State v. Conroy. ( 2020 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
30-JUN-2020
06:09 PM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o--
________________________________________________________________
STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SEAN CONROY,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CR. NO. 11-1-0355(4))
JUNE 30, 2020
McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ., WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J.,
DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILSON, J.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Sean Conroy (“Conroy”)
was convicted following a jury trial of assault in the second
degree. The prosecutor made at least eight improper statements
during closing argument in violation of Conroy's right to a fair
trial. The misconduct affected the issue central to Conroy’s
self-defense claim: whether he acted with the intent to protect
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himself. The only witnesses to the incident at the time of the
injury were Conroy and his wife (hereinafter CW). Therefore,
in the circumstances of this case, the violation of Conroy’s due
process right to a fair trial was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
I. Factual Background
A. Circuit Court Proceedings
Conroy was indicted for assault in the first degree in
violation of HRS § 707-710(1) (1993), in connection with an
incident involving CW.1 At trial, CW testified that she was
married to Conroy on the date of the incident and that they were
living together in an apartment in Kīhei, Maui.2 According to
CW, on March 14, 2011, she and Conroy had an argument in their
apartment parking lot; they were struggling over her Camaro car
keys when Conroy punched her in the face with both of his fists,
and CW lost consciousness. CW testified that she could not
recall the number of times she was struck because she lost
consciousness. CW also testified that she did not recall
hitting Conroy prior to Conroy’s first punch, and that she did
not kick Conroy prior to being punched. CW further stated that
1
HRS § 707-710(1) (1993) provides: “A person commits the offense
of assault in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly
causes serious bodily injury to another person.”
2
The Honorable Richard T. Bissen, Jr. presided.
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on the day of the incident she was 5'9" and weighed 120 pounds,
and that Conroy was 6'4" or 6'5" and weighed 240 or 250 pounds.
When CW was asked if she told a police officer that
she slapped Conroy once on his left temple, CW stated, “I guess.
I guess that’s what I told him.” The State entered into
evidence a photo of CW six months before the incident, and a
photo of CW taken in April 2011 after the incident. CW
testified that the two photos demonstrated that her smile was
different as a result of the incident, and that she can “only
smile with half [of her] face [because of] the injuries.” CW
also stated that she has had nightmares about the incident,
which have clouded “[her] memories of the exact things that
happened on [the day of the incident].”
Dr. Andrew Don (“Dr. Don”), who supervised CW’s
follow-up treatment, testified that eight days after the
incident, CW’s left cheek and nose were swollen, her eyes were
swollen and possibly bloodshot, and that she had a “chip
fractured on the front of her teeth.” He further testified that
CW’s nose was fractured on both sides, and that her cheekbone
was also fractured and bruised on the left side. Dr. Don also
testified that because of CW’s swelling, a large blood clot was
coagulating on that side of her face, causing scarring and
restricting the movement of her face. According to Dr. Don,
CW’s condition could be permanent, and surgery would not make
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any difference. He also stated that CW’s injuries were caused
by at least two “full–force [blows] from the fist.”
Officer William Melton (“Officer Melton”), who
responded to the incident, testified that CW appeared to be
dazed, and had a swollen face, swollen eyes, some blood to the
left side of her eye, and some cuts on her body. Officer Melton
stated that Conroy waived his right to remain silent, and
recounted Conroy’s statement as follows:
Basically, [Conroy] stated that he suspected his
girlfriend, [CW], was fooling around. [Conroy] saw
some things in the car that she wanted to drive off
in. And further, [Conroy] believed that [CW] was
going to be with another man, and they fought over a
set of keys to the Camaro that [CW] wanted to use.
[Conroy] got struck to the left side of his temple he
said, and then he responded by punching [CW] twice to
the face.
Officer Melton also testified that Conroy told him
that when he punched CW twice in the face, she was knocked
backwards onto the hood of the Camaro. Officer Melton stated
that Conroy indicated that he had injuries to the left side of
his temple where he had been struck, and that there was a “red
linear marking, kind of purplish on the left side of [Conroy’s]
temple.” According to Officer Melton, Conroy did not complain
of any other injuries, such as being kicked in the groin.
Officer Melton further testified that if Conroy told him that he
had been kicked in the groin, then he would have indicated it in
his report because “[a]nytime a guy gets kicked in the groin,
that’s an attention grabber.”
