State v. Lane ( 2022 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 49028
    STATE OF IDAHO,                                )
    )    Filed: July 1, 2022
    Plaintiff-Respondent,                   )
    )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
    v.                                             )
    )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    KEVIN DAVID LANE,                              )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    Defendant-Appellant.                    )
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
    Kootenai County. Hon. Scott Wayman, District Judge.
    Judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver
    and delivery of a controlled substance, affirmed.
    Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kiley A. Heffner, Deputy
    Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
    Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney
    General, Boise, for respondent.
    ________________________________________________
    GRATTON, Judge
    Kevin David Lane appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
    methamphetamine with intent to deliver and delivery of a controlled substance. Lane challenges
    the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the affidavit in support of the
    search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. We affirm.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Lane was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine, 
    Idaho Code § 37
    -2732B(a)(4)(A).
    The charge arose after Detective Ryan Jacobson submitted an affidavit and application for search
    warrant to search a home in Post Falls. In the affidavit, Detective Jacobson stated that he had
    “received information from a proven reliable, confidential source that Kevin Lane was trafficking
    methamphetamine” out of his home. Based upon the tip, Detective Jacobson ran a driver’s license
    1
    query and confirmed the identified house was Lane’s “listed address.” Detective Jacobson then
    “conducted a trash pull” at the home and reported:
    I sorted through the garbage and found items of note: Numerous pieces of
    mail addressed to Kevin Lane at [the home]. I located a small, yellow plastic baggie
    which was consistent with baggies commonly used to hold controlled substance in
    the drug trade. I observed a white crystalline residue in the baggie which I field
    tested. The substance tested presumptive positive for amphetamine. I also
    observed two quart sized zip locked bags. Both of these bags were turned inside
    out and were wet as if they had been washed. This is a common tactic used by
    people who dispose of drug baggies in an attempt to prevent the discovery of
    controlled substances. It would not make sense for someone to wash a plastic
    baggie that was to be disposed of. The other quart sized baggie had been cut and
    had “1 lb” written on it.
    Detective Jacobson noted in the affidavit that the size of bags found in the trash were “much
    larger than a normal drug baggie used by consumers of controlled substances, would be more
    consistent with a baggie used by drug traffickers, and could contain a pound of controlled
    substances such as methamphetamine.” Additionally, the trash also contained Q-tips and Kleenex
    with black residue on them, which were similar in appearance to items frequently used for cleaning
    drug pipes.
    Based on the accumulation of evidence, the magistrate court issued a search warrant for
    the residence. When officers arrived to execute the search warrant, Lane was detained at the door
    and read his Miranda1 rights. He then made a series of incriminating statements to the officers,
    including they were likely to find an “[o]unce or so” of methamphetamine in a specific drawer in
    the home. A complete search of the residence yielded multiple bags of methamphetamine along
    with various drug remnants and drug paraphernalia.
    Lane filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. In
    the motion, Lane claimed the search warrant was not sufficiently supported by probable cause
    because Detective Jacobson failed to state why the confidential informant was reliable and because
    the evidence discovered in the garbage pull was stale and not indicative of trafficking. Therefore,
    he argued that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Lane’s
    motion to suppress and held that the search was proper because the search warrant was supported
    by probable cause. The parties then entered into a plea agreement in which Lane pled guilty to
    reduced charges of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A),
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
    2
    methamphetamine delivery, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), and he reserved his right to appeal from the
    district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Lane timely appeals.
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
    to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
    substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
    as found. State v. Atkinson, 
    128 Idaho 559
    , 561, 
    916 P.2d 1284
    , 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
    suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
    weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
    
    127 Idaho 102
    , 106, 
    897 P.2d 993
    , 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 
    132 Idaho 786
    , 789, 
    979 P.2d 659
    , 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
    III.
    ANALYSIS
    Lane asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the
    affidavit failed to establish probable cause.
    When probable cause to issue a search warrant is challenged on appeal, the reviewing
    court’s function is to ensure that the magistrate court had a substantial basis for concluding that
    probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238-39 (1983); State v. Josephson, 
    123 Idaho 790
    , 792, 
    852 P.2d 1387
    , 1389 (1993); State v. Lang, 
    105 Idaho 683
    , 684, 
    672 P.2d 561
    ,
    562 (1983). In this evaluation, great deference is paid to the magistrate court’s determination.
