based on his knowledge that Quindt
had murdered before:
The main thing that kept going through my mind was that
[Quindt] brags about killing people, and I didn’t know if
he was for real about it. I didn’t know if he was joking
about it. I didn’t know if he would actually kill me. I
didn’t know anything at that point. I was scared. I was
petrified. In my mind, I really thought I was going to
die.
Williams testified that, after Quindt made the threatening
statement, Quindt turned down a dark road and “he says I’m going
to kill you, and he goes like this, like he nods, like he was
assuring himself or something.”
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Fearing that his life was in danger, Williams
testified that he then decided to strike Quindt: “I was scared,
and I stabbed him. I -- I took the knife out of my pocket, and
I stabbed him. I didn’t aim. I didn’t try to hit a certain
area. I just went around the seat of the truck, and I stabbed.”
Williams explained that when he decided to use the knife to
strike Quindt, he was “petrified” because he thought Quindt
would kill him:
I was petrified. I had never been so scared. I -- there
wasn’t really much time from when he threatened me to we’re
in a dark street now and he’s -- he’s going to kill me.
There was -- besides terror, I don’t think I was thinking
anything besides I can’t let him stop this truck. It’s my
only possibility -- he said when he stops this truck, he’s
going to fucking kill me, and I can’t let him stop the
truck.
After the altercation, Williams panicked because he
had just struck his friend, and he feared for his life as well
as Quindt’s. Quindt pulled into the Waianae Mall parking lot
and both men left the car. Williams got out of the car by
pressing the button by the driver’s seat that rolled down the
back passenger window, then opened the door from the outside.
Williams testified that he put the truck between him and Quindt
as a “barrier,” then threw up. Williams described his feelings
as “distraught” and that he had “just stabbed my friend. I was
very scared for his life, for mine.” He then called his mother,
and he told her that Quindt was hurt, that Quindt and Williams
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were going to the hospital, and he asked her to come to the
hospital.6
Despite his panic, Williams sought to aid Quindt.
Williams saw that Quindt was “bleeding really badly from his
neck” and testified that he took off his shirt and “wrapped it
around [Quindt’s] neck and told him to put pressure on it.”
According to Williams, he told Quindt that he needed to go to
the hospital. Williams testified that he then drove Quindt to
the Waianae Coast Comprehensive Health Center while “crying
hysterically.”
Williams explained he initially lied to police because
Quindt had told him to do so. Williams stated that, on the way
to the health center, Quindt told him “don’t tell the police
what happened, don’t worry, dude, don’t worry, nothing’s going
to happen, don’t tell the police.” According to Williams, after
arriving at the health center, Quindt told him “get the knife
and go get rid of it and come back up here and get cleaned up .
. . and get ready for the police. Don’t tell them what
happened[.]” Williams hid the knife and returned to the health
center where he met with police officers.
6
Williams’ mother testified that, when she picked up the call from
Williams, “he just kept saying mom and -- and I -- I’m -- I’m scared, I’m
scared. He was very hysterical. I had a very hard time understanding what
he was saying.”
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On cross examination, the State asked Williams about
his intent when he struck Quindt. Williams agreed that he told
Detective Robello that he had “stabbed [Quindt] with the intent
to kill him before [Quindt] could kill [Williams].” Williams
explained that he felt that way “[a]t the time that I gave that
statement.” He also testified that he had seen a weapon on
Quindt earlier in the evening.
On redirect, Williams described in more detail his
state of mind at the time of the altercation. Williams
explained that he thought that he needed to attack Quindt
because he thought Quindt would kill him:
I was thinking I need to do something to prevent him from
killing me, like he threatened to do to me. He said he was
going to kill me. I didn’t think of killing him. I
thought of maiming him. I thought of just incapacitating
him so he couldn’t try to kill me. I was locked in the
back of his truck. I didn’t want to give him the
opportunity to open my door and have an advantage over me.
I -- I didn’t want to kill him. I don’t know why I said
that, but I didn’t want to kill him.
. . . .
The only thought I can really remember was live, that I
have to live. I have a son that I love dearly, and I was
scared. The only thing I could think of was do something
first. He said he would kill me when he stopped the truck,
don’t let him stop the truck.
