People v. Jones , 2021 IL 126432 ( 2021 )

2021 IL 126432IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 126432)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ROBERT CHRISTOPHER
JONES, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 16, 2021.
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Garman, Theis, Michael J. Burke, and Overstreet concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
Justice Neville dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Anne M. Burke.
OPINION
¶1 Petitioner Robert Christopher Jones was a juvenile in 2000, when he pled guilty
to one count of first degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant
to a fully negotiated plea agreement. After unsuccessfully petitioning for
postconviction relief, petitioner sought leave to file a successive postconviction
petition alleging his 50-year juvenile sentence violated the eighth amendment
protections in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The trial court denied his
motion for leave, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that petitioner’s claims
did not invoke the protections provided to juveniles in Miller. 2020 IL App (3d)
140573-UB. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the United States Supreme
Court’s most recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___,141 S. Ct.
1307, 1312 (2021), we affirm the appellant court’s judgment.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In 1999, when petitioner was 16 years old, he was charged in La Salle County
circuit court with eight counts of first degree murder; two counts of armed robbery,
a Class X felony; one count of residential burglary, a Class 1 felony; and one count
of home invasion, a Class X felony. Petitioner confessed to entering the home of
George and Rebecca Thorpe at 2 a.m. armed with a knife. He knew they were home
at that time, and he intended to take their money. The Thorpes were an elderly
couple whom petitioner considered to be his great-aunt and great-uncle. Petitioner
stated he did not know how many times he stabbed George before he moved to
Rebecca’s room and began to stab her as she reached for the telephone. He also did
not know how many times he stabbed Rebecca before he covered her face with a
pillow to stop her from making “gurgling” sounds. After taking Rebecca’s purse
and lockbox, petitioner fled the scene.
¶4 After abandoning a potential insanity defense, petitioner agreed to enter a fully
negotiated guilty plea. According to the plea deal, he would plead guilty to one
count each of first degree murder and residential burglary and two counts of armed
robbery in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining charges. Under the
terms of the agreement, petitioner would be sentenced to concurrent prison terms
of 50 years for the murder, 30 years for each armed robbery count, and 15 years for
the residential burglary, with credit being given for the time he already spent in
custody. He was 17 years old when he agreed to enter into the plea agreement.
¶5 After reviewing the factual predicate for the charges and the terms of the plea
agreement and giving the appropriate admonishments, the trial judge found the plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made. Petitioner waived the preparation of a
presentence investigation report as well as any hearing on mitigating and
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aggravating factors. In May 2000, the trial court entered judgment in accordance
with the terms of the parties’ fully negotiated plea agreement.
¶6 Petitioner did not timely seek to withdraw his guilty plea or appeal from that
judgment. He did, however, later file a pro se postconviction petition seeking relief.
In that petition, petitioner argued that his defense counsel was ineffective and that
his sentence constituted an unconstitutional violation of his due process rights. The
trial court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing, and that dismissal was
upheld on appeal. People v. Jones, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1159 (2004) (table)
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶7 Petitioner later filed a pro se successive postconviction petition, arguing that
both the provision automatically transferring certain juvenile cases to adult criminal
court and the requirement in the Illinois truth-in-sentencing statute that he serve
every day of his sentence were unconstitutional under the principles the United
States Supreme Court found applicable to juvenile offenders in Miller, 467 U.S.
460, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551(2005). In petitioner’s motion for leave to file his successive postconviction
petition, filed two weeks after that petition, he noted that his guilty plea and the
subsequent judgment were entered in 2000, years before Miller was decided. He
also asserted that the mandatory statutory scheme that applied to him at that time
was void when applied to juvenile offenders. The trial court denied petitioner’s
motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition.
