State of Tennessee v. Bobby Daniel Pettie ( 2015 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs November 12, 2014
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BOBBY DANIEL PETTIE
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County
    No. 17678 Lee Russell, Judge
    No. M2014-00113-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 28, 2015
    The Defendant, Bobby Daniel Pettie, was found guilty by a Bedford County Circuit Court
    jury of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, promotion of
    methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, possession of a firearm during the
    commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, and possession of methamphetamine,
    a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-435 (2014), 39-17-433 (2014), 39-17-1324
    (2014), 39-17-418 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to sixteen years for
    initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, six years for promotion of
    methamphetamine manufacture, six years for possession of a firearm during the commission
    of a dangerous felony, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of
    methamphetamine. The court ordered the initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine
    and the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture sentences be served concurrently with
    each other and consecutively to the possession of a firearm during the commission of a
    dangerous felony and to the possession of methamphetamine sentences, for an effective
    sentence of twenty-two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the
    Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the
    trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We
    affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    R OBERT H. M ONTGOMERY, J R., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which N ORMA
    M CG EE O GLE and C AMILLE R. M CM ULLEN, JJ., joined.
    Donna Orr Hargrove, District Public Defender; Andrew Jackson Dearing III (on appeal, at
    trial, and at sentencing), Assistant District Public Defender; Jennifer Lenore Fiola (at motion
    for new trial hearing), Assistant District Public Defender; and Alicia Nicole Napier (at
    suppression hearing), Shelbyville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bobby Daniel Pettie.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney
    General; Robert Carter, District Attorney General; and Richard A. Cawley (at trial and
    suppression hearing) and Michael D. Randles (at motion for new trial hearing), Assistant
    District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    This case arises from a traffic stop of the Defendant by Shelbyville Police Officer
    Shane George on June 26, 2012. At the trial, Officer George testified that he was assigned
    to the drug task force and was stopped at a traffic light when he saw a Harley-Davidson
    motorcycle. The driver of the motorcycle was wearing a chrome helmet, a bandana, and a
    black jacket. Although it was dark outside, the driver was wearing dark-colored sunglasses.
    The driver’s description matched that of a person who had been observed by a Dollar General
    Market employee making suspicious purchases earlier in the day. When the traffic light
    turned green, Officer George followed the motorcycle but was unable to obtain a license
    plate number because the tag was vertical.
    Officer George testified that as he followed the motorcycle, he saw it weave within
    its lane of travel, speed up, and abruptly slow down. He continued following the motorcycle,
    and he saw it abruptly move from the “fast lane” to the “slow lane.” He said another vehicle
    in the slow lane had to apply its brakes to “make a safe distance from the motorcycle.” Based
    on the motorcycle’s movements, he initiated a traffic stop. He identified the Defendant as
    the driver.
    Officer George testified that the Defendant did not have a driver’s license in his
    possession, although the Defendant claimed to have a valid license. He noted that not having
    a license in one’s possession when operating a motor vehicle was an offense and that an
    officer had discretion to arrest the driver. The Defendant explained that he thought he left
    his license at his mother’s house. Officer George told the Defendant that they could resolve
    the issue if the Defendant was willing to drive to his mother’s house to retrieve his license
    while Officer George followed him. Officer George wanted to ensure the Defendant was
    who he claimed to be, had a valid license, and did not have any outstanding arrest warrants.
    He told the Defendant that he was not free to leave and that any deviation from the route to
    his mother’s house would result in his arrest. Another officer arrived at the scene to assist
    Officer George, and all three men drove to the Defendant’s mother’s house.
    Officer George testified that after arriving at the Defendant’s mother’s house, he and
    the Defendant walked to the door, but the Defendant did not enter the house. The Defendant
    said he might have left his driver’s license inside his truck, which was parked nearby. As the
    Defendant searched the truck from the driver’s side door, Officer George used his flashlight
    -2-
    to look through the passenger-side window to help search and to “keep an eye” on the
    Defendant. The Defendant did not find his license. Officer George did not recall if the
    Defendant used a key to enter the truck.
    Officer George testified that he saw a box in the truck’s backseat containing a gallon-
    size metal container of Coleman camping fuel and that he considered the item suspicious in
    light of the Defendant’s ammonium nitrate purchase earlier that day from the Dollar General
    Market. He said the two items were used to manufacture methamphetamine. The Defendant
    walked toward his mother’s house to look for his driver’s license, and Officer George told
    the Defendant that he would permit the Defendant to look inside the house on the condition
    that the Defendant permit Officer George to enter the house. As the Defendant opened the
    door and stood in the threshold, he told Officer George that he could not permit him to enter
    the house because it belonged to his mother. At that time, Officer George smelled the odors
    of camping fuel and acid coming from inside the house, which he associated with the
    manufacture of methamphetamine based on his experience and training.
    Officer George testified that he grabbed the Defendant’s arm, told him to step outside
    the house, and told him to sit on the steps. The Defendant complied. Officer George read
    the Defendant his Miranda rights while in the presence of Officer Shelton. Upon
    questioning, the Defendant denied any methamphetamine manufacture inside the house. The
    Defendant consented to a search of his truck. Although the truck was now locked, Officer
    George used his flashlight to look inside the truck and inside the truck bed. He saw two clear
    plastic garbage bags. He saw that one of the garbage bags contained a green-colored bottle,
    which “was pressed somewhat flat.” He saw the “remnants of the lab in the bottom of the
    bottle.” He also saw a twenty-ounce drink bottle, which contained the remnants of a “gasser”
    and sulfuric acid. He said that in this instance, the gasser was rock salt.
