PA Department of Heath v. Wallace McKelvey and PennLive ( 2018 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Pennsylvania Department of Health,              :
    Petitioner                     :
    :
    v.                               :
    :
    Wallace McKelvey and PennLive,                  :   No. 1372 C.D. 2017
    Respondents                     :   Submitted: June 22, 2018
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                             FILED: September 27, 2018
    The Pennsylvania Department of Health (Department) petitions for
    review of the August 31, 2017 Final Determination of the Office of Open Records
    (OOR) granting the request of Wallace McKelvey, a reporter for PennLive,
    (Requester) and ordering the Department to provide all responsive records within 30
    days. We affirm.
    On May 9, 2017, Requester submitted a request to the Department
    pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1 seeking “[t]he names, job titles and
    departments of the panel that is reviewing and scoring applications for
    grower/processor and dispensary permits under the medical marijuana program[]”
    (Request). Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a; see also R.R. at 5a; Final Determination
    1
    Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
    at 1, R.R. at 36a. The Department denied the Request, stating that the requested
    information is exempt from disclosure under Pennsylvania regulations governing the
    medical marijuana program. Requester appealed to the OOR. The OOR invited the
    parties to supplement the record and directed the Department to notify third parties
    of their ability to participate in the appeal. Final Determination at 2, R.R. at 37a.
    The Department responded, reiterating its position that the information was exempt
    from disclosure under its regulations, and arguing that the information was also
    exempt because disclosure would threaten the personal security of the panel
    members.2 See id.; R.R. at 16a-20a. The Department also submitted the affidavit of
    John Collins (Collins), Director of the Office of Medical Marijuana. R.R. at 24a-
    25a.       Subsequently, the OOR requested a supplemental affidavit from the
    Department to address whether all applications are reviewed by all panel members
    of a single review panel. R.R. at 28a; see Final Determination at 2, R.R. at 37a. The
    Department replied, stating that it could not directly address the roles of individual
    reviewers, but it offered a supplemental affidavit from Collins (Affidavit) in an
    attempt to provide responsive information. R.R. at 28a; see Final Determination at
    2, R.R. at 37a.
    After review, the OOR rejected the Department’s argument that the
    requested information was exempt under the Department’s regulation, 28 Pa. Code
    § 1141.35(c), which at the relevant time provided, “[t]he applicant may not obtain
    the names or any other information relating to persons reviewing applications,
    including a reviewer’s individual application reviews.” See Final Determination at
    4-6. The OOR noted that the Medical Marijuana Act (Act)3 and its implementing
    2
    The Department is permitted to assert additional grounds for denial on appeal before the
    OOR. See Levy v. Senate of Pa., 
    65 A.3d 361
    , 383 (Pa. 2013).
    3
    Act of April 17, 2017, P.L. 84, 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101 – 10231.2110.
    2
    regulations make certain information expressly confidential, and that the regulation
    on which the Department relies is not contained within any confidentiality provision,
    but, rather, is contained within a section addressing the denial of permits under the
    Act. 
    Id. The OOR
    concluded that the regulation’s express terms make application
    reviewer information confidential only with respect to: (i) an applicant for a permit;
    and (ii) applicants whose applications have been denied. 
    Id. at 5.
                 The OOR recognized that an interpretation which prohibits only denied
    applicants from obtaining application reviewer information, but allows other
    members of the public to obtain such information, could produce an absurd result
    because a denied applicant could easily obtain such information through a third
    party. 
    Id. The OOR
    reasoned, however, that if not all panel members are responsible
    for reviewing all applications, it is possible to reconcile Section 1141.35(c) with the
    confidentiality provisions found in Section 1141.22 of the Department’s regulations,
    28 Pa. Code § 1141.22, which do not make review panel information confidential.
    In particular, an applicant might be able to determine panel members but would not
    be aware of the individual panel members who denied an application. The OOR
    noted that the Department refused to answer the OOR’s questions concerning
    whether the entire panel of reviewers or a subset of the panel reviewed each
    application, and therefore, the OOR inferred that not all panel members review each
    application. Final Determination at 5-6.
    The OOR also rejected the Department’s argument that disclosure of
    the information would threaten personal security. 
    Id. at 6.
    The OOR noted that the
    Department’s only evidence in support of this exemption was Collins’ Affidavit and
    concluded that it was too conclusory and speculative to support the claimed
    exemption. 
