State v. Cattaneo ( 2021 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    24-FEB-2021
    07:45 AM
    Dkt. 70 MO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
    MICHAEL A. CATTANEO, Defendant-Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    (CR. NO. 2PC151000023; CR. NO. 2PC151000122)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Nakasone, JJ.)
    Defendant-Appellant Michael A. Cattaneo (Cattaneo)
    appeals from a July 16, 2019 Order Denying Cattaneo's [Hawai#i
    Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)] Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of
    Sentence (Order Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence) and April 24,
    2020 Findings of Fact (FOFs) and Conclusions of Law (COLs) and
    Order Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence (FOFs/COLs & Order)
    entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit
    Court).1
    1
    The Honorable Richard T. Bissen, Jr. presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    This appeal arises out of two criminal cases brought
    by Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i (State) against Cattaneo.
    Cattaneo pleaded no contest to, and was convicted of, one count
    of Negligent Homicide in the First Degree in violation of Hawaii
    Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-702.5(1)(b) (2014),2 one count of
    Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree in violation of
    HRS § 712-1243(1) (2014),3 and one count of Prohibited Acts
    Related to Drug Paraphernalia in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a)
    (2010).4   Cattaneo was sentenced to an indeterminate ten-year
    2
    HRS § 707-702.5 provides:
    § 707-702.5 Negligent homicide in the first degree .
    (1) A person commits the offense of negligent homicide in
    the first degree if that person causes the death of:
    (a)   Another person by the operation of a vehicle in a
    negligent manner while under the influence of
    drugs or alcohol; or
    (b)   A vulnerable user by the operation of a vehicle
    in a negligent manner.
    (2) Negligent homicide in the first degree is a class B
    felony.
    3
    HRS § 712-1243 provides:
    § 712-1243 Promoting a dangerous drug in the third
    degree. (1) A person commits the offense of promoting a
    dangerous drug in the third degree if the person knowingly
    possesses any dangerous drug in any amount.
    (2) Promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree is
    a class C felony.
    4
    HRS § 329-43.5 provides, in relevant part:
    § 329-43.5 Prohibited acts related to drug
    paraphernalia. (a) It is unlawful for any person to use, or
    to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant,
    propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound,
    convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
    repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or
    otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled
    substance in violation of this chapter. Any person who
    (continued...)
    2
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    term of imprisonment for Negligent Homicide in the First Degree
    and indeterminate five-year terms for each of the drug-related
    convictions, with the five-year terms running concurrently to
    each other and consecutively to the ten-year term.
    Upon conclusion of a direct appeal from the December 4,
    2015 Judgment of Conviction and Sentence (Judgment),5 discussed
    briefly below,6 Cattaneo filed an HRPP Rule 35(b) Motion for
    Reduction of Sentence (Motion to Reduce Sentence).            After a
    hearing, the Circuit Court entered the Order Denying Motion to
    Reduce Sentence.
    Cattaneo contends that the Circuit Court erred in
    denying the Motion to Reduce Sentence by neglecting to consider
    "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities" among
    similarly-situated defendants and failing to "state a sufficient
    basis for re-imposing consecutive sentences upon resentencing."
    Cattaneo also contends that he received ineffective assistance of
    counsel during the hearing on the Motion to Reduce Sentence.
    Cattaneo asks this court to vacate the Circuit Court's April 24,
    (...continued)
    violates this section is guilty of a class C felony and upon
    conviction may be imprisoned pursuant to section 706-660
    and, if appropriate as provided in section 706-641, fined
    pursuant to section 706-640.
    5
    On December 20, 2018, this court issued a Summary Disposition
    Order affirming the December 4, 2015 Judgment. See State v. Cattaneo, CAAP-
    XX-XXXXXXX and CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2018 WL 6696055
     (Haw. App. Dec. 20, 2018)
    (SDO). The Judgment on Appeal was entered on January 31, 2019. Cattaneo
    filed an application for writ of certiorari to the Hawai #i Supreme Court,
    which was denied on May 8, 2019. See State v. Cattaneo, SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2019 WL 2024438
    , *1 (Haw. May 8, 2019).
    6
    See infra note 7.
    3
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    2020 FOFs/COLs & Order and remand this case for a rehearing
    before a different judge.       After reviewing the record on appeal
    and the relevant legal authorities, and giving due consideration
    to the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, we affirm.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    On January 20, 2015, Cattaneo was indicted by a grand
    jury on two counts of Negligent Homicide in the First Degree, one
    count of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an
    Intoxicant, and one count of Driving Without Motor Vehicle
    Insurance.     On February 23, 2015, the State filed a Felony
    Information and Non-Felony Complaint charging Cattaneo with two
    counts related to dangerous drug possession and paraphernalia,
    one count of Driving Under the Influence, one count of Driving
    Without a License, and two counts related to driving without
    insurance.     On August 6, 2015, Cattaneo, represented by the
    Office of the Public Defender, pleaded no contest to and was
    convicted of one count of Negligent Homicide in the First Degree
    in violation of HRS § 707-702.5(1)(b), one count of Promoting a
    Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree in violation of HRS § 712-
    1243(1), and one count of Prohibited Acts Related to Drug
    Paraphernalia in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a).
    In the plea agreement, the parties agreed, inter alia,
    to seek concurrent sentencing on all counts.        The Circuit Court
    nevertheless sentenced Cattaneo to consecutive terms of
    imprisonment.        In CR. No. 15-1-0023(4), Cattaneo was sentenced to
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    an indeterminate ten-year term of imprisonment for his conviction
    of Negligent Homicide in the First Degree.         In CR. No. 15-1-
    0022(2), Cattaneo was sentenced to an indeterminate five-year
    term for each of his convictions for Promoting a Dangerous Drug
    in the Third Degree and Prohibited Acts Related to Drug
    Paraphernalia, to run concurrently with each other and
    consecutively with the ten-year term.
