State v. Campbell ( 2021 )


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  •                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 47037
    STATE OF IDAHO,                                       )
    )
    Plaintiff-Respondent,                            )        Boise, December 2020 Term
    )
    v.
    )        Opinion filed: February 10, 2021
    CARLI JOANN CAMPBELL,
    )
    )        Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
    Defendant-Appellant.                             )
    Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
    Kootenai County. Lansing L. Haynes, Senior District Judge.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    Eric Don Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant.
    Ben McGreevy argued.
    Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Justin
    Porter argued.
    _______________________________________________
    MOELLER, Justice
    This case asks us to determine whether the district court properly instructed the jury on
    the elements of accessory to a felony. The State charged Carli Campbell as an accessory to a
    felony under Idaho Code section 18-205(1) for withholding or concealing information from
    police officers about an aggravated battery and burglary that occurred in her home on December
    24, 2017. After the evidentiary phase of the trial was completed, Campbell requested that the
    district court instruct the jury that the State was required to prove that the alleged assailant,
    Michael Cross, committed the aggravated battery or burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. The
    State opposed this request and the district court agreed, concluding that while the State was
    required to prove Campbell had knowledge of the conduct that constituted an aggravated battery
    or a burglary, it was not was required to prove Cross committed the aggravated battery or
    burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Campbell
    guilty. Campbell now appeals her conviction to this Court. We affirm.
    1
    II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Daniel Renaud and Carli Campbell have known each other for about fifteen years.
    Sometime after Campbell’s husband was incarcerated, their relationship had become romantic.1
    On December 23, 2017, Campbell and her female friend met Renaud at a bowling alley around
    10:00 p.m. About an hour later, Renaud, Campbell, and her friend took an Uber back to
    Campbell’s house, near Hayden, Idaho. Renaud left his vehicle at the bowling alley because he
    had been drinking. Once back at Campbell’s house, the three of them played cards and drank
    alcohol. Later, after Campbell and Renaud had engaged in sexual intercourse in her bedroom,
    Campbell became angry when she saw Renaud cuddling on the couch with her friend. Renaud
    suggested that he, Campbell, and her friend engage in a “threesome.” Campbell was incensed
    and demanded that Renaud leave. He refused, claiming he was too drunk, it was 2:30 a.m., and
    his vehicle was parked at the bowling alley. Campbell went outside with her phone for about five
    minutes, and then returned and told Renaud that he would get his “ass kicked” if he did not
    leave. Campbell told him, “If I was [sic] you, I would leave.” Renaud said he would be staying,
    and then closed his eyes and fell asleep on the couch.
    Shortly thereafter, Renaud opened his eyes and saw Matthew Cross coming through the
    front door and rushing at him. He recognized Cross because Renaud had met him on two prior
    occasions. He testified that Cross pointed at Renaud and then “bull rushed” him. Cross punched
    and kicked Renaud, until he became unconscious.
    Campbell called 911 and requested an ambulance. She told the operator, “there was like a
    dispute over a girl and someone got punched.” Kootenai County Sheriff’s Deputy Brock
    responded to a report of an unconscious male at Campbell’s house around 3:13 a.m. on
    December 24, 2017. When Deputy Brock arrived, Campbell met him and directed him to the
    kitchen, where he observed a male, later identified as Renaud, propped up by Campbell’s friend.
    Renaud was lethargic, mumbling, his eyes were rolling around, and he had blood on his face.
    Deputy Brock attempted to question Renaud but Renaud was largely incoherent.
    Campbell told Deputy Brock that an unknown individual entered her home without
    permission, beat Renaud until he was unconscious, and then left. She stated that she had not seen
    anything or anybody because she was in another room sleeping when it happened. Later, Deputy
    1
    Carli Campbell is married to Cody Campbell, who was incarcerated at the Kootenai County Jail during the time
    relevant to this case.
    2
    Brock overheard Campbell tell medical personnel that Renaud had been kicked and punched.
