Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 49108
KRYSTAL K. DEMONEY-HENDRICKSON, )
as Personal Representative of the Estate of )
Cynthia K. Juker, )
)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent, ) Boise, November 2022 Term
)
v. ) Opinion filed: March 30, 2023
)
REDGINALD R. LARSEN, an individual, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, )
)
and )
)
THE ESTATE OF CYNTHIA K. JUKER, )
)
Third Party Defendant-Respondent. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, Twin Falls County. Eric J. Wildman, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded.
Wright Brothers Law Office, PLLC, Twin Falls, for Appellant. Kyle E. Bastian
argued.
Vaughn Fisher and Christopher Brown, Boise, for Respondents. Vaughn Fisher argued.
ZAHN, Justice.
This case concerns an action for the partition of real property. Redginald Larsen appeals
from the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration following its grant of summary
judgment brought by Krystal Demoney-Hendrickson and the Estate of Cynthia K. Juker. For the
reasons stated below, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the
case for further proceedings.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 1994, Larsen, who was then single, purchased unimproved property in Twin Falls
County (the “Rock Garden Property”) as the sole owner. In 2014, Larsen and Cynthia Juker entered
into a romantic relationship. Despite participating in an unofficial ceremony resembling a wedding
in 2018, the two were never legally married. Shortly after their relationship began, Larsen and
Juker moved into a home owned by Juker (the “Wrangler Property”).
In August 2019, Larsen and Juker entered into a building contract to construct a home on
the Rock Garden Property. To procure financing for the project, Larsen and Juker submitted a joint
loan application that First Federal Savings Bank of Twin Falls approved. To qualify for the loan,
First Federal required Larsen to execute a quitclaim deed for the Rock Garden Property that listed
himself and Juker as grantees. The deed reads,
Reginald [sic] R. Larsen, a single man Grantor(s) do(es) hereby convey, release,
remise and forever quitclaim unto Redginald R. Larsen and Cynthia Kay Juker,
Husband and Wife Grantee(s) whose address is: 3579 Rock Garden Lane North
Kimberly, ID 83341 (Primary Residence) the following described premises, to-
wit: [reference to attached legal description of Rock Garden Property.]
(Capitalization altered; bold in original.) The deed was executed on October 4, 2019.
About a month later, Juker unexpectedly passed away. Her daughter, Krystal Demoney-
Hendrickson, was appointed personal representative of Juker’s estate (collectively referred to as
“the Estate”). At the time of Juker’s passing, the home on the Rock Garden Property was still under
construction. Larsen continued living on the Wrangler Property until construction on the Rock
Garden Property finished in April 2020, after which he moved into the new home. Initially, the
relationship between Larsen and Demoney-Hendrickson was amicable following Juker’s passing,
but things began to unravel shortly after Larsen moved into the new home.
According to Larsen, he and Juker entered into two oral agreements around the time they
sought financing for the home construction. Larsen explains that, under these agreements, Juker
was to sell the Wrangler Property and use the proceeds to pay down the First Federal loan. In the
meantime, Larsen agreed he would be solely responsible for financing the home construction out
of his separate funds. In accordance with this agreement, Larsen states he reimbursed Juker for
any expenses she incurred related to the home construction until the Wrangler Property could be
sold.
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In contrast, the Estate maintains Juker died intestate and never indicated her wishes for
what was to become of her personal and real property in the event of her death. The Estate also
disputes whether Larsen was solely responsible for funding the Rock Garden Property
construction. Once construction was completed, Larsen occupied the Rock Garden Property. The
Estate sold the Wrangler Property, but none of the proceeds from that sale were applied toward
the First Federal loan.
Friction between the parties over ownership of the Rock Garden Property ultimately led
the Estate to sue Larsen in the summer of 2020. The Estate asserted causes of action for partition
by sale and conversion, and later added claims for ouster and unjust enrichment. Larsen asserted a
counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that he owned 100% of the Rock Garden Property.
