State v. Baker. ( 2020 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
13-MAR-2020
01:51 PM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAII,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CELESTE BAKER,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTC-17-035154)
MARCH 13, 2020
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
When a driver in the State of Hawaii is involved in an
accident that causes damage to another person’s vehicle or
property, the driver is required by law to stop the vehicle at,
or as close as possible to, the accident scene and remain there
until the driver has provided certain identifying information.
The applicable statute also requires that every such stop be
made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. In
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this case, we consider whether the State must include this
additional statutory requirement when charging a driver with the
offense of not stopping at an accident scene and providing the
required information. We answer this question in the
affirmative. We also conclude that the State failed to prove in
this case that the defendant did not provide the required
statutory information to the police after the accident.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 26, 2017, at 3:35 p.m., Celeste Baker was
issued a traffic citation for violating Hawaii Revised Statutes
(HRS) §§ 291C-13, Leaving Scene of Accident Involving Vehicle
Damage (failure to stop),1 and 431:10C-104, No Motor Vehicle
Insurance Policy. The citation contained Baker’s name, address,
driver’s license number, and date of birth. The citation also
listed the license plate number, make, model, type, color, and
year of Baker’s vehicle. One month later, the State filed a
1
HRS § 291C-13 (Supp. 2008) provides the following in full:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting
only in damage to a vehicle or other property that is
driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop
such vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close
thereto as possible, but shall forthwith return to, and in
every event shall remain at, the scene of the accident
until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of section
291C-14. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing
traffic more than is necessary. For any violation under
this section, a surcharge of up to $100 may be imposed, in
addition to other penalties, which shall be deposited into
the trauma system special fund.
2
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two-count complaint in the district court alleging that Baker
violated HRS §§ 291C-13 and 431:10C-104.2 Count 1 of the
complaint states as follows:
COUNT 1: On or about October 26, 2017, in the City and
County of Honolulu, State of Hawai‘i, CELESTE BAKER, as the
driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting only
in damage to a vehicle or other property that was driven or
attended by a person, did intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly fail to immediately stop such vehicle at the
scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible, and
did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly fail to
forthwith return to, and in every event remain at, the
scene of the accident and fulfill the requirements of [HRS
§ 291C-14], thereby committing the offense of Accidents
Involving Damage to Vehicle or Property in violation of
[HRS § 291C-13]. [HRS § 291C-14] requires that the driver
of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in . . .
damage to any vehicle or other property which is driven or
attended by any person shall give the driver’s name,
address, and the registration number of the vehicle the
driver is driving, and shall upon request and if available
exhibit the driver’s license . . . to the driver or
occupant of or person attending any vehicle or other
property damaged in the accident and shall give such
information . . . to any police officer at the scene of the
accident or who is investigating the accident and shall
render to any person injured in the accident reasonable
assistance, . . . . In the event that none of the persons
specified is in condition to receive the information to
which they otherwise would be entitled under [HRS § 291C-
14(a)], and no police officer is present, [HRS § 291C-
14(b)] requires that the driver of any vehicle involved in
the accident after fulfilling all other requirements of
[HRS §§ 291C-12 and 291C-14(a)], insofar as possible on the
driver’s part to be performed, shall forthwith report the
accident to the nearest police officer and submit thereto
the information specified in [HRS § 291C-14(a)].
Baker pleaded not guilty to the charge.3 A bench trial
commenced on January 29, 2018.4
2
Count 2 alleged that Baker violated HRS § 431:10C-104. This
count was later dismissed. The dismissal is not an issue on appeal.
3
The oral charge read at trial tracked the language in the
complaint but did not include a recitation of the statutory requirements a
(continued . . .)
3
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The State’s first witness at trial was Megumi Moon,
who testified that on October 26, 2017, at approximately 2:04
p.m., the vehicle she was driving was involved in an accident.