    Id. 3 Accordingly,
    the OOR ordered the Department to provide all
    responsive records to Requester within 30 days. The Department now petitions this
    Court for review of the OOR’s Final Determination.4
    With respect to the regulation under which the Department claims the
    records are exempt, 28 Pa. Code § 1141.35(c), we note that after the Department
    filed its appeal with this Court and both parties briefed the matter, the Department
    issued amended temporary regulations amending, among other things, Chapter 1141
    of Title 28 of the Pennsylvania Code, which includes the regulation at issue.5 See
    48 Pa.B. 2767 (May 12, 2018).
    This Court issued an order on May 17, 2018, directing the parties to file
    supplemental briefs “addressing the effect, if any, of the amended temporary
    regulations” on the pending matter, and the parties complied. In its supplemental
    brief, the Department argues that the changes in its temporary regulations have no
    impact on this case, one of the reasons being that the regulations were amended
    subsequent to Requester’s Request and the amended regulatory section was not
    4
    In reviewing a final determination of the OOR involving a Commonwealth agency, this
    Court’s standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is broad or plenary. Bowling v.
    Office of Open Records, 
    75 A.3d 453
    , 467-68 (Pa. 2013).
    5
    The amended regulations were published May 12, 2018, effective May 17, 2018. 48
    Pa.B. 2767 (May 12, 2018). Relevant here, the regulation previously promulgated at 28 Pa. Code
    § 1141.35(c) has been deleted. Additionally, Section 1141.22(b) was amended to provide:
    The following information is considered confidential, is not subject
    to the Right-to-Know Law . . .
    ...
    [t]he names and any other information relating to persons
    reviewing permit applications, including a reviewer’s
    individual permit application reviews and notes.
    48 Pa.B. 2771 (May 12, 2018); see also 28 Pa. Code § 1141.22(b)(11).
    4
    made retroactive. We agree with the Department that the amended regulations do
    not affect the disposition of this case for that reason.
    It is an undisputed rule of statutory construction that
    statutes, other than those affecting procedural matters,
    must be construed prospectively except where the
    legislative intent that they shall act retrospectively is so
    clear as to preclude all question as to the intention of the
    legislature. . . . This principle has been promulgated as law
    by our legislature in 1 Pa. C.S. § 1926, which provides:
    No statute shall [be] construed to be retroactive
    unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the
    General Assembly.
    This rule has been applied to the regulations of
    administrative agencies.
    R & P Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    541 A.2d 432
    , 434 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)
    (citations omitted). Here, the amended temporary regulations at issue do not affect
    procedural matters, and, as the Department points out, they were not made
    retroactive. Accordingly, in deciding this matter, we will apply the temporary
    regulations as they existed on the date of Requester’s Request, and our decision will
    not apply or interpret the amended temporary regulations.
    A principle underlying the RTKL is to allow citizens to scrutinize
    government activity and increase transparency. SWB Yankees LLC v. Wintermantel,
    
    45 A.3d 1029
    , 1034, 1050 (Pa. 2012) (stating the RTKL “is remedial legislation
    designed to promote access to official government information in order to prohibit
    secrets, scrutinize the actions of public officials, and make public officials
    accountable for their actions” (quoting Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 
    990 A.2d 5
    813, 824 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), aff’d, 
    75 A.3d 453
    (Pa. 2013))). To that end, the
    RTKL provides that records in the possession of an agency are presumed to be
    public. Section 305(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.305(a). That presumption does
    not apply, however, if: “(1) the record is exempt under Section 708; (2) the record is
    protected by a privilege; or (3) the record is exempt from disclosure under any other
    Federal or State law or regulation . . . .” 65 P.S. § 67.305(a). “Exemptions from
    disclosure must be narrowly construed due to the RTKL’s remedial nature . . . .”
    Office of Governor v. Scolforo, 
    65 A.3d 1095
    , 1100 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “An agency
    bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a record is
    exempt from disclosure under one of the enumerated exceptions.”6 Brown v. Pa.
    Dep’t of State, 
    123 A.3d 801
    , 804 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); see Section 708(a)(1) of the
    RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708(a)(1).
    Here, the Department argues that the records are exempt under the
    Department’s regulation at 28 Pa. Code § 1141.35(c), which prohibits disclosure of
    the names or any other information relating to persons reviewing applications, and
    under the personal security exemption in Section 708(b)(1)(ii) of the RTKL, 65 P.S.
    § 67.708(b)(1)(ii).