    Officer George testified that the green bottle contained everything used to
    manufacture methamphetamine and that the bottle was called “a one pot.” He identified
    coffee filters inside the trash bags that were used to separate the methamphetamine from the
    oil and said the filters contained a residue from the filtering process. He also identified a
    hole in the cap of the bottle, which he said was used to move the gas from the container with
    the rock salt and acid to the container with the camping fuel oil. He said the gas caused the
    methamphetamine to crystalize in the oil and to settle to the bottom of the container.
    Officer George testified that he smelled sulfuric acid coming from the twenty-ounce
    bottle. He said the bottle could be reused with additional rock salt and sulfuric acid to make
    more methamphetamine and agreed the bottle was ready for use. He identified “pink balls
    of junk” in the bottom of the bottle and said that the balls contained sodium hydroxide,
    ammonium nitrate, and pseudoephedrine, which were used to make methamphetamine. He
    -3-
    said the “dark specks” in the bottom were lithium from batteries used in the manufacture
    process. He identified the one-quarter-inch tube used to connect the two containers. He
    concluded that he had found a one-pot or shake-and-bake methamphetamine laboratory.
    Officer George testified that he explained to the Defendant what he had found inside
    the bed of the Defendant’s truck and that he was under arrest. The Defendant stated that he
    had been in town a couple of weeks and had been staying with his mother while he finished
    moving from Alabama to Tennessee. He owned the motorcycle and the truck. The
    Defendant admitted to Officer George that he used the items in the truck to manufacture
    methamphetamine while in Alabama and that he transported the items to Tennessee. Officer
    George did not believe that the Defendant transported the materials from Alabama, and he
    asked if the Defendant had anything inside the house. The Defendant told him to look inside
    the toolbox. The Defendant and Officer George entered the house together to obtain the
    toolbox, which contained items commonly used in the manufacture process. Officer George
    identified black latex gloves, coffee filters, sulfuric acid, a coffee/spice grinder containing
    pseudoephedrine residue, a Thermos, a funnel, two jars containing sodium hydroxide, cutters,
    a pair of pliers wrapped in electrical tape, two sets of digital scales, a bag containing small
    Ziploc bags, and an unopened pack of lithium batteries.
    Officer George testified that the pliers were probably used to manipulate the hose or
    pull the lithium from the batteries. He said the scales had residue on them, and the Defendant
    stated that the scales were used to weigh the materials used in the manufacture process and
    to weigh the finished product. He said the small Ziploc bags were the size of jewelry bags
    and were indicative of someone packaging drugs for redistribution. He said the grinder was
    used to break down the pseudoephedrine before adding it to the mixture in order to quicken
    the manufacture process, and he noted the grinder contained pseudoephedrine residue. He
    said the Defendant admitted he owned the toolbox and its contents.
    Officer George testified that the Defendant also told him about a few jars inside the
    house that were related to the manufacture process. The Defendant pointed to a pint-sized
    Mason jar, which contained Coleman camping fuel, and to a larger Mason jar, which
    contained methamphetamine residue.               The Defendant admitted to using the
    methamphetamine in the larger jar and said he last used it the previous day. Officer George
    said the jar he identified as Coleman camping fuel might have been meth oil, which
    contained methamphetamine before it crystalized. He said the field test he used was for dry
    materials, not liquids, and as a result, he could not determine whether the jar contained fuel
    or meth oil. He said the material was not sent to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI)
    Crime Laboratory because the laboratory discouraged submission of volatile, flammable, and
    corrosive substances. He said the Defendant seemed to have left the jar in plain view without
    thinking.
    -4-
    Officer George testified that the Mason jar found inside the house containing the
    methamphetamine residue was used to filter the Coleman fuel because methamphetamine
    was found at the bottom of the jar. He said a Mason jar was not a storage container because
    it was difficult to obtain the finished product from the bottom of the jar. He took a sample
    from the jar and sent it to the TBI laboratory for analysis. He said the Defendant also
    directed him toward a black nylon case inside the house, which contained a brown glass vial
    containing methamphetamine. He obtained a sample and sent it to the TBI laboratory for
    analysis.
    Officer George testified that he found a loaded twelve-gauge shotgun under the rear
    passenger seat of the Defendant’s truck. Latex gloves were also found inside the truck. He
    identified a bucket placed just outside the house that contained clear tubing under a yellow
    bag. He also saw unopened cold packs containing ammonium nitrate with the Dollar General
    logo.
    Officer George testified that he interviewed the Defendant after he collected the
    evidence and seized the Defendant’s vehicles. Although portions of the recorded interview
    were played for the jury, the recordings submitted with the appellate record are from pretrial
    court appearances and do not include Officer George’s interview of the Defendant. Officer
    George testified that he and the Defendant discussed the digital scales and plastic bags found
    at the scene. He told the Defendant that the scales and bags were indicative of someone
    selling drugs, and the Defendant denied selling drugs. The Defendant claimed he was
    “producing” drugs for his personal use. They discussed whether the Defendant was trading
    finished methamphetamine for boxes of Sudafed because the State limited the amount that
    could be purchased within a thirty-day period and because of the national registry of people
    who purchased it. The Defendant claimed that he had not obtained any Sudafed in about one
    year and that the three boxes his girlfriend purchased every thirty days were enough for him
    to “get by” just for himself.
    Officer George testified that the Defendant told him that he had been in Tennessee for
    about two weeks and that his mother had lived in Tennessee for about one year. The
    Defendant admitted to using methamphetamine the previous day. The Defendant stated that
    he moved from Alabama to get away from methamphetamine but that he was still using
    drugs.
    Officer George testified that they discussed whether methamphetamine was made
    inside the Defendant’s mother’s house and that he told the Defendant that he thought drugs
    were “cooked” inside the house. Officer George stated that all the evidence found at the
    scene, including the trash inside the truck bed, the open container of camping fuel inside the
    house, the finished methamphetamine inside the house, the ammonium nitrate and tubing in
    -5-
    the trash can at the door, and the “fresh” odor inside the house suggested to him that
    methamphetamine was made inside the house. He asked the Defendant about the fuel in the
    Mason jar. The Defendant explained that the jar had a lid when it was inside his toolbox but
    that he removed the lid and the finished methamphetamine when he entered the house. The
    Defendant claimed he was “sloppy” for leaving the jar open.