She stated that the collision occurred just before the bus stop
at Blaisdell Park as she was proceeding eastbound on Kamehameha
Highway towards Honolulu. Moon described the part of the
highway where the collision occurred as a “zigzag” due to
construction. A car was driving in front of her in the right
lane of the two-lane highway, Moon explained, and the car
switched to the left lane; as they passed a traffic light, the
car merged back into her lane, and the rear end of the other car
hit the front driver side fender of her vehicle. Moon
identified Baker in court as the driver of the other car in the
collision. Moon explained that she knew Baker’s car hit her
vehicle because she felt the impact and there was a dent on the
front fender wall of her vehicle.5
(. . . continued)
driver must fulfill when the other motorist is unable to receive the driver’s
information and no police are present.
4
The Honorable Randal I. Shintani presided.
5
No picture of the dent was entered into evidence. Moon also
indicated that there were five other occupants in her vehicle, none of whom
testified.
4
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After the collision occurred, Moon explained, she
immediately signaled Baker to pull over, and they got out of
their cars. Moon testified that she asked for Baker’s license
and registration, but that Baker would not provide them to her,
and they got into an argument. Moon stated that while they were
stopped on the highway, she called the police and waited a while
for them to arrive.
According to Moon, when Baker refused to provide her
information, she told Baker to meet at “Anna Miller’s” because
they were holding up traffic. Moon testified that Baker said
she was not from Hawaii, but that she knew where Anna Miller’s
was and agreed to meet there in the parking lot. Moon
acknowledged that Anna Miller’s was on the other side of
Kamehameha Highway from the direction in which she was driving,
and that there were other places they could have gone by turning
to the right.
Moon testified that she called the police when she
arrived at Anna Miller’s, and that she drove around the parking
lot and waited for about thirty minutes but did not see Baker.
Moon stated that she filled out a police report when police
arrived approximately an hour and a half later.
Officer Brandon Kam of the Honolulu Police Department
testified that he responded to a report of a motor vehicle
collision at approximately 2:30 p.m., and that it was a “call of
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somebody wanting to report [a] motor vehicle collision . . .
away from the scene.” The officer could not recall where he was
directed to go, but he testified that he met Baker when he
arrived at the indicated location.
According to the officer, Baker stated that she was
being accused of colliding with another vehicle and that the
occupants in the other vehicle had been hostile toward her,
yelled at her, and asked for $700. While making his report,
Officer Kam explained, he received an update via dispatch of a
“fled type scene” and ceased his discussion with Baker so that
he could get further clarification. The officer stated that he
determined the update was related to the same vehicle collision
that he was discussing with Baker. The officer testified that
while he was at the scene he did not observe any visible damage
to Baker’s vehicle.
Baker testified that she worked as a sales associate,
was also a student, and had lived in Hawaii for only one year.
Baker recounted that, on the day in question, she was driving
home when she saw a vehicle to her right driving very close, and
that she stuck her hand out the window because it appeared the
driver of the vehicle was trying to alert her to something.
Baker stated that she “wasn’t sure what was going on,” so she
pulled her vehicle to the side of the road. She immediately got
out of the car, Baker testified, and the driver began “yelling
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at me that I hit her car.” Baker explained that she responded
to Moon that she had not hit her vehicle, and that she did not
see a dent in Moon’s vehicle or damage to her own car.
Baker also stated that Moon never asked for her
insurance information because Moon “was too busy yelling,” and
therefore she never refused to provide such information. Baker
said that she tried to calm Moon down and asked Moon for her
name. According to Baker, Moon did calm down, they exchanged
first names, and she asked Moon to meet on the side of the road.
Moon agreed, Baker testified, and Baker pulled to the right side
of the same road that they first stopped, but Moon wasn’t there.
Baker testified that she stopped at an auto repair place and
waited for Moon to arrive, but when Moon did not show up she
called the police. Baker also denied Moon’s statement that Moon
asked her to meet at Anna Miller’s.
During closing arguments, the State argued that Baker
did not stay at the scene, exchange information, and file a
police report as required by the failure to stop statute.
Defense counsel contended that Baker did not intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly violate the statute, but that instead
Baker attempted to comply with its terms by pulling over when
she was accused of hitting a car and calling the police soon
after the incident occurred.
