State v. Alese Syrene Stewart ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 36079
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 464
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: May 13, 2010
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
ALESE SYRENE STEWART-MYERS, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonneville County. Hon. Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge.
Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified four-year sentence
with one-year determinate term for second degree kidnapping, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
______________________________________________
Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; GRATTON, Judge;
and MELANSON, Judge
PER CURIAM
Alese Syrene Stewart-Myers was found guilty of second degree kidnapping. I.C. §§ 18-
4501(1), 18-4503. The district court imposed a unified four-year sentence with a one-year
determinate term, but suspended the sentence and placed Stewart-Myers on probation.1
Following several violations of her probation, the district court revoked probation, sent Stewart-
Myers to participate in the rider program and ultimately and placed Stewart-Myers back on
probation. Subsequently, Stewart-Myers admitted to violating several terms of the probation,
and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original
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Stewart-Myers was also found guilty and sentenced for aiding and abetting an assault.
However, that judgment of conviction and sentence is not an issue on this appeal.
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sentence. Stewart-Myers appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in
revoking probation and that the sentence is excessive.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772
P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation
has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the
court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at
326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A
decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court
abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328.
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review
and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well
established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822
P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-
73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id.Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering
execution of Stewart-Myers’s original sentence without modification. Therefore, the order
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revoking probation and directing execution of Stewart-Myers’s previously suspended sentence is
affirmed.
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