United States v. Elliott ( 1998 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                   No. 97-4756
    DAMON EMANUEL ELLIOTT,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
    Peter J. Messitte, District Judge.
    (CR-97-53)
    Submitted: June 30, 1998
    Decided: August 5, 1998
    Before MURNAGHAN and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
    HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Richard I. Kovelant, Laurel, Maryland; Douglas Clark Hollmann,
    Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United
    States Attorney, John V. Geise, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Ranganath Manthripragada, Assistant United States Attorney, Green-
    belt, Maryland, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Damon Elliott was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual abuse
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
     (1994), and sentenced to 189
    months' imprisonment. On appeal, he alleges a violation of the
    Speedy Trial Act and insufficiency of evidence to support the jury's
    verdict. He further maintains that he was prejudiced because he was
    not arraigned until the first day of his trial. Finding no reversible
    error, we affirm.
    The evidence at trial disclosed that Elliott was a casual friend of
    the victim, Yolanda Clark, who was 16 at the time of the offense.
    Clark lived with her aunt, Barbara Hughes, and Ms. Hughes' two chil-
    dren, Derrick, 11, and Christy, 23. On January 21, 1997, Elliott called
    Clark, who was alone with Derrick, and indicated that he was going
    to come to Hughes' residence. Clark replied, "whatever." Later that
    evening, Derrick unexpectedly found Elliott in Clark's bedroom. At
    his request, Clark prepared Elliott something to eat, and shortly there-
    after Clark and Derrick followed Elliott upstairs into her bedroom. At
    Elliott's direction, Derrick went downstairs.
    Alone with Clark in her bedroom, Elliott began yelling at Clark for
    "disrespecting" him and striking her with a closed fist. He then
    pushed her onto the bed and began removing her clothes, despite her
    pleas to stop. He then pulled down his pants and placed his penis in
    her vagina. At this time the phone rang. Pushing Elliott off of her,
    Clark answered the phone, and crying, told her cousin, Christy, who
    was on the phone, to come home. Elliott grabbed the phone and
    pulled the cord out of the wall. He then pushed Clark's head into the
    wall and began choking her with a pillow over her face. Elliott then
    exited through the bedroom window. Within minutes, Clark's cousin
    Christy, the paramedics, and the police arrived. Clark was then taken
    to the hospital. Several witnesses testified consistently with Clark's
    testimony.
    2
    Elliott was indicted on February 24, 1997, on one count of forcibly
    causing another person to engage in a sexual act in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
     (1994) and was later arraigned. On March 31, 1997,
    the grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging him with
    two additional counts, attempting to commit the offense charged in
    the first count, also in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 2241, and knowingly
    engaging in sexual conduct with another person by the use of force
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
    (a)(1) (1994). Trial was initially set
    for May 20, 1997. On the government's motion, however, the court
    continued the trial to July 22, 1997, to allow time for DNA tests of
    fluid and hair samples taken from Elliott and Clark. By order dated
    April 22, 1997, the court directed that the period of time between the
    Government's motion and the new trial date be excluded for speedy
    trial purposes. On July 17, 1997, the court again reset the trial to
    August 26, 1997. On July 29, 1997, the Government moved for dis-
    covery. Trial commenced on August 26, 1997, at which time Elliott
    was arraigned on the superseding indictment. The jury found Elliott
    guilty on count two, attempting to forcibly cause another person to
    engage in a sexual act.
    Elliott first alleges that the court failed to try him within seventy
    days of his indictment in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
     (1994). This claim lacks merit, however, because the failure
    to move for dismissal on this basis prior to trial or a plea of guilty
    constitutes a waiver of that right under the Act. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3162
    (a)(2) (1994). In any event, our computation of the number of
    days that elapsed between indictment and trial, allowing for the vari-
    ous exclusions allowed under the Act, reveals that Elliott was brought
    to trial within the requisite period of time. Accordingly, we find no
    plain error. See United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731-32 (1993).
    Elliott further claims that he was prejudiced because he was not
    arraigned on the superseding indictment until the first day of his trial.
    Although Fed. R. Crim. P. 10 provides rules regarding the arraign-
    ment of a defendant, it does not, nor does any other authority that we
    can find, suggest that it has to take place at a certain time. In fact,
    even where there is a failure to arraign a defendant on a superseding
    indictment, there is no reversible error absent a showing that the
    defendant was in some way prejudiced. See United States v. Correa-
    Ventura, 
    6 F.3d 1070
    , 1073 (5th Cir. 1993). Given defense counsel's
    3
    own admission that the superseding indictment did not change the
    defense in any way and the fact that a jury could have found Elliott
    guilty of attempted rape, a lesser included offense of the offense origi-
    nally charged, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c), we find that Elliott was not
    prejudiced by the court's failure to arraign him on the superseding
    indictment until immediately before the trial. Hence, we find no
    reversible error.*
    Lastly, Elliott asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support
    the jury's guilty verdict. On direct appeal of a criminal conviction, a
    verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, viewed in
    the light most favorable to the Government, to support it. See Glasser
    v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942). As a threshold matter, credi-
    bility determinations are solely within the jury's province and are not
    subject to appellate review. See United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    ,
    862-63 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, #6D 6D6D# U.S. ___, 
    65 U.S.L.W. 3586
    (U.S. Feb. 24, 1997) (No. 96-6868). After reviewing the record and
    the testimony of the victim and the other witnesses, we find ample
    evidence to support the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm
    Elliott's conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    _________________________________________________________________
    *Elliott also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on his law-
    yer's failure to move for dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act and his
    acknowledgement of the lack of prejudice from the late arraignment.
    Because the record does not conclusively demonstrate ineffective assis-
    tance of counsel, we leave this claim to factual development on collateral
    review. See United States v. Williams, 
    977 F.2d 866
    , 871 (4th Cir. 1992).
    4