B. Procedural Background
Both the Estate and Larsen moved for summary judgment on their claims for partition by
sale and declaratory judgment. The Estate argued that it owned 50% of the Rock Garden Property
by virtue of the warranty deed to Juker. Larsen argued that he owned 100% of the Rock Garden
Property by virtue of the parties’ agreement and because he reimbursed Juker for all expenses she
paid for the property.
The district court granted the Estate’s motion and denied Larsen’s motion. The district
court found the deed “to be clear, unambiguous, and controlling” and concluded it need not
consider any evidence beyond the language of the deed to determine ownership of the Rock Garden
Property. Relying exclusively on the deed, the district court found that Larsen and the Estate each
owned an undivided, one-half interest in the Rock Garden Property as a matter of law. Following
its determination of the parties’ respective interests, the district court concluded the Rock Garden
Property must be partitioned by sale as a matter of law. The district court also found that the Rock
Garden Property consisted of 5.05 acres and contained a single residence and that it would not be
possible to physically partition the property without great prejudice to the parties. The district court
therefore ordered the partition of the property by sale.
Larsen filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court’s summary judgment order.
Larsen argued that the district court’s decision was in error because extrinsic evidence is
admissible in a partition action to establish the parties’ ownership interests and, therefore, the
district court erred in relying exclusively on the language of the deed to determine the parties’
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respective interests in the property. Larsen argued that the district court should have also
considered the parties’ respective contributions to the property when making its decision.
The district court denied Larsen’s motion, largely relying on the same line of reasoning
from its original order. However, the district court did clarify that its original order made only two
determinations: (1) that Larsen and the Estate each owned an undivided, one-half interest in the
Rock Garden Property, and (2) that partition by sale must occur as a matter of law because partition
in kind would result in great prejudice. The district court stated that “[w]ho paid what with respect
to the construction of the residence is disputed and thus presents a genuine issue of material fact
not ripe for summary judgment.” Thus, the district court concluded that issues related to
contributions and expenditures would be resolved when the proceeds from the sale of the Rock
Garden Property were divided.
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Larsen moved for permission from
the district court to appeal its order under Idaho Appellate Rule 12. The district court denied the
motion. Larsen then moved this Court for permission to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to reconsider, which this Court granted.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to the Estate?
2. Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review for this appeal. Larsen argues this
Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court in deciding the motion for
reconsideration. Since the district court was reconsidering its order on the cross-motions for
summary judgment, Larsen asserts this Court should apply the summary judgment standard. The
Estate asserts that a clear error standard of review applies since the district court’s order pertained
to partitioning real estate.
“[W]hen reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration,
this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the lower court in deciding the motion for
reconsideration.” Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). Thus,
“when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant of
summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment.” Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113. “If there
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is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises
free review.” Neeser v. Inland Empire Paper Co., 170 Idaho 692, 696, 516 P.3d 562, 566 (2022)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Larsen has appealed the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration.
Therefore, we apply the summary judgment standard in our review of the district court’s denial of
Larsen’s motion.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The district court erred in granting the Estate’s motion for summary judgment.
Larsen asserts that the district court erred by not considering extrinsic evidence to
determine his and the Estate’s respective ownership interests in the Rock Garden Property. He
argues that a presumption arises in partition actions that can be rebutted through extrinsic evidence
and asserts that this Court’s decision in Wilson v. Mocabee, 167 Idaho 59, 467 P.3d 423 (2020),
supports his position. Thus, Larsen maintains that the district court erred by relying exclusively on
the language of the deed to determine his and the Estate’s respective interests in the Rock Garden
Property. The Estate maintains the district court applied the correct standard.
The district court applied the standard from Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 315 P.3d 824(2013), to determine the parties’ respective interests under the quitclaim deed. Under this standard,
the district court concluded it should not consider extrinsic evidence because the deed was
unambiguous. The district court determined that this Court’s decision in Wilson was
distinguishable and that the quitclaim deed established that Larsen and the Estate each owned an
undivided, one-half interest in the Rock Garden Property.