    Officer George testified that the Defendant admitted to using methamphetamine the
    day of his arrest. Officer George asked the Defendant to tell him how many times he made
    methamphetamine within a thirty-day period, and the Defendant said fifteen times because
    he was “cooking” only for himself. The Defendant then stated that he probably made
    methamphetamine about thirty times when he and his girlfriend used the drugs. He was
    paying non-drug users about $30 and drug users about $20 per box of Sudafed.
    Officer George testified that the Defendant denied selling methamphetamine and
    giving away the drugs. The Defendant later said, though, that he did not give away the
    drugs. Officer George testified that the Defendant never denied making methamphetamine
    in Alabama. He did not believe the Defendant transported the trash from Alabama and said
    he thought the “actual production process” occurred at the Defendant’s mother’s house. He
    said that the most important item the person who made methamphetamine wanted to dispose
    of quickly was the one-pot gasser because possessing that item usually resulted in criminal
    liability. He thought that the Defendant intended to dispose of the evidence quickly but had
    not yet done so. He also noted the wet coffee filters in the garbage bag inside the truck bed,
    the smell coming from the house, and the materials found inside the house, including the
    open jar of Coleman camping fuel and the finished methamphetamine.
    On cross-examination, Officer George testified that the items in the garbage bags
    inside the truck bed showed an initiation of the manufacture process. He noted, though, that
    once the chemicals combined, the reaction continued. He equated the combining of the
    materials in the one-pot gasser to the process of making bread from dough. He denied the
    items in the garbage bags had been thrown away but agreed the garbage bags also contained
    french fries and hamburger wrappers. He also said the mixed chemicals that had been used
    to manufacture methamphetamine could be used again in another process.
    Officer George testified that he did not write the Defendant a citation during the
    traffic stop because he gave the Defendant an opportunity to provide his driver’s license and
    because he did not know whose name to place on a citation. He read the Defendant his
    Miranda rights in the presence of Officer Shelton after smelling the odors coming from the
    house. He agreed that the Defendant claimed the methamphetamine was made in Alabama,
    that the Defendant had an Alabama driver’s license, and that the Defendant’s truck and
    motorcycle were registered in Alabama.
    -6-
    Officer George testified that he did not tell the Defendant that he would “help him
    out” if the Defendant permitted him to search the toolbox and that he told the Defendant that
    he would talk to the prosecutor about his cooperation. He noted the prosecutor might have
    taken the Defendant’s cooperating into consideration relative to any plea offers. He said he
    told the Defendant that he could not make promises to help the Defendant. He said the
    Defendant opened the toolbox and agreed the coffee filters inside were unused. He denied
    the items inside the toolbox were more indicative of promotion of methamphetamine
    manufacture rather than initiation because the white residue in the grinder was indicative of
    grinding pseudoephedrine pills for the extraction process. He said the toolbox contained
    partial bottles of sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide. He concluded that these components
    had been used to manufacture methamphetamine. He said the grinder with the pill residue
    was the beginning, or initiation, of the manufacture process.
    Officer George testified that the pseudoephedrine registry log showed the Defendant
    purchased pseudoephedrine in Alabama until his arrest for the current charges and that he
    began purchasing it in Tennessee while released on bond pending the trial. Officer George
    searched the Defendant during the traffic stop and found no methamphetamine,
    pseudoephedrine, or items used to manufacture drugs. He agreed the Defendant was not
    under the influence and could drive safely. He said the shotgun was found under the rear
    passenger-side seat of the Defendant’s truck and agreed the Defendant said that he did not
    know the gun was in the truck and that it belonged to a friend who was helping him move.
    Officer George questioned the truth of the Defendant’s explanation. He agreed, though, that
    the gun did not have “double-aught buckshot or slugs” in the shell. He said that although he
    believed methamphetamine was manufactured inside the house, he did not know positively.
    He agreed the house was not quarantined.
    On redirect examination, Officer George testified that the coffee filters inside the
    toolbox were dry and that the filters inside the garbage bag were used to manufacture
    methamphetamine. He said he found the box of materials inside the truck on the backseat
    and the gun underneath the seat.
    Shelbyville Police Officer Jody Shelton testified that on June 26, 2012, he saw Officer
    George performing a traffic stop and that he stopped to assist. He ran a driver’s license
    check on the Defendant’s name through dispatch, which showed a valid license. His
    equipment, though, could not display a photograph of the Defendant. As a result, he was
    unable to verify the Defendant’s identity. He followed Officer George and the Defendant
    to the Defendant’s mother’s house. He did not participate in Officer George’s interview of
    the Defendant but was present when Officer George read the Defendant his Miranda rights.
    He heard the Defendant waive his rights and agree to answer questions. He said the
    Defendant admitted to possessing the components of a methamphetamine laboratory. The
    -7-
    Defendant also said the components were used to manufacture methamphetamine in
    Alabama. Officer Shelton saw the Defendant show Officer George the toolbox and the open
    Mason jar inside the house. He did not recall if the Defendant admitted to using
    methamphetamine but said the Defendant stated he moved from Alabama to get away from
    people who were associated with methamphetamine. He said the Defendant was cooperative
    and cordial. On cross-examination, Officer Shelton testified that he did not recall if the
    Defendant had an Alabama or Tennessee driver’s license.