    Because Campbell had told Deputy Brock that she did not see anything, Deputy Brock
    questioned her again. Campbell then told Deputy Brock, “I didn’t see what happened. I just
    know that I saw the kick.” Campbell also told another officer she saw “a person” but she could
    not describe their race or gender. Yet, a short time later, Campbell told a different officer that
    “he” had walked in and punched and kicked Renaud and then walked out—specifically using
    male pronouns in her statement. Officers expressed skepticism about Campbell’s story and
    concern over her apparent indifference to the crime, explaining that she would be charged if they
    found out she was lying, Yet, Campbell continuously denied any knowledge of the incident,
    insisting that an unknown person randomly came into her house and knocked out Renaud, even
    though she initially told the 911 operator that “there was like a dispute over a girl.”
    Upon regaining full consciousness at the hospital, Renaud identified Cross as his attacker
    to police officers. Doctors determined that Renaud had a broken jaw and a fractured sinus that
    required surgery. Afterwards, doctors wired his jaw shut for five weeks. Renaud’s recovery was
    difficult – he lost twenty pounds because he could not eat solid food, he endured serious pain, he
    could not work, and he could barely communicate. The metal plates used to hold his jaw in place
    became infected, so Renaud had to undergo a second surgery to remove and replace those. The
    shape of Renaud’s jaw has been permanently altered as a result of the incident.
    Deputy Brock and other deputies were unsuccessful in their attempts to arrest Cross until
    about two weeks after the incident. Deputy Brock confiscated two cell phones from Cross. Law
    enforcement then obtained search warrants for Cross’ two cell phones and Campbell’s cell phone
    and extracted data from all three cell phones. Detective Kelso also obtained a search warrant for
    records from Cross’ cell phone provider. Data from these records showed when the phone had
    been used and which cell phone towers it was near during use, thereby giving a rough physical
    location of where the caller was when the calls were placed and the text messages sent. Detective
    Kelso examined the content of text messages between Cross and Campbell from the days
    surrounding the incident and opined that they were also engaged in a sexual relationship.
    On the night of the incident, the cell phone records showed that Campbell called Cross at
    2:39 a.m. and the call lasted two minutes and forty seconds, and then Cross called Campbell
    back at 2:42 a.m. and that call lasted fifteen seconds. At 2:55 a.m. Cross texted Campbell, “Its
    [sic] ok carli i [sic] know im [sic] not worth it. Wish you the best.” Campbell responded at 3:01
    3
    a.m., “Actually was looking forward to you fucking him up. You are a great man wish I could
    have seen that.” Cross replied at 3:01 a.m., “Lmfao I bet,” “Cop callin [sic] for sure,” and “Not
    setting me up.” At 3:03 a.m. Campbell sent Cross a text, “He was so scared,” and she sent
    another one at 3:04 a.m., “I am like upset that he’s gonna [sic] keep his teeth.”
    Detective Uhrig analyzed the cell phone provider records to generate a map that showed
    what cell phone tower Cross’ phone was operating near at the time of the incident. At 11:37
    p.m., Cross’ phone was operating in a sector on the north side of Coeur d’Alene. At 2:38 a.m.
    and between 2:55 a.m. and 3:06 a.m. the phone was operating in a sector on the north side of
    Hayden, near Campbell’s house.
    An analysis of Campbell’s cell phone also revealed she conducted several internet
    searches immediately following the incident, including such topics as: (1) “can cops subpoena
    text messages”; (2) “How Can I Protect My Cell Phone Data Records From Law Enforcement
    Subpoenas[]”; (3) “Court Rules Police Don’t Need A Warrant To Get Your Cellphone Records”;
    (4) “can cops read text messages”; (5) “How do you read deleted text messages”; and (6) “how
    long does it take cops to get phone records.”
    The State charged Campbell with accessory to a felony under Idaho Code section 18-
    205(1). The superseding indictment alleged:
    That the defendant, Carli Joann Campbell, on or about the 24th day of December,
    2017, in Kootenai County, Idaho, having knowledge that a felony had been
    committed, to wit; aggravated battery and/or burglary, did willfully withhold or
    conceal it from a peace officer or officers, all of which is contrary to the form,
    force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against the
    peace and dignity of the People of the State of Idaho.
    The case proceeded to trial and the State presented evidence and testimony consistent with the
    aforementioned facts. Campbell did not testify in her defense or present any evidence.