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Jon Brammer (“Brammer”), CW’s and Conroy’s neighbor,
testified that immediately after the incident, CW looked like
she “had hit her head on the steering wheel” in an auto
accident. Brammer testified that at that time, CW was arguing
and swearing at Conroy, and Conroy was verbally defending
himself. Brammer testified that CW said, “You hit me,” and
Conroy replied, “Well, you hit me.” Brammer also testified that
Conroy stated that “[CW] asked for it[,]” and that he heard
Conroy say to CW, “[Y]ou know you had it coming,” and “[D]on’t
tell me you didn’t deserve it.” The State then rested its case.
The defense then presented its case, and recalled
Brammer, who testified about a 2010 incident that occurred at
his home, where CW was allegedly drunk and lying down on the
floor. According to Brammer, CW did not want to be moved, and
when Conroy attempted to pick CW up, she “thrashed out” and
kicked Conroy’s hand twice.
Conroy testified on his own behalf at trial. At the
beginning of Conroy’s testimony, he was asked about a previous
incident in 2009 involving an argument with CW. He testified
that CW hit him on the side of his head at least three times
with a television remote control, knocking out his tooth.
Conroy testified that on the day of the incident, the
nature of his relationship with CW was “more of a roommate
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situation,” and that CW “did her own thing and was in her own
room, [and] chose not to do anything with [him] in any sense.”
CW asked him to move his truck and when he approached
his truck, he saw his personal items in the back seat of the
Camaro. Conroy thought that CW “was trying to rub something in
[his] face, that she could do what she liked with whatever.” He
began to take his personal items from the Camaro and put them on
the hood of his truck and in the empty adjacent parking stall.
In response, CW retrieved the items and put them back into the
Camaro. CW then yelled at him, accusing him of acting childish.
In response, Conroy told CW, “I’m done being disrespected. . . .
I’m done. . . . I just -- I want you to leave. I want you to
leave. Just please give me the keys.”
He asked CW to give him the keys to the truck, house,
mailbox, and Camaro because he owned them all.3 CW swore at him,
and taunted him by asking, “These keys?” and “yanked” the keys
back when he attempted to take them. He asked CW to give him
the keys several more times, and CW then kicked him in the
groin, causing him to bend over. Immediately after he was
kicked, CW hit him on his head on the left side of his temple.
He then punched CW twice in the face, causing her to fall back
on the Camaro. When he tried to help CW onto her feet, she was
3
CW had testified that the Camaro was jointly owned by
Conroy and herself.
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dazed and fell to the ground, and he testified that he was
“scared,” “shaken,” and thought, “oh my God, I’ve got to get
help.”
When Officer Melton arrived at the scene, Conroy
started to explain that CW was his wife, and then explained that
he guessed that CW was “more of a friend now.” He informed
Officer Melton that he had injuries to his head and groin. On
cross-examination, Conroy also testified that he re-broke the
metacarpal bone of his little finger when he punched CW.
On rebuttal, CW testified that approximately a year
before the incident in the instant case, Conroy accused her of
having a “man’s name in [her] contact list” in her phone, and an
argument ensued. According to CW, Conroy punched her in the
side of the face or head with a fist, and “grabbed [her] by the
throat and neck and began to squeeze,” making it difficult for
CW to breathe.
In the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor sought
to persuade the jury that Conroy’s intent was not to defend
himself but to manifest his anger and jealousy by making “sure
that she didn’t give that smile to any other man[.]” The
prosecutor’s argument was objected to by Conroy’s counsel three
times, however the court sustained only one objection and did
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not strike the improper comment, allowing the two other
statements over the defense’s objections:4
[PROSECUTOR:] Their marriage was going down.
[CW] no longer gave the Defendant nature’s smile, so
he was going to make sure that she didn’t give that
smile to any other man, and she won’t. She can’t.
He was going to teach her a lesson, a lesson
that she would never, could never forget, a lesson
she would remember every time she looked in a mirror.
Look at [CW’s] eyes. What do you see in those eyes?
Resignation, defeat, a woman that’s learned her
lesson. We should teach her a new lesson. I say we
teach her that there is justice in the world. I say
we teach her that there can be justice in this –-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would just object.
Passion, prejudice.
THE COURT: Sustained, counsel.
. . . .
[PROSECUTOR]: Whatever we do here, we’re not going
to put nature’s smile back on [CW’s] face, but you
can put the smile back in her eyes. What is justice
in this case? It’s finding the Defendant guilty of
the crime that he committed. Holding him accountable
for the full extent of what he did. As a community,
you come together to formally agree on what he did to
make a judgment on his actions. The actions he took
on March 14, 2011 and what he did on March 14, 2011
was assault in the first degree.