    TBI Special Agent Laura Cole, an expert in forensic chemistry, testified that she
    analyzed the evidence in this case. She analyzed a small amount of tan powder from the
    Mason jar and concluded it was methamphetamine. She also analyzed the substance found
    in the brown vial and concluded it was methamphetamine. The combined substances
    weighed 0.05 grams. On cross-examination, she stated that 0.05 grams was a “minuscule”
    amount.
    Upon this evidence, the jury found the Defendant guilty of initiating the manufacture
    of methamphetamine, promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, possession of a firearm
    during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of methamphetamine. The trial
    court imposed partial consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of twenty-two years,
    eleven months, and twenty-nine days. This appeal followed.
    I
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support all of his
    convictions, except possession of methamphetamine. The State responds that the evidence
    is sufficient. We agree with the State.
    In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether,
    after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
    of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 
    221 S.W.3d 514
    , 521
    (Tenn. 2007). The State is “afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
    reasonable inferences” from that evidence. 
    Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521
    . The appellate
    courts do not “reweigh or reevaluate the evidence,” and questions regarding “the credibility
    of witnesses [and] the weight and value to be given to the evidence . . . are resolved by the
    trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 
    958 S.W.2d 651
    , 659 (Tenn. 1997); see State v. Sheffield, 
    676 S.W.2d 542
    , 547 (Tenn. 1984).
    -8-
    “A crime may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a
    combination of the two.” State v. Hall, 
    976 S.W.2d 121
    , 140 (Tenn. 1998); see also State
    v. Sutton, 
    166 S.W.3d 686
    , 691 (Tenn. 2005). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether
    the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 
    331 S.W.3d 370
    , 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 
    279 S.W.3d 265
    , 275 (Tenn. 2009)).
    A. Initiating the Manufacture of Methamphetamine
    Relative to initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, “[i]t is an offense for a
    person to knowingly initiate a process intended to result in the manufacture of any amount
    of methamphetamine.” T.C.A. § 39-17-435(a) (2014). Initiate means “to begin the
    extraction of an immediate methamphetamine precursor from a commercial product, to begin
    the active modification of a commercial product for use in methamphetamine creation, or to
    heat or combine any substance or substances that can be used in methamphetamine creation.”
    
    Id. § 39-17-435(c).
    The Defendant argues that the evidence fails to show that he mixed chemicals to
    initiate the manufacture of methamphetamine in Tennessee. The record reflects that Officer
    George found the remnants of a methamphetamine laboratory and the remnants of a gasser
    inside the bed of the Defendant’s truck. Officer George said that the two-liter bottle
    contained everything needed to manufacture methamphetamine. Inside the clear garbage
    bags were wet coffee filters used to separate the methamphetamine from the camping fuel.
    The filters contained residue from the filtering process. Officer George found inside the
    garbage bags a twenty-ounce bottle containing rock salt and sulfuric acid residue. He said
    the twenty-ounce bottle was used to move the gas from the container with the rock salt and
    sulfuric acid to the container with the camping fuel. The gas caused methamphetamine to
    form and settle to the bottom of the container with the fuel. He said the twenty-ounce bottle
    could be used again with the addition of more rock salt and sulfuric acid. Officer George
    also identified sodium hydroxide, ammonium nitrate, and pseudoephedrine, which were used
    to manufacture methamphetamine, in the bottom of one of the bottles. Also in the garbage
    bags were tubing used to connect the two bottles and portions of lithium batteries used in the
    manufacture process.
    The Defendant admitted to making methamphetamine in Alabama, but the jury was
    free to discredit the Defendant’s statement and to conclude that the Defendant made
    methamphetamine at his mother’s house in Tennessee. The Defendant claimed that he had
    been in Tennessee for two weeks and that he brought the garbage bags from Alabama. We
    note that the Defendant admitted to using methamphetamine the previous day. The coffee
    filters, though, inside the garbage bags used in the manufacture process were still wet at the
    time of the Defendant’s arrest. Additionally, a Coleman fuel can was inside the truck, and
    -9-
    a toolbox inside the house contained latex gloves, coffee filters, partial bottles of sulfuric
    acid and sodium hydroxide, a grinder containing pseudoephedrine residue, scales, lithium
    batteries, and cutters. We note that the Defendant told Officer George that the scales were
    used, in part, to weigh the finished product and that the scales had methamphetamine residue.
    Officer George testified that the grinder was used to break down the pseudoephedrine before
    being added to the mixture to manufacture methamphetamine and that the grinder contained
    pseudoephedrine residue. He said adding pseudoephedrine began the extraction process.
    Relative to the Mason jars found inside the house, Officer George testified that the
    jar containing the methamphetamine residue was not a storage container for the finished
    product but instead was used to filter the methamphetamine and the camping fuel because
    the finished product was difficult to remove from the bottom of a Mason jar. Officer George
    concluded that methamphetamine was made inside the house based on the items found inside
    the garbage bags, the open Mason jar of camping fuel found inside the house, the
    methamphetamine found inside the house, the ammonium nitrate and tubing found in the
    trash can just outside the door leading into the house, and the odor coming from the house.
    He also stated that most people disposed of the items found in the garbage bags as soon as
    possible because possessing a one-pot gasser generally resulted in criminal liability, and he
    thought the Defendant intended to dispose of the garbage bags quickly. The evidence is
    sufficient that the Defendant initiated the manufacture process in Tennessee.
    B. Promoting the Manufacture of Methamphetamine
    A person is guilty of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine if he or she
    “[s]ells, purchases, acquires, or delivers any chemical, drug, ingredient, or apparatus that can
    be used to produce methamphetamine, knowing that it will be used to produce
    methamphetamine, or with reckless disregard of its intended use.” 