1. Idaho’s partition statutes provide a three-step process for analyzing partition claims.
Idaho has a statutory framework permitting co-owners to bring an action to partition real
property. See I.C. § 6-501. Three statutes address the analytical steps that a district court must
follow when deciding a partition action. Idaho Code section 6-501 provides:
When several cotenants hold and are in possession of real property as parceners,
joint tenants or tenants in common, in which one (1) or more of them have an estate
of inheritance, or for life or lives, or for years, an action may be brought by one (1)
or more of such persons for a partition thereof, according to the respective rights of
the persons interested therein, and for a sale of such property, or a part thereof, if it
appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners.
Additionally, section 6-508 states:
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The rights of the several parties, plaintiff as well as defendant, may be put in issue,
tried and determined in such action; and when a sale of the premises is necessary,
the title must be ascertained by proof to the satisfaction of the court before the
judgment of sale can be made[.]
Finally, section 6-512 provides:
If it be alleged in the complaint and established by evidence, or if it appear by the
evidence without such allegation in the complaint, to the satisfaction of the court,
that the property, or any part of it, is so situated that partition cannot be made
without great prejudice to the owners, the court may order a sale thereof. Otherwise,
upon the requisite proofs being made, it must order a partition according to the
respective rights of the parties as ascertained by the court[.]
Taken together, these statutes set forth a sequential framework for partition actions.
The first step is for the district court to determine whether the parties to the action possess
some interest in the property at issue. See I.C. § 6-501. The second step is to ascertain the
“respective rights of the persons interested” in the subject property. Id. In other words, the district
court must determine the parties’ respective ownership interests in the subject property. Id.; I.C. §
6-508. The third step is to determine the most appropriate method of partition: a partition in kind
or a partition by sale. See I.C. §§ 6-501, 6-508. Critically, “when a sale of the premises is necessary,
the title must be ascertained by proof to the satisfaction of the court before the judgment of sale
can be made[.]” I.C. § 6-508 (emphasis added).
2. The district court erred in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence when determining the
parties’ respective ownership interests in the Rock Garden Property.
Here, the district court erred when it conflated the first and second steps in the partition
framework. As the district court correctly noted, “when the language of a deed is unambiguous,
the intention of the parties is a matter of law ascertained from the deed’s plain language without
the aid of extrinsic evidence.” Hoch, 155 Idaho at 639, 315 P.3d at 827 (citing Machado v. Ryan,
153 Idaho 212, 218, 280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012)). The deed here states:
Reginald [sic] R. Larsen, a single man Grantor(s) do(es) hereby convey, release,
remise and forever quitclaim unto Redginald R. Larsen and Cynthia Kay Juker,
Husband and Wife Grantee(s) whose address is: 3579 Rock Garden Lane North
Kimberly, ID 83341 (Primary Residence) the following described premises, to-
wit: [reference to attached legal description of the Rock Garden Property.]
(Capitalization altered; bold in original.) The district court correctly concluded that the plain
language of the deed shows that Larsen conveyed an interest in the Rock Garden Property to Juker.
The district court, therefore, properly concluded that Juker possessed some interest in the Rock
Garden Property.
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This only resolves the first step, however. After determining that Larsen conveyed an
interest to Juker, the district court needed to advance to the second step and determine how much
of an interest Larsen conveyed. Here, the district court assumed that Larsen and Juker took
ownership in equal shares because there were only two names on the deed, and the deed did not
specify their respective interests in the property. The district court, however, erred in making this
assumption.
Idaho law provides that every interest in real estate is presumed to be a tenancy in common
unless the deed expressly provides otherwise. I.C. § 55-508. The face of the quitclaim deed in this
case does not indicate that the parties intended anything other than a tenancy in common. As a
result, because Larsen and Juker took as tenants in common, they could have taken unequal
ownership interests in the Rock Garden Property. See 4 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas
Editions § 32.06 (David A. Thomas ed. 2017) (“Because unity of interest is not required, it is not
necessary that tenants in common have equal shares.”). See also 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and
Joint Ownership § 31 (“A tenancy in common is a form of ownership in which each cotenant owns
a separate fractional share of undivided property. The property may be owned in equal or unequal
undivided shares. . . .”).