. . . .
So, therefore, what I began in this -- at this
portion, what is justice? Justice is going to be
returning a verdict where that box is checked where
as to assault in the first degree, you’ll find him
guilty as charged.
Consider that, you know, when Defendant broke
[CW’s] face, when you look at the way she testified,
consider her demeanor, the pictures of her after the
scene. He broke something inside of her as well.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, objection. Passion,
prejudice.
4
The prosecutor’s statements that are at issue on appeal are
underlined.
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THE COURT: I’ll allow this.
[PROSECUTOR]: We all want [CW’s] spirit to heal even
if her face won’t. But in order for that to happen,
there has to be justice done.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, same objection.
THE COURT: So noted, Counsel.
[PROSECUTOR]: Give [CW] the justice that she needs.
Give her the justice she deserves. Most importantly,
give the Defendant the justice that he deserves.
Find him guilty of assault in the first degree. Now,
there’s going to be -- I would leave with you I think
we should be curious about whether the Defendant can
explain two things.
One, how does a man who has been kicked
directly on his right testicle bent over in
excruciating pain deliver two power punches strong
enough to break [CW’s] left cheek, shatter her nose
and send her 120-pound body flying onto the hood of
the Camaro? Explain that. Explain also why there
were no tears on the Defendant’s face when he was
testifying.
In Conroy’s closing argument, defense counsel argued
that CW kicked Conroy in the groin, and then as he bent over, CW
punched him in his temple. In response to CW’s kick, Conroy
threw two unaimed punches that were not planned, or conducted in
retaliation, and were instead for self-defense and to get away
from CW. When Conroy realized where he had hit CW, he was
scared and tried to help her. Defense counsel told the jury
that CW was not a credible witness, and that Conroy, even though
“he had no duty to testify,” told the truth and was credible.
In the State’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor again
asked the jury to find that Conroy’s intent was to hurt CW, not
to defend himself. Defense counsel objected three times; the
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court sustained two objections and instructed the jury to
disregard the improper statements twice:
[PROSECUTOR]: You break my heart, I break your face.
That’s what this case is about.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would just object.
Passion and prejudice.
THE COURT: All right. Sustained.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Move to strike.
THE COURT: So ordered. The jury will disregard. The
Court will order that last statement struck.
. . . .
Now, as far as the defense counsel’s statement
that Defendant’s testimony was the more credible one,
why then were there no tears on his face? When he
was feigning his emotion about, you know, this
situation and trying to get his keys and frustration
and then feeling sorry for her after he had hit her.
And he’s making this crying face. Why were there no
tears? That has not been explained.
The statement itself, you’ll behold as far as
credibility, you can consider the probability or
improbability of a person’s statement. You know,
when -- in direct examination of the Defendant,
defense counsel tried to say in asking him, okay, you
were kicked on the right side or it was off to the
side, but in cross-examination, he made it pretty
clear, that, no, it was a hit to my right testicle.
If it was a kick to his right testicle and he was
bent over in excruciating pain, he would not have
been able to hit anybody.
I think that’s part of, certainly for the guys
here --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would just object,
improper opinion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Move to strike.
THE COURT: Stricken. The jury will disregard the
last remark made by the attorney.
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The jury found Conroy guilty of assault in the second
degree under HRS § 707-711 (Supp. 2010),5 which was the lesser
included offense of assault in the first degree for which Conroy
was indicted. On May 2, 2012, the circuit court entered its
Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence, sentencing Conroy
to sixty days of imprisonment and five years of probation, with
credit for time served. The court stayed the jail sentence
pending appeal.
B. ICA Proceedings
Conroy appealed to the ICA, arguing that many of the
statements the prosecutor made during closing argument and
rebuttal closing argument constituted misconduct. Conroy
broadly contended that the prosecutor’s statements contained a
“stream of characterizations offered to raise and inflame the
passions of the jury,” which were not based on evidence adduced
at trial, and that the prosecutor repeatedly used “I” to insert
personal opinion, misstated evidence, and that the error was not
harmless. Accordingly, Conroy argued that his conviction should
5
HRS § 707-711(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2010) provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the
second degree if:
(a) The person intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly causes substantial bodily injury to
another; [or]
(b) The person recklessly causes . . . substantial bodily
injury to another[.]
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be reversed, or in the alternative, vacated and remanded for a
new trial.