    Id. § 39-17-433(a)(1)
    (2014). Although the Defendant claims his conduct did not constitute the promotion of the
    manufacture of methamphetamine, he fails to explain why. See T.R.A.P. 27(a)(7)(A); see
    also Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). In any event, the Defendant told Officer George that he
    produced methamphetamine for his personal use and that he acquired pseudoephedrine from
    his then-girlfriend, who purchased the pseudoephedrine in order for him to manufacture
    enough methamphetamine for thirty days. He also told Officer George that he paid non-drug
    users about $30 and drug users $20 per box of Sudafed they obtained for him. The record
    also shows that Officer George found plastic tubing, empty packages of ammonium nitrate
    with the Dollar General logo, and Coleman fuel and that the three items were used to
    manufacture methamphetamine. The evidence is sufficient.
    -10-
    C. Possession of a Firearm
    “It is an offense to possess a firearm with the intent to go armed during the
    commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.” T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(a) (2014).
    Initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine is a dangerous felony. See 
    id. at (i)(1)(K).
    The evidence must show a defendant’s intent or purpose of going armed. Cole v.
    State, 
    539 S.W.2d 46
    , 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); see Hill v. State, 
    298 S.W.2d 799
    , 301
    (Tenn. 1957). “Intent may be inferred from both direct and circumstantial evidence.” State
    v. Washington, 
    658 S.W.2d 144
    , 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); see generally Graham v.
    State, 
    404 S.W.2d 475
    (Tenn. 1966). Possession may be actual or constructive. State v.
    Shaw, 
    37 S.W.3d 900
    , 903 (Tenn. 2001). Constructive possession requires a showing that
    a defendant had “the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control
    over . . . [the item] either directly or through others.” State v. Cooper, 
    736 S.W.2d 125
    , 129
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “‘In essence,
    constructive possession is the ability to reduce an object to actual possession.’” State v.
    Williams, 
    623 S.W.2d 121
    , 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (quoting United States v. Martinez,
    
    445 F.2d 495
    , 498 (5th Cir. 1979)).
    The Defendant argues that the proof fails to show that he possessed the shotgun with
    the intent to go armed during the commission of a felony. Although the gun was under the
    passenger seat of his truck, the record shows that the Defendant had constructive possession
    of it. The containers actively used in a methamphetamine laboratory were found in garbage
    bags inside the truck bed, and a Coleman fuel can and rubber gloves were found inside the
    truck. The Defendant admitted that the garbage bags were his, and the jury rejected his claim
    that he only manufactured methamphetamine in Alabama. Officer George believed that the
    Defendant intended to dispose of the garbage bags quickly but had not yet done so.
    Disposing of the garbage bags was important to the manufacture process because, as Officer
    George testified, possession of the items in the bags usually resulted in criminal liability.
    The Defendant was in constructive possession of the gun, and the jury was free to discredit
    the Defendant’s explanation that a friend left the gun in his truck and that he did not know
    the gun was there. We note the record shows that the truck was unlocked when the
    Defendant looked for his driver’s license but that it was later locked and the keys missing
    after he consented to a search of the truck. The evidence is sufficient. The Defendant is not
    entitled to relief on this basis.
    -11-
    II
    Motion to Suppress
    The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
    He argues that although Officer George had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop, he
    unlawfully “placed the [D]efendant under custodial arrest” and that all the evidence at the
    Defendant’s mother’s house should have been suppressed. In essence, he argues that the
    officer should have issued a citation and released him. The State responds that the
    Defendant’s argument was not raised in the trial court and that he is not entitled to plain error
    relief because it was reasonable for Officer George to reject the Defendant’s “proof of
    identification and place him under arrest until he could show a license.” We conclude that
    the Defendant is not entitled to relief.
    A trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal
    unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 
    928 S.W.2d 18
    , 23 (Tenn.
    1996); State v. Jones, 
    802 S.W.2d 221
    , 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Questions about the
    “credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts
    in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” 
    Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23
    . The prevailing party is entitled to the “strongest legitimate view of the
    evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.”
    State v. Keith, 
    978 S.W.2d 861
    , 864 (Tenn. 1998); see State v. Hicks, 
    55 S.W.3d 515
    , 521
    (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s application of the law to its factual findings is a question of law
    and is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Yeargan, 
    958 S.W.2d 626
    , 629 (Tenn. 1997).
    In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this court may consider the trial
    evidence as well as the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. See State v. Henning,
    
    975 S.W.2d 290
    , 297-99 (Tenn. 1998); see also State v. Williamson, 
    368 S.W.3d 468
    , 473
    (Tenn. 2012).
    At the suppression hearing, Shelbyville Police Officer Shane George testified
    consistently with his previously recited trial testimony. He agreed the Defendant was being
    detained during the drive to the Defendant’s mother’s house. He said Officer Shelton arrived
    at the house while the Defendant was looking inside his truck for his driver’s license and left
    the scene after the Defendant was taken into custody.
    Officer George testified that the Defendant did not consent to his entering the house
    when the Defendant was looking for his driver’s license. He denied the truck was locked
    when they arrived at the scene and said the Defendant looked inside the truck for his license.
    He assumed the Defendant locked the truck after looking for his license because it was
    locked later. He said that while the Defendant looked for his license inside the truck, he
    -12-
    looked through the window with his flashlight but denied looking inside the truck bed. He
    agreed the Defendant was being detained at that time because he had committed an offense
    for which he could have been arrested by not having a driver’s license on demand during a
    lawful traffic stop. He said he was simply providing the Defendant the opportunity to find
    his license. He said that if his license “checked out,” he would have been allowed to either
    issue him a citation or release him without a citation.
    Officer George testified that he probably could have contacted a judge about the can
    of Coleman camping fuel in the backseat of the Defendant’s truck but that based on his
    experience, it would have been futile to attempt to obtain a search warrant solely based on
    the fuel can. He said he did not ask the Defendant to sign a consent to search form. On
    redirect examination, he stated the Defendant claimed that he had been at his mother’s house
    for two weeks, that he had a home in Alabama, and that he was in the process of moving to
    Tennessee.