This Court has not yet addressed how a trial court should determine the respective
ownership rights of the parties to a partition action. As discussed above, in the event of a cotenancy
in common, the owners may own in equal or unequal shares. Unless a deed expressly identifies
those respective interests on its face, it only indicates that an interest has been granted, but not
what percentage of interest has been granted. Therefore, we turn to the question of how to
determine the respective ownership interests of the parties in a situation such as this.
Larsen asserts that the district court erred by not looking beyond the plain language of the
deed to determine the parties’ respective ownership interests. See Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21,
232 P.3d 799 (2010); Garrett v. Garrett, 154 Idaho 788, 302 P.3d 1061 (2013); Kawamura v.
Kawamura, 159 Idaho 1, 355 P.3d 630 (2015). Larsen argues that Idaho law permits a district court
to consider extrinsic evidence when a deed is executed in the course of obtaining financing. For
example, in Barrett we held that “evidence beyond the deed itself [can] be introduced to determine
the character of property even where that determination might differ from the language of the
deed.” Barrett, 149 Idaho at 24, 232 P.3d at 802. In so holding, we acknowledged that “[t]his Court
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has previously allowed courts to look to a variety of factors in determining the character of
property.” Id. See also Kawamura, 159 Idaho at 4–5, 355 P.3d at 633–34.
We conclude that Barrett and Kawamura are distinguishable from the situation before us
in this case. Those cases concerned the determination of whether real property at issue in a divorce
action was separate or community property. See Barrett, 149 Idaho at 23, 232 P.3d at 801 (“[T]he
inquiry is whether the character of [the relevant] property changed during the marriage.”);
Kawamura, 159 Idaho at 4–5, 355 P.3d at 633–34 (concluding that property at issue was
community property). Here, we are not reviewing a determination of separate or community
property in a divorce action. Instead, we are reviewing the respective ownership interests of Larsen
and Juker—an unmarried couple—in a partition action.
Larsen argues that our decision in Garrett shows that Barrett and Kawamura apply in
partition actions. Garrett was a partition action that involved two issues: (1) whether separate
property that one spouse brought into the marriage was transmuted to community property during
the course of a marriage; and (2) whether the husband’s deed conveying that property to his son
was validly delivered. Garrett, 154 Idaho at 790, 302 P.3d at 1063. The district court concluded
the property was transmuted into community property and cited to Barrett for the proposition that
it was free to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the character of the property. Id. The district
court also found there was no valid delivery of the deed. Id. at 790–91, 302 P.3d at 1063–64. On
appeal, this Court did not address the transmutation determination and instead affirmed the district
court on its alternative holding that the deed had not been validly delivered. Id. at 791, 302 P.3d at
1064. Delivery is not an issue here; thus, Garrett is inapt.
Larsen also contends that this Court addressed the consideration of extrinsic evidence in a
partition action in Wilson. There, Mocabee and Wilson, an unmarried couple, had been
cohabitating for many years when Wilson received a large inheritance. Wilson, 167 Idaho at 62,
467 P.3d at 426. Wilson used her inheritance to purchase a home and instructed the title company
to include Mocabee’s name on the deed. Id. Wilson and Mocabee eventually split up, and Wilson
filed a complaint against Mocabee for quiet title, unlawful detainer, and partition. Id. The case
proceeded to a bench trial on the partition claim. Id. at 63, 467 P.3d at 427.
Prior to trial, Mocabee filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence
demonstrating Wilson did not intend to give him a 50% ownership interest in the home. Id. In
denying the motion, the district court noted that partition actions are different in kind from an
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action on a deed, making it necessary to look at matters outside the deed. Id. at 63–64, 467 P.3d at
427–28. The parties stipulated to have the following presumption govern the standard of proof at
trial: “there is a presumption that where we have two people on a deed that they are co-tenants
owning [an] undivided 50 percent interest, that that presumption is rebuttable, [and] that we will
look at a contribution.” Id. at 64, 467 P.3d at 428. The district court ultimately concluded that
Wilson owned a 100% interest in the home because she contributed 100% of the purchase price,
and the evidence did not establish she intended to give Mocabee any interest. Id. Given this
outcome, the district court held that it was unnecessary to partition the property. Id. Mocabee then
appealed to this Court. Id.