    At the sentencing hearing, the Circuit Court solicited
    statements from, inter alia:       Cattaneo, Cattaneo's mother,
    defense counsel, prosecution counsel, and the friends and family
    of the deceased.    The Circuit Court concluded that Cattaneo
    "clearly ha[s] no respect for the law" and "no respect for other
    people", and that Cattaneo's "rule-breaking attitude has cost a
    man his life."    The court then explained its sentencing
    rationale:
    [T]he focus is on how do we change you [(Cattaneo)]?
    What must the Court do to change you or people who think
    like you or people who act like you? How do I stop them and
    you from doing this again?
    . . . .
    So what I can do is separate you from society long
    enough for you to gain this insight that you started on and
    also prevent this from happening to others? [sic]
    The time for lessons has passed. This isn't a teaching
    moment, in my mind. This is a moment for punishment.
    . . . .
    And so the Court is sentencing the defendant.
    Considering the factors under Chapter 706-606, the
    Court has considered the nature and circumstances of the
    offense and the history and characteristics of this
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    defendant, especially the history and characteristics of the
    defendant.
    The Court has considered the need for this sentence to
    reflect the seriousness of the offense. And this is of the
    most serious nature, the taking of one's life.
    . . . .
    The Court is considering promoting respect for the
    law, providing just punishment for this offense, the Court
    is absolutely considering affording adequate deterrence to
    criminal conduct. And deterrence is not just to the
    defendant, but to those who would think like this or like
    him.
    The Court is considering protecting the public from
    further crimes of this defendant and providing the defendant
    with needed educational or vocational training, medical
    care, other correctional treatment in the most effective
    manner.
    The types of sentences available to the Court have
    been adequately and appropriately pointed out by both
    counsel. And the Court does appreciate the argument that
    both counsels have made.
    And the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
    among defendants with similar records who have been found
    guilty of similar conduct. I do not know of the sentences
    imposed in other courtrooms in either September or any other
    months of similar cases. I know, however, what this Court
    sentences in these types of offenses.
    And so taken [sic] all that into account, in Criminal
    Number 15-1-0023, Count Two, the defendant is committed to
    the custody of the Department of Public Safety for a period
    of 10 years.
    In Criminal Number 15-1-0122, Count One, the defendant
    is sentenced to a period of five years; Count Two, a period
    of five years.
    Those terms will run concurrently with each other and
    consecutively to the sentence imposed in 15-1-023, totaling
    15 years.
    Thereafter, the court entered the Judgment.           On January
    27, 2016, Cattaneo filed a notice of appeal from the Judgment
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    (Direct Appeal), which was docketed in CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX.             The
    Judgment was affirmed.7
    On June 19, 2019, Cattaneo filed the Motion to Reduce
    Sentence, requesting that the Circuit Court exercise its
    discretionary power to reduce Cattaneo's sentence to a concurrent
    sentence on all convictions pursuant to the provisions of HRS §§
    706-6068 and 706-668.5.9      The motion stated that "[u]nder the
    7
    In the Direct Appeal, Cattaneo raised three points of error,
    summarized as follows:
    (1) the Circuit Court plainly erred when it focused on
    unreliable hearsay in conjunction with sentencing in the
    form of Facebook entries described in a letter attached to
    the Presentence Diagnosis and Report (PSI Report); (2) the
    Circuit Court plainly erred when it imposed consecutive
    sentences in this case; and (3) this court should recognize
    plain error in Cattaneo's sentencing because the State
    failed to comply with the terms of the plea agreement.
    State v. Cattaneo, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2018 WL 6696055
     at *1 (Haw. App. Dec. 20,
    2018) (SDO).
    8
    HRS § 706-606 (2014) provides:
    § 706-606 Factors to be considered in imposing a
    sentence. The court, in determining the particular sentence
    to be imposed, shall consider:
    (1)   The nature and circumstances of the offense and
    the history and characteristics of the
    defendant;
    (2)   The need for the sentence to be imposed:
    (a)   To reflect the seriousness of the offense,
    to promote respect for law, and to provide
    just punishment for the offense;
    (b)   To afford adequate deterrence to criminal
    conduct;
    (c)   To protect the public from further crimes
    of the defendant; and
    (d)   To provide the defendant with needed
    educational or vocational training,
    medical care, or other correctional
    treatment in the most effective manner;
    (continued...)
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    provisions of HRS §§ 706-606 and 706-668.5, a concurrent sentence
    would be more appropriate and in line with sentencing defendants
    convicted of Negligent Homicide in the First Degree."             Moreover,
    Cattaneo argued that "other case sentencing(s) support the
    original term of 10 years concurrent" because those other
    "Comparable Cases" contain similar, if not "more egregious", fact
    patterns resulting in convictions for Negligent Homicide in the
    First Degree along with other felony convictions, but that those
    same cases, in the same jurisdiction, resulted in concurrent
    sentencing.
    In addition, Cattaneo represented himself as a model
    inmate who had sought diligently to improve himself in the almost
    five years he had been incarcerated, proposing that the court
    "may see Cattaneo has been serving good time and seeking to be as
    productive as possible in his almost 5 years of [incarceration]
    by gaining skills and being employed."10         Appended to the Motion
    (...continued)
    (3)   The kinds of sentences available; and
    (4)   The need to avoid unwarranted sentence
    disparities among defendants with similar
    records who have been found guilty of similar
    conduct.
    9
    HRS § 706-668.5 (2014) provides, in relevant part: "The court, in
    determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or
    consecutively, shall consider the factors set forth in section 706-606." HRS
    § 706-668.5(2).