¶8 On appeal, petitioner argued the claims in his pro se successive petition met the
cause-and-prejudice standard, requiring his case to be remanded to the trial court
for appointment of counsel and additional postconviction proceedings. The
appellate court disagreed and affirmed the denial of leave to file the successive
postconviction petition. It agreed with the trial court that petitioner did not satisfy
the cause-and-prejudice test and held that his sentence was not mandatory because
he voluntarily entered into a fully negotiated plea arrangement. The appellate court
also explained that petitioner was unable to receive relief under Miller because he
did not receive a life sentence when he could be released from prison at the age of
66. 2016 IL App (3d) 140537-U.
¶9 In his initial petition for leave to appeal to this court, petitioner argued his plea
was void because it was premised on a now-unconstitutional mandatory life
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sentence. We entered a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its
judgment and reconsider those contentions in light of People v. Buffer, 2019 IL
122327, where we held that a sentence of more than 40 years constitutes de facto
life for a juvenile offender. After reexamining those issues, the appellate court
vacated its prior decision and again affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
petitioner’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, with
Justice Wright specially concurring. 2020 IL App (3d) 140573-UB.
¶ 10 The appellate court reasoned that petitioner’s fully negotiated guilty plea
stipulated to a 50-year sentence that was only later declared to constitute de facto
life, effectively waiving any eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII)
sentencing challenge based on the principles in Miller. In addition, he could not
challenge the sentencing scheme at the time as it applied to him because his fully
negotiated plea agreement precluded it from ever actually being applied to him.
Because petitioner was therefore unable to establish the “prejudice” prong of the
cause-and-prejudice test, the appellate court’s judgment affirmed the trial court’s
denial of his motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition. 2020
IL App (3d) 140573-UB, ¶¶ 14, 19. The court later denied petitioner’s motion for
rehearing.
¶ 11 Petitioner then filed a petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court’s
revised judgment pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019),
and this court allowed that petition.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Before this court, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether the appellate court
erred by finding that his 1999 guilty plea, entered into while he was a juvenile, bars
him from filing a successive postconviction petition alleging that his 50-year
de facto life sentence violated the eighth amendment of the federal constitution
(U.S. Const., amend. VIII) under the rationale in Miller and its progeny and (2) the
appropriate remedy under the facts of this case if petitioner raised a valid Miller
claim.
¶ 14 We begin our examination by addressing a question of first impression in
Illinois: whether petitioner’s guilty plea, entered into when he was a juvenile,
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precludes him from raising a Miller claim. Because that issue presents a pure
question of law, it is subject to de novo review. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450,
¶ 25.
¶ 15 Petitioner argues that the sentencing scheme in place at the time of his guilty
plea violated the eighth amendment protections noted in Miller. He asserts that, if
he had gone to trial and been convicted of committing two first degree murders as
a juvenile offender, he would have faced a mandatory life sentence under the then-
existing statutory sentencing scheme. To comport with Miller, however, the trial
court was required to use its discretion when deciding whether to impose a life
sentence on a juvenile offender. Because the mandatory life sentence required by
the statutory scheme precluded the trial court from exercising its discretion in
imposing the proper sentence, petitioner asserts that the scheme was
unconstitutional as applied to him as a juvenile offender.
¶ 16 The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the federal
constitution’s eighth amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment
for juvenile offenders are premised on the fundamental concept of proportionality.
The Court has viewed the application of that concept “less through a historical
prism than according to ‘ “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.” ’ ” Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976), quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)). The additional protections that the Court has recognized for youthful
offenders, however, are not without bounds.
¶ 17 As the Court recently reaffirmed in Jones, 593 U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1312,
although juvenile offenders may not receive mandatory sentences of life-without-
parole, they may still be given discretionary life sentences if the appropriate
safeguards are in place. See also Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (stating that “Graham,
Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury
must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing
the harshest possible penalty for juveniles”). In petitioner’s view, therefore, a
constitutionally valid sentencing scheme must provide trial courts with discretion
in setting those types of juvenile sentences. He asserts that here the sentencing
scheme that would have applied if he had been convicted of the two first degree
murder charges would have mandated a life sentence, eliminating the trial court’s
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use of any discretion, and for that reason it was an unconstitutional violation of
juveniles’ eighth amendment protections under Miller.