7
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The district court found Baker guilty of failing to
comply with the requirements of HRS § 291C-13, stating that the
court’s decision was based on “the demeanor and credibility of
the witness,” “the testimony of Ms. Moon, Officer Kam, as well
as Ms. Baker,” and “the time frame in which the testimony was
elicited.”6 The court imposed a fine of $100 and other fees in
its January 29, 2018 Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order
and Plea/Judgment (Judgment).7 Baker timely appealed.
II. ICA PROCEEDINGS
On appeal, Baker argued that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain her conviction for the reason that, because
it was necessary for the parties to move their vehicles out of
traffic, the State was required to prove that the stop at the
accident scene could have been made without obstructing traffic
6
The entirety of the district court’s ruling was as follows:
Okay. Court’s ready to rule. Court, considering the
demeanor and credibility of the witness, court’s going to
find Ms. Baker guilty as charged of failing to comply with
the requirements of 291C-13. Court, considering the
testimony of Ms. Moon, Officer Kam, as well as Ms. Baker,
considering the time frame in which the testimony was
elicited, and again based on the credibility of the
witness, court’s basing its decision.
It is unclear whether the district court’s decision as to guilt was based on
Baker not remaining at the scene, not going to Anna Miller’s, not providing
the requisite information to Moon or the officer, or a combination of these
circumstances.
7
On May 7, 2018, the district court issued a Notice of Entry of
Judgment and/Order and Plea/Judgment (Restitution Order) ordering Baker to
pay restitution in the amount of $2,262.58.
8
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more than necessary. Baker maintained that she fulfilled the
statutory requirements of HRS § 291C-14 (duty to give
information) by calling the police and reporting the incident
after moving her car. Baker also contended that the complaint
and oral charge failed to adequately and fully inform her of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her because they did
not allege the attendant circumstance that “[e]very stop shall
be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.”8
This omission rendered the charge deficient even under the post-
conviction liberal construction rule, argued Baker.
The State responded that “stopping without obstructing
traffic more than necessary” is not an element of the offense of
failure to stop. No Hawaii case required the State to prove
that a stop “was able to be done without obstructing traffic
more than necessary,” the State maintained. Since proving this
circumstance is not an element of the crime, the State
contended, and Baker did not challenge the sufficiency of the
charge prior to conviction, the liberal rule of construction
applied to reviewing the charge. As to the sufficiency of the
evidence, the State asserted that Moon’s testimony demonstrated
8
Additionally, Baker contended that the court erred in ordering
restitution. The ICA ruled in Baker’s favor on this issue and reversed the
Restitution Order. Neither party challenges the ruling on certiorari review.
9
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that Baker failed to provide the required statutory information
to Moon at the scene or at Anna Miller’s or give the information
to Officer Kam. Baker therefore violated the failure to stop
statute, argued the State.
In a Summary Disposition Order,9 the Intermediate Court
of Appeals (ICA) stated that to prove the offense of failure to
stop, the State was required to prove that (1) Baker’s vehicle
was involved in an accident resulting only in damage to another
motorist’s vehicle; (2) Baker failed to immediately stop at the
scene or as close thereto as possible; and (3) Baker failed to
remain there until she fulfilled her duty to give information.
(Citing State v. Gartrell, 9 Haw. App. 156, 158, 828 P.2d 298,
299-300 (1992).) The ICA found that the State presented
evidence that Baker’s car struck and caused damage to Moon’s
vehicle, and that Baker left the accident scene before providing
any information other than her first name to Moon.10 The ICA
noted that the district court did not credit Baker’s testimony
9
The ICA’s Summary Disposition Order can be found at State v.
Baker, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL 1747026 (App. Apr. 18, 2019) (SDO).
10
The ICA further stated that testimony presented by the State
supported the court’s conclusion that Baker did not, at any time, make the
required statutory disclosures to Moon or Officer Kam. However, the district
court did not specifically make this determination. See supra note 6.
10
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that she remained where the parties had agreed to meet.11 Thus,
the ICA concluded that there was substantial evidence to support
the conviction under HRS § 291C-13.
