State v. Matsui ( 2022 )


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  •  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    24-MAR-2022
    07:58 AM
    Dkt. 47 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
    KEITH M. MATSUI, Defendant-Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    (CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By: Ginoza, C.J., and Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.)
    Defendant-Appellant Keith M. Matsui (Matsui) appeals
    from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying
    Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 3, and 4 (Order), entered
    on November 22, 2019, in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit
    (Circuit Court).1/
    On November 25, 2018, Matsui was issued two traffic
    citations, which were subsequently filed in the District Court of
    the Second Circuit, Wailuku Division (District Court): one for
    traffic crimes, Case No. 2DTC-18-005218 (Traffic Crime Case), and
    one for traffic infractions, Case No. 2DTI-18-019086 (Traffic
    Infraction Case).
    On December 24, 2018, in the Traffic Crime Case, Matsui
    was charged by Amended Complaint with: (1) Driving While License
    Suspended or Revoked, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes
    (HRS) § 286-132 (Count 1); (2) No Motor Vehicle Insurance, in
    1/
    The Honorable Richard T. Bissen, Jr. presided. On December 3,
    2019, the Circuit Court entered the Order Granting Motion for Leave to File
    Interlocutory Appeal, allowing Matsui to appeal from the Order, pursuant to
    HRS § 641-17 (2016).
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    violation of HRS § 431:10C-104(a); (3) Driving Without a License,
    in violation of HRS § 286-102 (Count 3); and (4) Operating a
    Vehicle After License and Privilege Have Been Suspended or
    Revoked for Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an
    Intoxicant, in violation of HRS § 291E-62(a)2/ (HRS § 291E-62(a)
    Offense or Count 4).     The Traffic Crime Case was later committed
    to the Circuit Court and became Case No. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX.
    Meanwhile, on December 26, 2018, in the Traffic
    Infraction Case, the District Court entered a default judgment
    against Matsui for several traffic infractions, including failing
    to have a valid driver's license in his immediate possession, in
    violation of HRS § 286-116(a)3/ (Driver's License Infraction).
    On October 31, 2019, in the Traffic Crime Case,
    Matsui filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 3, and 4 (Motion),
    arguing that the Driver's License Infraction was a lesser-
    included offense of those counts, such that the judgment against
    2/
    HRS § 291E-62(a) (Supp. 2017) provides:
    (a) No person whose license and privilege to operate a
    vehicle have been revoked, suspended, or otherwise
    restricted pursuant to this section or to part III or
    section 291E-61 or 291E-61.5, or to part VII or part XIV of
    chapter 286 or section 200-81, 291-4, 291-4.4, 291-4.5, or
    291-7 as those provisions were in effect on December 31,
    2001, shall operate or assume actual physical control of any
    vehicle:
    (1)    In violation of any restrictions placed on the
    person's license;
    (2)    While the person's license or privilege to
    operate a vehicle remains suspended or revoked;
    (3)    Without installing an ignition interlock device
    required by this chapter; or
    (4)    With an ignition interlock permit unless the
    person has the ignition interlock permit and a
    valid State of Hawaii identification card in the
    person's immediate possession.
    3/
    HRS § 286-116(a) (Supp. 2017) provides, in relevant part:
    (a) Every licensee shall have a valid driver's license
    in the licensee's immediate possession at all times . . .
    when operating a motor vehicle, and shall display the same
    upon demand of a police officer. Every police officer or
    law enforcement officer when stopping a vehicle or
    inspecting a vehicle for any reason shall demand that the
    driver or owner display the driver's or owner's driver's
    license and insurance identification card.
    2
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    Matsui for the Driver's License Infraction barred any conviction
    on those counts. The State opposed the Motion as to Count 4 and
    indicated that "it intend[ed] to dismiss Counts One and Three
    prior to trial, for other reasons." Following a hearing on
    November 12, 2019, the Circuit Court: (1) concluded that the
    Motion was moot as to Counts 1 and 3 based on the State's
    representation; and (2) denied the Motion. As relevant here, the
    court ruled that the Driver's License Infraction was not a
    lesser-included offense of the HRS § 291E-62(a) Offense.
    On appeal, Matsui raises a single point of error,
    contending that the Circuit Court erred in concluding that the
    Driver's License Infraction was not a lesser-included offense of
    the HRS § 291E-62(a) Offense.
    Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
    submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
    the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
    resolve Matsui's point of error as follows and affirm:
    HRS § 701-109(1)(a) (2014) states:
    (1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish
    an element of more than one offense, the defendant may be
    prosecuted for each offense of which such conduct is an
    element. The defendant may not, however, be convicted of
    more than one offense if:
    (a)   one offense is included in the other, as defined
    in subsection (4) of this section[.]
    In turn, HRS § 701-109(4) (Supp. 2018) states:
    (4) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
    included in an offense charged in the felony complaint,
    indictment, or information. An offense is so included when:
    (a)   It is established by proof of the same or less
    than all the facts required to establish the
    commission of the offense charged;
    (b)   It consists of an attempt to commit the offense
    charged or to commit an offense otherwise
    included therein; or
    (c)   It differs from the offense charged only in the
    respect that a less serious injury or risk of
    injury to the same person, property, or public
    interest or a different state of mind indicating
    lesser degree of culpability suffices to
    establish its commission.
    See State v. Alston, 
    75 Haw. 517
    , 532–33, 
    865 P.2d 157
    , 166
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    (1994) ("[A]n offense is a lesser included offense of another if
    it 'satisfies the requirements set forth in HRS § 701-109(4)
    which codifies the common law doctrine of lesser included
    offenses.'" (original brackets omitted) (quoting State v.
    Burdett, 
    70 Haw. 85
    , 87, 
    762 P.2d 164
    , 165 (1988))).
    Whether an offense is a lesser-included offense under
    HRS § 701–109(4) is a question of law reviewed de novo under the
    right/wrong standard. See State v. Rumbawa, 94 Hawai#i 513, 516,
    
    17 P.3d 862
    , 865 (App. 2001) (citing State v. Friedman, 93
    Hawai#i 63, 68, 
    996 P.2d 268
    , 273 (2000)).
    In State v. Kalua, 144 Hawai#i 7, 
    434 P.3d 1202
     (2019),
    the Hawai#i Supreme Court ruled that judgment on a civil speeding
    infraction constituted a "conviction" for purposes of HRS
    § 701-109(1)(a) and (4). Id. at 16, 434 P.3d at 1211 (citing HRS
    § 701-107(5)). As a result, the statutory protections of HRS
    § 701-109(1)(a) and (4) apply where a defendant faces conviction
    of both a civil traffic infraction and a criminal offense, if the
    civil infraction (1) pertains to the same conduct as the criminal
    offense, and (2) is a lesser-included offense of the criminal
    offense. See id. at 16-17, 434 P.3d at 1211-12.
    Here, there has been no trial to determine whether the
    Driver's License Infraction and the HRS § 291E-62(a) Offense
    pertain to the same conduct. See id. at 17, 434 P.3d at 1212
    (remanding for trial to determine whether the speeding and
    excessive speeding offenses involved the same conduct rather than
    separate criminal acts). However, the State stipulated below,
    for purposes of the Motion, "that one aspect of [Matsui's]
    conduct in this case - specifically, operation of a vehicle on
    November 25, 2018 - would establish a single element of the [HRS
    § 291E-62(a) O]ffense in Count Four, as well as [the Driver's
    License Infraction]." In addition, Matsui relied solely on
    subsection (4)(a) of HRS § 701-109 as his basis for dismissal of
    Count 4. Thus, the only issue we consider in this interlocutory
    appeal is whether, under HRS § 701-109(4)(a), the Driver's
    License Infraction is a lesser-included offense of the HRS
    § 291E-62(a) Offense.
    4
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    "The general rule is that 'an offense is included if it
    is impossible to commit the greater without also committing the
    lesser.'" State v. Manuel, 148 Hawai#i 434, 440, 
    477 P.3d 874
    ,
    880 (2020) (brackets omitted) (quoting Friedman, 93 Hawai#i at
    72, 
    996 P.2d at 277
    ). "Additionally, in applying HRS
    § 701-109(4)(a), . . . 'several factors may be considered in
    determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of
    another: (1) the degree of culpability; (2) the legislative
    statutory scheme; and (3) the end result.'" Id. (quoting
    Friedman, 93 Hawai#i at 72, 
    996 P.2d at
    277 (citing Alston, 75
    Haw. at 533, 
    865 P.2d at 166
    )); see id. at 441, 477 P.3d at 881
    (referring to these three factors as the "Alston factors").