¶ 18 If the statutory sentencing scheme had actually been applied in this case to set
petitioner’s life sentence, petitioner’s argument would have presented a claim that
we could have reviewed on its legal merits. The problem with petitioner’s claim is
apparent from his arguments on this issue: the mandatory scheme that applied in
Illinois at the time he was sentenced was never applied to him. Instead, his 50-year
sentence for a single count of first degree murder was imposed as part of the fully
negotiated guilty plea agreement he entered into with the State.
¶ 19 Petitioner acknowledges, as he must, that he was never sentenced under the
statutory scheme he now claims is constitutionally invalid as it applied to him. He
maintains, however, that when he entered into the plea agreement with the State,
he did not anticipate that the 50-year prison term stipulated in it would later be
declared to be a de facto life sentence that required the trial court’s use of discretion
and consideration of his youthful characteristics and rehabilitative potential. In
making that argument, petitioner effectively asserts that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter into the plea agreement. It is undisputed, however, that petitioner,
the State, and the trial court all correctly understood the law that was applicable at
the time petitioner entered into the plea agreement. The crux of petitioner’s claim
is that none of them knew that the Supreme Court would later change the criteria
for reviewing the constitutionality of the applicable law.
¶ 20 By entering a plea agreement, a defendant “forecloses any claim of error. ‘It is
well established that a voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or
irregularities, including constitutional ones.’ ” (Emphasis added.) People v.
Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543,
545 (2004)). Here, petitioner did not raise any claim that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction.
¶ 21 Fundamentally, plea agreements are contracts, and principles of waiver apply
equally to them. People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 87 (2011). Entering into a contract
is generally “a bet on the future.” Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir.
2016). “[A] classic guilty plea permits a defendant to gain a present benefit in return
for the risk that he may have to [forgo] future favorable legal developments.” Id.-6-
¶ 22 In Dingle, the defendant was 17 years old when he was charged with numerous
serious offenses, including murder. After the State filed a notice of its intent to seek
the death penalty under South Carolina law, Dingle sought to avoid death by
entering a guilty plea on all counts in exchange for a sentence of life in prison with
the possibility of parole after 30 years. Because the imposition of consecutive
sentences proved to bar the possibility of parole, Dingle sought postconviction
relief. While those proceedings were pending, the Supreme Court issued Roper,
543 U.S. 551, holding that the eighth amendment barred capital punishment for
juvenile offenders, eliminating any risk that he could have been sentenced to death
if convicted of the charged offenses. Dingle then tried to withdraw his guilty plea,
asserting that his original guilty plea was based on his desire to avoid the death
penalty, for which he was no longer eligible after Roper. Dingle, 840 F.3d at 172-
73.
¶ 23 In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals compared the situation to
that in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), where the defendant also pled
guilty to avoid the death penalty. When changes in the law resulted in the defendant
no longer being death-eligible, Brady attempted to withdraw his plea. In rejecting
that request, the Supreme Court explained that
“[t]he rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require
that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess
every relevant factor entering into his decision. A defendant is not entitled to
withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been
accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the
likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action. More particularly,
absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents
[citation], a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then
applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions
indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 757.
See Dingle, 840 F.3d at 175.
¶ 24 Here, petitioner has not claimed that the State engaged in any misrepresentation
or committed any misconduct. He attempts to distinguish the rule in Brady by
pointing out an alleged factual distinction, arguing that Brady was not destined to
receive a death sentence and that his attempt to withdraw the plea came after the
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Court struck down the state law that imposed the death penalty. In his brief,
petitioner asserts that Brady’s “attempt was unsuccessful precisely because he pled
guilty to avoid a potential, not a certain, sentence.”
