Judith H. Beaudet v. Charles P. Hoops ( 2011 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 36942
    JUDITH H. BEAUDET,                                )      2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 399
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                       )      Filed: March 18, 2011
    )
    v.                                                )      Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
    )
    CHARLES P. HOOPS,                                 )      THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    )      OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    Defendant-Respondent                       )      BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    )
    and                                               )
    )
    NADIHOOPS, LLC, an Idaho limited                  )
    liability company                                 )
    )
    Intervenor-Respondent.                     )
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
    Boundary County. Hon. Steven C. Verby, District Judge.
    Judgment of the district court granting quiet title, affirmed.
    Judith H. Beaudet, Bonners Ferry, pro se appellant.
    Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., Brent C. Featherston, Sandpoint, for respondents.
    ________________________________________________
    GUTIERREZ, Judge
    Judith H. Beaudet appeals the district court’s judgment granting quiet title in favor of
    Hoops and effectively denying her claims for relief.
    I.
    BACKGROUND
    On December 2, 2000, Beaudet and Hoops entered into a limited partnership agreement
    for the purpose of acquiring and holding a piece of property in Boundary County. In 2003,
    Beaudet executed and recorded a quitclaim deed to Hoops. Beaudet received $20,000 from
    Hoops for the purchase of her interest in the property. Hoops also provided Beaudet with an
    option to buy back her interest in the property by paying him back the $20,000. Subsequently,
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    Beaudet attempted to negotiate her option to buy back the property by offering Hoops $5,000 to
    put her one-half interest back into the land contract with a $15,000 balance due to Hoops at the
    time of sale to a third-party buyer. Hoops rejected the offer.
    Beaudet filed a complaint with the district court alleging that she is the sole owner of the
    property, a limited partnership defines the parties’ intent regarding the property, and that Hoops
    blocked her from exercising her option to buy back the property. After a two-day court trial, the
    district court determined that Beaudet signed the quitclaim deed, and thereby quitclaimed all
    right, title, and interest in the property, and that Beaudet did not exercise her option to buy back
    her interest in the property, but instead tried to renegotiate the option terms. The district court
    further determined that the option was void as a matter of law since it failed to include a deadline
    or time for performance. Beaudet now appeals.
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    When this Court reviews a lower court’s decision, it determines whether the findings of
    fact support the conclusions of law. Anderson v. Larsen, 
    136 Idaho 402
    , 405, 
    34 P.3d 1085
    ,
    1088 (2001). While we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial and
    competent evidence, we exercise free review of the trial court’s conclusions of law. State v.
    Clark, 
    135 Idaho 255
    , 257, 
    16 P.3d 931
    , 933 (2000).
    III.
    DISCUSSION
    Beaudet’s opening brief contains twenty issues and, as best as can be determined, sets
    forth the following arguments: the district court’s judgment and writs were improperly entered
    and enforced; Beaudet has been denied the right to appeal; the district court erred in evaluating
    the credibility of the testimony presented; the district court improperly admitted an exhibit
    during trial; the district court aggregated the existing contract to a third party; Beaudet executed
    the quitclaim deed under duress; and Hoops is not entitled to attorney fees and costs. Within
    these numerous issues, Beaudet fails to develop any coherent arguments accompanied with
    authority to support any of her claims. It is well established that an appellate court will not
    consider a claim of error that is not supported by both argument and citation to authority. State
    v. Grazian, 
    144 Idaho 510
    , 518, 
    164 P.3d 790
    , 798 (2007); State v. Zichko, 
    129 Idaho 259
    , 263,
    
    923 P.2d 966
    , 970 (1996) (stating when issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of
    2
    law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered). A party waives an issue cited on
    appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking. Zichko, 
    129 Idaho at 263
    , 
    923 P.2d at 970
    . However, in the interest of providing some clarity, we address certain
    issues that stand out.
    Beaudet asserts that the district court’s judgment and writs of restitution and possession
    were improperly entered and enforced. She argues that they were based on the wrong judgment
    day and were not signed or filed. Beaudet fails to provide any citations to the record or
    elsewhere to show that these items were improperly entered. See I.A.R. 35(a)(6) (stating that the
    argument section of the brief must contain “citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the
    transcript and record relied upon”). Beaudet further argues that she has been denied the right to
    appeal. As this case is currently being reviewed by this Court, it is hard to see how Beaudet has
    been denied this right. To the extent Beaudet is arguing that she was denied the right to appeal
    her writ of restitution and writ of possession, those issues were subsumed into her motion for
    stay of execution of the judgment, which was denied at the trial court level as well as the
    appellate level.
    Beaudet asserts that the district court erred in evaluating the credibility of the testimony
    presented because “the judge relied on his ‘common sense’ to reach a decision.” At the end of
    the trial, the district court stated: “As a judge, I have to make a decision at the end of the day
    what’s more probably likely to have happened than not happened. I resort to common sense, the
    law, in making that decision.” The district court then went on to state that after listening and
    watching Beaudet’s testimony, there were things that she did and said that made portions of her
    testimony suspicious, such as when she was asked if her signature was on the quitclaim deed.
    The district court noted that there were long pauses and it appeared that Beaudet was trying to
    figure out a way to deny it was her signature. This is the type of decision the judge was referring
    to when he stated that he would rely on common sense and the law. When examined in context,
    it is clear that the judge was not relying solely on his common sense to make decisions. The
    district court did not err in evaluating the credibility of the testimony.
    Beaudet asserts that Exhibit A, which was the quitclaim deed, was switched during trial
    and that she was unable to prepare argument with regard to the new Exhibit A. However, when
    Hoops’ counsel moved to admit Exhibit A, Beaudet made no objection on the basis that the
    exhibit was switched, nor has she offered any evidence to prove as much. See State v. Fodge,
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    121 Idaho 192
    , 195, 
    824 P.2d 123
    , 126 (1992); Small v. State, 
    132 Idaho 327
    , 331, 
    971 P.2d 1151
    , 1155 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that issues not raised below are not preserved for appeal).
    Beaudet additionally argues that the district court aggregated the existing contract to a third party
    and it is unclear as to what Beaudet is referring to in this instance.
    For the first time on appeal, Beaudet asserts that she was coerced into executing the
    quitclaim deed. She argues that she was denied the opportunity to present evidence of coercion,
    duress, or threat. Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on
    appeal. Fodge, 
    121 Idaho at 195
    , 
    824 P.2d at 126
    ; Small, 132 Idaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155.
    Nevertheless, the record does not support Beaudet’s argument that she was denied the
    opportunity to present evidence of duress. During the trial, Beaudet was repeatedly asked if she
    wanted to present rebuttal evidence or testimony in response to Hoops’ testimony that she freely
    and voluntarily signed the quitclaim deed. Beaudet declined the opportunity to present evidence
    or testimony on the issue of coercion.
    Finally, Beaudet argues that Hoops is not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
    An award of attorney fees may be granted under I.C. § 12-121 to the prevailing party and such an
    award is appropriate when the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has been
    brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Rendon v. Paskett, 
    126 Idaho 944
    , 945, 
    894 P.2d 775
    ,776 (Ct. App. 1995). Beaudet has brought this appeal without so
    much as a cite to the record or any relevant authority. Moreover, she has not presented a cogent
    argument for any of her claims.          The appeal was frivolous, unreasonable, and without
    foundation. Therefore, we award Hoops, the prevailing party, attorney fees and costs as a matter
    of right under I.A.R. 41.
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    There has been no showing of reversible trial error. The district court’s judgment in
    favor of Hoops is affirmed. Costs and attorney fees are awarded to Hoops on appeal.
    Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
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