    During the jury instruction conference, following the close of evidence, Campbell
    objected to the district’s court’s refusal to give her proposed jury instructions. Campbell’s
    proposed instructions required the jury to find that the State proved Cross committed an
    aggravated battery or burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, her proposed instructions
    read:
    In order for the defendant to be guilty of Accessory to a Felony, the state
    must prove each of the following elements of Aggravated Battery as related to
    Matthew Cross:
    1. On or about December 24, 2017
    4
    2. in the state of Idaho
    3. Matthew Cross committed a battery upon Daniel Renaud,
    4. by wearing shoes and kicking Daniel Renaud, and
    5. when doing so Matthew Cross caused great bodily harm, permanent
    disability or permanent disfigurement and/or used a deadly weapon or
    instrument
    If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then
    you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.
    ....
    In order for the defendant to be guilty of Accessory to a Felony, the state
    must prove each of the following elements of Burglary as related to Matthew
    Cross:
    1. On or about December 24, 2017
    2. in the state of Idaho
    3. Matthew Cross entered a house located at [] North Maple in Hayden
    and
    4. at the time entry was made, Matthew Cross had the specific intent to
    commit Aggravated Battery.
    If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
    must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
    (Emphasis added).
    Campbell supported her proposed instructions by arguing, “in this particular case, since it
    is an element of the offense that [Campbell] had knowledge that a felony occurred, that the State
    is indeed required to prove that the offense occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.” Campbell
    further asserted, “Because if this was an issue where it only amounted to a level of a
    misdemeanor battery, then my client wouldn’t have withheld or concealed information or
    knowledge regarding a felony, which this is specific to a felony offense.”
    The district court rejected Campbell’s proposed instructions and reasoned:
    the State must prove that the defendant in this case had knowledge of conduct that
    can be constituted [sic] aggravated battery or burglary, but not that she had
    knowledge that those crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that
    those crimes have such evidence that they amount to beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
    standard.
    Instead of imposing a burden on the State to prove Cross committed a collateral crime, the
    district court required the jury to find an aggravated battery and/or burglary had been committed
    beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court gave the following elements instruction:
    5
    In order for the defendant to be guilty of Accessory to a Felony, the State
    must prove each of the following:
    1. On or about December 24, 2017
    2. in the state of Idaho
    3. the defendant Carli Joann Campbell while
    4. having knowledge that an Aggravated Battery and/or Burglary had
    been committed
    5. did willfully withhold or conceal knowledge of such Aggravated
    Battery and/or Burglary from a peace office or officers.
    If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
    must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
    (Emphasis added). The district court also defined the elements of Aggravated Battery and
    Burglary for the jury, using standard Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (ICJI) 511, 1203, 1207.
    The jury found Campbell guilty of accessory to a felony. The district court imposed a
    unified sentence of five years, with zero years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. Following a
    successful Rider, the district court suspended the sentence and placed Campbell on supervised
    probation for two years. Campbell timely filed a notice of appeal.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “ ‘Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the
    applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.’ ” State v.
    Draper, 
    151 Idaho 576
    , 587, 
    261 P.3d 853
    , 864 (2011) (quoting State v. Humphreys, 
    134 Idaho 657
    , 659, 
    8 P.3d 652
    , 654 (2000)). This Court looks to jury instructions as a whole, rather than
    individually, to determine whether they adequately present the issues and state the applicable
    law. Id. at 588, 
    261 P.3d at 865
    ; State v. Adamcik, 
    152 Idaho 445
    , 472, 
    272 P.3d 417
    , 444 (2012).
    “ ‘An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole
    misled the jury or prejudiced a party.’ ” State v. Mann, 
    162 Idaho 36
    , 43, 
    394 P.3d 79
    , 86 (2017)
    (quoting State v. Zichko, 
    129 Idaho 259
    , 264, 
    923 P.2d 966
    , 971 (1996)). If there is an omission
    of an essential element in a jury instruction this Court employs the harmless error test. State v.
    Hickman, 
    146 Idaho 178
    , 180, 
    191 P.3d 1098
    , 1100 (2008).