    Shelbyville Police Officer Jody Shelton testified consistently with his previously
    recited trial testimony.
    The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence found at the Defendant’s
    mother’s house. Relative to the traffic stop, the court found that Officer George had probable
    cause to stop the Defendant based on his erratic driving and speeding. The court found that
    after the initial stop, the Defendant was obligated to provide identification, that the
    Defendant was not able to do so, and that the officer provided the Defendant the opportunity
    to obtain his driver’s license at his mother’s house. Relative to the search of the truck, the
    court found that the Defendant consented and that the items seen inside the truck were in
    plain view. Relative to the house, the court found that the evidence showed the Defendant
    had been a resident for about two weeks, although he had a residence in Alabama. The court
    found that the Defendant consented to the search of the house and that the Defendant had the
    authority to provide the consent.
    The Defendant argued in his motion to suppress that (1) the search and seizure of the
    items in the garbage bags was an improper warrantless search, (2) he did not consent to the
    warrantless search of his truck or his mother’s house, and (3) Tennessee was not the proper
    venue for the initiation charge because the alleged offense was committed in Alabama. The
    State correctly notes in its brief that the Defendant did not argue at the suppression or motion
    for a new trial hearings that the evidence should have been suppressed because Officer
    George should have issued a citation for the Defendant’s lack of identification and released
    him. He presents this argument for the first time on appeal. This court has stated that “an
    accused may not litigate an issue on one ground, abandon that ground post-trial, and assert
    a new basis” on appeal. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 781 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990);
    -13-
    see T.R.A.P. 3(e) (A defendant is entitled to an appeal provided that “in all cases tried by a
    jury, no issue presented for review shall be predicated upon error in the admission . . . of
    evidence . . . unless the same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise
    such issues will be treated as waived.”). As a result, this court is limited to plain error
    review. See T.R.A.P. 36(b) (“When necessary to do substantial justice, an appellate court
    may consider an error that has affected the substantial rights of a party at any time, even
    though the error was not raised in the motion for a new trial[.]”).
    The Tennessee Supreme Court has determined the criteria for establishing plain error,
    which requires a showing that
    (a) the record . . . clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear
    and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial right
    of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused did not
    waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is
    “necessary to do substantial justice.”
    State v. Adkisson, 
    899 S.W.2d 626
    , 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Each of the five factors
    must be established and “complete consideration of all the factors is not necessary when it
    is clear from the record that at least one of the factors cannot be established.” State v. Smith,
    
    24 S.W.3d 274
    , 283 (Tenn. 2000). Reversal requires an error “of such a great magnitude that
    it probably changed the outcome of the trial.” 
    Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642
    . Likewise, the
    error in question should be one that “had an unfair prejudicial impact which undermined the
    fundamental fairness of the trial.” 
    Id. We conclude
    that the Defendant has failed to establish plain error. He concedes in
    his brief that critical to the issue he now raises is what constitutes “satisfactory evidence of
    identification” pursuant to the “cite and release” statute and that the issue is one of first
    impression. See T.C.A. § 40-7-118(c)(3) (2012) (stating that a citation cannot be issued if
    “[t]he person arrested cannot . . . offer satisfactory evidence of identification”). In State v.
    Walker, 
    12 S.W.3d 460
    , 466 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court discussed the identity
    exception to the cite and release statute, requiring a custodial arrest when the identity of a
    misdemeanant is in doubt. The court concluded that a police officer may arrest a
    misdemeanant when it is “objectively reasonable” to reject the information he or she has
    provided. 
    Id. at 467.
    As a result, “the determination of whether verbal representations
    supply satisfactory evidence of identity must be made on a case-by-case basis.” 
    Id. In the
    present case, Officer George was unable to confirm the identity of the Defendant, who
    claimed to be an out-of-state person, and the officer’s decision not to cite and release the
    Defendant was not objectively unreasonable. Therefore, the Defendant cannot establish that
    -14-
    a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached. See 
    Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42
    . The
    Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief.
    III
    Sentencing
    The Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. He argues his effective
    sentence is disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenses and is not the least severe
    measure to achieve the purposes for which the sentences were imposed. The State responds
    that the sentences were proper. We agree with the State.
    This court reviews challenges to the length of a sentence within the appropriate
    sentence range “under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of
    reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 
    380 S.W.3d 682
    , 708 (Tenn. 2012). A trial court must
    consider any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, the
    principles of sentencing, counsel’s arguments as to sentencing alternatives, the nature and
    characteristics of the criminal conduct, any mitigating or statutory enhancement factors,
    statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to sentencing
    practices for similar offenses in Tennessee, any statement that the defendant made on his own
    behalf, and the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 168
    (Tenn. 1991) (citing T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103 (2014), -210 (2014); State v. Moss, 
    727 S.W.2d 229
    , 236 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Taylor, 
    744 S.W.2d 919
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)); see
    T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (2014).
    Likewise, a trial court’s application of enhancement and mitigating factors are
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion with “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range
    sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our
    Sentencing Act.” 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706-07
    . “[A] trial court’s misapplication of an
    enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial
    court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” 
    Id. at 706.
    “So long as there
    are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as provided by
    statute, a sentence imposed . . . within the appropriate range” will be upheld on appeal. 
    Id. The abuse
    of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness also applies to the
    imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. Pollard, 
    432 S.W.3d 851
    , 859 (Tenn. 2013).
    A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to impose consecutive service. 
    Id. A trial
    court may impose consecutive sentencing if it finds by a preponderance of the
    evidence that one of the criterion is satisfied in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-
    115(b)(1)-(7) (2014). In determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, though, a
    -15-
    trial court must ensure the sentence is “no greater than that deserved for the offense
    committed” and is “the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the
    sentence is imposed.” T.C.A. § 40-35-103(2), (4) (2014); see State v. Desirey, 
    909 S.W.2d 20
    , 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
    At the sentencing hearing, the presentence report showed that the Defendant had
    previous felony convictions in Alabama for two counts of third degree burglary and theft.