The ICA also determined that there was no requirement
that the State prove, as an element of the offense of failure to
stop, that Baker knew the stop was made without obstructing
traffic more than is necessary. The ICA instead described this
part of the statute as an “explanatory clause” that serves to
“more clearly define the element” of stopping at the accident
scene or as close thereto as possible. Because the explanatory
clause is not an element of the offense, the ICA concluded, its
omission in the complaint and oral charge did not render them
deficient.
The ICA thus affirmed the district court’s Judgment
finding Baker guilty of violating HRS § 291C-13. Baker’s
application for certiorari challenging the ICA’s rulings was
accepted by this court.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Sufficiency of a Charge
Whether a charge sets forth all the essential elements
of a charged offense is a question of law, which we review under
11
The district court also did not expressly find Baker’s testimony
not credible. See supra note 6.
11
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the de novo, or right/wrong, standard. State v. Wheeler, 121
Hawaii 383, 390, 219 P.3d 1170, 1177 (2009).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, “[e]vidence adduced in the trial court must be
considered in the strongest light for the prosecution[.]” State
v. Kalaola, 124 Hawaii 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010)
(quoting State v. Richie, 88 Hawaii 19, 33, 960 P.2d 1227, 1241
(1998)). “The test on appeal is not whether guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was
substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact.” Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Complaint Was Insufficient.
Baker argues that because the complaint and oral
charge omitted the language “[e]very such stop shall be made
without obstructing traffic more than is necessary,” which is an
“attendant circumstances element and/or essential fact[]” of the
offense, the charge was deficient and violated her right to due
process of law.
The sufficiency of a charge “implicates an accused’s
rights under the Hawaii Constitution, article I, sections 5, 10
and 14.” State v. Nesmith, 127 Hawaii 48, 52, 276 P.3d 617, 621
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(2012). Under article I, section 5, “No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law[.]” Haw. Const. art. I, § 5. And under article I, section
14, an accused is entitled to adequate notice of the charge: “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation[.]” Haw. Const. art. I, § 14. Accordingly, if a
charge is defective, it “amounts to a failure to state an
offense, and a conviction based upon it cannot be sustained, for
that would constitute a denial of due process.” State v.
Wheeler, 121 Hawaii 383, 391, 219 P.3d 1170, 1178 (2009)
(quoting State v. Merino, 81 Hawaii 198, 212, 915 P.2d 672, 686
(1996)).
It is well settled that when the State alleges that a
person committed a crime, the “accusation must sufficiently
allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged.”
Id. In addition to containing all of the elements of the
offense, the charge must also sufficiently apprise the defendant
of what the defendant must be prepared to meet. Id. And
generally, “[w]here the statute sets forth with reasonable
clarity all essential elements of the crime intended to be
punished, and fully defines the offense in unmistakable terms
readily comprehensible to persons of common understanding, a
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charge drawn in the language of the statute is sufficient.” Id.
at 393, 219 P.3d at 1180 (alteration in original) (quoting State
v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 282, 567 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1977)). In
some cases, however, a charge tracking the language of the
statute will be insufficient to adequately describe the crime
and will violate due process. Nesmith, 127 Hawaii at 53, 276
P.3d at 622.
The “elements” of an offense, which must be alleged
and proved by the State, are (1) conduct, (2) attendant
circumstances, and (3) results of conduct. HRS § 702-205
(2014). An attendant circumstance is a circumstance that
“exist[s] independently of the [actor’s conduct].” State v.
Aiwohi, 109 Hawaii 115, 127, 123 P.3d 1210, 1222 (2005)
(alterations in original). Additionally, under Hawaii Rules of
Penal Procedure Rule 7(d) (2012), a charge must contain “a
plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged.” The State must also allege
the requisite state of mind for each element of the offense.
State v. Apollonio, 130 Hawaii 353, 359, 311 P.3d 676, 682
(2013); HRS §§ 701-114 (2014), 702-204 (2014). The state of
mind must be included in the charge “to alert the defendant[] of
precisely what [the defendant] need[s] to defend against to
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avoid a conviction.” Nesmith, 127 Hawaii at 56, 276 P.3d at
625.