    10
    Cattaneo stated that he goes to school full-time while also
    holding a full-time job in the kitchen where he prepares meals for special
    diet need prisoners. In addition, Cattaneo stated that he has taken courses
    in vocational plumbing, received several certificates on courses of personal
    improvement, obtained an OSHA "10" safety card, and is signed up to take
    (continued...)
    8
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    to Reduce Sentence is a hand-written note (Note), apparently
    authored by Cattaneo, in which he expresses contrition,
    acknowledges the "terrible decision" he made that led to the
    taking of another's life, acknowledges that "[t]here is no
    question that [he] needed to take a long hard look at [his] life
    and the direction it was headed", and that he "has come a long
    way from where [he] was, and [he is] sure [he has] a ways to go."
    On June 25, 2019, the State filed a Statement of No
    Position to Cattaneo's Motion to Reduce Sentence.
    A hearing on the Motion to Reduce Sentence was held on
    June 27, 2019, at which Cattaneo was represented by Matthew Kohm
    (Kohm).
    Kohm argued that Cattaneo has shown remorse and has
    adjusted, such that the Court might find that Cattaneo "can be
    productive or that he deserves a chance."          Kohm reiterated points
    concerning Cattaneo's good conduct and self-improvement in
    prison.   Kohm made arguments regarding mitigating factors related
    to Cattaneo's conviction for Negligent Homicide, his lack of
    prior felony convictions, and the prospects for his reintegration
    in society.    With respect to "Comparable Cases," Kohm argued:
    Lastly, I would say is I know this Court is very aware
    of the different sentences that go on in this Court and
    other Courts. Myself, as a civil attorney, most of my
    practice, I also get to see these cases from the civil side
    and what the parole board does.
    (...continued)
    further vocational courses and to do the "RDAP program." Cattaneo also stated
    that he has family ready and job prospects to help him transition back to life
    on Maui should he be released.
    9
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    I will let the Court know, [Cattaneo] was set as a
    Level 3 offender. I was involved in a First Circuit case,
    State v. Sioni Tilini, who was an Army vet who was in a
    collision and he killed the other driver. And he was also
    set as a Level 3 offender.
    So I say that to this Court so that it's not like
    [Cattaneo] is going to walk if he got a concurrent sentence.
    But it's the parole board, it's been my experience is that
    they do treat these severely. And he will still have to do
    many things before he's eligible for parole.
    In response, the Circuit Court, inter alia, stated that
    it had "read all of [Cattaneo's] moving papers" and further
    acknowledged that "[Cattaneo] has made good use of his time[.]
    There's no doubt he's made improvements."
    Cattaneo made a statement, reiterating the main thrust
    of his Note, expressing contrition for the damage he caused,
    taking full responsibility for his actions, and stating that he
    had no excuse for his bad decision-making.        Additionally,
    Cattaneo stated that "when [he] was sentenced to prison . . .
    prison was exactly what [he] needed."       Nevertheless, Cattaneo
    stated that he had matured to become a "completely different
    person" with "more to offer society."
    The Circuit Court acknowledged Cattaneo's arguments and
    representations:   "I think you have made good use of your time.
    And so I appreciate the words you've just spoken, as well as what
    you wrote, which the Court also spent a lot of time reviewing."
    Kohm further argued that Cattaneo has adjusted well to
    and remained misconduct-free in prison, and that he wants to
    contribute and be part of society.       Kohm reiterated that Cattaneo
    had "attempted to have some maturity" and that certain
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    aggravating character insights which may have been considered by
    the court in sentencing were made "before [Cattaneo's] wake-up
    call."    Kohm concluded by asking the court to reduce Cattaneo's
    sentence and give him concurrent sentencing.
    In regards to "the portion of the doctrine that has to
    do with other cases in this jurisdiction," the Circuit Court
    stated:
    [I]t's not the Court's practice to review cases that
    are issued by other Courts, whether in this circuit or
    others. Because I happen to know that every case is nuanced,
    every case has something that may not be obvious to someone.
    I get it all the time, and I hear it sometimes in
    letters where someone says, well, how come this guy stole a
    car and he got a year and the other guy assaulted somebody
    and he got 30 days and, you know, sometimes even from the
    same Court.
    So I think it's dangerous to -- while we do follow the
    rule of precedent as far as the law is concerned, I think it
    would be dangerous to start deciding cases on how someone
    else decided a case without knowing every single detail
    about that case.
    I don't know about any other Court, but I personally
    try my best to factor in every single element that I think
    is important. And some cases can have 50 things that you
    should consider, and some have five. I don't know what other
    judges do in deciding their ultimate decision.
    So I do factor in the argument of the prosecutor, the
    argument of the defense, the recommendation from probation.
    Obviously, the input from the victims and the input from the
    defendant. They're all significant factors.
    I did exactly that in this case with Mr. Cattaneo.
    The Circuit Court concluded:
    There has been no change in circumstance in this case,
    except for the passage of time and the improvement of the
    defendant[.]
    . . . .
    I sent him to be punished. I sent him to think greatly about
    the life he took and the impact it had on those who remain.
    So it's with that this Court recalling all of the
    factors that were taken into account that I deny your
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    motion. And this is not a simple decision either. I've
    pondered this as well.
    . . . .
    This sentence was made to reflect the very, very
    serious consequence that occurred, as well as all the other
    factors that have already been discussed that I won't
    rehash. But it's also a deterrent to every other person out
    there.
    . . . .
    [discussing other recent driving related fatalities]
    This is not a reflection of Mr. Cattaneo and I'm not
    comparing him to those. As I said, I don't look at the other
    cases one way or the other to give somebody a harsher
    sentence or a lighter sentence because I think it's not fair
    to a person to do that. I think every single case should
    stand on its own.
    But I do deny your motion with much thought, counsel.