3. Jury Instructions
The circuit court instructed the jury on self-defense.
The circuit court instructed the jury on the justified use of
deadly force in self-defense as follows:
The use of deadly force upon or toward another person is
justified if the defendant reasonably believes that deadly
force is immediately necessary to protect himself on the
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present occasion against death or serious bodily injury.
The reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the use
of protective deadly force was immediately necessary shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position under the circumstances of which
the defendant was aware or as the defendant reasonably
believed them to be when the deadly force was used.
4. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Williams guilty as charged. The
circuit court sentenced Williams to imprisonment for a term of
life with the possibility of parole.
C. Intermediate Court of Appeals
The Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) affirmed
Williams’ conviction. The ICA held the limitations imposed on
Williams’ proffered statements by the circuit court “did not
materially impair Williams’ claim of self-defense.” According
to the ICA, the evidence permitted by the circuit court was
equivalent to Williams’ proffered statements. Because the ICA
considered the evidence admitted by the circuit court to be
equivalent to Williams’ excluded proffered statements, the ICA
determined that any error in the court’s limitations “did not
materially impair his claim of self-defense and was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
D. Application for Writ of Certiorari
Williams raises the following issues on appeal:
Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the circuit
court did not err in limiting and/or excluding the
proffered evidence under (HRE) 404(a)(2) and 404(b) because
under its rationale (1) the proffered HRE 404(a)(2)
evidence was not probative because it constituted
unsubstantiated hearsay; (2) and error in limiting and/or
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excluding any of the proffered evidence constituted
harmless error because substantively equivalent evidence
was introduced that satisfied Williams’s HRE 404(b)
request; and (3) Williams waived the HRE 404(a)(2) issue.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In State v. West, 95 Hawaiʻi 452, 456-57, 24 P.3d 648,
652-53 (2001), this court stated:
[D]ifferent standards of review must be applied to
trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of
evidence, depending on the requirements of the particular
rule of evidence at issue. When application of a
particular evidentiary rule can yield only one correct
result, the proper standard for appellate review is the
right/wrong standard. However, the traditional abuse of
discretion standard should be applied in the case of those
rules of evidence that require a “judgment call” on the
part of the trial court.
(Quoting Kealoha v. Cty. of Hawaii, 74 Haw. 308, 319-20, 844
P.2d 670, 676 (1993)). Rulings made pursuant to HRE Rule 404
require a “judgment call” and we therefore apply the abuse of
discretion standard:
Evidentiary decisions based on HRE Rule 403, which require
a “judgment call” on the part of the trial court, are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. HRE 404 represents a
particularized application of the principle of HRE 403, and
we will employ the same abuse of discretion standard of
review.
State v. Richie, 88 Hawaiʻi 19, 37, 960 P.2d 1227, 1245 (1998)
(internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes omitted).
“The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly exceeds
the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or
practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.”
Samson v. Nahulu, 136 Hawaiʻi 415, 425, 363 P.3d 263, 273 (2015)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. A defendant has a constitutional due process right to
present a complete defense.
A person charged with a crime has a fundamental right
to present a defense; the right to defend oneself has been
deemed fundamental to a fair trial under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I,
section 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution. Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that the exclusion of evidence
critical to the defense and the denial of an opportunity to
cross-examine a witness denied the defendant a trial “in accord
with traditional and fundamental standards of due process” and
stating that “[f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an
accused to present witnesses in his own defense”); State v.
Matafeo, 71 Haw. 183, 185, 787 P.2d 671, 672 (1990) (“The due
process guarantee of the Federal and Hawaii constitutions serves
to protect the right of an accused in a criminal case to a
fundamentally fair trial”).
Central to the protection afforded by due process “is the
right to be accorded ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.’” (emphasis added, citation omitted) (quoting
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). It is “a
right to [a] day in court,” and “include[s], as a minimum, a
right . . . to offer testimony[.]” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
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44, 51 (1987) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948));
see State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 259, 492 P.2d 657, 660
(1971). Logically, the accused’s right to call witnesses
includes “a right to testify himself, should he decide it is in
his favor to do so. In fact, the most important witness for the
defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself.” Rock,
483 U.S. at 52. The right to “call[ ] witnesses is incomplete
if [the defendant] may not present himself [or herself] as a
witness.” Id.; see State v. Loher, 140 Hawaiʻi 205, 216, 398
P.2d 794, 805 (2017) (holding that restricting a defendant’s
decision whether to take the stand to assert a defense would
violate various state and federal constitutional guarantees).