Here, HRS § 291C-13 provides in relevant part the
following:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting
only in damage to a vehicle or other property that is
driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop
such vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close
thereto as possible, but shall forthwith return to, and in
every event shall remain at, the scene of the accident
until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of section
291C-14. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing
traffic more than is necessary.
HRS § 291C-13 thus places a duty on a driver who is
involved in an accident that causes damage to another vehicle to
(1) immediately stop at the scene of the accident or (2) stop
“as close thereto as possible” and “forthwith return” to the
accident scene. The second alternative requires a driver who
does not stop immediately following the accident to stop as
close as possible to the accident scene and then forthwith
return to that location. “Possible” is commonly understood to
mean “able to be done; within the power or capacity of someone
or something.” The New Oxford American Dictionary 1332 (2001).
Since it is “possible” for a driver to stop very close to the
accident scene, which may be in the middle of a crowded freeway,
a driver may reasonably believe that the statute mandates that
the driver must stop “as close” to the scene of the accident “as
possible.”
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But the failure to stop statute also requires that
“[e]very [] stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more
than is necessary.” HRS § 291C-13. This statutory requirement
must be read in conjunction with its corresponding requirement
to “immediately stop . . . at the scene of the accident or as
close thereto as possible.” Thus, the failure to stop statute
plainly recognizes that a stop that is as close to the accident
scene as possible may be one that obstructs traffic more than is
necessary. See Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 76 Hawaii
46, 71, 868 P.2d 1193, 1218 (1994) (“[C]ourts are bound, if
rational and practicable, to give effect to all parts of a
statute, and [] no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed
as superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (quoting Methven–Abreu
v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 73 Haw. 385, 392, 834 P.2d 279,
284 (1992))). Accordingly, while a driver involved in an
accident that results in property damage to another’s vehicle is
mandated to stop immediately or as close to the scene of the
accident as possible, the stop must not unnecessarily obstruct
traffic.
It is thus apparent that the duty to stop at the
accident scene or as close thereto as possible is subject to the
statutory requirement that the stop be made without obstructing
traffic more than is necessary. Consequently, the phrase “as
close [] as possible,” as used in HRS § 291C-13, does not
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necessarily coincide with its common meaning. Rather, a stop
“as close thereto as possible” is qualified to the extent that
the stop should not obstruct traffic more than is necessary.
See Wheeler, 121 Hawaii at 394, 219 P.3d at 1181 (the meaning of
the term “operate” as used in the statute was not the same as
its commonly understood definition, and the term was therefore
not “readily comprehensible to persons of common
understanding”); State v. Pacquing, 139 Hawaii 302, 308, 389
P.3d 897, 903 (2016) (statutory definition of “confidential
personal information” differed from its “commonly understood
definition” and thus simply including the statutory phrase in
the complaint was insufficient to apprise the defendant of what
the defendant must be prepared to meet).
The inclusion of the statutory language to not
obstruct traffic more than is necessary means that a driver is
required to not cause an unnecessary traffic obstruction or
create a risk to other drivers when stopping. That is, the
legislature intended to avoid the hazardous traffic situation or
serious traffic congestion that might occur were drivers to
exchange information in a location that obstructed traffic more
than is necessary. Indeed, stopping immediately or very close
to the accident’s location could result in a series of
successive accidents, with the subsequent accidents causing
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greater harm and being a greater risk to safety than the
original accident. A driver therefore does not violate the
statute by not stopping at the scene, by not stopping as close
as “possible” to the scene, or not returning to the scene of the
accident, if doing so would prevent a traffic hazard that would
otherwise result.
Thus, a driver, in lieu of stopping as close as
possible to the scene of the accident, may instead stop at the
closest location to the accident scene that does not result in
an unnecessary traffic obstruction--without violating the
statute. By the same token, the requirement to “forthwith
return” to the scene of the accident is also subject to the
qualification that the “return” to the accident scene can be
done without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. The
requirement that the stop was made without obstructing traffic
more than is necessary is thus a requisite aspect of proof of
the offense when the driver stops at, or forthwith returns to, a
location that the State contends is not as close as “possible”
to the accident scene.