On appeal, this Court found that Mocabee stipulated to the presumption and, therefore,
could not assert the district court erred in applying the presumption. Id. at 66–67, 467 P.3d at 430–
31. This Court went on to draw the same distinction that the district court did: “this is not a case
about construing a deed; it is an action to determine, when the deed was silent on its face, whether
Wilson intended to give Mocabee any interest in the home at all.” Id. at 67, 467 P.3d at 431. In
other words, “this was not an action on the deed, but a partition action to determine the ownership
interests of each party.” Id. This Court ultimately affirmed the district court under the invited error
doctrine. Id. at 67–70, 467 P.3d at 431–34.
Here, the district court recognized, and we agree, that Wilson is not controlling given the
unique facts of that case. Unlike the parties in Wilson, Larsen and the Estate did not stipulate to a
legal standard to determine their respective ownership interests in the property. With that said, in
Wilson, this Court recognized generally applicable principles that arise under Idaho’s partition
statutes. As we noted in Wilson, there is a widely accepted presumption that arises in partition
actions: “[w]here two or more persons take as tenants in common under an instrument silent as to
their respective shares, there is a presumption that their shares are equal.” 167 Idaho at 65, 467
P.3d at 429. See also, e.g., Gallagher v. Townsend, 443 P.3d 847, 850–51 (Wyo. 2019). We further
stated that “[t]his is the presumption that arises under Idaho’s partition statute.” Wilson, 167 Idaho
at 65, 467 P.3d at 429.
Given the different factual circumstances of this case, we take this opportunity to reiterate
that when an instrument is silent as to the parties’ respective interests in property sought to be
partitioned, a presumption of equal shares applies. We are not alone in applying this presumption.
See, e.g., Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816, 818–19 (Wyo. 2010) (citation omitted) (“It is widely
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accepted that, ‘if the instrument does not specify the shares of each co-tenant, it will be presumed
that they take equal, undivided interests.’”); Howard v. Hughes, 427 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Nev. 2018);
In re Estate of Dern Family Tr., 928 P.2d 123, 131 (Mont. 1996); D.M. v. D.A., 885 P.2d 94, 96–
97 (Alaska 1994); Cummings v. Anderson, 614 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wash. 1980).
The question then arises whether the presumption is rebuttable or irrebuttable. Our sister
states have recognized that the presumption of equal shares may be rebutted with evidence
showing that the parties intended to create unequal shares. E.g., Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 818–19;
Howard, 427 P.3d at 1048; In re Estate of Dern Family Tr., 928 P.2d at 131–32; D.M., 885 P.2d
at 97–98; Cummings, 614 P.2d at 1287. Some jurisdictions have limited the evidence that can be
introduced to rebut this presumption. See, e.g., Gallagher, 443 P.3d at 850 (noting that permissible
extrinsic evidence includes “proof that the co-tenants contributed unequal amounts toward the
purchase price of the property, and there is neither a family relationship among the co-tenants nor
any evidence of donative intent on the part of those who contributed more than their pro rata
amounts toward the purchase price.”); Howard, 427 P.3d at 1048 (holding that the presumption of
equal shares may be rebutted “through evidence of lack of relatedness or donative intent”).
We agree that the presumption should be a rebuttable one and hold that the presumption of
equal shares may be rebutted with evidence that the parties intended to create unequal shares. We,
however, see no reason to limit the types of evidence that may be considered in this analysis. We
recently determined that in partition actions, our district courts should consider the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether physical partition would result in great prejudice to the
parties. Nordgaarden v. Kiebert, No. 48919, 2023 WL 2618459, at *7 (Mar. 24, 2023). We see no
reason that our district courts should not likewise examine the totality of the circumstances to
determine the respective ownership interests of the parties. The presumption of equal shares may
be rebutted with a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parties intended to share
unequally in the property. The party opposing equal ownership bears this burden. Our district
courts are free to consider extrinsic evidence in conducting this analysis.