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. The district court properly instructed the jury on the charge of accessory to a
    felony.
    Campbell contends the district court erred when it refused to give her proposed jury
    instruction, which required the jury to find the State proved Cross committed an aggravated
    6
    battery or burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. She essentially asserts that the jury had to find the
    principal, Cross, guilty of a felony before she could be found guilty as an accessory. Campbell
    argues that due process requires each and every element of a crime to be proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right
    to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that due
    process, ‘no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction
    except upon sufficient proof – defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of
    fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.’
    Adamcik, 
    152 Idaho at 460
    , 
    272 P.3d at 432
     (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 316
    (1979)).
    First, we begin our analysis with Idaho Code section 18-205(1), which pertains to
    accessories to a felony crime. Statutory interpretation is intended to ascertain and “ ‘give effect
    to legislative intent.’ ” Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 
    148 Idaho 427
    , 430, 
    224 P.3d 494
    , 497
    (2009) (quoting State v. Doe, 
    147 Idaho 326
    , 328, 
    208 P.3d 730
    , 732 (2009)). This Court begins
    with the statute’s literal words, “which are the best guide in determining legislative intent.” 
    Id.
    Idaho Code section 18-205(1) provides:
    All persons are accessories who, having knowledge that a felony has been
    committed:
    (1) Willfully withhold or conceal it from a peace officer, judge,
    magistrate, grand jury or trial jury
    (Emphasis added). A plain reading of this statute does not support Campbell’s position. The
    plain words require that the person charged have knowledge that a felony has been committed.
    The reasonable interpretation of section 18-205(1) is that it places the burden on the State to
    prove that the accessory possessed the required mental state—knowledge of the felony—and it
    requires commission of a felony.
    No Idaho appellate court has ever held that conviction of a principal of the crime, prior to
    or during the trial of the accessory, is a prerequisite to an accessory conviction. However, while
    considering whether accessory after the fact is a lesser included offense of aiding and abetting,
    this Court noted the essential statutory elements of accessory of a felony as:
    [T]he accessory after the fact statute requires that (1) the actor hav[e] knowledge
    that a felony has been committed; then, (2) with that knowledge . . . willfully
    withhold or conceal that knowledge from law enforcement. . . .
    7
    Rome v. State, 
    164 Idaho 407
    , 418, 
    431 P.3d 242
    , 253 (2018) (internal quotations omitted).
    In State v. Hauser, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to the sufficiency of
    the evidence for a conviction as an accessory to a felony. See State v. Hauser, 
    143 Idaho 603
    ,
    
    150 P.3d 296
     (Ct. App. 2006). The defendant conceded that the State presented sufficient
    evidence to prove the underlying offense – so that issue was never considered by the court. Id. at
    607, 150 P.3d at 300. Instead, the defendant focused her appeal on the requirement that the State
    must prove she had actual knowledge that a felony had been committed. Id. Regarding that
    argument, the court held, “the knowledge requirement of I.C. § 18-205, in the context of
    subsection (1) of that statute, is met if the person charged as an accessory had such information
    as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a felony had been committed.” Id. The court
    in State v. Teasley also reached a similar result. See Teasley, 
    138 Idaho 113
    , 
    58 P.3d 97
     (Ct. App.
    2002). We find Hauser’s holding regarding the knowledge element persuasive and we adopt it
    here.
    Campbell cites a handful of federal cases to support her position that the district court
    should have given a separate instruction that required the jury to find the State had proved Cross
    committed burglary or aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Innie,
    
    7 F.3d 840
    , 850 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. De La Rosa, 
    171 F.3d 215
    , 221 (5th Cir. 1999);
    United States v. Rivera-Figueroa, 
    149 F.3d 1
    , 6 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Lepanto,
    
    817 F.2d 1463
    , 1467 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Cruz-Santiago, 
    330 F. Supp. 2d 26
    , 28
    (D. P.R. 2004). However, these cases do not support Campbell’s argument that the district court
    needed to instruct the jury on the elements of burglary and aggravated battery, as it related to
    Cross.