¶ 25 What petitioner’s argument fails to recognize is the similarity of the actual
circumstances surrounding the pleas entered by both Brady and petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that he agreed to the plea deal with the State to avoid the
mandatory sentence of life in prison he would have received if convicted of the host
of serious charges, including two first degree murder counts, filed against him. Due
to the procedural posture of this case, the record is sparse regarding any possible
defenses petitioner may have been able to employ at trial. Although petitioner
suggests that he had no defense to the charges, no one, including petitioner, can be
certain of the outcome of the case if he had chosen to proceed to trial instead of
pleading guilty. The State is constitutionally required to prove its case against a
defendant at trial beyond a reasonable doubt for good reason. It would be purely
speculative for this court to conclude that petitioner was doomed to be convicted of
the most serious charges against him at trial and sentenced to mandatory life
without parole, and we decline to adopt that approach in this case.
¶ 26 Contrary to the assertion in petitioner’s brief, his current effort to undo the
effects of his guilty plea shares much common ground with that of the defendant in
Brady. Most importantly for our present analysis, both defendants entered a plea
“to avoid a potential, not a certain, sentence.” Because the principles that were
considered and applied in Brady and Dingle operate here with equal force, we
conclude that petitioner’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any
constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law. See
Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33; Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 545.
¶ 27 Furthermore, petitioner’s Miller claims require him to show that the de facto
life sentence he received was not entered as a result of the trial court’s use of its
discretion since both this court and the Supreme Court permit the imposition of
discretionary life sentences on juvenile offenders. Jones, 593 U.S. at ___, 141 S.
Ct. at 1312; Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 43. As the
State points out, the trial judge here was not required to accept the parties’ fully
negotiated plea agreement. If the judge had found the factual predicate for the plea
insufficient, found the defendant’s entry of his plea to be involuntary or
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unintelligent, or determined that the stipulated 50-year sentence was excessive
under the facts and circumstances of the case, he could have declined to accept the
plea. Because the trial court had the option to accept or reject the plea agreement
offered by the parties, its decision necessarily constituted an exercise of its
discretion. The trial court’s decision to accept the plea agreement and enter a
judgment consistent with it, thereby convicting petitioner, in relevant part, of one
count of first degree murder and imposing the parties’ agreed-on 50-year prison
sentence, was not compelled by the statutory sentencing scheme that applied at the
time or by any other legal authority. We therefore reject petitioner’s Miller
challenge.
¶ 28 Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply only when a trial
court lacks, or refuses to use, discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to a life,
or de facto life, sentence. The trial court in this case did not fail to exercise its
discretion in deciding to accept the parties’ plea agreement and entering petitioner’s
convictions and 50-year sentence accordingly. Because petitioner failed to make
constitutional claims that were cognizable under Miller, it was not error to deny his
motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 29 Because we find Miller inapplicable, we need not address the petitioner’s
remaining arguments. We also need not consider the second issue before us,
namely, the proper remedy for an unconstitutional imposition of a de facto life
sentence in this case.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court upholding
the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for leave to file his pro se successive
postconviction petition.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
¶ 33 JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting:
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¶ 34 The issue presented is whether petitioner, who entered a guilty plea in exchange
for a de facto life sentence, is precluded from challenging that sentence as
unconstitutional in violation of the new substantive rule of law set forth in Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The majority holds that petitioner is not entitled
to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence because he waived that right by
entering a negotiated guilty plea. Supra ¶¶ 19-26. I disagree and would hold that
the Miller protections must be guaranteed to juvenile offenders who plead guilty as
well as to those who insist that the State prove the charges beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 35 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 36 Petitioner was charged with several offenses, including two counts of first
degree murder, that were committed when he was 16 years old. Petitioner
ultimately entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count each of first degree
murder and residential burglary and two counts of armed robbery. In exchange, the
State agreed to specified terms of imprisonment and dismissed the remaining
charges against him. The circuit court approved the terms of the plea agreement
and sentenced petitioner to concurrent prison terms of 50 years for murder, 30 years
for each armed robbery count, and 15 years for residential burglary. As part of the
plea process, petitioner waived his right to the preparation of a presentence
investigation report and to a hearing in mitigation and aggravation. Petitioner was
17 years old when he entered into the plea agreement.