Accordingly, when a defendant stops in close proximity
of the accident scene and provides the requisite information,
the State, in order to show a violation of the statute, is
required to prove the following: (1) the defendant failed to
stop at a location that was as close to the scene of the
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accident as possible, or to forthwith return thereto, and (2)
the failure did not result from the defendant avoiding an
unnecessary obstruction of traffic.
Thus, HRS § 291C-13 contains the following elements:
(1) the defendant was driving a vehicle that was involved
in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle or
other property;
(2) the vehicle or property was driven or attended by
another person;
(3) the defendant did not
(a) immediately stop at the scene of the accident, or
at a location as close thereto as possible and
forthwith return to the scene that would not have
obstructed traffic more than is necessary;
or
(b) provide the information required by section 291C-
14 to the other driver and any police officer at the
scene, or, in their absence, forthwith report the
accident to the nearest police officer and provide
that information to the officer.
HRS §§ 291C-13, 291C-14. The State is also required to allege
that each element was committed intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly when charging this offense.12
In this case, Baker challenged the sufficiency of the
charge for the first time on appeal, and the liberal
12
Because HRS § 291C-13 does not contain a mens rea, HRS § 702-204
applies. HRS § 702-204 (“When the state of mind required to establish an
element of an offense is not specified by the law, that element is
established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly.”); HRS § 701-102(3) (2014) (“The provisions of chapters 701
through 706 of the Code are applicable to offenses defined by other statutes,
unless the Code otherwise provides.”).
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construction standard is thus applied in reviewing the charge.
State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 90, 657 P.2d 1019, 1019-20 (1983);
State v. Wells, 78 Hawai‘i 373, 381, 894 P.2d 70, 78 (1995); see
also State v. Kauhane, 145 Hawaii 362, 372-73, 452 P.3d 359,
369-70 (2019) (holding that the charge was insufficient under
the Motta/Wells rule because the common definition of
“obstructs” did not comport with its statutory definition).
Under this standard, we consider whether the charge can
reasonably be construed to charge an offense or, alternatively,
whether the defendant was prejudiced. Kauhane, 145 at 369-70,
452 P.3d at 366-67. A complaint, for example, cannot reasonably
be construed to charge an offense if it omits an element of the
offense or when the common definition of an element of an
offense set forth in the charge does not comport with its
statutory definition. Pacquing, 139 Hawaii at 308, 389 P.3d at
903; Wheeler, 121 Hawaii at 394, 219 P.3d at 1181.
The State in this case did not specify in the
complaint that Baker did not stop either at the accident scene
or stop at the location closest to the accident scene and
forthwith return thereto without obstructing traffic more than
is necessary. The State’s omission of this statutory
qualification did not provide Baker with fair notice of the
elements of the offense charged. Wheeler, 121 Hawaii at 395,
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219 P.3d at 1182. In fact, the charge did not include any
reference to the language “without obstructing traffic more than
is necessary” or include language similar to it. The failure to
include the statutory language resulted in this element of the
charge having a common meaning that differed from the express
statutory requirements, and thus neither the complaint nor the
oral charge can be reasonably construed to charge an offense.
Id. Accordingly, the deficient charge deprived Baker of the
right to due process. Nesmith, 127 Hawaii at 52, 276 P.3d at
621. As a result, the State failed to state an offense, and the
conviction based upon it cannot be sustained. Kauhane, 145
Hawaii at 373, 452 P.3d at 370; Pacquing, 139 Hawaii at 308, 389
P.3d at 903; Wheeler, 121 Hawaii at 391, 219 P.3d 1178.
The ICA concluded that the phrase requiring every stop
to be made without obstructing traffic more than necessary in
the failure to stop statute was merely an “explanatory clause”
that “serves to more clearly define” the element of the offense
pertaining to the driver’s duty to stop, but that the clause did
not impose an additional conduct requirement that the State must
prove. We do not endorse the ICA’s “explanatory clause”
framework. The State must prove that the defendant, by failing
to stop as close to the scene of the accident as possible or
forthwith return, could have done so without obstructing traffic
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more than is necessary. The charging instrument in this case
did not adequately set forth the elements of the offense so that
the charge was “readily comprehensible to persons of common
understanding.” Wheeler, 121 Hawaii at 394-95, 219 P.3d at
1181-82. The complaint therefore failed to give Baker proper
notice of the elements of the offense with which she was
charged, and the ICA erred in concluding that the charge was not
deficient.13
B. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Convict Baker Under
HRS § 291C-13.
Baker also contends that there was not sufficient
evidence to prove that she intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly failed to comply with the failure to stop offense.
See HRS § 291C-13.
As explained, to prove that Baker violated HRS § 291C-
13, the State was required to prove that (1) Baker was driving a
vehicle that was involved in an accident resulting only in
damage to a vehicle or other property; (2) the vehicle or
property was driven or attended by another person; (3) Baker did
13
To the extent that the following cases do not require the
qualifying language “without obstructing traffic more than is necessary” to
be included in the charge, they are overruled: State v. Gartrell, 9 Haw. App.
156, 828 P.2d 298 (1992); State v. Preza, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL 245667
(App. Jan. 17, 2019) (SDO); State v. Meloche, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2016 WL
7175232, at *2 (App. Dec. 8, 2016) (SDO); and State v. Davis, No. CAAP-11-
0000509, 2014 WL 4648172, at *1 (App. Sept. 17, 2014) (SDO).
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not (a) immediately stop at the scene or stop as close thereto
as possible and forthwith return to the scene without
obstructing traffic more than is necessary; or (b) give the
required information to the other driver and any police officer
at the scene, or, in their absence, forthwith report the
accident to the nearest police officer and provide the required
information after fulfilling other statutory requirements
insofar as possible. The State was also required to prove that
Baker committed each element of the offense intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly. HRS §§ 291C-13, 701-114, 702-204.
To fulfill the requirements of the duty to give
information statute, HRS § 291C-14,14 Baker was required to
14
HRS § 291C-14 (2014) provides, in relevant part, the following:
(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in . . . damage to any vehicle or other property
which is driven or attended by any person shall give the
driver’s name, address, and the registration number of the
vehicle the driver is driving, and shall upon request and
if available exhibit the driver’s license or permit to
drive to . . . the driver or occupant of or person
attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the
accident and shall give such information and upon request
exhibit such license or permit to any police officer at the
scene of the accident or who is investigating the
accident . . . .
(b) In the event that none of the persons specified is in
condition to receive the information to which they
otherwise would be entitled under subsection (a), and no
police officer is present, the driver of any vehicle
involved in the accident after fulfilling all other
requirements of . . . subsection (a) of this section,
insofar as possible on the driver’s part to be performed,
shall forthwith report the accident to the nearest police
(continued . . .)
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provide her name, address, and the registration number of her
vehicle to Moon and any police officer at the scene of the
accident or who is investigating the accident, and, if
requested, exhibit her driver’s license. HRS § 291C-14(a).
However, if it was not possible to exchange this information--
such as when the other motorist is not in a condition to receive
the information and no police officer is present--Baker was
required to promptly report the accident to the nearest police
officer and provide the required information after fulfilling
other statutory requirements insofar as possible. HRS § 291C-
14(b).
Moon testified that the collision occurred at
approximately 2:04 p.m. on October 26, 2017.15 After the
collision occurred, Moon immediately signaled to Baker to pull
over, she explained, and Baker complied. Moon stated that there
was construction on the part of the highway where the collision
occurred that caused the road to “zigzag.” Moon testified that
(. . . continued)
officer and submit thereto the information specified in
subsection (a).
15
As to the first two elements of the offense, there is no dispute
that Baker and Moon were driving their vehicles. And accepting Moon’s
testimony that she felt the impact of the contact and saw damage to her car,
there was substantial evidence that an accident resulting in damage to Moon’s
car occurred.