    Gates, 
    462 U.S. at 236
    ; State v. Wilson, 
    130 Idaho 213
    , 215, 
    938 P.2d 1251
    , 1253 (Ct. App. 1997).
    The test for reviewing the magistrate court’s decision is whether the court abused its discretion in
    finding that probable cause existed. State v. Holman, 
    109 Idaho 382
    , 387, 
    707 P.2d 493
    , 498 (Ct.
    App. 1985). When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, the burden of proof is on the
    defendant to show that the search was invalid. State v. Kelly, 
    106 Idaho 268
    , 275, 
    678 P.2d 60
    , 67
    (Ct. App. 1984).
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
    effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
    warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
    3
    particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
    seized.
    Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth
    Amendment, except that “oath or affirmation” is termed “affidavit.” Therefore, in order for a
    search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that evidence or fruits
    of a crime may be found in a particular place. Josephson, 
    123 Idaho at 792-93
    , 
    852 P.2d at
    1389-
    90.
    Probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care
    and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that a person is guilty of a
    crime. See State v. Julian, 
    129 Idaho 133
    , 136, 
    922 P.2d 1059
    , 1062 (1996). Probable cause is
    not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction. 
    Id.
     Rather, probable cause deals
    with the factual and practical considerations on which reasonable and prudent persons act.
    Brinegar v. United States, 
    338 U.S. 160
    , 175 (1949); Julian, 
    129 Idaho at 136
    , 
    922 P.2d at 1062
    .
    Lane argues that the affidavit did not establish probable cause because the confidential
    informant tip did not include the basis of knowledge and the evidence found during the garbage
    search was stale and not indicative of trafficking. The State argues that although the information
    related to the confidential informant tip was sparse, it may still be considered in the probable cause
    analysis. Furthermore, the State argues that, even disregarding the tip, there was still probable
    cause based upon the evidence from the garbage pull. The State contends the evidence was not
    stale because drug trafficking is continuous in nature.
    Based upon the affidavit, there were essentially two sources of information from which
    probable cause could be found: (1) the statements made by the confidential informant; and (2) the
    results of the garbage pull and Detective Jacobson’s explanation of their significance.
    Probable cause is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances and making a
    practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
    before the court, there is a fair probability that contraband or other evidence of a crime will be
    found in a particular place. Gates, 
    462 U.S. at 238
    ; Lang, 
    105 Idaho at 684
    , 
    672 P.2d at 562
    . In
    adopting this “totality of the circumstances” test in Gates, the United States Supreme Court
    abandoned a previous standard developed in Aguilar v. Texas, 
    378 U.S. 108
     (1964) and Spinelli
    v. United States, 
    393 U.S. 410
     (1969), which required that the government demonstrate both the
    informant’s veracity and the informant’s basis of knowledge. Gates, 
    462 U.S. at 238
    . In State v.
    4
    Chapple, 
    124 Idaho 525
    , 528, 
    861 P.2d 95
    , 98 (Ct. App. 1993), we explained the effect of
    the Gates decision:
    [T]he Court did not completely abandon the two-pronged test of Aguilar-
    Spinelli but suggested that the two prongs are closely intertwined, so that “a
    deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of
    a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”
    [Gates], 
    462 U.S. at 233
    . Thus, while the “totality of the circumstances” has
    eliminated the rigid requirements of “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” derived
    from the Aguilar-Spinelli decisions, these standards remain a useful first step in
    evaluating probable cause where the information is derived, at least in part, from
    an undisclosed informant. State v. Prestwich, 
    110 Idaho 966
    , 
    719 P.2d 1226
     (Ct.
    App. 1986); State v. Schaffer, 
    107 Idaho 812
    , 817, 
    693 P.2d 458
    , 463 (Ct. App.
    1984).