    Cruz-Santiago may be the closest case on point. There, the defendant was charged and
    convicted of accessory after the fact by providing assistance to a fugitive charged with
    conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. Cruz-Santiago, 
    330 F. Supp. 2d at 27
    . On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her
    conviction for accessory after the fact. 
    Id.
     The court brushed aside the government’s argument
    that focused on the defendant’s mere knowledge that the offense had been committed. 
    Id.
     at 27-
    28. The court noted that “ ‘commission of the underlying offense is a prerequisite for conviction
    as an accessory after the fact.’ ” 
    Id. at 28
     (quoting Innie, 
    7 F.3d at 850
    ). The court reiterated the
    three elements the government must prove to establish an accessory after-the-fact conviction “
    8
    ‘(1) the commission of an underlying offense against the United States; (2) the defendant’s
    knowledge of that offense; and (3) assistance by the defendant in order to prevent the
    apprehension, trial, or punishment of the offender.’ ” 
    Id.
     (quoting De La Rosa, 
    171 F.3d at 221
    ).
    The court found that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find the first element - that
    there was a commission of an underlying offense against the United States. 
    Id.
     The court
    importantly stated:
    While it is true that ‘[c]onviction of the principal is not a necessary condition
    precedent to the conviction of an accessory after the fact’ U.S. v. Walker, 
    415 F.2d 530
     (9th Cir. 1969), the Court cannot sustain a conviction without any
    evidence that Diaz-Rivera voluntarily conspired to possess with the intent to
    distribute heroine [sic], cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana as stated in his
    indictment. For example, a review of the record indicates that there was no
    circumstantial or direct evidence presented at trial to determine whether Diaz-
    Rivera acted alone or whether he had entered into a voluntary agreement with
    one or more individuals which ultimately is the essence of a conspiracy.
    
    Id.
     Similarly, in Rivera-Figueroa, the court noted in a footnote that, “[t]he accessory-after-the-
    fact offense does have some elements in common with the principal crime insofar as it requires
    proof of the substantive offense by someone . . . .” 
    149 F.3d at
    6 n.5 (emphasis added). It did not
    discuss the issue further.
    These authorities cited by Campbell actually support the district court’s jury
    instructions, as given. There must be evidence of the underlying felony and its commission “by
    someone,” in order to sustain an accessory conviction. 
    Id.
     (emphasis added). This can be done by
    “circumstantial or direct evidence presented at trial” demonstrating the principal’s culpability.
    Cruz-Santiago, 
    330 F. Supp. 2d at 28
    . Here, that standard was met because the district court
    required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell had knowledge that someone
    committed an aggravated battery or burglary. Therefore, to find that Campbell was an accessory,
    it was not necessary for the jury to make a specific finding that Cross was the principal.
    Similarly, the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, which this Court generally presumes to
    be correct, only require a felony to have been committed, not a conviction of the actual principal
    who committed the felony. Mann, 162 Idaho at 43; McKay v. State, 
    148 Idaho 567
    , 571 n.2, 
    225 P.3d 700
    , 704 n.2 (2010). ICJI 310 suggests the following instruction:
    A person who knows a felony was committed, and willfully conceals it from a
    [peace officer] [judge] [magistrate] [grand jury] [petit jury] [or] [harbors and
    protects the person charged with or convicted thereof,] is guilty of an accessory.
    9
    ICJI 310. Cross’ identity as the principal was not a prerequisite to Campbell’s conviction as an
    accessory. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to give Campbell’s proposed
    instructions, which would have required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, “as related
    to Matthew Cross,” that he committed the battery.
    The district court’s instructions, although formatted differently than ICJI 310, were
    appropriate because: (1) they were consistent with the plain language of the statute, (2) they
    reflected persuasive authorities that require proof the underlying crime was committed “by
    someone” rather than conviction of the principal, and (3) the instructions mirrored the relevant
    Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions. The jury was instructed on the elements of the crime of
    accessory to a felony, as follows:
    In order for the defendant to be guilty of Accessory to a Felony, the State
    must prove each of the following:
    1. On or about December 24, 2017
    2. in the state of Idaho
    3. the defendant Carli Joann Campbell while
    4. having knowledge that an Aggravated Battery and/or Burglary had
    been committed
    5. did willfully withhold or conceal knowledge of such Aggravated
    Battery and/or Burglary from a peace office or officers.