The State argued that the prosecutor’s statements did
not constitute misconduct because they properly urged the jury
to hold Conroy responsible for his actions and were reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence. The State further argued
that even assuming the alleged improper statements constituted
misconduct, they were harmless.
In a summary disposition order, the ICA determined
that only one of the prosecutor’s statements constituted
misconduct: “You break my heart, I break your face. That’s
what this case is about.” State v. Conroy, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX,
2016 WL 3524605, at *15 (App. June 27, 2016)(SDO). However, the
ICA concluded that any related error was harmless. Id. Thus,
the ICA affirmed the circuit court’s Judgment of Conviction and
Probation Sentence. Id. The ICA filed its Judgment on Appeal
on July 22, 2016.
II. Standard of Review
“Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed
under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which
requires an examination of the record and a determination of
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” State
v. Rogan, 91 Hawaiʻi 405, 412, 984 P.2d 1231, 1238 (1999)
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(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)(quoting State
v. Sawyer, 88 Hawaiʻi 325, 329 n.6, 966 P.2d 637, 641 f.6
(1998)).
“Prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial or the
setting aside of a guilty verdict only where the actions of the
prosecutor have caused prejudice to the defendant’s right to a
fair trial.” State v. McGriff, 76 Hawaiʻi 148, 158, 871 P.2d
782, 792 (1994). “In order to determine whether the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct reached the level of reversible error,
[the appellate court considers] the nature of the alleged
misconduct, the promptness or lack of a curative instruction,
and the strength or weakness of the evidence against defendant.”
State v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 198, 830 P.2d 492, 502 (1992).
III. Discussion
A. At Least Eight of the Prosecutor’s Statements During
Closing Argument and Rebuttal Were Improper.
“The term ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ is a legal term
of art that refers to any improper action committed by a
prosecutor, however harmless or unintentional.” State v. Udo,
145 Hawai‘i 519, 534, 454 P.3d 460, 475 (2019). Allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct are first reviewed to determine whether
the prosecutor’s actions were improper, and violated the accused
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citizen’s right to a fair trial.6 If so, the court must then
determine whether the violation of the right to a fair trial was
harmless. State v. Tuua, 125 Hawaiʻi 10, 14, 250 P.3d 273, 277
(2011).
Having reviewed the proceedings of the trial afforded
Defendant Conroy, it is apparent the prosecutor committed
misconduct at least eight times in violation of Conroy’s right
to a fair trial — specifically during closing argument.7
First, the prosecutor asserted that Conroy “was going
to make sure that [CW] didn’t give that smile to any other man,
and she won’t. She can’t.”
Second, the prosecutor told the jury “we should teach
her a new lesson. I say we teach her that there is justice in
the world. I say we teach her that there can be justice in
this. . . .”
Third, the prosecutor told the jury they were to find
Conroy guilty to “put the smile back in her eyes.”
Fourth, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider that
Conroy “broke something inside of [CW.]”
6
See State v. McGhee, 140 Hawaiʻi 113, 123 f.10, 398 P.3d 702, 712
n.10 (2017) (“The district court in this case plainly erred when it allowed
the prosecutor to read in closing argument Kearney’s 252 Statement, which was
not in evidence. This error affected McGhee’s substantial rights because it
severely compromised McGhee’s right to a fair trial.”).
7
The Dissent agrees that all eight statements were improper.
Dissent at 2.
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Fifth, the prosecutor noted the jury’s purpose was to
heal CW’s spirit: “We all want [CW’s] spirit to heal even if
her face won’t. But in order for that to happen, there has to
be justice done.”
Sixth, the prosecutor repeated his admonition to the
jury — previously ruled improper by the trial court - that its
purpose was to provide justice to CW in order to heal her: “We
all want [CW’s] spirit to heal even if her face won’t. But in
order for that to happen, there has to be justice done.”
Seventh, the prosecutor asserted that “You break my
heart, I break your face. That’s what this case is about.”
And eighth, the prosecutor injected personal knowledge
about the pain caused by a kick to the groin.
1. FIRST STATEMENT
The statement that Conroy “was going to make sure that
[CW] didn’t give that smile to any other man, and she won’t.