Larsen invites us to adopt a second presumption, a presumption of proportional shares, that
some jurisdictions apply once the initial presumption of equal shares has been rebutted. See, e.g.,
Howard, 427 P.3d at 1048–49. This presumption would apply to set ownership interests according
to the parties’ respective financial contributions to the property. Id. We decline Larsen’s invitation
to adopt a second presumption in addition to the first. Our holding today permits our trial courts
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to consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the presumption of equal shares
has been overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. A partition action is an action in equity.
Nordgaarden, 2023 WL 2618459, at *7. Our trial courts are well-equipped to review the evidence
and determine whether to apply the presumption of equal shares. A second presumption would
only serve to invade the province of the district court and complicate the determination of the
parties’ respective ownership interests.
The district court in this case erred in conducting the second step of the partition inquiry
because it did not consider any evidence beyond the language of the deed to determine whether
Larsen had rebutted the presumption of equal shares. Given that the deed at issue was silent as to
Larsen and Juker’s respective ownership shares, the district court should have permitted Larsen to
produce the extrinsic evidence he claimed would show that the parties did not intend to create
equal ownership in the Rock Garden Property. For purposes of summary judgment, the district
court needed to consider whether the evidence Larsen produced was admissible and created a
genuine issue of material fact as to the parties’ intent in creating equal ownership interests in the
property. We now employ this standard in our de novo review of the district court’s decision
denying Larsen’s motion for reconsideration.
3. There is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the parties’ respective ownership
interests in the Rock Garden Property.
Larsen argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the parties’
respective ownership interests because the only admissible evidence in the record shows he made
all the financial contributions. Larsen asserts that he contributed all the funds necessary for the
improvements to the Rock Garden Property, including the down payment on the construction loan
he and Juker jointly obtained and all loan payments to date. The Estate asserts that the parties’
intent regarding the deed is a disputed fact. The Estate further argues there is a genuine dispute of
material fact related to contributions for the improvements to the Rock Garden Property.
The district court concluded that there was a genuine dispute of material fact related to the
parties’ contributions toward the improvements to the Rock Garden Property but treated the
dispute as one applicable to a contribution claim, rather than a determination of the parties’
respective ownership interests. The district court therefore concluded that the amount of
contribution to which Larsen was entitled would be resolved at a court trial. After that amount was
determined, Larsen would be reimbursed from the proceeds of the sale of the Rock Garden
Property.
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A presumption of equal shares arises in this case because the quitclaim deed is silent as to
Larsen’s and Juker’s respective ownership interests. However, Larsen has produced admissible
evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the parties’ intent concerning their
respective ownership interests in the Rock Garden Property. Larsen contends that there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to his monetary contributions. As a result, he claims that he not
only rebutted the presumption of equal shares, but that he also established the parties did not intend
for Juker to have any interest in the property. He further contends that even if we do not agree with
him on this point, at a minimum, his evidence established a genuine issue of material fact
concerning the parties’ intended ownership interests and therefore, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment.
After considering all of the evidence presented below, we conclude that there is a genuine
issue of material fact concerning the parties’ respective ownership interests. Larsen’s evidence of
unequal monetary contributions was not the only evidence presented that bore on the parties’
intended ownership interests. Larsen’s own declaration states that “[i]n order to qualify for the
necessary financing, [Juker] and I submitted a joint loan application to First Federal” for which he
and Juker were later jointly approved. Larsen continues, “[a]round that time, [Juker] and I orally
agreed that after the closing of the First Federal loan, [Juker] would sell the Wrangler Property,
use the sale proceeds to pay down the First Federal loan, and move into the new home with me.”
Larsen then states that he agreed to finance the construction costs until the Wrangler Property was
sold. While Larsen has produced evidence suggesting he contributed all sums for improving the
Rock Garden Property, Larsen admits he was unable to procure financing for the improvements to
the Rock Garden Property without Juker being a co-obligor on the construction loan. The lending
bank required Larsen to sign a quitclaim deed, transferring an interest in the property to Juker in
exchange for providing the construction loan.
This evidence indicates that Larsen intended to convey an interest in the Rock Garden
Property to Juker because otherwise he could not have obtained the construction loan. In a similar
vein, the fact that Juker agreed to be a co-obligor on the loan, combined with the parties’ agreement
that she would use the proceeds from the sale of the Wrangler Property to pay down the
construction loan, suggests the parties’ agreed that Juker would own an interest in the property.