    On July 16, 2019, the Circuit Court entered the Order
    Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence.       On August 14, 2019, after a
    withdrawal and substitution of counsel was approved, Cattaneo was
    granted a thirty-day extension of time to file a notice of
    appeal.   On September 16, 2019, Cattaneo filed a notice of appeal
    from the Order Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence.
    On February 19, 2020, Cattaneo moved for entry of FOFs
    and COLs Regarding the Order Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence,
    and on April 24, 2020, the court entered its FOFs/COLs & Order.
    In the FOFs/COLs & Order, the court stated, inter alia,
    that "[t]he Court reviewed all available information to reach its
    original sentence.    The Court considered the arguments of the
    parties[.]"   The court stated that "[i]n considering the Motion
    to Reduce Sentence, the Court reconsidered all of the factors
    that were relevant to [Cattaneo's] sentencing on December 4,
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    2015," and that "[t]here has been no change of circumstance,
    except for the passage of time and [Cattaneo's] personal
    improvements."
    The Circuit Court concluded, inter alia, that "[a]
    sentencing court has discretion to impose consecutive terms."
    The court noted its obligation to consider the factors set forth
    in HRS § 706-606 and set forth the factors.     The court concluded
    that Cattaneo's original sentence reflected the court's
    consideration of the HRS § 706-606 factors, the sentence
    specifically served the purposes of punishment and deterrence,
    and there was no reason to change or reduce Cattaneo's sentence.
    II.   POINTS OF ERROR
    Cattaneo raises three points of error on appeal,
    contending that:    (1) the Circuit Court plainly erred in refusing
    to consider facts and arguments regarding the need to avoid
    unwarranted disparities in sentencing among similarly-situated
    defendants; (2) the Circuit Court abused its discretion in
    failing to state a "sufficient basis for re-imposing consecutive
    sentences upon resentencing;" and (3) Cattaneo received
    ineffective assistance of counsel at the Motion to Reduce
    Sentence hearing.
    III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    In general, "[a] judge has broad discretion in matters
    related to sentencing."   State v. Phillips, 138 Hawai#i 321, 357,
    
    382 P.3d 133
    , 169 (2016) (citation omitted).     Accordingly, "[t]he
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    authority of a trial court to select and determine the severity
    of a penalty is normally undisturbed on review in the absence of
    an apparent abuse of discretion or unless applicable statutory or
    constitutional commands have not been observed."          Barnett v.
    State, 91 Hawai#i 20, 26, 
    979 P.2d 1046
    , 1052 (1999) (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    "A trial court has the discretion to, within the time
    limits set forth by HRPP Rule 35, reduce a sentence.           Therefore,
    orders on HRPP Rule 35 motions for reduction of sentence are
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion."       State v. Kong, 140 Hawai#i
    103, 109, 
    398 P.3d 692
    , 698 (2017) (Kong II) (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly
    exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or
    principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment
    of a party litigant. The burden of establishing abuse of
    discretion is on appellant, and a strong showing is required
    to establish it.
    State v. Hinton, 120 Hawai#i 265, 273, 
    204 P.3d 484
    , 492 (2009)
    (citation and quotation marks omitted).        "[T]he determination of
    the existence of clear abuse is a matter which is not free from
    difficulty[,] and each case in which abuse is claimed must be
    adjudged according to its own peculiar circumstances."           State v.
    Gaylord, 78 Hawai#i 127, 144, 
    890 P.2d 1167
    , 1184 (1995)
    (citation omitted).    "Factors which indicate a plain and manifest
    abuse of discretion are arbitrary or capricious action by the
    judge and a rigid refusal to consider the defendant's
    contentions."   State v. Kahapea, 111 Hawai#i 267, 278, 
    141 P.3d 14
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    440, 451 (2006) (brackets, citations, and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, the
    supreme court has explained:
    When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel, this court looks at whether defense counsel's
    assistance was within the range of competence demanded of
    attorneys in criminal cases. The defendant has the burden of
    establishing ineffective assistance of counsel and must meet
    the following two-part test: 1) that there were specific
    errors or omissions reflecting counsel's lack of skill,
    judgment, or diligence; and 2) that such errors or omissions
    resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial impairment
    of a potentially meritorious defense. To satisfy this second
    prong, the defendant needs to show a possible impairment,
    rather than a probable impairment, of a potentially
    meritorious defense. A defendant need not prove actual
    prejudice.
    State v. Wakisaka, 102 Hawai#i 504, 513-14, 
    78 P.3d 317
    , 326-27
    (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    IV.   DISCUSSION
    A.    Motion to Reduce Sentence
    Cattaneo argues that the Circuit Court erred in denying
    his Motion to Reduce Sentence because the court in denying the
    motion failed to consider "[t]he need to avoid unwarranted
    sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
    have been found guilty of similar conduct" in violation of HRS
    § 706-606(4), and failed "to adequately articulate the reasons
    that it imposed consecutive sentences" in violation of HRS § 706-
    668.5(2).    Specifically, Cattaneo contends that the court refused
    to consider facts and arguments regarding two similarly-situated
    defendants who also were convicted of multiple offenses including
    Negligent Homicide in the First Degree but who received
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    concurrent, rather than consecutive, prison sentences.      In
    addition, Cattaneo claims that the Circuit Court did not explain
    why the disparity between Cattaneo's sentence and these other
    sentences was warranted.   We examine each contention in turn.
    It is well-established that sentencing determinations
    are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and
    entitled to substantial deference on appeal.     Kahapea, 111
    Hawai#i at 281, 141 P.3d at 454; State v. Kong, 131 Hawai#i 94,
    101, 
    315 P.3d 720
    , 727 (2013) (Kong I) ("A sentencing judge
    generally has broad discretion in imposing a sentence.")
    (citation omitted); State v. Murray, 
    63 Haw. 12
    , 25, 
    621 P.2d 334
    , 342 (1980) (a sentencing court is "afforded wide latitude in
    the selection of penalties from those prescribed and in the
    determination of their severity").