She can’t[,]” improperly encouraged jurors to sympathize with
CW, and to consider the effects of CW’s injuries on her future
relationships and quality of life. Rogan, 91 Hawaiʻi at 414, 984
P.2d at 1240 (“the statement that the incident was ‘every
mother's nightmare,’ . . . was a blatantly improper plea to
evoke sympathy for the Complainant's mother and represented an
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implied invitation to the jury to put themselves in her
position”).8
2. SECOND STATEMENT
The prosecutor next improperly informed the jury that
its purpose was to provide justice to CW:
[Conroy] was going to teach [CW] a lesson, a lesson
that she would never, could never forget, a lesson
she would remember every time she looked in a mirror.
Look at [CW’s] eyes. What do you see in those eyes?
Resignation, defeat, a woman that’s learned her
lesson. We should teach her a new lesson. I say we
teach her that there is justice in the world. I say
we teach her that there can be justice in this--.
(Emphasis added).
The trial court sustained Conroy’s objection on the
grounds that it inflamed the passions and prejudice of the jury,
that it was not based on evidence, and that the prosecutor
improperly inserted personal opinion by using the terms, “I” and
“we.”
The prosecutor’s statement was clearly improper. In
State v. Apilando, this court held that it was improper for the
prosecutor to request that the jury “send a message to the
community that [the defendant’s] actions were wrong and would
not be tolerated.” 79 Hawaiʻi 128, 141-43, 900 P.2d 135, 148-50
(1995). This court reasoned that as a result of this “send a
8
The Dissent parses Rogan to diminish the importance of prosecutorial
misconduct deemed “blatantly improper” by this court in Rogan: namely, an
appeal to the sympathy of the jury to place themselves in the position of the
mother of the complaining witness who alleged sexual assault. Dissent at 5.
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message” statement, “there [was] a significant risk that the
jury might find the defendant guilty simply based on its view
that the conduct the defendant [was] accused of committing [was]
intolerable, even though it ha[d] not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 142-43, 900 P.2d 149-50.
Here, the statement encouraged the jury to teach CW
that justice exists, which could have “divert[ed] the jury from
its duty to decide the case on the evidence.” Id. at 149, 900
P.2d at 142 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);
see State v. Mars, 116 Hawaiʻi 125, 143, 170 P.3d 861, 879 (App.
2007)(finding that the prosecutor’s comment that “[t]his
community is measured by how we treat its weakest members” was
improper because it “appeared to invite the jury to base its
verdict on considerations other than the evidence in the case”);
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.
2005)(“A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal
defendant in order to protect community values, preserve civil
order, or deter future lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such
prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be convicted
for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence.”)
(quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir.
1994)).
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The prosecutor also improperly sought to add the
imprimatur of his office by asking the jury to join him to teach
CW a lesson and provide justice to CW: “We should teach [CW] a
new lesson. I say we teach [CW] that there is justice in the
world. . . . Whatever we do here, we’re not going to put
nature’s smile back on [CW’s] face.” (Emphasis added). The
prosecutor’s use of the inclusive pronoun, “we,” implied that
the jury and the State had similar interests and were working
together in convicting Conroy to provide CW justice. This
implication of unity, and the suggestion of an alliance between
the State and the jury against Conroy, was improper:
In light of the “prestige associated with the
prosecutor’s office” and the “significant persuasive
force” the prosecutor’s argument is likely to have on
the jury, this court has repeatedly recognized that
the prosecutor “has a duty to seek justice, to
exercise the highest good faith in the interest of
the public and to avoid even the appearance of unfair
advantage over the accused.”
State v. Basham, 132 Hawaiʻi 97, 116, 319 P.3d 1105, 1124 (2014).
3. THIRD STATEMENT
The prosecutor then continued his improper request to
the jury by advising them to find Conroy guilty in order to put
a smile in CW’s eyes: “Whatever we do here, we’re not going to
put nature’s smile back on [CW]’s face, but you can put the
smile back in her eyes. What is justice in this case? It’s
finding the Defendant guilty of the crime that he committed.”
The implication to the jury was that a just verdict is one of
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guilt that would allow CW to smile again. Again the jury was
diverted from their duty to decide the case based on the
evidence in order to consider a verdict that would make the CW
smile. See e.g., State v. Klinge, 92 Hawai‘i 577, 592, 994 P.2d
509, 524 (2000)(“the prosecutor's remark could have ‘divert[ed]
the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by
injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the
accused under the controlling law.’”).
4. FOURTH STATEMENT
The improper appeal to the jury to make a decision to
demonstrate to CW sympathy for her injuries was compounded by
subsequent statements from the prosecutor: “Consider that, you
know, when [Conroy] broke [CW’s] face, when you look at the way
she testified, consider her demeanor, pictures of her after the
scene. [Conroy] broke something inside of her as well.” Conroy
objected to these statements on the basis of “passion,
prejudice”. The court overruled the objection, stating, “I’ll
allow this.”