Aside from Larsen’s monetary contributions, he presented no evidence to suggest that the parties
intended anything other than to equally share in ownership of the property. When viewed together,
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this evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on the
question of the parties’ respective ownership interests in the property. Therefore, we reverse the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Estate concerning the parties’ respective
ownership interests and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Finally, we reject Larsen’s assertion that he owns a 100% interest in the Rock Garden
Property. Larsen voluntarily executed a quitclaim deed conveying an interest in the property to
Juker. In exchange, she agreed to assume equal responsibility for the construction loan and the
bank agreed to make the construction loan to them. The district court properly determined, based
on the plain language of the deed, that Larsen conveyed an interest in the Rock Garden Property
to Juker. We affirm the district court’s determination that Juker has an interest in the property.
We remand so that the district court may determine the parties’ respective ownership
interests. After considering the totality of the evidence, the district court may reach the same
conclusion it reached on summary judgment. But first, the district court must consider all
admissible and relevant evidence bearing on the parties’ intent, including evidence extrinsic to the
deed. On remand, the district court will need to determine whether Larsen has rebutted the
presumption of equal shares by a preponderance of the evidence adduced at trial.
4. After ascertaining the parties’ ownership interests, the district court must determine
whether partition by sale is warranted.
Larsen argues the district court erred by concluding partition by sale must occur as a matter
of law. The Estate asserts that the district court properly concluded partition by sale must occur
based on its position that the parties each owned an undivided, one-half interest in the Rock Garden
Property. The district court concluded that partition by sale must occur because the property could
not be divided equally without great prejudice to the parties.
The district court’s error in granting summary judgment concerning the parties’ respective
ownership interests requires that we vacate the district court’s order for a partition by sale. The
parties’ respective interest in the Rock Garden Property must be determined before the district
court can determine whether the property should be partitioned in kind or by sale. As previously
explained, Idaho’s partition statutes give rise to a three-step inquiry. The determination of whether
great prejudice would result from a partition in kind is made after the parties’ respective interests
in the property have been ascertained.
It is possible that the district court could determine that the parties intended Juker to receive
something less than a 50% interest. Although the Rock Garden Property contains only one
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residence, it also includes 5.05 acres of land. Depending on the parties’ respective ownership
interests and the value of the land, it may be possible to physically partition the property without
great prejudice by giving one the house and the other part of the remaining land. It is also possible,
again depending on the parties’ respective ownership interests and the value of the land, that the
property could be physically partitioned and any resulting inequality in value resolved through a
compensatory adjustment between the parties. See I.C. § 6-541 (“[I]n all cases the court has power
to make compensatory adjustment between the respective parties according to the ordinary
principles of equity.”). As a result, we vacate the district court’s order for a partition by sale so
that the district court may analyze whether great prejudice would result from a physical partition
after it determines the parties’ respective ownership interests.
For guidance on remand, we direct the parties and the district court to our recent decision
holding that a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances when considering whether
great prejudice would result from a physical partition. See Nordgaarden, 2023 WL 2618459, at
*4–7. On remand the district court should apply this standard to determine whether partition in
kind would result in great prejudice to the parties.
B. We do not award either party attorney fees on appeal.
Both parties request attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code
section 6-545. By its plain language, section 6-545 only permits an award of attorney fees
“expended . . . for the common benefit” of the parties to the partition action. I.C. § 6-545.
Otherwise, when litigation arises between the parties, the court may require them to bear their own
expenses of litigation. Id. Neither party to this appeal has expended attorney fees on appeal for
“the common benefit.” Instead, this appeal is wholly adversarial in nature and, as a result they each
should bear their own fees.
V. CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Estate because
there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the parties’ respective ownership interests in the
Rock Garden Property, which must be resolved before deciding whether partition by sale or in
kind is the appropriate remedy. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We decline to award either party attorney fees, but award Larsen his costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 40.
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, STEGNER, and MOELLER, CONCUR.
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