¶ 37 After filing an unsuccessful petition for postconviction relief, petitioner later
moved for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. His proffered
successive petition asserted that the automatic-transfer provision for juvenile
offenders, together with the truth-in-sentencing provision in force at the time,
required him to serve his entire 50-year sentence. According to the petition, that
sentencing scheme violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amend. VIII; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).
¶ 38 The circuit court denied petitioner’s motion for leave to file the successive
petition, and the appellate court affirmed. Thereafter, this court entered a
supervisory order directing the appellate court to reconsider its decision in light of
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People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41, which held that any sentence greater
than 40 years’ imprisonment constitutes a de facto life sentence.
¶ 39 On remand, the appellate court again affirmed. 2020 IL App (3d) 140573-UB.
The appellate court acknowledged that petitioner had shown cause under the cause-
and-prejudice test applicable to successive postconviction petitions but held that he
failed to establish prejudice because he had forfeited any constitutional challenge
to his sentence by entering a fully negotiated plea. Id. ¶ 14. The appellate court
concluded that, by entering into a negotiated plea agreement, petitioner had waived
his right to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence. Id. ¶¶ 14-20.
¶ 40 The majority also affirms, and its reasoning essentially mirrors that of the
appellate court. According to the majority, petitioner cannot show prejudice
because he waived any constitutional error in the imposition of his sentence when
he entered a negotiated guilty plea that included a de facto life sentence, even
though he was a juvenile and the circuit court did not consider the factors articulated
in Miller. Supra ¶¶ 19-27. I cannot agree with the majority’s decision because it
disregards the fundamental principles governing the sentencing of juvenile
offenders.
¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 42 A. United States Supreme Court
Juvenile Sentencing Jurisprudence
¶ 43 In an unbroken line of cases commencing in 2005, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that juvenile offenders are constitutionally different from
adult defendants with regard to sentencing. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578-79 (2005), the Court concluded that the eighth amendment prohibits capital
punishment for murderers who were under 18 at the time of their crimes. Five years
later, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), the Court held that the eighth
amendment prohibits a mandatory sentence of life without parole for offenders who
were under 18 and committed nonhomicide offenses. Then in Miller, 567 U.S. at
489, the Court held that the eighth amendment precluded a mandatory sentence of
life without parole for a juvenile offender who has committed homicide. The Court
recognized that such a sentence could be imposed only where the sentence is not
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mandatory and the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of a
youthful offender and to impose a lesser punishment. Id. at 476. In Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206, 212 (2016), the Court held that Miller applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review. And most recently in Jones v.
Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (2021), the Court reaffirmed
that the Miller factors must be considered before a sentencer can impose a
discretionary life term on a juvenile offender. The Court also recognized that the
individual states may adopt additional reforms that limit the sentencing of juvenile
offenders. Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1323.
¶ 44 B. Illinois Supreme Court
Juvenile Sentencing Jurisprudence
¶ 45 This court has embraced all of those holdings and applied them to juvenile
offenders in Illinois. Two years before Montgomery was issued, we held that the
new rule announced in Miller is retroactive and must be applied to cases on
collateral review. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39. In People v. Reyes, 2016
IL 119271, ¶ 9. we held that Miller applies when a juvenile offender is sentenced
to a mandatory term of years that is the functional equivalent of life without the
possibility of parole and that the failure to consider the offender’s youth,
immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation as mitigating factors constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
¶ 46 In People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 38, we recognized that the Miller
Court’s reasoning is not specific to mandatory life sentences alone. Holman
observed that, under Miller and Montgomery, life sentences imposed on juvenile
offenders—whether mandatory or discretionary—are disproportionate and violate
the eighth amendment, unless the sentencer considers youth and its attendant
characteristics. Id. ¶ 40. Accordingly, we held that Miller applies to discretionary
sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders. Id.
¶ 47 In Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41, this court held that a prison term imposed
on a juvenile offender that exceeds 40 years constitutes a de facto life sentence in
violation of the eighth amendment. We further observed that
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“to prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced
for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was
subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and
(2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics
in imposing the sentence.” Id. ¶ 27.
