Dillard v. State , 101 Idaho 917 ( 1981 )

DONALDSON, Justice.

The state alleged in a petition that appellant Dillard, a 17V2 year old minor, committed the murder of Ruth Madsen, an elderly woman, in her trailer home located at the Marsing Job Corps Center near Marsing, Idaho. On March 22, 1978, the deceased’s body was found in her trailer with three knife slash wounds of the neck, and multiple stab wounds on her lower neck and chest. The curtains in the trailer had been partially burned in an apparent attempt to cover up the murder.

After an investigation, an Owyhee County Deputy Sheriff filed a petition alleging that Dillard committed the first degree murder of Ruth Madsen on or about March 21, 1978. On March 30, 1978, the prosecuting attorney of Owyhee County, State of Idaho, filed a motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction under I.C. § 16-1806 so that Dillard could be charged with, and tried for, the offense of first degree murder as an adult. The waiver decision determined whether Dillard, if found guilty at a subsequent proceeding, would be under juvenile protection services until he reaches majority, or would be subject to death or life imprisonment as an adult.¹ After a two-day evidentiary hearing,. the magistrate made the following findings:

1. that Dillard is an immature, streetwise juvenile from an unstable home and has a sociopathic personality that is generally treatable;

2. that he is not a disruptive, hardened, or embittered juvenile;

3. that although Idaho has no adequate facilities itself, it has contracted with California making an appropriate juvenile rehabilitation program available for treatment of Dillard;

4. that Dillard has little experience with juvenile rehabilitation or correction programs;

5. that Dillard’s substantiated prior offenses are burglaries at age 12, 15, and 16;

6. that the likelihood appears as good for Dillard as it would for most any other juvenile that he could be rehabilitated by available programs; and

7. that the offense alleged to have been committed by Dillard appears to have been committed unquestionably in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner.

The magistrate described his weighing of the involved factors by stating that:

“[EJven though the Court finds the offense charged is of a very serious nature, that the juvenile does have some serious prior record, that this is outweighed by the fact that juvenile programs and processes are available, if not in Idaho, available through contract through states such as California, that he is likely to be amenable as any other child of comparable age, personality, and background, that such have not been exhausted, and it is the intent of the Legislature that before a juvenile be treated as an adult, that it be shown that there would be no purpose Or benefit from further efforts in the juvenile process or programs.”

The denial of the motion to waive jurisdiction was appealed by the State to the district court.

The district court reviewed and reversed the magistrate’s decision using the standards of review established by I.R.C.P. 83(u); Koester v. Koester, 99 Idaho 654, 586 P.2d 1370 (1978), and In the Matter of Matthews, 97 Idaho 99, 540 P.2d 284 (1975). The district court citing Koester, supra, permitted additional evidence to be entered pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) as to the lack of facilities available for Dillard’s treatment and made its own findings as to such evidence. The district court explained that:

“Here as in Koester, the evidence offered by the state reflects a ‘material change of circumstances that had occurred since the appeal’ was filed. The state has offered, and this Court has admitted an affidavit of John Shuler, identified as the person who administers the [Idaho] program for placement and supervision of delinquent youths in other states, which relates that on March 5, 1979, he received a letter, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit, from the California Youth Authority stating that ‘due to population pressures, it is necessary to terminate the agreement entered into on July 1, 1978, between the State of Idaho and the Department of Youth Authority.’ That letter further advised that it constituted the thirty day notice of termination provided for in the contract, that no additional referrals would be accepted after the thirty day period, and that it might become necessary to return to Idaho any persons already placed in the California facilities. Shuler’s affidavit further states that on March 7,1979, he talked by telephone with the California official who approves placement of youth in California facilities, and that said official advised Shuler that no other persons from Idaho would be accepted after April 1, 1979. Finally, the affidavit affirms that Idaho has no placement contracts with any states other than California.”