The prosecutor’s statements improperly appealed to the
passions of the jury, encouraging jurors to make a decision
based on their sympathies towards CW and to consider any
emotional injuries that she suffered. Rogan, 91 Hawai‘i at 414,
984 P.2d at 1240.
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5. FIFTH AND SIXTH STATEMENTS
Next, the prosecutor again improperly sought to
persuade the jury to make a decision based on their sympathy for
injuries CW suffered and the duty to help her heal: “We all
want [CW’s] spirit to heal even if her face won’t. But in order
for that to happen, there has to be justice done.” Conroy
objected to this statement as an appeal to passion and
prejudice. The court responded, “So noted, Counsel.”
We conclude the statement was improper because, viewed
in context, it was calculated to “divert the jury from its duty
to decide this case based on the evidence[.]” Apilando, 79
Hawaiʻi at 149, 900 P.2d at 142. The prosecutor requested that
the jurors provide justice to help heal CW’s spirit, which could
have encouraged them to make their decision based on sympathy
for CW or a need to exact retribution on Conroy rather than on
the evidence.
6. SEVENTH STATEMENT
After defense counsel’s closing argument, the
prosecutor began his rebuttal closing argument by stating: “You
break my heart, I break your face. That’s what this case is
about.” Conroy objected to this statement on the basis of
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passion and prejudice, and the court sustained the objection,
struck the statement, and instructed the jury to disregard it.9
We agree with the ICA that this statement improperly
referred to facts not in evidence. Conroy, 2016 WL 3524605, at
*8.
7. EIGHTH STATEMENT
Thereafter, the prosecutor sought to provide
additional evidence to the jury based on his personal experience
that if Conroy were kicked in the testicle, he would not have
been able to strike CW:
The statement itself, you’ll behold as far as
credibility, you can consider the probability or
improbability of a person’s statement. . . . If it
was a kick to [Conroy’s] right testicle and he was
bent over in excruciating pain, he would not have
been able to hit anybody. I think that’s part of,
certainly for the guys here --
Conroy objected to this statement on the basis of improper
opinion, and the court sustained the objection, struck the
statement, and instructed the jury to disregard it.
The statement was improper. The prosecutor was
beginning to comment on his personal knowledge of the amount of
pain a kick to the groin would have caused when he stated, “I
think that’s part of, certainly for the guys here --[.]” While
9
The ICA recognized that this statement constituted prosecutorial
misconduct when it found no evidentiary support for the statement by the
prosecutor: “You break my heart, I break your face. That’s what this case
is about.” Conroy, 2016 WL 3524605, at *8.
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comments based on the testimony regarding the alleged kick to
Conroy’s groin would have been proper, the prosecutor’s comment
regarding his personal knowledge of the severity of pain a man
experiences when kicked in the groin was improper. Tuua, 125
Hawaiʻi at 12, 250 P.3d at 275 (holding that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct by stating to the jury during closing
arguments, without supporting evidence, that the defendant’s
brother could be convicted of perjury for testifying that he,
rather than his brother Tuua, committed the offense.); cf. State
v. Nofoa, 135 Hawaiʻi 220, 227-30, 349 P.3d 327, 334-37 (2015)
(holding that it was error for the court to instruct the
prosecutor that evidence could be offered to the jury during the
state’s rebuttal argument).
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct Affecting the Issue of Defendant’s
Intent Was Not Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Where the
Only Witnesses to the Altercation Were the Defendant and
the CW.
As noted, a three-part test is applied to determine
whether prosecutorial misconduct is harmless. “In order to
determine whether the alleged prosecutorial misconduct reached
the level of reversible error, [the appellate court considers]
the nature of the alleged misconduct, the promptness or lack of
a curative instruction, and the strength or weakness of the
evidence against defendant.” Agrabante 73 Haw. at 198, 830 P.2d
at 502. The standard the prosecution must meet to prove the
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violation of an accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial
was harmless is whether “there is a reasonable possibility that
error might have contributed to conviction. If there is such a
reasonable possibility in a criminal case, then the error is not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the judgment of
conviction on which it may have been based must be set aside.”
State v. Holbron, 80 Hawaiʻi 27, 32, 904 P.2d 912, 917 (1995).