    Likewise, this court and the Hawai#i Supreme Court have
    repeatedly affirmed the proposition that HRPP Rule 35 vests the
    circuit courts with discretion to reduce a defendant's sentence
    following a direct appeal.    See, e.g., State v. Hussein, 122
    Hawai#i 495, 512, 
    229 P.3d 313
    , 330 (2010) (citing, inter alia,
    State v. LeVasseur, 
    1 Haw. App. 19
    , 29, 
    613 P.2d 1328
    , 1335
    (1980) ("[W]e point out that under [HRPP Rule 35] it is open to
    the court below to reduce the sentence within ninety (90) days of
    the receipt of our mandate if it sees fit.") (emphasis added)).
    HRPP Rule 35(b) states that the circuit court "may reduce a
    sentence within 90 days after the sentence is imposed, or within
    16
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    90 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon
    affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal[.]"
    (Emphasis added).   This court has also concluded that a circuit
    court must consider the factors set forth in HRS § 706–606 in
    ruling on an HRPP Rule 35(b) motion to reduce sentence.        See,
    e.g., State v. Sauceda, No. 30622, 
    2011 WL 1909112
    , *1 (Haw. App.
    May 18, 2011) (SDO) (citing Kahapea, 111 Hawai#i at 278, 280–82,
    141 P.3d at 451, 453–55); see also State v. Kong, CAAP-15-
    0000066, 
    2016 WL 6997646
    , *2-4 (Haw. App. Nov. 29, 2016) (mem.
    op.), vacated on other grounds, Kong II, 140 Hawai#i 103, 
    398 P.3d 692
     (reviewing circuit court's denial of HRPP Rule 35(b)
    motion for independent consideration of merits under HRS § 706-
    606).
    Reconciling a trial court's obligation to consider the
    HRS § 706-606 sentencing factors with its general discretion in
    sentencing matters, appellate courts in this jurisdiction have
    oftentimes stated that "[t]he weight to be given the factors set
    forth in HRS § 706–606 in imposing sentence is a matter generally
    left to the discretion of the sentencing court, taking into
    consideration the circumstances of each case."     State v. Barrios,
    139 Hawai#i 321, 328, 
    389 P.3d 916
    , 923 (2016) (quoting Kong I,
    131 Hawai#i at 101, 315 P.3d at 727 (quoting State v. Akana, 
    10 Haw. App. 381
    , 386, 
    876 P.2d 1331
    , 1334 (1994))).      Thus,
    "'[a]bsent clear evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a
    sentencing court will have considered all factors before imposing
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    concurrent or consecutive terms of imprisonment under HRS
    § 706–606.'"    Id. at 333, 
    389 P.3d 928
     (quoting Kong I, 131
    Hawai#i at 102, 315 P.3d at 728 (quoting Hussein, 122 Hawai#i at
    503, 229 P.3d at 321)).
    In State v. Kahapea, the supreme court considered,
    inter alia, whether the trial court abused its discretion in
    denying a defendant's HRPP Rule 35 motion where the defendant's
    sentence to consecutive terms of imprisonment for theft of public
    funds was significantly greater than the sentences of the
    defendant's co-conspirators and sentences imposed on defendants
    in other cases involving the theft of public funds.            111 Hawai#i
    267, 
    141 P.3d 440
    .      In relevant part, Kahapea argued that his
    sentence of, inter alia, five ten-year terms of imprisonment to
    run consecutively violated HRS § 706-606(4) on the grounds that
    other allegedly similarly-situated defendants received concurrent
    sentencing.    Id. at 280-82, 
    141 P.3d at 453-55
    .11
    On appeal, the supreme court examined whether the
    circuit court correctly concluded that Kahapea's sentence was
    "ultimately mandated," and examined the circuit court's denial of
    Kahapea's HRPP Rule 35 motion in light of the "statutory
    penological goals of retribution, incapacitation, and
    deterrence[.]"     Id. at 281-82, 
    141 P.3d at 454-55
    .         While the
    11
    As set forth above, HRS § 706-606(4) requires a court to
    consider: "The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
    defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
    conduct."
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    circuit court had distinguished the sentences of other allegedly
    similarly-situated defendants put forward in Kahapea's HRPP Rule
    35 motion, the supreme court's analysis focused on the gravity of
    Kahapea's crimes and whether "the punishment fit the crimes, as
    well as the needs of the individual defendant and the community."
    Id. at 281, 
    141 P.3d at 454
     (brackets, citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted).    The supreme court noted that "even a
    disparity among defendants' sentences does not establish that any
    particular defendant's sentence is excessive", and concluded that
    "the circuit court reasonably placed greater significance" on the
    damage caused by Kahapea's actions.     
    Id.
     (brackets, citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).     In so doing, the supreme
    court appeared to give credence to the prosecution's argument,
    which the court quoted in its opinion, that "Kahapea's reference
    to the sentences of other defendants merely illustrates a
    different sentencing court's discretion and does not demonstrate
    that the court that sentenced him abused its discretion in
    imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment."     
    Id.
       The supreme
    court concluded that "[w]hile stern, the circuit court's sentence
    furthers the statutory penological goals . . . and does not
    reflect arbitrary or capricious action or a rigid refusal to
    consider the defendant's contentions", and therefore that the
    denial of Kahapea's HRPP Rule 35 motion was not a plain and
    manifest abuse of discretion.    Id. at 282, 
    141 P.3d at 455
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    The supreme court's interpretation of HRS § 706-606
    accords with the statute's legislative history.     As part of a
    "comprehensive review of the entire penal code" conducted in
    response to growing public concern with crime in the early 1980s,
    the Hawai#i Legislature endorsed a fundamental philosophical
    departure from the then-existing "approach of sentencing which
    emphasize[d] rehabilitation toward achieving the goal of just
    punishment."   Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 51-86, in 1986 Senate Journal,
    at 747,748, 1986 House Journal, at 937, 938.     Although the
    legislative overhaul called for restraint in "judicial discretion
    in the initial decision to imprison", it "allow[ed] for
    discretion in the term of imprisonment."     Stand. Comm. Rep. No.