    The report showed that on August 28, 2006, the Defendant was found guilty of third degree
    burglary and sentenced to seven years in the Alabama Department of Correction. The
    offense date in the present case was June 26, 2012.
    The Defendant graduated from high school and completed two months of classes at
    Tennessee Technology Center before his arrest. He reported employment from June 2009
    to December 2010. The Defendant reported good physical and mental health and admitted
    to drinking alcohol between ages fifteen and twenty-five. He said he stopped drinking when
    a close friend died in a car accident. He abused pain medication between ages twenty-one
    and twenty-six. He reported that the opiate abuse ended as a result of his arrest and
    confinement in Alabama. The Defendant reported that he began using methamphetamine at
    age thirty, which continued until his arrest in the present case. The Defendant was married
    and had a son at the time of sentencing.
    Shelbyville Police Officer Shane George testified that his work on the drug task force
    had focused on methamphetamine enforcement for the previous six years. He said that
    methamphetamine use had increased drastically in Bedford County during the thirteen years
    he had participated in the task force. He said that during his first year on the task force, he
    made one methamphetamine-laboratory-related arrest. He said that he made about six or
    seven arrests in 2013. He said the defendants he had previously prosecuted were mostly
    concerned about going to jail. He thought jail time would serve as a deterrent to someone
    who was in the business of initiating, promoting, or manufacturing methamphetamine. He
    recalled a female defendant whom he prosecuted for the manufacture of methamphetamine
    and who served her sentence. He said she told him that she had been sober almost six years
    and that a lengthy jail sentence was the best thing that ever happened to her.
    On cross-examination, Officer George testified that he had no contact with the
    Defendant before the day of the traffic stop and that the Defendant said he lived in Alabama
    but was in the process of moving to Tennessee. He agreed that the Defendant was driving
    his motorcycle on the day of the offenses and that the shotgun was found in the Defendant’s
    truck. Officer George found no weapons on the Defendant’s person.
    -16-
    The Defendant testified that he was thirty-three years old and that he lived in Alabama
    before his arrest. He said he came to Tennessee to help move his mother, who lived in
    Bedford County. He said he was married and had a nine-month-old son, who he last saw
    four months previously. He admitted an addiction to methamphetamine for the previous
    three years and said he used it daily. He admitted during his presentence interview that he
    made methamphetamine but said it was only to support his personal habit. He denied selling
    methamphetamine.
    The Defendant testified that he previously worked for Vulcan Plastics and Robin
    Rents and that he had several odd jobs, which included taking care of his mother and
    stepfather. He said he was either attending school or working most of his life. He said that
    he was studying “industrial electricity” when he was arrested and that he planned to continue
    his education in the future. Relative to the friend who lost his life in a car accident, the
    Defendant told the trial court that he blamed himself for his friend’s death because he
    convinced his friend to drive that day.
    The Defendant testified that he believed he needed to participate in a drug
    rehabilitation program and needed a structured life. He realized that he would always be an
    addict and that he needed help for the remainder of his life. He said his life was better when
    he had structure and noted he did not start using drugs until one and one-half years after he
    was released from prison in Alabama. He said he did well when he was under intensive
    supervision. He agreed he complied with all the conditions of his release until his arrest in
    the present case.
    The Defendant testified that he had been in jail for six months and that he had thought
    about his situation. He said he had lost all self-respect because he had been through this
    previously. He had lost his dignity and integrity and said he brought shame and
    disappointment to his mother. He apologized to his mother and said he was most sorry that
    he had missed the opportunity to provide for his child.
    The Defendant testified that he and trial counsel discussed the intense supervision
    associated with community corrections and that he wanted the opportunity to have structure
    in his life. He said that if he could not comply with the conditions of community corrections,
    he deserved to go to jail. He told the trial judge that he had lost sight of what was important
    and that since he had been sober, he realized what was important. He asked for the
    opportunity to provide for his son and promised he would “never be back up here.”
    On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that he resigned from Vulcan Plastic
    in December 2010 and that he worked at Robin Rents and performed odd jobs from 2010
    until his arrest in the present case. He said his odd jobs included painting motorcycles,
    -17-
    helping his uncle, and caring for his mother. He agreed he did not have a steady job for some
    of that time but said he was in school. He said he resigned from Vulcan Plastic because he
    and another employee had a conflict.
    The Defendant testified that his wife was addicted to methamphetamine and that
    before his arrest, she obtained methamphetamine from him. He agreed that he provided his
    wife with methamphetamine while she was pregnant, which was directly related to his son’s
    developmental problems. He admitted to using methamphetamine to “get off” methadone.
    The Defendant testified that although he received a seven-year sentence on August
    28, 2006, for third degree burglary in Alabama, he was not on parole or probation at the time
    the present offenses were committed. He said that after serving thirty percent of his sentence,
    he was on parole for one year and that his sentence was finished after the year of parole. He
    said he had been released for four and one-half years. He denied that the parole officer
    supervised him for the full seven years. He denied that third degree burglary in Alabama
    involved a residence. He denied using methamphetamine while on parole.
    Upon examination by the trial court, the Defendant testified that although Robin Rents
    confirmed his employment ended in April 2009, he left in early 2011 and began the industrial
    electrician program. He confirmed for the court that he was not on parole at the time he
    committed the present offenses. He said he began using methamphetamine about one and
    one-half years after his release in Alabama. He admitted to committing two burglaries and
    one theft before he began using methamphetamine. He said those convictions occurred while
    he was abusing opiates.
