DHW v. Khurana ( 2019 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 46030
    IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH                     )
    AND WELFARE,                                   )    Filed: June 19, 2019
    )
    Plaintiff-Respondent,                   )    Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
    )
    v.                                             )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    PRAVEEN KEVIN KHURANA,                         )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    )
    Defendant-Appellant,                    )
    )
    and                                            )
    )
    JOHN WILLIAM PERRY,                            )
    )
    Defendant.                              )
    Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Nez
    Perce County. Hon. Jay P. Gaskill, District Judge.
    Judgment of the district court, affirmed. Attorney fees and costs awarded to
    respondent.
    Praveen Kevin Khurana; Lewiston, pro se appellant.
    Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Douglas E. Fleenor, Deputy
    Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
    ________________________________________________
    GRATTON, Chief Judge
    Praveen Kevin Khurana appeals from the district court’s order granting summary
    judgment, which voided deeds giving the appellant an interest in real property. We affirm.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    This appeal is the result of a Medicaid estate recovery action brought by the Idaho
    Department of Health and Welfare (Department). Delores Adamson, a Medicaid recipient,
    applied for and was provided with $239,781.80 in medical benefits. During the years before her
    death, Adamson made numerous transfers of her real property some involving Khurana. Upon
    1
    Adamson’s death, the Department filed a complaint seeking to set aside these transfers so it
    could recover the benefits from Adamson’s estate. It eventually moved for summary judgment
    claiming Adamson’s transfers were in contravention of state and federal law. Specifically, it
    asserted that because Adamson never received adequate consideration for the property, the
    transfers were voidable. The district court granted the motion and entered a final judgment;
    voiding the conveyances to Khurana. 1 Khurana timely appeals.
    II.
    ANALYSIS
    Khurana asserts numerous issues on appeal. However, as pointed out by the Department,
    none are properly supported by argument. A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument
    or authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 
    130 Idaho 122
    , 128, 
    937 P.2d 434
    , 440 (Ct. App.
    1997). “A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without specific
    reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue.” Bach v. Bagley, 
    148 Idaho 784
    , 790, 
    229 P.3d 1146
    , 1152 (2010). Khurana lists twenty-three issues but fails to
    mention most in his argument. Those that are mentioned fail to assign error to the district court
    and are not supported by any relevant authority. Without such support, we will not consider
    these assertions in detail. 2
    However, even if we were to consider them, it appears from the record that the district
    court did not err in granting summary judgment because Khurana failed to raise a genuine issue
    of material fact. On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of
    material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 
    111 Idaho 851
    , 852, 
    727 P.2d 1279
    , 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).
    Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
    the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    1
    John William Perry’s interest is no longer at issue as he transferred any interest he had in
    the property to Khurana in 2018.
    2
    Pro se litigants are not entitled to special consideration or leniency because they
    represent themselves. To the contrary, it is well-established that courts will apply the same
    standards and rules whether or not a party is represented by an attorney and that pro se litigants
    must follow the same rules, including the rules of procedure. Michalk v. Michalk, 
    148 Idaho 224
    , 229, 
    220 P.3d 580
    , 585 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted); Suitts v. Nix, 
    141 Idaho 706
    , 709, 
    117 P.3d 120
    , 123 (2005); Twin Falls Cnty. v. Coates, 
    139 Idaho 442
    , 445, 
    80 P.3d 1043
    , 1046 (2003).
    2
    moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
    The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Stoddart v.
    Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 
    149 Idaho 679
    , 683, 
    239 P.3d 784
    , 788 (2010).      Khurana did not
    provide any information that demonstrated the transfers were valid or that adequate consideration
    was provided. 3 Without any evidence to support his argument it is unlikely the district court
    erred in granting summary judgment.
    III.
    ATTORNEY FEES
    The Department requests attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117(1), arguing
    Khurana acted unreasonably in bringing this appeal. The statute provides:
    [I]n any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political
    subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court
    hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
    reasonable attorney’s fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds
    that the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
    Because Khurana’s claims amount to conclusory statements without assignment of specific error,
    we cannot say they have a reasonable basis in fact or law. Consequently, as a state agency and
    the prevailing party, the Department is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    Khurana’s claims on appeal will not be considered by this Court because he has failed to
    support them with relevant argument and authority. We therefore affirm the district court’s
    judgment. Attorney fees and costs on appeal are awarded to the Department.
    Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.
    3
    The district court properly considered whether Adamson’s property was disposed of
    without adequate consideration. Having concluded Adamson did not receive adequate
    consideration, it was required to void those transfers pursuant to I.C. § 56-218(2): “Khurana
    failed to provide evidence to support his argument that adequate consideration was received for
    the transfer. . . . Where that has not been done in this case, summary judgment is appropriate.”
    3