    487, in 1985 House Journal, at 1216.    With specific reference to
    HRS § 706-606, the supreme court subsequently characterized the
    reforms as reflecting an "overriding aspiration 'to afford
    deterrence and to provide just punishment.'"     Gaylord, 78 Hawai#i
    at 149-50, 
    890 P.2d at
    1189-90 (citing Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 51-
    86, in 1986 Senate Journal, at 748, 1986 House Journal, at 938).
    Considered alongside the plain text of the statute, this
    understanding supports the conclusion that courts applying HRS
    § 706-606 are fundamentally charged with ensuring that the
    "punishment fit the crimes" under the "penological goals"
    established by the Legislature.    Kahapea, 111 Hawai#i at 281-282,
    
    141 P.3d at 454-55
    .
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Here, Cattaneo's sentence was imposed in part to
    reflect the grave consequences of his actions.         At the original
    sentencing hearing on December 4, 2015, the Circuit Court
    articulated in great detail its reasons for ordering the sentence
    it did and set forth its purpose of imposing "just punishment."
    The court considered each of the HRS § 706-606 factors in turn
    and noted, among other things, that Cattaneo's offense was "of
    the most serious nature, the taking of one's life."          Echoing the
    "penological goals of retribution, incapacitation, and
    deterrence" articulated in Kahapea, 111 Hawai#i at 282, 
    141 P.3d at 455
    , the Circuit Court explained that Cattaneo's sentence was
    aimed at "promoting respect for the law", "affording adequate
    deterrence . . . not just to the defendant, but to those who
    would think like this or like him", and "protecting the public
    from further crimes of this defendant[.]"        Regarding HRS § 706-
    606(4), the court expressly considered "the need to avoid
    unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants who have been
    found guilty of similar conduct" and stated that, although it
    "[did] not know of the sentences imposed in other courtrooms", it
    knew "what this Court sentences in these types of offenses."
    The Circuit Court thus concluded, inter alia:
    [T]he focus is on how do we change you [(Cattaneo)]? What
    must the Court do to change you or people who think like you
    or people who act like you? How do I stop them and you from
    doing this again?
    . . . .
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    So what I can do is separate you from society long
    enough for you to gain this insight that you started on and
    also prevent this from happening to others? [sic]
    The time for lessons has passed. This isn't a
    teaching moment, in my mind. This is a moment for
    punishment.
    At the June 27, 2019 hearing on the Motion to Reduce
    Sentence, the Circuit Court "recall[ed] all of the factors that
    were taken into account" in Cattaneo's original sentencing.               The
    court stated that it considered all of Cattaneo's moving papers,
    that the input of the defense was a significant factor in its
    deliberation, that it was "not a simple decision" to deny the
    Motion to Reduce Sentence, and that the court pondered the
    decision, and denied the motion after "much thought."            The
    Circuit Court also grappled with the needs of the community and
    discussed the worsening number of fatalities occurring on the
    roads.   See Kahapea, 111 Hawai#i at 281, 
    141 P.3d at 454
     (noting
    the sentencing court's discretion to make the punishment fit the
    needs of the community).      In conclusion, the Circuit Court
    maintained its central purpose of securing just punishment,
    stating, inter alia:
    There has been no change in circumstance in this case,
    except for the passage of time and the improvement of the
    defendant[.]
    . . . .
    I sent him to be punished. I sent him to think greatly
    about the life he took and the impact it had on those who
    remain.
    . . . .
    This sentence was made to reflect the very, very
    serious consequence that occurred. . . . But it's also a
    deterrent to every other person out there.
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    Cattaneo argues that the Circuit Court neglected to
    consider HRS § 706-606(4), the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
    disparities among similarly-situated defendants, pointing to a
    series of statements made by the court at the June 27, 2019
    hearing on the Motion to Reduce Sentence.     The Circuit Court
    stated that "it's not the Court's practice to review cases that
    are issued by other Courts, whether in this circuit or others."
    The court went on to say that it "think[s] it would be dangerous
    to start deciding cases on how someone else decided a case
    without knowing every single detail about that case", and that
    the court "[does not] look at the other cases one way or the
    other to give somebody a harsher sentence or lighter sentence
    because . . . it's not fair to a person to do that.      [The court]
    thinks every single case should stand on its own."      Cattaneo
    contends that these statements rebut the presumption that the
    sentencing court considered HRS § 706-606(4).     Reviewing the
    record as a whole, we find these contentions to be unpersuasive.
    The Circuit Court's statements were made in direct
    reference to Cattaneo's "argument and moving papers," following
    the court's express recognition of "the portion of the doctrine
    that has to deal with other cases" -- which Cattaneo acknowledges
    is a reference to HRS § 706-606(4) -- and in fact demonstrate
    that the court "considered" HRS § 706-606(4).     The Circuit Court
    made further reference to the disparate sentencing argument and
    stated:
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    I happen to know that every case is nuanced, every case has
    something that may not be obvious to someone.
    I get it all the time, and I hear it sometimes in
    letters where someone says, well, how come this guy stole a
    car and he got a year and the other guy assaulted somebody
    and he got 30 days and, you know, sometimes even from the
    same Court.
    The court explained its ultimate determination on the
    Motion to Reduce Sentence, including:
    I don't know about any other Court, but I personally
    try my best to factor in every single element that I think
    is important. And some cases can have 50 things that you
    should consider, and some have five. I don't know what other
    judges do in deciding their ultimate decision.