The nature of the misconduct committed by the
prosecutor was one of repeated improper appeal to the jury to
find Conroy guilty based on sympathy for CW and the need to heal
her — and to improperly call for the jury to deliver justice not
based on the facts, but on the need to provide revenge in the
form of a guilty verdict. Eight times improper statements were
made to the jury. In particular, the prosecutor continued to
improperly explain to the jury that they should provide justice
to CW after the court had previously sustained the objection to
those same arguments.
The nature of the misconduct included a statement to
the jury that lacked any evidentiary support. The prosecutor
ascribed to the Defendant the statement “You break my heart, I
break your face.” As the Intermediate Court acknowledged, there
was no evidence to support the prosecutor’s claim that Conroy
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“had this thought[.]”10 However, the assertion constituted
support for the State’s theory that Conroy acted out of jealousy
to injure CW — rather than to defend himself.11
At the close of trial, the court provided the jury
with a one sentence instruction to disregard stricken
statements: “Instruction number 4, you must disregard entirely
any matter which the Court has ordered stricken.” The trial
court’s curative instructions to disregard the evidence stricken
by the court were insufficient to cure the risk of prejudice to
Conroy because “the cumulative effect of prejudicial conduct
going to the issue of guilt is so strong that it overcomes the
presumption that the curative remarks of the court have rendered
10
The ICA explained:
The nature of the statement was improper, however,
because it was phrased in the first-person point of view—
You break my heart, I break your face—as though Conroy
either spoke those words or had this thought at some time.
Yet Conroy never testified that he intended to hurt CW; he
was not asked, and did not disclose, his emotions regarding
the divorce or ending relationship, nor did he tell the
jury anything to support an inference that his actions were
premeditated (although other witnesses seemed to attribute
that type of sentiment to him). Accordingly, it might be
said that “the statement[] diverted the jury from its duty
to decide the instant case on the evidence” before it.
Conroy, 2016 WL 3524605, at *11 (internal citations omitted).
11
The Dissent appears to conflate the fact that some evidence
supports a characterization that Conroy was jealous that CW was seeing
another man with the improper introduction of false evidence in the closing
argument in support of this theory. Dissent at 6. Jealousy was indeed the
motive argued by the prosecutor as a basis for the jury to reject Conroy’s
claim of self-defense. The ICA found that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by making the false statement: “You break my heart, I break your
face”—a statement that improperly bolstered the government’s theory and
contradicted Conroy’s assertion of self-defense.
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12
the prejudicial remarks harmless.” State v. Pemberton, 71
Haw. 466, 476, 796 P.2d 80, 85 (1990)(holding that the
cumulative effect of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct was so
pervasive that it overcame the presumption that limiting
instructions by the trial court could render the prejudicial
remarks harmless); see also Klinge, 92 Hawai‘i at 596, 994 P.2d
at 528 (“We recognize that there are situations in which[]
although no single prosecutorial act deprive[s] Defendant of a
fair trial, the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's improper
conduct [can be] so prejudicial as to deny him [or her] a fair
trial.”).
The first two factors relevant to a determination of
harmless error weigh in favor of a finding that the error was
harmful: (1) the prosecutorial misconduct was protracted,
repeated, and extensive in nature; and (2) the trial court’s
attempts to cure the effects of the misconduct were
insufficient.
Under the third factor, the strength of the evidence,
an error is harmful when “there is a reasonable possibility that
the error complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.” State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai‘i 356, 378, 60 P.3d
12The trial court sustained four objections to the prosecutor’s
improper statements to the jury, but in only two instances struck the
evidence and instructed the jury to “disregard the last remark by the
attorney[.]”
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306, 328 (2002) (citations and internal quotation omitted);
Nofoa, 135 Hawai‘i at 229, 349 P.3d at 336. Of significance to a
determination of the strength of the prosecution’s case is that
there were no witnesses to the altercation other than Conroy and
CW.13 The credibility of Conroy’s claim that his intent was to
protect himself when he hit CW was dependent on whether CW
slapped him in the face and kicked him in the groin. Their
testimony was the only evidence presented as to whether CW used
force against Conroy.
Conroy’s testimony was that he reacted “[without] a
thought”14 to protect himself after being kicked in the groin and
slapped by the CW.15 The force of the kick was sufficient to
13
See Rogan at 415, 984 P.2d at 1241 (“With regard to the third
factor in determining prosecutorial misconduct, this case essentially turned
on the credibility of two witnesses—the Complainant and Rogan. There were no
independent eyewitnesses or conclusive forensic evidence in this case.