Thus, a defendant’s right to present his version of the events
in his own words is “basic in our system of jurisprudence[.]”
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273. A defendant who chooses to
testify gives the jury an opportunity to consider the
defendant’s credibility based on the defendant’s manner and
demeanor.7 See State v. Walsh, 125 Hawai‘i 271, 302, 260 P.3d
350, 381 (2011) (Recktenwald, C.J., concurring). 8
7
With regard to the credibility of witness testimony, the jury in
this case was instructed as follows:
In evaluating the weight and credibility of a witness’s
testimony, you may consider the witness’s appearance and
demeanor; the witness’s manner of testifying; the witness’s
intelligence; the witness’s candor or frankness or lack thereof;
the witness’s interest, if any, in the result of this case; the
(continued . . .)
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B. The circuit court erroneously prohibited Williams from
presenting evidence relevant to his state of mind and
therefore violated his constitutional right to due process.
The circuit court prevented Williams from offering his
own version of facts relevant to his self-defense claim, which
violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
Williams was unable to testify that his fear for his life arose
from Quindt’s statements to him that: Quindt knows about gang-
bangers and gang-members; he has experience with violence from
spending time in jail; Quindt got away with murder by “beating
the charge” because someone else took credit for it; and he did
the crime but got off on a technicality. Williams was also
(. . . continued)
witness’s relation, if any, to a party; the witness’s temper,
feeling, or bias, if any has been shown; the witness’s means and
opportunity of acquiring information; the probability or
improbability of the witness’s testimony; the extent to which the
witness is supported or contradicted by other evidence; the
extent to which the witness has made contradictory statements,
whether in trial or at other times; and all other circumstances
surrounding the witness and bearing upon his or her credibility.
8
If a court seeks to exclude relevant evidence it must find the
probative nature of the evidence to be substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice or another listed factor:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
HRE Rule 403. The circuit court failed to apply HRE Rule 403 to its
exclusion of Quindt’s testimony. Thus, the probative value of the
constitutionally significant testimony of Williams as to his state of mind
was ruled inadmissible by the circuit court without weighing its probative
value against any prejudice to the government arising from admission of
Quindt’s statements as they were made to Williams.
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precluded from testifying to the jury that Quindt told him that
Quindt did hard time in California and had to learn to fight to
survive.
Williams sought to introduce Quindt’s proffered
statements as state-of-mind evidence evincing fear Quindt would
take his life. In so doing, Williams sought to justify his use
of deadly force in his own defense. 9 Williams’ state of mind
when he struck Quindt was an essential element of his defense. 10
The circuit court’s curtailment of the defendant’s
testimony as to his state of mind at the time he committed the
offense bespeaks a misapprehension of the discretion available
to the court. It is for the jury to evaluate the strength of
the defendant’s claim of self-defense with full opportunity to
observe a defendant’s complete presentation of the evidence that
allegedly caused the accused to act in self-defense. 11
9
Williams sought to introduce evidence of Quindt’s statements as
evidence of “another fact that is of consequence[,]” HRE Rule 404(b), namely,
as evidence that he reasonably feared for his life when he acted in self-
defense.
10
The use of deadly force in self-defense “is justifiable . . . if
the actor believes that deadly force is necessary to protect himself against
death [or] serious bodily injury . . . .” HRS § 703-304. “In evaluating the
reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that deadly force was necessary for
self-protection, the evidence must be assessed from the standpoint of a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position under the circumstances as the
defendant subjectively believed them to be at the time he or she tried to
defend himself or herself.” State v. Lubong, 77 Hawaiʻi 429, 433, 886 P.2d
766, 770 (App. 1994).
11
The Dissent usurps the role of the jury by evaluating how the
jury would weigh and reject Williams’ testimony. The Dissent concludes that
the jury would not have found Williams credible even if he were permitted to
(continued . . .)