    This Court takes very seriously its sentencing. And I
    try to give it a lot of thought because I know how much it's
    impacting that person, whether it's one day or I sentence
    them to the rest of their life in prison. I think that's a
    heavy, heavy decision to make, and not one to be taken
    lightly.
    So I do factor in the argument of the prosecutor, the
    argument of the defense, the recommendation from probation.
    Obviously, the input from the victims and the input from the
    defendant. They're all significant factors.
    I did exactly that in this case with Mr. Cattaneo.
    The record on appeal demonstrates that the Circuit
    Court considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
    disparities pursuant to HRS § 706-606(4) and rejected the
    argument that Cattaneo's sentence presented an unwarranted
    sentence disparity.    The court, in confronting whether to
    exercise its discretion to reduce Cattaneo's sentence, took
    considerable pains to explain why Cattaneo's sentence was
    "ultimately mandated" in light of the "statutory penological
    goals" and purpose of "just punishment" despite Cattaneo's
    argument that his consecutive sentences presented an unwarranted
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    disparity.    See Kahapea, 111 Hawai#i at 281-82, 
    141 P.3d at
    454-
    55.
    In the written FOFs/COLs & Order, as well, the Circuit
    Court expressly recognized its obligation to consider the factors
    set forth in HRS § 706-606.       The Circuit Court concluded that
    Cattaneo's original sentence reflected the court's consideration
    of the HRS § 706-606 factors, that the sentence also specifically
    served the purposes of punishment and deterrence, and that
    because there were no significant changes of circumstance, the
    court concluded that there was no reason to change or reduce
    Cattaneo's sentence.
    Reviewing the July 19, 2019 Order Denying Motion to
    Reduce Sentence and the April 24, 2020 FOFs/COLs & Order, as well
    as the entire record of these proceedings, we reject Cattaneo's
    argument that the Circuit Court did not sufficiently consider HRS
    § 706-606(4) in denying the Motion to Reduce Sentence.12
    For these reasons, we conclude that the Circuit Court
    did not fail to sufficiently consider facts and arguments
    concerning the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities
    as required by HRS § 706-606(4).
    12
    Although the court did not expressly distinguish the two
    "Comparable Cases" cited by Cattaneo in the Motion to Reduce Sentence, the
    record shows that the court carefully considered the arguments at both the
    original sentencing hearing and the hearing on the Motion to Reduce Sentence
    regarding the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities and deliberated
    the "nuanced" circumstances of this case. See Gaylord, 78 Hawai #i at 144, 
    890 P.2d at 1184
     ("each case in which abuse is claimed must be adjudged according
    to its own peculiar circumstances"); Kahapea, 111 Hawai #i at 281, 
    141 P.3d at 454
     ("[A] disparity among defendants' sentences does not establish that any
    particular defendant's sentence is excessive") (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
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    B.    The Consecutive Sentences
    Cattaneo argues that the Circuit Court failed to state
    a sufficient basis for "re-imposing" consecutive sentences upon
    "resentencing."   In doing so, Cattaneo improperly conflates what
    happened in this case – the court rejected Cattaneo's request to
    reduce his sentence – with something that did not happen here – a
    resentencing of Cattaneo.    The Circuit Court was not required to
    "resentence" Cattaneo upon the denial of the HRPP Rule 35 motion
    and expressly declined to do so.
    We nevertheless note that HRS § 706-668.5 vests the
    trial court with discretion to prescribe consecutive sentences
    where "multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a
    defendant."   See HRS § 706-668.5(1).   HRS § 706-668.5(2) provides
    that "[t]he court, in determining whether the terms imposed are
    to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall
    consider the factors set forth in section 706-606."      Interpreting
    HRS §§ 706-606 and 706-668.5(2), the supreme court has held that
    "circuit courts must state on the record at the time of
    sentencing the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence."
    Kong I, 131 Hawai#i at 102, 315 P.3d at 728 (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
    As discussed above, at the original sentencing hearing,
    the Circuit Court went point-by-point through the HRS § 706-606
    factors.   At the hearing on Cattaneo's Motion to Reduce Sentence,
    the court recalled "all of the factors that were taken into
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    account" in its original sentence, considered Cattaneo's moving
    papers and the arguments set forth therein, and found "no change
    in circumstance in this case, except for the passage of time and
    the improvement of the defendant[.]"    Upon conclusion of the
    arguments and hearing a statement from Cattaneo, the Circuit
    Court reiterated the essence of its rationale for maintaining
    Cattaneo's sentence as it did.    The court's reasons are further
    stated in the FOFs/COLs & Order.
    We conclude that Cattaneo's second point of error is
    without merit.
    C.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Cattaneo argues that he received ineffective assistance
    of counsel at the hearing on his Motion to Reduce Sentence,
    contending that his then-counsel was ineffective because he
    failed to:   (1) "properly support the argument regarding the
    Comparable Cases because he did not have the court records as
    evidence;" (2) realize that the Circuit Court was "mistake[n] in
    flatly refusing to consider [] HRS §706-606(4)" and "failing to
    object" when such a mistake "should have been readily apparent;"
    and (3) "argue that the Court did not provide a sufficient basis
    for imposing consecutive sentences."    These arguments are without
    merit.
    When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel, we look to whether defense counsel's assistance was
    within the "range of competence expected of criminal lawyers."
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Hussein, 122 Hawai#i at 511, 229 P.3d at 329.     To prevail on his
    claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Cattaneo has the
    burden of establishing (1) "specific errors or omissions of
    defense counsel reflecting counsel's lack of skill, judgment, or
    diligence" and (2) "that these errors or omissions resulted in
    either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially
    meritorious defense."    Id. at 510, 229 P.3d at 328.