    Alyssa Rooks, the Defendant’s mother, testified that the Defendant was a loving father
    and that the baby loved the Defendant. She said that the baby recognized the Defendant’s
    voice and that the Defendant spent time with the baby. She stated that since the Defendant’s
    incarceration, he admitted he had a methamphetamine addiction. She said that after she was
    injured in a severe car accident in 2008, the Defendant moved into her Alabama home to care
    for her and her late husband, who suffered from cancer. She said that although the
    Defendant might not have been employed, he had a full-time job caring for them.
    Ms. Rooks testified that the Defendant had been there for her since her husband died
    and that she depended upon him. She believed the Defendant needed treatment. She said
    that the Defendant could live with her if released and that anyone could inspect her house.
    She wanted the trial court to impose a structured sentence that involved education, substance
    abuse treatment, therapy, and a program to teach the Defendant how to reenter society. She
    wanted the Defendant to have a chance to have a life and said the person addicted to
    -18-
    methamphetamine was not the person she knew and loved. She knew the Defendant had
    decided to stay sober.
    On cross-examination, Ms. Rooks denied knowing the Defendant was manufacturing
    methamphetamine at her house and denied seeing signs of drugs at her house. She was an
    agent with the United States Department of Agriculture and said she “wouldn’t even go for
    that.” She said that although she was surprised to learn the Defendant provided his pregnant
    wife with methamphetamine, she suspected the Defendant provided it to prevent his wife
    from getting it elsewhere. She denied helping the Defendant hide his truck from a
    repossession agency and said she did not know initially the truck was being repossessed. She
    said she told a detective where the truck was located after she knew what was happening.
    The trial court found that the Defendant was a Range II offender based on two of the
    three Alabama felony convictions. Relative to enhancement factors, the court found that
    factor (1) applied based on the Defendant’s previous convictions and his admitted criminal
    behavior. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1) (2014) (“The defendant has a previous history of
    criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the
    appropriate range[.]”). The court noted that the behavior most concerning was the
    Defendant’s providing methamphetamine to his pregnant wife and stated that this conduct
    was significant. The trial court, though, refused to find that the Defendant was on parole at
    the time the present offenses were committed because the record failed to show Alabama’s
    sentencing procedures. See 
    id. § 40-35-114(13)
    (At the time the felony was committed, the
    Defendant was released on parole). The court noted that the Defendant did not request the
    application of mitigating factors and found that it did “not have to deal with them.”
    Based on the enhancement factors, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to sixteen
    years for initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, six years for promotion of
    methamphetamine manufacture, six years for possession of a firearm during the commission
    of a dangerous felony, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for simple possession. The trial
    court noted that the Defendant was required to serve five of the six years for the firearm
    conviction and that our statutes required the six-year sentence to be served consecutively to
    any remaining sentences.
    Relative to consecutive sentencing, the trial court found that the Defendant had an
    extensive criminal record and noted the seriousness of the present and previous convictions.
    Although the court found that the record did not justify complete consecutive service, it
    ordered partial consecutive service. The court ordered the initiating the manufacture of
    methamphetamine and the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture convictions be
    served concurrently but consecutively to the firearm and simple possession convictions, for
    an effective sentence of twenty-two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days.
    -19-
    The trial court found that the presumption of alternative sentencing was overcome by
    the evidence and that confinement was necessary to protect society from the Defendant, who
    had a lengthy criminal history. The court noted the Defendant’s criminal history predated
    his methamphetamine use. The court found that confinement was necessary to avoid
    depreciating the seriousness of the offenses. The court credited Officer George’s testimony
    regarding the increasing prevalence of methamphetamine manufacture in Bedford County
    and found that confinement was necessary to deter others from committing similar offenses.
    Although the trial court stated that the proof did not show that the Defendant was on
    parole in Alabama at the time of the offenses, it found that the present offenses were
    committed within the period of his sentence. It found that a “profound risk” existed showing
    the Defendant would commit another offense if he were released to probation. The court
    agreed the Defendant needed structure. The court found that community corrections would
    not provide sufficient structure and stated that the Defendant would live longer in
    confinement because of his multiple addictions.
    The Defendant does not argue that the trial court improperly applied the enhancement
    factor or failed to apply any mitigating factors. The Defendant also does not argue that the
    court improperly ordered partial consecutive service. The basis of his contention is simply
    that his sentence is not appropriate given the facts in the record. He notes the State’s scarce
    prison resources and argues the expenses would be better utilized for violent offenders.
    The record reflects that the trial court considered the appropriate principles of
    sentencing and that it imposed within-range sentences for each conviction. Likewise, the
    court properly applied the enhancement factor based on the Defendant’s previous felony
    convictions and his admitted criminal behavior. The court found, and the record supports,
    that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses and to
    deter others from committing similar offenses in the community. The testimony shows the
    offenses involved were on the rise in Bedford County. We note that the Defendant was not
    eligible for community corrections or probation relative to the possession of a firearm during
    the commission of a dangerous felony conviction. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(e)(2) (2014).
    Likewise, the Defendant was not eligible for probation relative to the initiating the
    manufacture of methamphetamine conviction because his sentence was in excess of ten
    years. See 
    id. § 40-35-303(a)
    (2014).
    Relative to partial consecutive sentencing, the trial court stated that complete
    consecutive sentencing was not warranted by the evidence. It found, though, that the
    Defendant had an extensive record of criminal activity. See 
    id. § 40-35-115(b)(2)
    (2014).
    The record supports the trial court’s finding. The Defendant had three felony convictions for
    burglary and theft, and he admitted those offenses occurred when he was abusing opiates.
    -20-
    Likewise, he admitted to using methamphetamine daily and to providing the drug to his then-
    pregnant wife. The record fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion in its
    sentencing determinations. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.
    In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgments
    of the trial court.
    _____________________________________
    ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE
    -21-