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after Baker refused to provide her license and registration, she
told Baker to meet at Anna Miller’s because they were holding up
traffic. Moon testified that Anna Miller’s was on the opposite
side of the highway that they were on and that there were
alternative places to turn right.
Officer Kam’s testimony indicated that he responded to
Baker’s report of a collision within thirty minutes after the
collision. The officer testified that when he arrived at the
location he had been directed to, he spoke with Baker and she
told him that she was being accused of colliding with another
vehicle. Neither Moon’s testimony nor Officer Kam’s testimony
provided any details as to Baker’s location after the accident.
Pursuant to the failure to stop statute, Baker was not
required to remain at the location of the accident scene because
the stopped vehicles were unnecessarily obstructing traffic.
And neither Officer Kam’s testimony nor other evidence presented
by the State provided substantial evidence that Baker did not
stop at a location as close to the scene of the accident as
possible without unnecessarily obstructing traffic. The
evidence accordingly did not prove, as required by the failure
to stop statute, that Baker failed to immediately stop or stop
as close as possible to the scene of the accident without
obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
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Similarly, the State also did not prove that Baker
violated the statute by her failure to “forthwith return” to the
scene of the accident. Returning to the accident scene would
have required Baker to stop her vehicle on a busy highway under
construction in a location that the evidence does not show would
not have obstructed traffic more than is necessary. The State
therefore failed to provide evidence that the second stop made
by Baker did not conform to the statute’s requirements.
The State could alternatively sustain a conviction in
this case if it provided substantial evidence that Baker failed
to comply with her duty to give information. There is no
dispute in this case that after Moon and Baker’s interaction at
the initial stop, they did not meet again. Because Baker was
not required to remain at or “forthwith return” to the location
of the initial stop, it follows that she could not exchange
information with Moon or a police officer at the scene of the
accident. Accordingly, Moon was not in a condition to receive
the information as she was not present, and thus Baker was
required to promptly report the accident to police and provide
the required information.
The evidence was uncontroverted that Baker called the
police and reported the accident shortly after it occurred.
This complies with the statutory requirement that Baker
forthwith report the accident to the nearest police officer.
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Officer Kam’s testimony did not explain what information Baker
provided or, more importantly, any information that she did not
provide when he spoke with her. Absent this evidence, the State
did not prove that Baker failed to fulfill her duty to give
information.16
The ICA incorrectly held that the testimony supported
the district court’s conclusion that Baker did not, at any time,
make the required statutory disclosure to Moon or Officer Kam
when in fact the district court did not make this conclusion.17
Nor does the record indicate what information Baker did or did
not provide to Officer Kam. It was the State’s burden to
present evidence demonstrating that Baker did not comply with
the failure to stop statute or give the required information to
Officer Kam, and the State failed to do so. The ICA thus erred
in finding that there was substantial evidence to support the
conviction.
16
It is noted that the record in this case contains the citation
issued by Officer Kam to Baker, which includes Baker’s name, address, and the
identifying information of her vehicle (the vehicle’s license plate number
and its make, model, type, color, and year). Thus, the citation indicates
that Baker, at least, substantially complied with the duty to give
information statute by providing her name, address, and vehicle information
such that the vehicle’s owner could be located. See State v. Villeza, 85
Hawaii 258, 265, 942 P.2d 522, 529 (1997) (“We determine substantial
compliance with a statute by determining whether the statute has been
followed sufficiently such that the intent for which it was adopted is
carried out.”).
17
See supra notes 6 and 10.
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V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we vacate that portion of the
ICA’s Judgment on Appeal affirming the district court’s January
28, 2018 Judgment.18 We also vacate the district court’s January
28, 2018 Judgment and remand the case to the district court with
instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.
Taryn R. Tomasa /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Chad Kumagai
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for respondent
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
18
The ICA’s reversal of the May 7, 2018 Restitution Order is not
challenged on certiorari review. See supra note 8.
28