    1. Whether the Records are Exempt from Disclosure under the
    Department’s Regulations
    The Department first argues that the information is exempt under its
    regulation, 28 Pa. Code § 1141.35(c), and that the OOR should have given deference
    to the Department’s interpretation of its own regulation. The Department maintains
    that the plain language of its regulation prohibits disclosure. The Department further
    6
    “A preponderance of the evidence standard, the lowest evidentiary standard, is
    tantamount to a more likely than not inquiry.” Delaware County v. Schaefer ex rel. Phila. Inquirer,
    
    45 A.3d 1149
    , 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
    6
    argues that the OOR erroneously concluded that the regulation only prohibits
    applicants who had been denied permits from obtaining the information, thereby
    unduly restricting the application of the regulation to those who have submitted an
    application. The Department also argues disclosure of the information would
    produce an absurd result because those who are prohibited from obtaining the
    information could simply have a third party obtain the information and then provide
    it to an applicant. The Department warns that such subterfuge is already being
    attempted and maintains that such machinations would eviscerate the purpose of the
    regulation and diminish the Department’s ability to preserve the integrity of the
    scoring process by limiting improper outside influences. The Department further
    points out that Requester is a reporter for PennLive and therefore has the ability to
    publish the information, thereby making it available to all applicants, which is
    prohibited and which could jeopardize the integrity of the process. The Department
    points out that, as stated in Collins’ Affidavit, it has not completed the permitting
    process and intends to use the same review panel for future permitting; therefore, the
    identities of the panel must remain confidential from future applicants.          The
    Department maintains that if it is required to construct a second review panel, there
    would likely be delays in granting permits and, thus, getting medical marijuana into
    the hands of patients, which is inconsistent with the General Assembly’s mandate
    for prompt implementation of the Act.
    As stated, records of a government agency are presumed to be public
    and subject to disclosure. See 65 P.S. § 67.305(a). At the time of Requester’s
    Request, both the Act and the Department’s regulations contained provisions which
    provided that certain information is considered confidential and not subject to the
    RTKL. See Sections 302(a) and 701(c) of the Act, 35 P.S. §§ 10231.302(a) &
    7
    10231.701(c); 28 Pa. Code §§ 1131.6 & 1141.22(b) (2016). However, none of those
    provisions makes information regarding application reviewers confidential and
    exempt from the RTKL.7
    Nonetheless, the Department claims the information is exempt under its
    regulation at 28 Pa. Code § 1141.35(c), which at the relevant time provided, “[t]he
    applicant may not obtain the names or any other information relating to persons
    reviewing applications, including a reviewer’s individual application reviews.” 28
    Pa. Code § 1141.35(c)(3) (2016).               At the time of Requester’s Request, the
    Department’s regulations defined applicant as “[a] person who wishes to submit or
    submits an application to the Department for a permit to operate as a
    grower/processor or dispensary, or both, under the act and this part.” 28 Pa. Code §
    1141.21.
    The plain language of 28 Pa. Code § 1141.35(c) applies only to
    “applicants.” The Department has failed to establish that Requester “wishes to
    submit” or “submit[ted]” a permit application to the Department and, thus, falls
    within that definition. Consequently, under the plain language of the regulation,
    Requester does not fall within the group to whom the information may not be
    released.8 Nonetheless, the Department points out that Requester is a reporter and
    speculates that he will publish the information to those applicants whose permit
    applications have been denied. While we acknowledge the possibility that the
    Department’s prediction might come to fruition, where the words of the regulation
    7
    The temporary regulation concerning confidentiality has been amended to include
    reviewer information. See supra note 5. However, as stated, the amended temporary regulations
    do not apply to the matter sub judice.
    8
    Thus, while we interpret this provision to apply to all applicants rather than only denied
    applicants, as the OOR stated, we agree with the OOR that Requester cannot be denied the records.
    8
    are plain, we may not disregard the letter of it under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
    See Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b);
    Pa. Dep’t of Corr./State Corr. Inst.-Somerset v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
    (Kirchner), 
    805 A.2d 633
    , 635 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (stating rules of statutory
    construction apply to regulations as well as statutes). Moreover, had the Department
    intended to restrict those beyond “applicant[s]” from obtaining reviewer
    information, it could have explicitly said so.9 To adopt the interpretation that the
    Department advocates here would require this Court to insert additional language
    into the regulation or otherwise rewrite the regulation. We may not do that. Further,
    because the Department’s interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of
    the regulation, we reject the Department’s argument that its interpretation of its
    regulation is entitled to deference. See Lancaster County v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd.,
    
    94 A.3d 979
    , 986 (Pa. 2014) (stating that an administrative agency’s interpretation
    is to be given controlling weight unless it is inconsistent with the statute itself or the
    statute is unambiguous); Seeton v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 
    937 A.2d 1028
    , 1037 (Pa.
    2007) (stating deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute never comes into
    play when the statute is clear and recognizing the dangers of deferring to
    interpretations developed in anticipation of litigation).
    Additionally, even assuming for the sake of argument that the words of
    the regulation were not explicit, thereby making it appropriate for this Court to look
    beyond its language and consider factors such as the consequences of the OOR’s
    9
    For example, we note that elsewhere in its regulations, the Department employs the term
    “person” which is seemingly all encompassing. See, e.g., 28 Pa. Code § 1141.23 (limiting number
    of permits issued to one person). The regulations define person as “[a] natural person, corporation,
    foundation, organization, business trust, estate, limited liability company, licensed corporation,
    trust, partnership, limited liability partnership, association or other form of legal business entity.”