    If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
    must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
    (Emphasis added). Campbell ignores the language at the bottom of the district court’s
    instructions that requires the jury to find each element – including the fact that an Aggravated
    Battery or a Burglary had been committed – beyond a reasonable doubt. This instruction clearly
    requires the jury to find commission of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,
    this instruction required the State to prove all the necessary elements.
    Furthermore, the district court followed the ICJI definitions of Aggravated Battery and
    Burglary in instructing the jury, which define those terms as follows:
    In order for a person to be guilty of Aggravated Battery, the State must prove each
    of the following:
    1. On or about a time
    2. in the state of Idaho
    3. a person committed a battery upon another,
    4. when doing so said person caused great bodily harm
    ....
    A “battery” is committed when a person:
    10
    (1) willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of
    another; or
    (2) actually, intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person
    against the will of the other; or
    (3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual
    ....
    In order for a person to be guilty of Burglary, the State must prove each of
    the following:
    1. On or about a time
    2. in the state of Idaho
    3. a person entered a home, and
    4. at the time entry was made said person had the specific intent to
    commit a felony.
    See ICJI 511, 1203, 1207. Therefore, the jury was informed of the required elements of
    aggravated battery and burglary, and it was instructed as an element to accessory that one of
    those crimes had to have been committed beyond a reasonable doubt.
    When read as a whole, the jury instructions correctly stated the law. State v. Medina, 
    165 Idaho 501
    , 507, 
    447 P.3d 949
     955 (2019). While we acknowledge that it might be ideal to either
    try both the principal and the accessory together, or first obtain a conviction of the principal
    before proceeding to trial with the accessory, it is not required. There is simply no requirement
    that the State must prove the identity of the principal, or establish their guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury instruction given to the jury by the district court
    properly reflected the law.
    B. Due to the uncontroverted and overwhelming evidence of guilt, the alleged errors
    in the jury instructions were harmless.
    Even if we were to find that the district court’s jury instructions were somehow erroneous
    for leaving out a required element, we must still determine whether the totality of the record
    would render such error harmless. “In instances where erroneous jury instructions were provided
    at trial, an appellate court must first determine whether an improper jury instruction affected the
    entire deliberative process.” State v. Perry, 
    150 Idaho 209
    , 224, 
    245 P.3d 961
    , 976 (2008). If the
    improper jury instruction was so fundamentally flawed that it affected the entire deliberative
    process, then reversal is required. 
    Id.
     However, in cases
    where the jury instructions were only partially erroneous, such as where the jury
    instructions improperly omitted one element of a charged offense, the appellate
    court may apply the harmless error test, and where the evidence supporting a
    finding on the omitted element is overwhelming and uncontroverted, so that no
    11
    rational jury could have found that the state failed to prove that element, the
    constitutional violation may be deemed harmless.
    
    Id.
     For the reasons discussed below, we find that the record in this case presents a compelling
    basis for finding that Campbell knew, yet concealed her knowledge, that a felony had been
    committed.
    First, although Campbell contends that she contested the evidence presented by the State
    on both the aggravated battery and burglary charges at trial, she called no witnesses, presented
    no evidence, and only claims that she contested the evidence through her closing argument. We
    reject this argument because it is a fundamental principle that the closing arguments of counsel
    are not evidence, as the jury in this case was specifically instructed. See ICJI 202. While
    Campbell pleaded not guilty, thereby requiring the State to present sufficient evidence to prove
    its case beyond a reasonable doubt, she made no attempt to rebut any of the State’s evidence with
    evidence of her own. Therefore, the evidence of guilt in the record before us is almost entirely
    uncontroverted.
    Second, turning to the weight of the evidence presented by the State in this case, it was so
    overwhelming that no rational jury could have found that the State had failed to meet its burden
    on every element. Narrowing the scope of our analysis to just the underlying acts by Campbell
    sufficient to prove the charge of accessory to an aggravated battery, the evidence was conclusive.