    Here, it is possible for a person to commit the HRS
    § 291E-62(a) Offense without also committing the Driver's License
    Infraction. For example, under HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) (Supp. 2018),
    a person convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence of
    an intoxicant (OVUII) could be sentenced for the first offense
    to, among other things, a one-year revocation of the person's
    license to operate a vehicle, and installation during the
    revocation period of an ignition interlock device on all vehicles
    operated by the person. However, under HRS § 291E-61(d), if
    certain conditions are met, and subject to specified
    restrictions, "the court may issue a separate permit authorizing
    a defendant to operate a vehicle owned by the defendant's
    employer during the period of revocation without installation of
    an ignition interlock device . . . ." See also HRS § 291E-
    44.5(c) (Supp. 2018) (authorizing the director4/ to issue the same
    type of permit). Further, under HRS § 291E-61(i), if certain
    conditions are met, "the court shall issue an ignition interlock
    permit that will allow the defendant to drive a vehicle equipped
    with an ignition interlock device during the revocation period."
    See also HRS § 291E-44.5(a) (authorizing the director to issue an
    ignition interlock permit). It appears that such permits are
    4/
    "'Director' means the administrative director of the courts or any
    other person within the judiciary appointed by the director to conduct
    administrative reviews or hearings or carry out other functions relating to
    administrative revocation under part III." HRS § 291E-1 (2007).
    5
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    considered a type of "license" for purposes of HRS chapter 291E.
    See HRS § 291E-1 (defining "License" to include "any driver's
    license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle
    issued under, or granted by, the laws of this State . . . .");
    see also HRS § 291E-41(a) ("Except as provided in section 291E-
    44.5, no license and privilege to operate a vehicle shall be
    restored under any circumstances during the administrative
    revocation period." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, HRS § 291E-
    62(a) allows a person convicted of OVUII whose driver's license
    has been revoked and who has been issued a permit pursuant to HRS
    § 291E-61 to legally drive a vehicle, as long as the person
    complies with certain conditions (e.g., installing an ignition
    interlock device in their vehicle or driving their employer's
    vehicle under specified restrictions). See also HRS § 286-132
    (2007) ("Except as provided in section 291E-62, no resident or
    nonresident whose driver's license, right, or privilege to
    operate a motor vehicle in this State has been canceled,
    suspended, or revoked may drive any motor vehicle upon the
    highways of this State while the license, right, or privilege
    remains canceled, suspended, or revoked." (emphasis added)). As
    a result, a person having a valid permit in their immediate
    possession pursuant to HRS § 291E-62(a), and is not in violation
    of HRS § 286-116(a), could still commit an HRS § 291E-62(a)
    Offense if, for example, the person operates a vehicle that does
    not have a required ignition interlock device installed or
    operates a vehicle in violation of specified restrictions.
    Because it is possible for a person to commit the HRS
    § 291E-62(a) Offense without also committing the Driver's License
    Infraction, under HRS § 701-109(4)(a), the Driver's License
    Infraction is not a lesser included offense of the HRS § 291E-
    62(a) Offense.5/ The Circuit Court did not err in so ruling.
    Matsui also contends for the first time that: (1) the
    Driver's License Infraction is a lesser included offense of the
    HRS § 291E-62(a) Offense pursuant to HRS § 701-109(4)(c); and (2)
    public policy considerations support dismissal of Count 4.
    5/
    In light of our conclusion, we need not address the three Alston
    factors.
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    Neither argument was raised below in connection with the Motion.
    "Generally, the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial
    level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal."
    State v. Hoglund, 
    71 Haw. 147
    , 150, 
    785 P.2d 1311
    , 1313 (1990)
    (citing State v. Cummings, 
    49 Haw. 522
    , 526-27, 
    423 P.2d 438
    , 442
    (1967)). This general rule appears to be particularly applicable
    here, where we review an interlocutory order denying a motion to
    dismiss, and not a final judgment. Accordingly, in this
    interlocutory appeal, this court will not consider the new
    arguments raised by Matsui as a basis for dismissal of Count 4.
    For the reasons discussed above, the Findings of Fact,
    Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
    Dismiss Counts 1, 3, and 4, entered on November 22, 2019, in the
    Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, is affirmed.
    DATED:   Honolulu, Hawai#i, March 24, 2022.
    On the briefs:
    /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Bradley J. Sova,                      Chief Judge
    Deputy Public Defender,
    for Defendant-Appellant.
    /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    Richard B. Rost,                      Associate Judge
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
    County of Maui,
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.               /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    Associate Judge
    7