Moreover, the legislature has codified the rule articulated in Miller by adopting a
set of nine statutory factors that must be considered when a court imposes sentence
on a juvenile offender. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020).
¶ 48 The progression of this precedent has been clear and consistent. Both the United
States Supreme Court and this court have specifically recognized that juvenile
offenders are different from adults when it comes to sentencing and that they are
entitled to additional protections that allow for the capacity to change, an increase
in maturity, and the potential for rehabilitation.
¶ 49 C. Application of Established Case Precedent
¶ 50 I believe this line of authority governs the outcome of this case. As the Supreme
Court has specifically recognized, juveniles inherently lack maturity, do not have a
fully formed character or a fully developed sense of responsibility, and are both
more susceptible to external influences and less able to control their environment
than are adults. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 475-76. In addition, juveniles are more
capable of change than adults and, consequently, more capable of being reformed.
Id. at 471. Based on these characteristics, juveniles are less deserving of the most
severe punishments, and it will be the rare case in which a life sentence will be
appropriate for a juvenile offender. Id. at 479-80.
¶ 51 Petitioner was a juvenile when the offenses were committed and when he
entered his guilty plea, and he agreed to serve a 50-year de facto life term without
the sentencing judge’s consideration of the characteristics that were attendant to his
youth. Also, as is common in cases involving a plea agreement, petitioner waived
his statutory right to a presentence investigation report and a hearing in mitigation
and aggravation—which would have influenced the sentencing judge’s assessment
of the plea agreement. A presentence investigation report and hearing in mitigation
would have provided relevant information as to petitioner’s characteristics such as
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his personal background and environment, his level of maturity and ability to
consider risks and consequences of behavior, the presence of cognitive or
developmental disability, his susceptibility to outside pressure, and his potential for
rehabilitation. The waiver of those two procedural safeguards prevented the
sentencing judge from fully considering the Miller factors.
¶ 52 In my view, the established precedent of the Supreme Court and this court as to
the sentencing of juveniles should apply here. I would adopt the reasoning applied
in a line of cases holding that a juvenile offender should receive the benefit of the
Miller protections even though he or she has entered a guilty plea. See People v.
Johnson, 2021 IL App (3d) 180357, ¶¶ 18-22 (holding that principles of waiver do
not apply to bar a juvenile offender from challenging his negotiated sentence under
Miller); People v. Applewhite, 2020 IL App (1st) 142330-B, ¶¶ 19-21 (same);
People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶¶ 18-19 (same as to a young-adult
offender); People v. Parker, 2019 IL App (5th) 150192, ¶¶ 10-18 (reversing the
denial of leave to file a successive postconviction based on Buffer).
¶ 53 D. The Majority’s Cases Are Distinguishable
¶ 54 The majority, however, reaches the opposite conclusion and places significant
reliance on Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady, the Supreme
Court addressed whether an adult defendant could argue that his guilty plea was
involuntary because he pled guilty to avoid a potential sentence of death, which
was subsequently held to be inapplicable to the charged offense. Id. at 749-50. The
Court held that the defendant was precluded from challenging the voluntariness of
his plea on the ground that “he discover[ed] long after the plea has been accepted
that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely
penalties attached to alternative courses of action.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 757.
¶ 55 The decision in Brady is distinguishable from this case in two critical respects.
First, it involved an adult defendant and has nothing whatsoever to do with the
sentencing of juvenile offenders. Second, the defendant in Brady only faced the
possibility of a death sentence if convicted. Id. at 743. Here, petitioner faced a
mandatory life sentence if convicted of both murder charges. The only reason the
mandatory life sentence provision was not applied to petitioner is because he agreed
to plead guilty to a single count of murder in exchange for a 50-year term of
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imprisonment. That sentence constitutes a de facto life term, requiring
consideration of the Miller factors. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41. Given that
Brady was decided more than 40 years ago and applies only to adult defendants, it
obviously does not consider the special concerns surrounding imposition of a life
term on a juvenile offender and does not reflect the evolving jurisprudence
governing how juvenile offenders are to be treated for sentencing purposes.