    In sum, the State presented substantial and competent evidence that on December 24, 2017, in
    the state of Idaho, Campbell had knowledge that a battery had been committed upon Renaud and
    the battery had caused Renaud great bodily harm, and Campbell willfully withheld and
    concealed knowledge of the crime from law enforcement every time she was questioned. See I.C.
    § 18-205(1).
    For example, the State presented substantial and competent evidence for a rational jury to
    have found that Campbell had knowledge of the circumstances related to the aggravated battery
    committed against Renaud. The evidence, again wholly unrebutted at trial, showed that
    Campbell told Renaud he would get his “ass kicked” if he did not leave. Later, Renaud awoke to
    see Cross enter through the front door, point at him, and then “bull rush” him. Campbell, despite
    initially denying any knowledge of the incident, later reported to law enforcement that Renaud
    was punched and kicked by an unknown random stranger. Renaud identified Cross as his
    assailant to law enforcement at the hospital. The crime was an aggravated battery—a felony—
    because Cross caused great bodily harm in commission of the battery, to wit: Cross broke
    12
    Renaud’s jaw and fractured his sinus; Renaud underwent two surgeries to fix his jaw, which
    included doctors installing metal plates; during recovery from surgery, Renaud lost weight,
    suffered great pain, and he could not work; he could barely communicate; and Renaud’s jaw
    shape has been permanently altered.
    Additionally, the State presented persuasive evidence that not only showed that Campbell
    had knowledge of the aggravated battery, but it also demonstrated she may have facilitated the
    attack. At the very least, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that she concealed and
    withheld the full extent of her knowledge about the crime from police officers. For example, the
    jury heard evidence that Campbell became angry after Renaud cuddled up to her female friend
    and suggested a “threesome.” Campbell then demanded that Renaud leave but he refused. Cell
    phone records confirm she then made at least two phone calls to Cross. The evidence suggested
    that Campbell was not only in a sexual relationship with Renaud at the time, but she had been
    similarly involved with Cross. After the calls with Cross, she warned Renaud that he would get
    his “ass kicked” if he did not leave. Shortly thereafter, Cross appeared at Campbell’s house and
    battered Renaud until he was unconscious. When police arrived, Campbell’s story constantly
    changing. For instance, she initially told Deputy Brock she had not seen what happened or who
    did it. Yet, Campbell told medical personnel that Renaud had been punched and kicked.
    Campbell later told Deputy Brock that she saw “a person” kick Renaud. Later on, Campbell told
    a different officer, while describing the incident, that “he” punched and “he” kicked Renaud.
    When directly confronted, Campbell continuously denied any knowledge of what happened,
    apparently forgetting that she had earlier reported to the 911 operator that there was a motive for
    the crime: “there was like a dispute over a girl and someone got punched.”
    After the incident, telecommunication records confirmed that Campbell and Cross
    exchanged multiple text messages, including one in which Campbell texted Cross: “Actually was
    looking forward to you fucking him up. You are a great man wish I could have seen that.”
    (Emphasis added). Cross replied, “Lmfao I bet.” Campbell also said, “He was so scared” and “I
    am like upset that he’s gonna [sic] keep his teeth.” The analysis of Cross’ cell phone records
    showed that before the incident, Cross’ phone was operating on the north side of Coeur d’Alene.
    However, around the time of the battery, Cross’ phone was operating in a sector on the north side
    of Hayden, near the incident. Between the time of the incident and the time police seized
    Campbell’s phone pursuant to a warrant, records show that Campbell made many internet
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    searches relating to whether police can subpoena text messages, and how to delete text messages.
    Most importantly, Campbell’s text messages to Cross, recorded jail phone calls with Cross and
    her husband, and post-incident internet searches all show that she knew the aggravated battery
    occurred and was actively attempting to conceal the full extent of her knowledge from law
    enforcement.
    In sum, this Court concludes that the district court properly rejected Campbell’s proposed
    jury instructions and correctly instructed the jury as required by Idaho Code section 18-205(1)
    and applicable precedent. Even if the district court somehow erred in its jury instruction, there
    was overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial to satisfy each and every element of the
    crime, thus satisfying the standard for harmless error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the conviction and judgment of the district
    court.
    Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BURDICK, BRODY and STEGNER CONCUR.
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