Instead, the prosecution’s case against Rogan depended heavily on the
Complainant's testimony. Given that Rogan denied having committed any of the
acts for which he was charged, this case was based on the Complainant’s
version of the events against Rogan’s version. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say that the evidence of criminal conduct against Rogan was
overwhelming.”)(footnote omitted).
14
The Dissent focuses on the statement “[without] a thought” to
conclude Conroy could not have acted to protect himself. As noted, the full
record provides the jury with ample evidence to support a finding that his
reaction was to protect himself and that he did so in the immediacy of being
struck. Dissent at 11.
15
The Dissent cites State v. Culkin, 97 Hawaiʻi 206, 216, 35 P.3d
233, 243 (2001), for the proposition that self-defense is not applicable
where the Defendant is reckless in believing the use of force is necessary or
in acquiring information material to justify its use. Dissent at 12. Culkin
is instructive. The Culkin court held that under the applicable statutes
self-defense is available when the defendant's subjective belief is
objectively reasonable. Id. Thus, the court found that the defendant’s
(. . . continued)
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cause him to experience pain that made him bend over. While
bent over, he was slapped in the face. After being slapped, he
quickly threw two “unaimed” punches that caused the CW’s
injuries. CW’s previous act of violence, as testified to by
Conroy, in which the CW struck him three times in the head with
a television remote with sufficient force to break his tooth,
constitutes further corroboration of his self-defense claim.
Conroy’s testimony constituted evidence upon which a reasonable
juror might have found he acted in self-defense.16
The strength of the evidence in support of self-
defense, the protracted nature of the prosecutorial misconduct,17
(continued . . . )
claim of self-defense was not preluded although he was charged with reckless
manslaughter. Id. As in Culkin, the determination of the applicability of
self-defense in this case was for the jury.
16
The Dissent argues that the evidence against Conroy was “so
overwhelming that there is no reasonable possibility his conviction was due
to the prosecutor’s improper statements” because “there is no dispute that
Conroy punched [CW] in the face — Conroy testified that he did so, not once,
but twice.” Dissent at 14, 16. While it is not disputed that Conroy punched
CW in the face, Conroy’s conviction turned on whether he acted in self-
defense. Therefore, the proper inquiry under the third prong of the
Agrabante test considers the evidence related to Conroy’s self-defense claim.
As discussed supra, the question of whether Conroy acted in self-defense was
dependent on the jury’s evaluation of the conflicting testimony of Conroy and
CW. Conroy testified that he reacted without thought to protect himself
after being kicked in the groin, the pain caused him to bend over and while
bent over he was slapped in the face, and that he quickly threw two unaimed
punches that caused the CW’s injuries. The evidence presented to the jury
clearly did not overwhelmingly refute self-defense, as also reflected in the
court providing instruction to the jury on this defense.
17
The Dissent asserts that unlike three cases involving
prosecutorial misconduct, Rogan, 91 Hawaiʻi 405, 984 P.2d 1231, Basham, 132
Hawaiʻi 97, 319 P.3d 1105, and Mainaaupo, 117 Hawaiʻi 235, 117 P.3d 1 (2008),
in the instant case “the prosecutor's improper statements did not refer to
(. . . continued)
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and the ineffective curative instructions of the court cause us
to conclude that the misconduct was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Pasene, 144 Hawaiʻi 339, 364, 439
P.3d 864, 889 (2019) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct may
provide grounds for a new trial if the prosecutor’s actions
denied the defendant a fair trial).
IV. Conclusion
The ICA’s July 22, 2016 judgment on appeal and the
circuit court’s May 2, 2012 judgment are vacated, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Matthew S. Kohm /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for Petitioner
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
Richard K. Minatoya
for Respondent /s/ Michael D. Wilson
(continued . . . )
the race or ethnicity of any party, express the prosecutor’s personal belief
that Conroy was guilty, misstate the law, or comment on the defendant’s
decision not to testify,” and therefore the prosecutorial misconduct “did not
prejudicially affect [Conroy's] substantial rights.” Dissent at 4-6. With
respect, nothing in our jurisprudence limits the situations where
prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial to the specific circumstances
listed by the Dissent. In this case, the critical test for whether the
prosecutorial misconduct is harmless is whether it can be concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the misconduct may have contributed to the conviction.
As discussed supra, there is a reasonable possibility that the misconduct
might have affected the jury’s deliberations.
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