    As noted, Detective Jacobson did not identify the confidential informant but stated that the
    information was provided by a known, proven, reliable source. In State v. Peterson, 
    133 Idaho 44
    ,
    48 n.1, 
    981 P.2d 1154
    , 1158 n.1 (Ct. App. 1999), this Court stated that the presence or absence of
    disclosure of the informant’s identity “cannot possibly affect the informant’s truthfulness.” In
    State v. Patterson, 
    139 Idaho 858
    , 
    87 P.3d 967
     (Ct. App. 2003), we further indicated that the
    informant’s veracity or reliability can be established through the credibility of the informant or the
    specific information provided. 
    Id. at 864
    , 87 P.3d at 973. The State concedes the information
    provided by Detective Jacobson as to the confidential tip was sparse. The district court found that
    the tip should be afforded “very little weight” in the probable cause analysis. However, ascribing
    some weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis remains appropriate.
    As to the garbage pull, Lane argues the evidence was stale and insufficient to indicate
    trafficking and, as a result, could not provide probable cause. However, there exists no magical
    number of days within which information is fresh and after which the information becomes stale.
    State v. Gomez, 
    101 Idaho 802
    , 808, 
    623 P.2d 110
    , 116 (1980). Rather, each case must be
    evaluated in light of the circumstances. 
    Id.
     An important factor in the staleness analysis is the
    nature of the criminal conduct. 
    Id.
     If the affidavit recounts criminal activities of a continuous
    nature, a time delay in the sequence of events is of less significance. State v. Alexander, 
    138 Idaho 18
    , 24, 
    56 P.3d 780
    , 786 (Ct. App. 2002).
    In regard to the significance of the garbage pull, Lane likens his case to Josephson, 
    123 Idaho at 794
    , 
    852 P.2d at 1391
    . In Josephson, the affidavit of probable cause alleged Josephson
    was growing marijuana in his home and provided information from an anonymous tip and evidence
    from a garbage pull. 
    Id. at 792
    , 
    852 P.2d at 1389
    . The tip was determined to be insufficient
    5
    because it lacked the basis of knowledge, veracity, and any corroborating evidence. 
    Id. at 793
    ,
    
    852 P.2d at 1390
    . The garbage pull seized, “mail recently sent to Josephson, two marijuana
    cigarette butts, an empty pack of ‘Zig-Zag’ rolling papers, a bag apparently containing marijuana
    residue, and five plant stems ranging in length from one and one-half inches to two and one-half
    inches which field-tested positive for marijuana.” 
    Id.
     Both the district court and the Idaho
    Supreme Court found this evidence was indicative of someone smoking marijuana at one point in
    time but failed to support probable cause of growing marijuana. 
    Id. at 794
    , 
    852 P.2d at 1391
    . An
    individual smoking one time did not suggest there would be contraband found in the home at the
    time of the search. 
    Id. at 795
    , 
    852 P.2d at 1392
    . Since a search of Josephson’s trash did not yield
    any evidence that indicated a crime continuous in nature, the affidavit failed to provide probable
    cause to issue a search warrant for his home. 
    Id.
    This case is distinct from Josephson.          First, the anonymous tip in Josephson was
    insufficient while Detective Jacobson’s confidential tip was limited but reliable. Plus, the evidence
    found in the garbage pull corroborated the confidential informant’s tip that Lane was trafficking
    methamphetamine. Second, Detective Jacobson’s garbage pull indicated drug trafficking rather
    than personal use.    Detective Jacobson discovered three baggies in Lane’s trash that were
    consistent with those commonly used to hold controlled substances in the drug trade. The small
    baggie tested presumptive positive for amphetamine in a field test and the two other quart size zip
    lock bags appeared to have been washed out in a manner typical of one attempting to evade drug
    detection. Detective Jacobson averred that the size of the washed out zip locks and the “1 lb” label
    written on one of them were also of significance relative to drug trafficking. As Detective
    Jacobson explained in his report, large bags such as those are inconsistent with personal drug use
    and are indicative of trafficking large amounts of illegal substances.
    Based on the totality of the facts, including the confidential informant’s tip, the officer’s
    training and experience, and the items discovered in Lane’s trash, the affidavit provided probable
    cause that evidence of drug trafficking would be discovered in Lane’s home.
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    The search warrant was supported by probable cause. Thus, the district court did not err
    when it denied Lane’s motion to suppress. We, therefore, affirm Lane’s judgment of conviction.
    Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.
    6