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To that end, the details of the proffered statements
of Quindt to Williams excluded by the circuit court convey
additional support for Williams’ self-defense that is absent in
the altered version devised by the court. Learning to fight “to
survive” has a different implication from simply learning to
fight in jail. By removing the phrase “to survive” from
Williams’ proffered statement, the circuit court filtered out a
key characterization of Quindt’s statement to Williams that
supported Williams’ apprehension that Quindt would willingly
engage in a brutal fight.12
(. . . continued)
pursue his strategic choice as to how to testify. Under this view, the jury
would not have believed his claim to have been frightened when Quindt told
him he learned to “fight to survive”; instead, the jury would have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams believed Quindt was less likely to
use force because Quindt would only attack if he were attacked first:
Put differently, the testimony that Quindt told Williams he had
to learn to fight to survive implies that Williams knew Quindt
would fight back to protect himself if attacked by another, not
that Williams should fear Quindt would attack him first. The
circuit court therefore ruled within its discretion when it
excluded this language based on its conclusion that the language
would confuse the jury.
Dissent at 13-14.
12
The Dissent concludes that a statement made by defense counsel
during opening statement was an adequate substitute for Williams offering
such testimony at trial. Id. at 13. In her opening statement, Williams’
counsel told the jury that Quindt told Williams he had to learn to fight to
survive. Respectfully, the Dissent’s proposition connotes that evidence can
be introduced during an opening statement . . . and condones reference to
evidence during closing argument that is excluded from introduction during
the evidentiary phase of the trial. The straightforward impropriety of a
court requiring, encouraging, or causing the defendant to rely upon the
opening statement to introduce evidence to the jury is settled. Cf. State v.
Nofoa, 135 Hawaiʻi 220, 227-30, 349 P.3d 327, 334-37 (2015) (holding that it
(continued . . .)
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In addition, the single statement selected by the
circuit court that “[Quindt] knew how to fight and learned how
to fight in jail” conveys a different, truncated message than
the multiple excluded statements constituting Williams’
proffered testimony: Quindt learned how to fight to survive “in
jail”; Quindt did “time for the crime of murder in California”;
Quindt “did hard time in California”; and Quindt “has experience
with violence from spending time in jail.” The multiple
statements of Quindt to Williams excluded by the circuit court
are relevant to Williams’ apparent belief regarding Quindt’s
fixation on intimidating Williams with his alarming past; the
exclusion of the statements also deprived Williams of the
opportunity to have the jury judge his credibility to expound on
the multiple conversations he contended caused him to fear for
his life at the time he used force against Quindt.
In addition to curtailing Williams’ testimony, the
circuit court wholly excluded the statement made by Quindt to
Williams that he knew about gang-bangers and gang-members.
(. . . continued)
was error for the court to instruct the prosecutor that evidence could be
offered to the jury during the state’s rebuttal argument). Here, the trial
court not only relegated the defense to a strategy legally impossible to
achieve—namely, the admission of evidence during opening statement—the court
thereafter instructed the jury to disregard the evidence. The jury was
instructed that “[s]tatements or arguments made by lawyers are not evidence.
You should consider their arguments to you, but you are not bound by their
memory or interpretation of the evidence.”
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According to the circuit court, it would be unclear to a
factfinder what Williams meant by the term “gangbangers”
because, for example, a gang member is not necessarily a violent
person. Again, the purpose of the evidence was misperceived by
the circuit court. Williams did not seek to communicate to the
jury the meaning of “gangbangers.” He sought to explain to the
jury what gangbangers meant to him when the term was used by
Quindt. As defense counsel explained in response to the court’s
characterization of the term gangbanger, “when [Williams] hears
that term, he thinks it’s something beyond just, you know minor
gang activity, and it involves something a little bit more
serious and involves more violence.” The evidence describing
Quindt’s bragging about knowing “gangbangers” could have
provided a specific, probative example of Quindt’s alleged
proclivity towards violence.13
The circuit court also reached the conclusion that
Williams’ testimony that Quindt bragged about killing with
impunity and escaping accountability due to a “technicality” was
irrelevant. The circuit court appears to have concluded that
13
Contrary to the circuit court’s understanding of the term,
“gangbanger” can connote a particularly violent subset of gang membership.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a gangbanger as: “A member of a
criminal or street gang, esp. one who engages in gang violence; a gangster.”