After considering the additional evidence, the district court found that there were no facilities available to the court which would be adequate to provide any likelihood of rehabilitation of Dillard by his age of majority. In reversing the magistrate’s decision, the district court pointed out that it did not prejudge Dillard’s innocence or guilt. On appeal, Dillard raises issues regarding the standard of review in appeals from the magistrate court to the district court.

This Court has held that a district court reviewing a decision of a magistrate may review the case on the record as an appellate court, remand the case for a new trial with instructions, or try the case de novo. In the Matter of Matthews, supra.

I.R.C.P. 83(u)(1) provides:

“The scope of appellate review on an appeal to the district court shall be as follows:

(1) Upon an appeal from the magistrate’s division of the district court, not involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court .... [Amended January 8, 1976, effective March 1, 1976.]”

In Hawkins v. Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P.2d 532 (1978), we read this rule as stating that a district court should perform the appellate review of a magistrate’s decision in the same manner as this Court performs its appellate review of the trial decision of a district court. Furthermore, I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) empowers the district court in an appellate review to hear additional evidence on one or more issues. In Koester, supra, this Court held:

“[T]hat where the district court choses to handle an appeal as an appellate review and then elects to hear additional evidence on one or more issues, these issues affected by the additional evidence shall be treated as if involving a trial de novo. In other words, to the extent that the new evidence affects the decision of the magistrate, the district court shall act as a trial court. Where the additional evidence admitted by the district court does not affect the determination of the magistrate, the district court shall act as an appellate court.

“On further áppeal to this court from the determination of the district court where additional evidence is presented pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2), the new matters affecting the magistrate’s determination will be scrutinized by this court according to the same standard of review as other appeals from the district court. However, where the district court’s review of the magistrate’s determination is not affected by the new matters presented to the district court, our review of the district court will be as though the district court was an intermediate appellate court.” Id. 99 Idaho at 656-57, 586 P.2d at 1372-73.

I.C. § 16-1806(8)² as added by 1977 Idaho Session Laws ch. 165, § 2, p. 427, and hence applicable, sets forth the factors on which the magistrate must base his decision about the petition for waiver of jurisdiction. This Court has recognized in State v. Christensen, 100 Idaho 631, 603 P.2d 586 (1979) that 1.C. § 16-1806(8)(g) makes the amount of weight to be given each factor discretionary with the juvenile court and allows the waiver decision to be based on any one or a combination of the factors set forth in I.C. § 16-1806(8).

In the case at bar, the district court chose to review the decision of the magistrate as an appellate court and then elected to hear additional evidence regarding the availability of juvenile rehabilitation programs. Based on the additional evidence, the district court found that an adequate juvenile rehabilitation program was no longer available for Dillard. We find substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s de novo finding regarding the additional evidence.

The magistrate stated that the availability of an adequate juvenile rehabilitation program was a factor on which he relied in weighing the factors to make his decision. Since the additional evidence affected the weighing process, it was appropriate for the district court to' weigh de novo the factors considered by the magistrate along with the factor on which additional evidence had been admitted. In doing so, it was discretionary with the district court to base its decision on any one or a combination of these factors pursuant to I.C. § 16-1806(8). In accordance with Koester, supra, the district court was required to accept those findings of the magistrate which were unaffected by the additional evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court.

' BAKES, C. J., and McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.

1 . This Court’s decision now determines whether Dillard, if found guilty at a subsequent proceeding, will be under juvenile protection services for less than a year, or will be subject to death or life imprisonment as an adult.

2 . “(8) In considering whether or not to waive juvenile court jurisdiction over the child, the juvenile court shall consider the following factors:

(a)The seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires isolation of the child beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;

(b) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;

(c) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons;

(d) The maturity of the child as determined by considerations of his home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;

(e) The child’s record and previous history of contacts with the juvenile justice system;

(f) The likelihood of rehabilitation of the child by use of facilities available to the court;

(g) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in subsection (8) of this section is discretionary with the court, and a determination that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law may be based on any one or a combination of the factors set forth above, which shall be recited in the order of waiver.”