Fidel Gomez Salazar v. State of Texas ( 2009 )


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  • Opinion filed August 28, 2009
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    ___________
    No. 11-08-00038-CR
    __________
    FIDEL GOMEZ SALAZAR, Appellant
    V.
    STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 244th District Court
    Ector County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. C-34,401
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The jury convicted Fidel Gomez Salazar of possession of a controlled substance in the
    amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred grams and assessed his punishment at
    confinement for fifteen years. We affirm.
    Background Facts
    Appellant was indicted with intentionally and knowingly possessing a controlled substance,
    cocaine, in the amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred grams. The indictment also
    alleged an enhancement for a previous felony conviction of burglary of a building. Appellant
    pleaded not guilty to the indictment but entered a plea of true to the enhancement paragraph.
    The trial court appointed Tracy Scown as appellant’s attorney. Prior to trial, appellant wrote
    a letter to the trial court complaining of his counsel’s representation. Appellant stated that Scown
    had failed to protect and represent his rights and interest to the best of her ability. The trial court
    held a hearing to address appellant’s concerns. Scown stated that she was not having difficulty
    representing and communicating with appellant and was not asking to withdraw. She also stated that
    she informed appellant that, if he wanted to represent himself, he needed to take that up with the
    court. Appellant did not request to represent himself at that time. The trial court did not appoint
    appellant new counsel but gave Scown and appellant a chance to discuss the complaints raised in
    appellant’s letter.
    Appellant was still dissatisfied with Scown’s representation and requested a hearing to have
    Scown removed as his court-appointed attorney. Even though appellant’s trial was set for the next
    week, the trial court allowed appellant to change counsel. In anticipation of her withdrawal, Scown
    had contacted Larry Barber to take over appellant’s representation. Barber stated that he had
    reviewed the file, would waive the ten-day rule, and would be ready to go to trial the next week. On
    the day of the trial before beginning voir dire, appellant stated that he was dissatisfied with Barber’s
    representation. The trial court stated that it believed that appellant was trying to delay trial, and it
    had addressed all of appellant’s complaints when it appointed new counsel. The trial court
    proceeded with the voir dire of the jury. On the day that testimony was to begin, appellant again
    complained that his counsel had not investigated the evidence and had not questioned any witnesses
    pertaining to the case. The court stated:
    THE COURT: Thus far, I have not seen anything that has been done or not
    been done either by Mrs. Scown or Mr. Barber that I believe is not reasonable or that
    is prejudicial to your defense. So I have reviewed your letter, and your motion to
    relieve Mr. Barber as your attorney is denied, unless you would like to represent
    yourself.
    THE DEFENDANT: At this time, that might not be a bad idea. Would I have
    time to prepare for trial?
    ....
    2
    THE COURT: No.
    ....
    THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Then I am stuck with him.
    Barber stated to the court that, several days prior to trial, he presented appellant with the forms to
    sign in order for appellant to represent himself, but appellant told him that he did not want to
    represent himself.
    The jury trial continued, and Barber conducted appellant’s defense. During the trial, the trial
    court gave appellant the opportunity to discuss trial strategy with his attorney outside the presence
    of the jury.
    Issue
    Appellant asserts in his sole issue that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to
    represent himself at trial.
    Analysis
    The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and TEX . CONST . art. I, § 10 provide
    an accused the right to make his defense, implicitly giving him the right to represent himself.
    Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 819 (1975); Williams v. State, 
    252 S.W.3d 353
    , 356 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2008). However, this right is not absolute. A defendant must assert the right to self-
    representation “clearly and unequivocally.” 
    Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835
    ; Funderburg v. State, 
    717 S.W.2d 637
    , 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Furthermore, the right must be asserted in a timely
    manner. Blankenship v. State, 
    673 S.W.2d 578
    , 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Ex parte Winton, 
    837 S.W.2d 134
    , 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). An assertion of the right to self-representation is timely
    if it is asserted before the jury is empaneled. 
    Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 585
    . If a defendant first
    asserts his right to self-representation after trial has begun, the right may have been waived. The trial
    court’s decision to allow the defendant to proceed pro se or to impose reasonable conditions on self-
    representation rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Kombudo v. State, 
    148 S.W.3d 547
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
    171 S.W.3d 888
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing United States v. Singleton, 
    107 F.3d 1091
    , 1099 (4th Cir. 1997)).
    A defendant’s request to conduct his own defense must not be a tactic to delay the proceedings.
    
    Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 585
    .
    3
    Appellant did not clearly and unequivocally state that he wanted to represent himself. When
    asked by the trial court if he wanted to represent himself, he stated, “[T]hat might not be a bad idea.”
    However, when he was denied more time to prepare for trial, appellant stated that he was “stuck
    with” Barber. This is not a clear invocation of his right to represent himself. Further, appellant was
    asked if he wanted to represent himself by both Scown and Barber prior to trial. Yet, he refused and
    wanted them to continue their representation.
    Even if appellant clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to represent himself, he did not
    do so in a timely manner because his request was made after the jury was empaneled. The trial court
    had the discretion to deny that request if it believed that it was only for the purpose of delay or that
    it would interfere with conducting a fair trial. The trial court provided numerous accommodations
    to appellant at pretrial and throughout the trial. See 
    Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1099-1100
    . The trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing appellant to have more time to prepare for trial in
    order to represent himself. We overrule appellant’s issue on appeal.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    RICK STRANGE
    JUSTICE
    August 28, 2009
    Do not publish. See TEX . R. APP . P. 47.2(b).
    Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
    McCall, J., and Strange, J.
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