¶ 56 In addition, the majority relies on Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171, 172 (4th
Cir. 2016), which involved a juvenile offender who pled guilty to avoid the
possibility of a death sentence and was sentenced to a life term with the opportunity
for parole. The offender sought to set aside his guilty plea on the ground that Roper
prohibited the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Id. at 173. In rejecting that
argument, the Dingle court relied on Brady to hold that the offender was precluded
from seeking vacatur of his guilty plea because the subsequently proscribed
sentence was not imposed on him. Id. at 174-76.
¶ 57 Dingle does not control this case any more than Brady does. Like the adult
defendant in Brady, the juvenile offender in Dingle only faced the possibility of a
death sentence upon conviction. Here, petitioner faced a mandatory life sentence if
convicted of both murder charges. Also, the offender in Dingle was not subjected
to the sentence that Roper invalidated. In this case, however, petitioner was
sentenced to a discretionary life term, as defined by Buffer, without the protections
guaranteed under Miller. The Dingle court simply tracked the reasoning adopted in
Brady and goes no further in explaining why juvenile offenders who plead guilty
should be deprived of the protections that have been universally adopted and
embraced following Miller.
¶ 58 In addition, the majority’s reliance on Brady and Dingle suffers from a basic
error in logic. The majority has confused the uncertainty of conviction with the
possibility of a harsh sentence that could be imposed if the offender goes to trial.
The uncertainty of conviction is present in virtually every case. That is why
prosecutors are willing to offer plea deals and why defendants are often motivated
to accept such deals to avoid the possibility of a sentence that is harsher than the
one offered. The fact that conviction was not certain in petitioner’s case was also
true in Brady and Dingle. The difference between these cases is the fact that the
offenders in Brady and Dingle entered guilty pleas to avoid a possible death
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sentence. Here, petitioner pled guilty to avoid a mandatory life term—an
unassailable statutory certainty upon conviction of two murder charges. Contrary
to the majority’s assertion, this case is not akin to Brady and Dingle.
¶ 59 The majority also relies on this court’s decision in People v. Sophanavong, 2020
IL 124337, ¶ 33 (citing People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 545 (2004)), for the
proposition that a defendant who enters a voluntary guilty plea relinquishes the
right to challenge nonjurisdictional errors or irregularities, including those based
on constitutional principles. However, both Sophanavong and Townsell are like
Brady in that they involved adult defendants and did not consider the special
sentencing concerns affecting juveniles. In addition, both of those cases are
distinctly different from this case in that they did not involve novel constitutional
rights. Id. ¶ 25 (rejecting defendant’s request for a new sentencing hearing based
on failure to comply with statutory requirement for a presentence investigation
report); Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 547 (rejecting a challenge based on Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which addressed well-established constitutional
rights). Here, petitioner’s claim is premised on the new substantive rule of
constitutional law articulated in Miller, which must be applied retroactively on
collateral review. Therefore, neither Sophanavong nor Townsell offers any
guidance in resolving this appeal, and Brady does nothing to change that.
¶ 60 E. The Majority’s Reasoning Is Flawed
¶ 61 1. Youth Diminishes the Ability to
Agree to a De Facto Life Sentence
¶ 62 The incontrovertible flaw in the majority’s reasoning is that it treats this case as
if it were a Brady case. It is not. It is a Miller case. And the United States Supreme
Court and this court have definitively and consistently held that juvenile offenders
are constitutionally different from adult defendants when it comes to sentencing.
¶ 63 Here, as a consequence of the automatic transfer statute and the truth-in-
sentencing law, petitioner is required to serve the full 50-year term of imprisonment
specified in the plea agreement. Thus, petitioner was subjected to a sentence that
has been declared unconstitutional—a discretionary de facto life term without the
possibility of parole and without consideration of the Miller factors.