Gangbanger, Oxford English Dictionary (Jan. 18, 2018),
http://www.oed.com.proxy.seattleu.edu/view/Entry/370323?redirectedFrom=gangba
nger#eid/ (emphasis added).
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since Williams was able to testify that Quindt bragged about
killing people and about committing an alleged attempted murder,
it would not be reasonable to assume the jury’s verdict might be
affected by the excluded testimony. If so, the conclusion
depreciated the probative value of the excluded facts to
Williams’ claim of life-threatening fear. As a defendant
accused of attempted murder, claiming self-defense, Williams’
defense was not complete without being able to inform the jury
through his testimony that the complainant told him he murdered
and got away with it due to a technicality.
Indeed, the State introduced evidence to the jury that
Quindt did not commit murder, telling the jury that Quindt was
exonerated of murder. In so doing, the probative value of
Williams’ testimony that Quindt bragged about getting away with
murder based on a technicality was heightened. 14 The probative
value of Williams’ testimony significantly increased. Left with
the knowledge that Quindt was exonerated of murder, the jury
might reasonably have concluded that Williams falsely testified
when he claimed that Quindt bragged about killing people.
14
Quindt’s statement, that he escaped accountability for a murder
due to a technicality, is manifestly relevant pursuant to HRE 401 because it
makes it “more probable” that Williams acted in self-defense. HRS § 626-1,
Rule 401. Pursuant to HRE Rule 403, the probative value of Quindt’s
statement “substantially outweighed” the unlikely possibility that it would
cause confusion of the issues or mislead the jury. HRS § 626-1, Rule 403.
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However, with the additional evidence omitted by the
circuit court that Quindt claimed to have killed people and
escaped accountability based on a technicality, the jury might
have reasonably believed that Williams thought Quindt believed
he could kill Williams and escape accountability. Moreover, the
testimony of Quindt was corroborative of evidence elicited from
him through cross-examination that it was Quindt—not Williams—
who had murderous intent. Quindt conceded he was in an angry
mood, that he carried a knife that evening, that Williams jumped
from the car and was ordered back in the car by Quindt, 15 that
Williams called his mother immediately after Quindt was injured,
and that Williams took him to the Waianae Coast Comprehensive
Health Center to receive treatment for his injury. 16
15
The Dissent fails to acknowledge evidence supporting Williams’
claim that he feared Quindt would drive him to an isolated location and kill
him. Instead, having reviewed all the evidence Williams was permitted to
present at trial, the Dissent finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would conclude Williams’ defense amounted to the incredible proposition he
was afraid Quindt would try to kill him as Quindt was driving and Williams
was seated in the back seat:
Moreover, despite Williams’s extensive self-defense
testimony, certain undisputed facts call into question Williams’s
credibility and render harmless the exclusion of further
testimony. First, Quindt was driving his vehicle in the driver’s
seat when Williams attacked him from the back seat. It is
difficult to imagine a scenario where Quindt could have reached
into the back seat, while driving, and killed Williams.
Dissent at 21.
16
The Dissent concludes that the trial strategy of defense counsel
and the defendant as to the content of defendant’s state of mind testimony
supporting his self-defense claim is subject to alteration by the court. Id.
at 13-14. Respectfully, no precedent identifies a consideration sufficient
(continued . . .)
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The significance of the defendant’s right to speak
directly to his peers about the exact allegedly life-threatening
words spoken to him by the complaining witness is ignored by the
Dissent in its conclusion—beyond a reasonable doubt—that police
officer testimony is a constitutionally available substitute for
the testimony of the defendant. 17 The Dissent adopts the
proposition that Detective Robello’s rendition of what Williams
told Quindt is a legitimate substitute for Williams’ testimony;
the testimony of a prosecution witness is deemed a substitute
for Williams’ right to offer the same testimony directly to the
(. . . continued)
to outweigh the right of the defendant to testify as to what was said to him
by the complaining witness that caused the defendant to act in self-defense.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the
court had discretion to edit a defendant’s testimony in support of her self-
defense claim notwithstanding that the testimony was hypnotically refreshed.