    In Hussein, the supreme court considered an ineffective
    assistance claim arising out of defense counsel's allegedly
    "meager pre-sentence preparation and argument."     122 Hawai#i at
    510-11, 229 P.3d at 328-329.    In particular, the defendant
    claimed "that her counsel was ineffective for failing to cite
    certain mitigating factors in a written sentencing memorandum" to
    the sentencing court.    Id. at 510, 229 P.3d at 328.    The supreme
    court concluded that the defendant was not denied effective
    assistance "inasmuch as all of the factors alleged by [the
    defendant] were presented to the [sentencing] court for
    consideration."   Id. at 511, 229 P.3d at 329.    Notably, although
    this court had noted that "counsel did not file a written
    sentencing memorandum and [defendant] now submits that counsel
    could have better argued the mitigating circumstances," the
    supreme court looked at the fact that the judge stated at the
    defendant's sentencing hearing that "[t]he court has reviewed the
    [presentence report]",    which this court had determined
    "referenced the . . . issues raised by [the defendant] on this
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    appeal."    Id. (italics in original).       The supreme court thus
    agreed with this court's conclusion that the defendant was not
    provided ineffective assistance of counsel, as the sentencing
    court "was made aware of the mitigating factors cited by
    [defendant], either through the [presentence report] or in open
    court."    Id.
    Cattaneo similarly contends that his prior counsel,
    Matthew Kohm, was ineffective because Kohm "failed to effectively
    create a record of the facts in the [Comparable Cases] because
    [Kohm] did not present the [Comparable Cases'] court records as
    evidence."    However, the Motion to Reduce Sentence, submitted to
    the court by Kohm on behalf of Cattaneo, contains a multiple-
    paragraphs-long section entitled "Other Cases", describing the
    facts of the convictions and sentencing in these Comparable
    Cases13 in support for the argument that "a concurrent sentence
    would be more appropriate and in line with sentencing defendants
    convicted of Negligent Homicide in the First Degree."              As
    Cattaneo himself states in his Opening Brief, "[t]he Motion to
    Reduce Sentence provided detailed information regarding the facts
    and circumstances of the Comparable Cases."
    13
    The two circuit court cases pointed to by Cattaneo are docketed in
    JIMS as State v. Shine, 2PC141000708, and State v. Duran, 2PC151000134. In
    his Opening Brief, Cattaneo requests this court take judicial notice of the
    eCourt Kôkua records of those cases pursuant to Hawai #i Rules of Evidence
    (HRE) Rule 201(b).   Although "[j]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of
    the proceeding", HRE 201(f), Cattaneo does not point to any specific
    adjudicative fact or facts of which we are to notice. We therefore decline to
    take judicial notice of those proceedings beyond what was presented to the
    Circuit Court.
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    In addition to presenting the Comparable Cases argument
    in the written motion, Kohm raised the issue, albeit briefly, at
    the hearing on the Motion to Reduce Sentence, stating "I know
    this Court is very aware of the different sentences that go on in
    this Court and other Courts."    Shortly thereafter, the court
    stated that it had "read all of [Cattaneo's] moving papers",
    later thanking Kohm for his "excellent argument and moving
    papers" and proceeded to discuss "the portion of the doctrine
    that has to do with other cases in this jurisdiction[.]"      The
    court did not reject Cattaneo's Comparable Cases argument for
    lack of detail or evidence.    Indeed, the court stated it
    considered "the argument of the defense" as a "significant
    factor" in its decision-making, and the court's Order Denying the
    Motion to Reduce Sentence reflects that it "considered the moving
    papers, submissions of parties and the argument submitted at the
    motion."
    Thus, we reject Cattaneo's claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel for alleged failure to supplement the
    argument by introducing the court records of Comparable Cases.
    Cattaneo also contends that his counsel was ineffective
    for failing to object to the Circuit Court's refusal to consider
    HRS § 706-606(4).   Cattaneo's counsel presented ample argument
    based on HRS §706-606(4) and adequately preserved the issue for
    appellate review.   We, therefore, fail to see any lack of
    competence emanating from a failure to object to the court's
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    explanation of the basis for his ruling.     Moreover, as discussed
    above, the Circuit Court fulfilled its obligation to consider the
    HRS § 706-606 factors, including HRS § 706-606(4).      We conclude
    that counsel's lack of objection did not constitute the
    "withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially
    meritorious defense."   Hussein, 122 Hawai#i at 510, 229 P.3d at
    328.
    Finally and relatedly, Cattaneo contends that his
    counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Circuit
    Court's "lack of rationale for its disproportionately long,
    consecutive sentences."   Again, as discussed herein, the Circuit
    Court's stated purposes of retribution, incapacitation, and
    deterrence -- based on the court's particular consideration of
    the "history and characteristics of the defendant," and of "the
    need for this sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
    offense," as articulated at length in the original sentencing and
    discussed at the hearing on the Motion to Reduce Sentence, as
    well as in the FOFs/COLs & Order -- satisfied the requirement
    that the court state on the record its reasons for imposing
    consecutive sentencing under HRS §§ 706-606 and 706-668.5.      See
    Kong I, 131 Hawai#i at 103, 315 P.3d at 729.     It therefore
    follows that Cattaneo's counsel's failure to object based on the
    court's "lack of rationale" cannot sustain a claim for
    ineffective assistance of counsel.
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    We therefore reject Cattaneo's contention that he was
    denied ineffective assistance of counsel on his Motion to Reduce
    Sentence.
    V.      CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, the Circuit Court's July 16, 2019
    Order Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence is affirmed.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 24, 2021.
    On the briefs:
    /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Pamela I. Lundquist,                      Chief Judge
    for Defendant-Appellant.
    /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Renee Ishikawa Delizo,                    Associate Judge
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
    County of Maui,                           /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.                   Associate Judge
    32