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¶ 64 The analysis of the majority severely undermines the protections articulated in
Miller and Holman. The majority’s reasoning ignores the fact that a juvenile
offender—like petitioner here—is likely to agree to a plea offer that includes an
unconstitutionally long prison term as a means of avoiding a mandatory life
sentence. The very same factors that Roper, Graham, and Miller have held to
diminish a juvenile offender’s culpability similarly impair a juvenile offender’s
ability to fully appreciate and knowingly enter into a plea agreement that includes
a de facto life sentence. When it comes to sentencing, the rules that apply to adult
defendants do not govern juvenile offenders, and this court should not mechanically
apply Brady, Sophanavong, and Townsell here.
¶ 65 2. The Majority Incorrectly Assumes That Miller
Does Not Apply to Discretionary Sentences
¶ 66 The majority seeks to justify its decision on the ground that the circuit court
could have declined to accept the 50-year term of imprisonment as part of the plea
agreement. Supra ¶ 27. This reasoning is entirely unpersuasive. This court held in
Holman that the protections recognized and mandated in Miller apply even where
the life sentence imposed on a juvenile is discretionary. Holman, 2017 IL 120655,
¶ 40. Also, given the nature of plea agreements generally—and the facts of this
case—the possibility that the circuit court might have rejected the terms of the plea
agreement is highly unlikely. But even if that were not the case, nothing in the
record before us demonstrates that the court considered the mitigating
characteristics attendant to petitioner’s youth in exercising its discretion to approve
the de facto life sentence. Those characteristics are equally relevant for offenders
who plead guilty and those who go to trial—they do not magically disappear simply
because a juvenile offender has agreed to a plea deal. If a sentencing judge is not
required to consider the Miller factors when deciding whether to approve a plea
agreement that includes a de facto life sentence, then juvenile offenders who are
tried as adults necessarily must insist on a trial in order to benefit from the
protections that Miller guarantees.
¶ 67 3. The Majority’s Contract Law Analysis Is Inapplicable
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¶ 68 As a final point, I find the majority’s reference to contract law as justification
for its decision to be misguided. Supra ¶ 21. In noting that plea agreements are
contracts and subject to waiver principles, the majority ignores that waiver of a
constitutional right requires more. This court has recognized that “[w]aiver of a
constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” and that “[s]uch
waivers must not only be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137
(2000).
¶ 69 Obviously, petitioner could not have knowingly waived his right to have the
Miller factors considered when the court was evaluating the propriety of his plea
agreement and de facto life term. Miller was not decided until 12 years after his
plea was accepted, and Buffer was decided 7 years after that. Because the
constitutional protections recognized in Miller and Buffer did not exist at the time
of his plea, petitioner agreed to and received a sentence that violates the eighth
amendment. In any other context, a juvenile such as petitioner would not be bound
by a contractual obligation. Yet the majority takes the extraordinary step of holding
that this court must enforce the terms of a contract that is unconstitutional.
¶ 70 4. The Majority Should Adhere to Supreme Court
and Illinois Precedent
¶ 71 This appeal offers the opportunity for this court to confirm that we meant what
we said in Holman and Reyes—that the constitutional protections recognized in
Miller apply to juvenile offenders who receive a life sentence, whether mandatory
or discretionary, natural or de facto. In my view, there is no good reason to depart
from our prior precedent. I believe that we should hold that all juvenile offenders,
including those who enter negotiated guilty pleas, are entitled to the protections set
forth in Miller.
¶ 72 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 73 In sum, I disagree with the majority’s holding that a juvenile offender is
precluded from challenging the imposition of a de facto term of life in prison,
without consideration of the characteristics attendant to petitioner’s youth, because
that sentence was the culmination of a negotiated plea agreement at a time when
the length of that sentence was not unconstitutional. Stare decisis has been—and
should remain—our guiding principle. Therefore, I cannot join in the majority
opinion, which ignores United States and Illinois juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.
I would reverse the judgment of the lower courts and remand the cause for further
postconviction proceedings. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 74 CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE joins in this dissent.
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