Rock, 483 U.S. at 60. Per a statute prohibiting the use of posthypnosis
testimony, the Supreme Court of Arkansas crafted testimony for the defendant
permitting only her recollection of the events prior to her hypnosis. The
Arkansas court excluded the defendant’s testimony remembered through hypnosis
because the court deemed unreliable any memory allegedly restored by
hypnosis. Id. at 47-48. The United States Supreme Court rejected the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s proposition that “any testimony that cannot be
proved to be the product of prehypnosis memory is unreliable[.]” Id. at 58.
It held that the unreliability of memory allegedly restored through hypnosis
did not render it “so immune to the traditional means of evaluating
credibility that it should disable a defendant from presenting her version of
the events for which she is on trial.” Id. at 61.
Unlike the hypnotically induced testimony in Rock, the testimony of
Williams bore no sign of mistruth—no indication of untrustworthiness other
than the opposing testimony of Quindt. Williams’ testimony was directly
relevant to the critical issue as to his state of mind when he allegedly
acted in self-defense. There was no need so overarching to his right to
present his defense in his own words to empower the judge to decide the words
he should use to defend himself before the triers of fact, nor to completely
exclude statements made to him that bore on his self-defense claim.
17
The Dissent finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any error
arising from the circuit court’s exclusion of Williams’ testimony was
harmless. Dissent at 22.
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jury. Respectfully, substituting prosecution witness testimony
for the testimony of the accused, as to what was said to the
accused by the complaining witness that engendered the accused
to act in self-defense, renders the right to present evidence a
mere pretense.
C. The circuit court’s errors in altering and excluding
Williams’ state of mind evidence were not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The violation of Williams’ constitutional due process
right to present a complete defense was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because there is “a reasonable possibility that
the error complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.” State v. Kassebeer, 118 Hawaiʻi 493, 505, 193 P.3d
409, 421 (2008) (quoting State v. Peseti, 101 Hawaiʻi 172, 178,
65 P.3d 119, 125 (2003)).
The improper exclusion and alteration of Williams’
testimony as to his state of mind at the time he stabbed Quindt
deprived Williams of evidence that he acted in self-defense as a
result of his life-threatening fear of Quindt. Faced with a
credibility contest with Quindt, the most important witness in
Williams’ defense was Williams. See DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239
F.3d 1057, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2001) (“There is simply no denying
that the most important witness in the defense of [the
defendant] was [the defendant] herself. The trial court not
only excluded [essential evidence], but worse still, it
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prevented [the defendant] from testifying fully in her own
behalf about why she did what she did—this in a case where proof
of the defendant’s state of mind was an essential element of the
defense.”).
The circuit court prevented Williams from presenting
his fully contextualized testimony as to his state of mind when
he struck Quindt—in a case in which Williams’ defense was based
entirely on whether the jury believed that he feared that his
life was in peril. The exclusion of such essential testimony is
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Calbero,
71 Haw. 115, 124–25, 785 P.2d 157, 161 (1989) (quoting State v.
Williams, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 36, 487 N.E.2d 560, 562-63
(1986))(holding that the defendant’s testimony reciting
statements of the rape complainant about prior sexual
experiences were proffered for an “important purpose, which is
to negate the implied establishment of an element of the crime
charged. For this reason, the probative value of the testimony
outweighs any interest the state has in its exclusion”); Fowler
v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 421 F.3d 1027, 1042 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the erroneous preclusion of cross-
examination of the victim “alone strongly supports a finding
that the error was not harmless” because the case came down to a
“credibility contest” between the victim and the defendant).
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V. CONCLUSION
Williams’ fundamental due process right to present a
complete defense was violated. The circuit court excluded
evidence relevant to Williams’ fear of Quindt, putting Williams
at a significant disadvantage in proving his use of violence was
a justified act committed in self-defense. Accordingly, the
ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence are vacated. The case is remanded to
the circuit court for a new trial.
Taryn R. Tomasa /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for Petitioner
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
James M. Anderson
for Respondent /s/ Michael D. Wilson
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