    28 Pa. Code § 1141.21.
    9
    interpretation,10 we agree with the OOR that its interpretation does not lead to an
    absurd result. The OOR acknowledged that if the public at large can obtain
    application reviewer information, a denied applicant could easily obtain that
    information through the use of a third party. Final Determination at 5. However,
    there is nothing in the record to establish that the release of the information would
    identify the specific panel member or members who reviewed the application and
    denied it. As such, there is no absurd result here that would compel this Court to
    interpret the Department’s regulation differently.
    Accordingly, we agree with the OOR that the Department did not carry
    its burden to establish that the records are exempt from disclosure under its
    regulation at 28 Pa. Code § 1141.35(c).
    2. Whether the Records are Exempt from Disclosure under the
    Personal Security Exemption
    Under the exemption known as the personal security exemption, the
    RTKL protects from disclosure “[a] record, the disclosure of which … would be
    reasonably likely to result in a substantial and demonstrable risk of physical harm to
    or the personal security of an individual.” 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(1)(ii). “To establish
    this exception applies, an agency must show: (1) a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of (2)
    ‘substantial and demonstrable risk’ to a person’s security.” Governor’s Office of
    Admin. v. Purcell, 
    35 A.3d 811
    , 820 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). A substantial and
    demonstrable risk means a risk that is real and apparent. See 
    id. Additionally, the
    10
    See Section 1921(c)(6) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c)(6)
    (stating when the words of a statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be
    ascertained by considering, among other things, the consequences of a particular interpretation);
    
    Kirchner, 805 A.2d at 635
    (applying statutory construction rules to regulations).
    10
    likelihood requires more than speculation. See 
    Purcell, 35 A.3d at 820
    (stating more
    than mere conjecture is needed).
    In proceedings before the OOR, affidavits are an acceptable form of
    evidence, and statements contained in an affidavit can constitute sufficient evidence
    to sustain the agency’s burden of proof. See Moore v. Office of Open Records, 
    992 A.2d 907
    , 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). However, “[t]his Court consistently holds that
    speculation and conclusory statements in an affidavit do not show a reasonable
    likelihood of a threat to security.” Carey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    61 A.3d 376
    , 376
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); see also 
    Scolforo, 65 A.3d at 1103
    (holding conclusory
    affidavits are insufficient); Delaware County v. Schaefer ex rel. Phila. Inquirer, 
    45 A.3d 1149
    , 1158 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (stating general, broad-sweeping conclusions
    are insufficient).
    To sustain its burden that the record sought here is exempt, the
    Department offered only the affidavit of Collins. The OOR determined that this
    evidence was too conclusory and speculative and, therefore, did not support the
    claimed exemption. We agree.
    In his affidavit, Collins stated that the privacy and confidentiality of the
    review panel must be maintained. Affidavit ¶ 2, R.R. at 31a-32a. He explained that
    because the Department has not yet completed the application permitting process
    and intends to use the same review panel to review future applications, the identity
    of the reviewers must be protected from future applicants. Affidavit ¶ 6, R.R. at 32a.
    He further stated that Requester requested the information in his capacity as a
    reporter for PennLive, and therefore, it is reasonable to infer that Requester intends
    to publish the names of review panel members. Affidavit ¶ 7, R.R. at 32a. Collins
    stated that protecting the identities of the review panel members is “imperative to
    11
    ensure the integrity of the program” and that “[a]llowing current and future
    applicants access to this information may expose the Review Panel to a plethora of
    issues including, but not limited to bribes, inducements, threats, harassment and
    undue influence.” Affidavit ¶ 9, R.R. at 33a.
    Collins’ statement that disclosure of the information “may expose the
    Review Panel to a plethora of issues” is conjecture and simply too speculative.
    Additionally, the standard to establish the exemption is that the disclosure is
    “reasonably likely to result in a substantial and demonstrable risk of physical harm
    to or the personal security of an individual[,]”11 not that it may result in such.
    Consequently, the OOR did not err in concluding that Collins’ Affidavit was too
    conclusory and speculative to support the claimed exemption.
    Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the OOR’s
    determination that the Department must provide all responsive records to Requester
    within 30 days.12
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    11
    See 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added); 
    Purcell, 35 A.3d at 820
    .
    12
    The request date defines the universe of responsive documents, and the Department only
    has the duty to provide records existing on or before that date. See Uniontown Newspapers, Inc.
    v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    151 A.3d 1196
    , 1205 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Records post-dating the Request
    are not responsive regardless of their relevance to the subject matter. 
    Id. at 1204-05.
                                                     12
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Pennsylvania Department of Health,     :
    Petitioner            :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    Wallace McKelvey and PennLive,         :   No. 1372 C.D. 2017
    Respondents            :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 27th day of September, 2018, the Final Determination
    of the Office of Open Records, dated August 31, 2017, is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge