Thompson v. Gordon ( 2006 )


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  •                     Docket No. 100600.
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
    CORINNE THOMPSON, Appellee, v. CHRISTIE GORDON et
    al.
    (Jack E. Leisch et al., Appellants).
    Opinion filed June 2, 2006.
    CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the
    court, with opinion.
    Justices Freeman, McMorrow, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman,
    and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    OPINION
    At issue in this case is whether a civil engineer must be
    licensed in Illinois pursuant to the Professional Engineering
    Practice Act of 1989 (the Engineering Act) (225 ILCS 325/1 et
    seq. (West 2002)), in order to testify as an Illinois Supreme
    Court Rule 213 (177 Ill. 2d R. 213) retained opinion witness in
    an Illinois civil action. The circuit court of Lake County held that
    an engineer must be licensed in the State of Illinois to
    participate as an expert witness in litigation pending in Illinois.
    The appellate court reversed. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d 447
    . For the
    following reasons, we affirm the appellate court.
    BACKGROUND
    On November 27, 1998, Christie Gordon was driving
    eastbound on State Route 132 in Gurnee, Illinois, when she
    swerved to avoid another vehicle. Gordon=s vehicle then
    crossed the raised median and collided with a westbound
    vehicle driven by Trevor Thompson. Corinne Thompson and
    Amber Thompson were passengers in that vehicle. Trevor
    Thompson and Amber Thompson died as a result of the
    collision. Corinne Thompson, individually and as independent
    administrator of the estates of Trevor Thompson and Amber
    Thompson, filed suit against defendants Christie Gordon,
    Grand Avenue Properties, Inc., Gurnee Mills (MLP) Limited
    Partnership, f/k/a Gurnee Mills Limited Partnership, Gurnee
    Properties Associated Limited Partnership, Western
    Development Corporation, Jack E. Leisch & Associates, Inc.
    (Leisch), CH2M Hill, Inc. (CH2M), The Mills Corporation, The
    Mills Limited Partnership, Gurnee Mills II LLC, and Gurnee
    Mills LLC. Leisch and CH2M were designers of the intersection
    of I-94 and Route 132 in Gurnee. Thompson alleged that
    defendants Leisch and CH2M were negligent in, inter alia,
    failing to provide a median barrier warrant analysis in their
    design proposal for improvements to the Route 132/I-94
    interchange, failing to consider the necessity of crossover
    protection on the bridge deck, including a Jersey barrier, and
    failing to design a barrier median to separate roadway traffic at
    the Route 132/I-94 interchange.
    Defendants Leisch and CH2M (hereinafter defendants) filed
    a motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued that the
    uncontroverted facts did not give rise to any duty owed by
    defendants to plaintiff because the work contracted for by
    defendants did not require median barrier analysis or design as
    claimed by plaintiff, and the design work did not encompass
    the area of the accident. Plaintiff filed her response to
    defendants= motion for summary judgment, including the
    affidavit of Andrew Ramisch, plaintiff=s Supreme Court Rule
    213 (177 Ill. 2d R. 213) expert witness. Ramisch=s affidavit
    stated that he was a civil engineer and had been actively
    involved in the analysis, design and construction of roadways,
    including highways, for over 30 years. Ramisch=s opinion was
    that defendants failed to meet the ordinary standard of care,
    including failing to design a Jersey median barrier over the
    bridge of Route 132. Had defendants performed the
    engineering work within the standard of care, it is more
    probable than not that a Jersey barrier would have been
    designed and constructed and would have prevented Gordon=s
    vehicle from crossing into the westbound lanes of Route 132
    and colliding with the Thompson vehicle. Attached to
    Ramisch=s affidavit was his curriculum vitae. According to
    Ramisch=s curriculum vitae, Ramisch received his Bachelor of
    Science in Civil Engineering in 1968, and received his Master
    of Science in Civil Engineering in 1974. Ramisch was licensed
    as a professional engineer in the District of Columbia.
    On January 30, 2003, defendants filed a motion to strike
    Ramisch=s affidavit on the ground that Ramisch was not
    qualified to render professional engineering services, including
    forensic engineering services, in the State of Illinois, and that
    Ramisch was in violation of the Engineering Act. Citing the
    appellate court=s decision in Van Breemen v. Department of
    Professional Regulation, 
    296 Ill. App. 3d 363
    (1998),
    defendants argued that because Ramisch was not licensed as
    a professional engineer in Illinois, he could not give opinions in
    this case. In response, plaintiff denied that Van Breemen
    supported defendants= motion to strike.
    Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendants=
    motion to strike. In granting the motion, the trial court held that
    -3-
    unless an engineer is licensed in the State of Illinois, the
    engineer cannot participate as an expert witness in any
    pending litigation in the State of Illinois because such
    participation would constitute the practice of professional
    engineering without a license in violation of section 39(b)(4) of
    the Engineering Act (225 ILCS 325/39(b)(4) (West 2002)) and
    Van Breemen. Plaintiff then filed a motion to reconsider,
    submitting that the trial court had erred in its construction of the
    Engineering Act. The trial court denied plaintiff=s motion to
    reconsider, but granted plaintiff=s subsequently filed motion for
    interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155
    Ill. 2d R. 308). The trial court certified two questions for
    interlocutory appeal:
    A1. Whether the work of an engineer, unlicensed in
    the State of Illinois, as an Illinois Supreme Court Rule
    213(f) retained opinion witness in a litigated matter in
    the State of Illinois, constitutes the unlicensed practice
    of professional engineering under the Illinois
    Professional Engineering Act (225 ILCS 325/1 (1992));
    and
    2. Whether Van Breemen v. Department of
    Regulation, 
    296 Ill. App. 3d 363
    , 
    694 N.E.2d 688
    (2nd
    Dist. 1998) controls the issue of whether a trial court
    strikes, on motion, the affidavit of an Illinois Supreme
    Court Rule 213(f) retained opinion witness, retained in a
    litigated matter in the State of Illinois, where the opinion
    witness is not licensed in the State of Illinois.@
    The appellate court granted plaintiff=s application for leave
    to appeal. On appeal, the appellate court declined to answer
    the first certified question, holding that the initial determination
    of what constitutes the unlicensed practice of engineering in
    Illinois is relegated to the Illinois Department of Financial and
    Professional Regulation, not to the appellate court. Thompson
    v Gordon, 
    349 Ill. App. 3d 923
    , 928 (2004) (Thompson I). With
    regard to the second certified question, the appellate court held
    that Van Breemen did not control and that an engineer could
    testify in Illinois without an Illinois license as a Rule 213
    retained opinion witness. Thompson 
    I, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 929
    .
    The appellate court therefore reversed the trial court=s order
    -4-
    striking Ramisch=s affidavit and remanded to the trial court for
    further proceedings. Thompson 
    I, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 930
    .
    Defendants then filed a petition for rehearing, and later
    moved for leave to supplement their petition for rehearing with
    a copy of a rule to show cause issued to Ramisch by the Illinois
    Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (the
    Department) on June 21, 2004. The rule to show cause
    directed Ramisch to show cause why the Department should
    not issue an order to cease and desist from the unlicensed
    practice of professional engineering, including providing
    consultation and evaluation of an engineering system and
    offering to provide forensic engineering services. The appellate
    court denied the motion to supplement and denied the petition
    for rehearing.
    Defendants then filed a petition for leave to appeal in this
    court. On September 22, 2004, while defendants= petition for
    leave to appeal was pending, the Department issued a cease
    and desist order against Ramisch and his corporation barring
    him from testifying as a professional engineer without an Illinois
    license. The cease and desist order found that Ramisch was
    not licensed in Illinois but was engaged in the practice of
    professional engineering in the State of Illinois for which an
    Illinois license is required. The cease and desist order stated
    that:
    A[a]n expert witness providing opinion testimony which
    involves the consultation on, investigation and analysis
    of an engineering system when such consultation,
    investigation and analysis requires extensive knowledge
    of engineering laws, formulae, materials, practice, and
    construction methods constitutes the practice of
    professional engineering, in specific forensic
    engineering.@
    The cease and desist order further found that the Aservices
    being offered and provided by [Ramisch] are the practice of
    professional engineering, including specifically forensic
    engineering.@
    On November 24, 2004, this court denied defendants=
    petition for leave to appeal, but issued a supervisory order
    -5-
    directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment in the case,
    to permit defendants to file a certified copy of the September
    22, 2004, cease and desist order entered by the Department
    against Ramisch, and to reconsider its judgment in light of the
    cease and desist order. Thompson v. Gordon, 
    212 Ill. 2d 555
    (2004) (supervisory order).
    Pursuant to this court=s supervisory order, the appellate
    court vacated its prior opinion and filed a new opinion. 356 Ill.
    App. 3d 447 (Thompson II). The appellate court again declined
    to answer the first certified question, stating that the initial
    determination of what constitutes the unlicensed practice of
    engineering in Illinois is relegated to the Department and not to
    the appellate 
    court. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 453
    . With regard to the
    second certified question, the appellate court again held that
    the Van Breemen decision did not control the issue of whether
    a trial court should strike the affidavit of a retained opinion
    
    witness. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 456
    . The appellate court noted that
    the issue of whether the plaintiff in Van Breemen was
    competent to act as an expert was not before the reviewing
    court, nor did the Van Breemen decision address that plaintiff=s
    competency as an 
    engineer. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 454
    . Rather,
    the Van Breemen case came before the court on judicial
    review of an administrative decision following the Department=s
    issuance of a cease and desist 
    order. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 454
    .
    The appellate court further held that the Department=s cease
    and desist order in this case did not alter its analysis or
    
    decision. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 455
    . The appellate court rejected
    defendants= suggestion that the cease and desist order should
    control the decisions of the trial and appellate courts, finding
    that an administrative body=s decision is not an adequate
    substitute for judicial 
    review. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 455
    . The
    appellate court held that the cease and desist order was
    relevant evidence, but was not binding on the trial court in
    considering whether to allow Ramisch to testify as an expert
    
    witness. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 456
    .
    The Thompson II court explained that the case concerned
    the trial court=s authority to admit expert testimony. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 457. The appellate court held that Ramisch=s lack of an
    Illinois license went to the weight of his testimony, not his
    -6-
    competency as an expert witness. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 459. The
    appellate court noted that this court has established that expert
    testimony is proper if the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill,
    experience, training, or education, and the expert=s testimony
    will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. 356 Ill.
    App. 3d at 457, quoting Snelson v. Kamm, 
    204 Ill. 2d 1
    , 24
    (2003). The Thompson II court acknowledged that the
    legislature had set out what constitutes the practice of
    engineering in the Engineering Act, but held that:
    AThe trial court=s gatekeeping function is to determine
    whether an individual is qualified to be an expert, not
    merely by determining whether that individual took an
    exam and can display a piece of paper showing a
    passing mark, but by reviewing the individual=s
    credentials, experience, and knowledge of the subject
    matter. [Citation.] The trial court=s function is also to
    determine whether that expert=s testimony would assist
    the trier of fact.@ 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 460.
    The Thompson II court then went beyond the certified
    question to consider the propriety of the trial court=s underlying
    order and found that the trial court had abused its discretion in
    striking Ramisch=s affidavit because the trial court had based
    its decision on an incorrect view of the law. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at
    461. The trial court failed to recognize the legal principles
    concerning the admission of expert testimony when it struck
    Ramisch=s affidavit on the basis that Ramisch lacked an Illinois
    license. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 461. The appellate court therefore
    reversed the circuit court=s order striking Ramisch=s affidavit
    and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 461-62.
    This court allowed defendants= petition for leave to appeal.
    177 Ill. 2d R. 315. This court also allowed the Illinois
    Department of Financial and Professional RegulationBDivision
    of Professional Regulation, and the Illinois Society of
    Professional Engineers and American Council of Engineering
    Companies of Illinois leave to file briefs as amici curiae in
    support of defendants. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
    -7-
    ANALYSIS
    At the outset, we note that the appellate court was correct
    in declining to address the first certified question. The first
    certified question asked whether the work of an engineer
    unlicensed in the State of Illinois as a Rule 213(f) retained
    opinion witness in a litigated matter in the state constitutes the
    unlicensed practice of engineering under the Engineering Act.
    As the appellate court found, the initial determination of that
    question is properly relegated to the Department.
    The Department of Professional Regulation (see 225 ILCS
    325/1 et seq. (West 2002)) was created by the legislature in
    section 5B15 of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois (20
    ILCS 5/5B15 (West 2002)) as a department of state
    government. Section 2105B75 of the Department of
    Professional Regulation Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105B75 (West
    2002), specifically established Adesign professionals dedicated
    employees@ who Ashall be devoted exclusively to the
    administration and enforcement@ of, inter alia, the Engineering
    Act. The Engineering Act, in turn, provides for a
    comprehensive regulation of the practice of professional
    engineering, empowering the Department to pass upon the
    qualifications and to conduct examinations of applicants for
    licensure as professional engineers; to conduct investigations
    and hearings regarding violations of the Engineering Act and to
    take disciplinary or other actions as provided in the Engineering
    Act; and to promulgate rules for the administration of the
    Engineering Act (225 ILCS 325/5(a), (d), (f) (West 2002)).
    Consequently, the appellate court was correct that it is within
    the province of the Department and not a reviewing court to
    initially determine what constitutes the unlicensed practice of
    professional engineering.
    Defendants then argue that, upon remand following this
    court=s supervisory order, the appellate court erred in again
    declining to answer the first certified question because on
    remand, the Department=s cease and desist order rendered the
    first certified question moot. Defendants assert that the
    Department=s cease and desist order conclusively established
    that Ramisch had practiced professional engineering without a
    license when he testified by affidavit. Because Ramisch did not
    -8-
    appeal the cease and desist order, that order is final.
    Consequently, the Department=s cease and desist order settled
    the first question certified by the circuit court in this case.
    In Thompson II, the appellate court explained that despite
    the Department=s cease and desist order finding that Ramisch
    had engaged in the unlicensed practice of professional
    engineering under the Engineering Act, its jurisdiction to
    consider the first certified question had not been triggered
    because the court=s jurisdiction could be effected only in
    accordance with the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS
    5/3B101 et seq. (West 2002)). 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 453. We
    agree with the appellate court.
    Pursuant to the Illinois Constitution of 1970, final judgments
    from the circuit courts are appealable as a Amatter of right,@ but
    final administrative decisions are appealable only Aas provided
    by law.@ Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, ''6, 9. The Administrative
    Review Law provides that A[e]very action to review a final
    administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a
    complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from
    the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was
    served upon the party affected by the decision ***.@ 735 ILCS
    5/3B103 (West 2002). Further, unless review of an
    administrative decision is sought within the time and manner
    provided for in the Administrative Review Law, Athe parties to
    the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be
    barred from obtaining judicial review of such administrative
    decision.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B102 (West 2002). If administrative
    review is not sought within the time allowed under the Act,
    Asuch decision shall not be subject to judicial review@ under the
    Act, except for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the
    administrative agency over the person or subject matter. 735
    ILCS 5/3B102 (West 2002).
    In this case, Ramisch did not seek review of the
    Department=s cease and desist order. Consequently, the cease
    and desist order was not subject to judicial review. We further
    note that even if Ramisch had sought judicial review of the
    Department=s cease and desist order, this court still would not
    have jurisdiction over an appeal of that case, absent an order
    consolidating such an appeal with this case, as judicial review
    -9-
    of an administrative order is a separate proceeding from an
    appeal in a civil case. The appellate court in Thompson II,
    therefore, properly held that its jurisdiction to consider the first
    certified question in light of the cease and desist order had not
    been triggered. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 453. For that same reason,
    we reject defendants= claim that the first certified question is
    moot. The issue raised in the first certified question simply is
    not before this court. In addition, because the issue raised in
    the first certified question is not before this court, we need not
    address the arguments of defendants and amici concerning the
    Engineering Act, whether forensic engineering as set forth in
    the Engineering Act includes testifying in a case, and whether
    Ramisch was practicing professional engineering without a
    license.
    Defendants then argue that, because the Department=s
    cease and desist order was a final order and conclusively
    established that Ramisch cannot testify in this case without an
    Illinois license, Ramisch was not qualified to testify as an
    expert witness.
    Defendants are correct that the cease and desist order is a
    final order. Contrary to defendants= assertions, however, the
    Department=s finding that Ramisch violated the Engineering Act
    by practicing engineering without an Illinois license is not
    dispositive of the issue before this court. The narrow issue
    before this court is whether licensure as a professional
    engineer is a prerequisite to testifying as an expert witness in a
    civil case, and whether the Van Breemen decision controls that
    issue. Because this issue concerns a question of law certified
    by the circuit court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308, our
    review is de novo. In re M.M.D., 
    213 Ill. 2d 105
    , 113 (2004).
    In Van Breemen, the Department solicited from the plaintiff
    a brochure advertising his services as an expert witness, so
    the plaintiff sent the Department a letter and his resume. Van
    
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 364
    . Thereafter, the Department
    sent the plaintiff a rule to show cause why the Department
    should not issue a cease and desist order for the plaintiff=s
    unlicensed practice of professional engineering. Van 
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 364
    . The plaintiff did not answer the rule to
    show cause to the Department=s satisfaction, so the
    -10-
    Department ordered the plaintiff to cease and desist from
    engaging in the practice of engineering until he was licensed.
    Van 
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 365
    . The Department found
    that the plaintiff was not licensed to practice as a professional
    engineer in the State of Illinois and was engaged in the
    practice of professional engineering as shown by his resume
    and letter. Van 
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 365
    . The circuit
    court confirmed the Department=s order and the plaintiff
    appealed. Van 
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 365
    .
    The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit
    court. The appellate court rejected the plaintiff=s claim that he
    did not represent himself to be a licensed professional
    engineer. Van 
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 365
    . The appellate
    court noted that A[a] person is construed to be practicing or
    offering to practice professional engineering if, among other
    things, he holds himself out as able to perform any service that
    is recognized as professional engineering practice.@ Van
    
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 366
    . Included in the examples of
    professional engineering is forensic engineering. Van
    
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 366
    . The appellate court
    concluded that the Department did not err in finding that the
    plaintiff had violated the Engineering Act, noting that the
    plaintiff=s resume accentuated the plaintiff=s forensic work and
    industrial failure investigations, thereby holding the plaintiff out
    as able to perform many services recognized as professional
    engineering practices, especially forensic engineering. Van
    
    Breemen, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 366
    .
    Defendants contend that Ramisch=s conduct in the present
    case closely parallels Van Breemen=s conduct. In both cases,
    the Department found that Ramisch and Van Breemen
    practiced professional engineering without a license and
    ordered both Ramisch and Van Breemen to cease and desist
    from their unlicensed activities. Defendants claim that the only
    difference between the two engineers is that Van Breemen
    merely advertised his skills as an expert, whereas Ramisch
    actually testified as an expert. Defendants assert that if Van
    Breemen could not even offer his services without a license, it
    follows that Ramisch cannot deliver his services without a
    license.
    -11-
    Although Ramisch=s conduct may closely parallel Van
    Breemen=s conduct, the appellate court was correct that the
    Van Breemen decision does not control the issue of whether a
    trial court should strike an affidavit of a Rule 213 retained
    opinion witness who is not licensed in the State of Illinois. Had
    Ramisch sought judicial review of the Department=s cease and
    desist order, the Van Breemen decision likely would have been
    dispositive of his case. However, whether the plaintiff in Van
    Breemen was qualified to act as an expert witness was not
    before that court. As the appellate court observed, the issue in
    this case concerns the authority of a trial court to determine
    whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances it
    should allow an expert to testify. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 457. With
    regard to that issue, Van Breemen is inapposite.
    For the same reason, we reject defendants= claim that the
    decision in Miller v. Department of Professional Regulation,
    
    276 Ill. App. 3d 133
    (1995), controls this case. Miller also came
    before the court for judicial review of an administrative decision
    where the Department issued a cease and desist order
    directing the plaintiff to refrain from engaging in the unlicensed
    practice of professional engineering. 
    Miller, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 135
    . Defendants contend that the Miller analysis applies to this
    case and establishes that the legislature intentionally included
    forensic engineering within the definition of professional
    engineering when the legislature wrote the 1989 Engineering
    Act. Defendants claim that Ramisch, like Miller, is bound by the
    Engineering Act and must be licensed before he can engage in
    and practice professional engineering in Illinois. However, like
    the court in Van Breemen, the court in Miller did not address
    whether the plaintiff in that case was competent to testify as a
    retained expert witness. The Miller decision, therefore, has no
    application to the present case.
    With regard to expert testimony, it is well settled that the
    decision whether to admit expert testimony is within the sound
    discretion of the trial court. Snelson v. Kamm, 
    204 Ill. 2d 1
    , 24
    (2003). A person will be allowed to testify as an expert if his
    experience and qualifications afford him knowledge that is not
    common to laypersons, and where his testimony will aid the
    trier of fact in reaching its conclusions. People v. Miller, 173 Ill.
    -12-
    2d 167, 186 (1996). AThere is no predetermined formula for
    how an expert acquires specialized knowledge or experience
    and the expert can gain such through practical experience,
    scientific study, education, training or research.@ Miller, 
    173 Ill. 2d
    at 186. Thus, A[f]ormal academic training or specific degrees
    are not required to qualify a person as an expert; practical
    experience in a field may serve just as well to qualify him.@ Lee
    v. Chicago Transit Authority, 
    152 Ill. 2d 432
    , 459 (1992). An
    expert need only have knowledge and experience beyond that
    of an average citizen. Miller, 
    173 Ill. 2d
    at 186. Expert
    testimony, then, is admissible Aif the proffered expert is
    qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
    and the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding
    the evidence.@ 
    Snelson, 204 Ill. 2d at 24
    .
    Based upon the foregoing, we find that the appellate court
    was correct in determining that licensure with the State of
    Illinois pursuant to the Engineering Act is not a mandatory
    prerequisite to rendering an expert opinion. Relevant
    considerations in determining whether Ramisch may testify as
    an expert include his knowledge, skill, experience, training and
    education; whether that knowledge, skill, experience, training
    and education afford Ramisch knowledge and experience
    beyond that of an average citizen; and whether Ramisch=s
    testimony will aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusions. As
    the appellate court found, the trial court in this case did not
    address any of the preceding considerations, striking
    Ramisch=s affidavit solely on the basis that Ramisch did not
    have an Illinois professional engineering license. While
    licensing may be a factor to consider in determining whether an
    engineer is qualified to testify as an expert witness, this court
    does not require an engineering license as a prerequisite to
    testifying.
    Defendants then argue that affirming the appellate court=s
    decision in this case has the Asurprising effect of both
    encouraging and condoning a criminal act.@ Defendants claim
    that pursuant to the appellate court=s decision, a trial court
    must consider Ramisch=s other qualifications and, if Ramisch
    meets the criteria for testifying as an expert witness, the trial
    -13-
    court must permit him to testify even though Ramisch will be
    committing a criminal act when he testifies.
    Whether Ramsich may be committing a criminal act by
    testifying in this case is a separate issue to be decided in a
    separate proceeding. We decline to prejudge the issue at this
    time. Moreover, in arguing that the Thompson II court=s order
    would be condoning and encouraging a criminal act,
    defendants misconstrue the holding in this case. The appellate
    court did not direct the trial court to allow Ramisch to testify,
    nor did the appellate court hold that the trial court could not
    consider Ramisch=s lack of an Illinois license in determining
    whether to admit Ramisch=s expert testimony. Rather, the
    appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in
    striking Ramisch=s affidavit solely on the basis that Ramisch
    lacked an Illinois license to practice engineering. The appellate
    court stated that the trial court should consider Ramisch=s lack
    of an Illinois license, as well as whether Ramisch qualified as
    an expert based upon his knowledge, skill, experience, training
    and education, and whether Ramisch=s proffered testimony
    would assist the trial court in understanding the evidence.
    Contrary to defendants= dire predictions, it is entirely possible
    that the trial court, after considering Ramisch=s knowledge,
    skill, experience, training, education, as well as his lack of an
    Illinois license, will again find that Ramisch is not qualified to
    testify in an Illinois civil trial concerning engineering practices. It
    is also possible that Ramisch, aware that he is subject to
    criminal penalties for violating the Department=s cease and
    desist order, will choose not to testify in this case. Because the
    appellate court simply remanded this cause to the trial court to
    properly consider all relevant factors in deciding defendants=
    motion to strike Ramisch=s affidavit, we find no error in the
    appellate court=s ruling.
    Defendants then argue that the appellate court decision in
    People v. West, 
    264 Ill. App. 3d 176
    (1994), supports the trial
    court=s decision to strike Ramisch=s affidavit and controls this
    case. In West, the defendant was convicted of arson and
    aggravated arson. 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 177
    . At trial, the
    defendant filed a motion to disqualify the State=s expert
    witness, John Walker, from testifying because Walker was not
    -14-
    licensed to investigate the cause and origin of fire for monetary
    gain as required by statute (225 ILCS 445/2(h)(4), 4 (West
    1992)). 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 178
    . The trial court denied the
    defendant=s motion, noting that although it was clear that
    Walker=s actions were contrary to the statute, Walker could
    testify as an expert witness because a person need not be
    licensed in order to qualify as an expert. 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 178
    .
    The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court had
    abused its discretion in denying the defendant=s motion to
    disqualify Walker. 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 184
    . The appellate
    court noted that the legislature had enacted a requirement for
    the protection of the public that anyone who investigates the
    causes and origins of fires for monetary gain must be licensed
    in order to conduct such an investigation, and had set forth in
    the statute the minimum requirements for licensure. 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 184
    . The appellate court stated that because of
    the legislation, Athe courts cannot ignore the licensing
    requirement in qualifying a witness as an expert, particularly
    where such conduct by the witness could subject the witness to
    criminal prosecution.@ 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 185
    . The
    appellate court reasoned that by allowing Walker to testify, the
    State and the trial court Awere permitting a continuation of a
    commission of a crime that should have been enjoined.@ 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 185
    .
    Defendants maintain that the reasoning in West applies in
    the instant case. In this case, as in West, the legislature has
    enacted a requirement for the protection of the public that any
    person who practices professional engineering, including
    forensic engineering, must be licensed to conduct those
    activities. It is clear, then, that the legislature felt that a person
    practicing professional engineering must be licensed by the
    state in order to ensure that the witness= opinions are given in a
    qualified, unbiased and proper manner. Further, because the
    legislature has provided that a person practicing as a
    professional engineer without a license is guilty of a Class A
    misdemeanor for a first offense and a Class 4 felony for a
    second or subsequent offense (see 225 ILCS 325/39(b)(4)
    (West 2002)), it is clear that if the trial court had allowed
    -15-
    Ramisch=s affidavit, it would have been permitting the
    continuation of a crime that should have been enjoined.
    The appellate court in West properly recognized that it is
    within the trial court=s discretion to determine whether a witness
    is qualified as an expert. 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 184
    . The
    West court also correctly stated that to qualify a witness as an
    expert, it must be shown that the witness= experience and
    qualifications afford him knowledge that is not common to
    laypersons and that the witness= testimony will aid the trier of
    fact in reaching its decision. 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 184
    . In
    addition, the appellate court accurately held that a trial court
    should consider a licensing requirement in determining whether
    a witness is qualified as an expert. 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 185
    . The West court erred, however, in holding that, because
    Walker was not licensed, the trial court had abused its
    discretion in allowing Walker to testify as an expert witness.
    See 
    West, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 184
    . To the extent that West may
    be read as holding that licensing is a prerequisite to the
    admissibility of expert testimony rather than a factor to be
    weighed in considering expert qualifications, we overrule that
    portion of West decision and reject defendants= argument that
    West controls the disposition of this case.
    Finally, defendants argue that the appellate court=s decision
    in Thompson II must be reversed because the appellate court
    failed to recognize that the legislature has created a special
    rule for engineering testimony, identifying such testimony as
    Aforensic engineering@ and requiring that a person engaging in
    professional engineering be licensed in Illinois. Defendants
    maintain, then, that the Engineering Act does require a person
    testifying as a professional engineer to be licensed in Illinois. In
    support of this argument, defendants note that the legislature
    has imposed similar evidentiary requirements in other statutes,
    for example, section 8B2501 of the Code of Civil Procedure
    (735 ILCS 5/8B2501 (West 2002)).
    Section 8B2501 of the Code of Civil Procedure is entitled
    AExpert Witness Standards@ and provides that A[i]n any case in
    which the standard of care applicable to a medical professional
    is at issue, the court shall apply the following standards to
    determine if a witness qualifies as an expert witness and can
    -16-
    testify on the issue of the appropriate standard of care.@ 735
    ILCS 5/8B2501 (West 2002). The statute then sets forth the
    standards that the court should consider, including Awhether
    the witness is licensed by any state or the District of Columbia
    in the same profession as the defendant.@ 735 ILCS
    5/8B2501(c) (West 2002).
    Although defendants cite section 8B2501 in support of their
    argument for reversal of the Thompson II court=s decision, we
    find the fact that the legislature has specifically provided for
    expert witness standards in medical malpractice cases weighs
    in favor of affirming the appellate court=s decision in this case.
    As the appellate court stated, Aif the legislature wanted to
    condition any testimony by a professional on whether the
    individual holds a state license, it could enact a statute setting
    standards for such expert witnesses, as it has done in cases in
    which the standard of care applicable to a medical professional
    is at issue.@ 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 460. Merely providing that an
    engineer engaging in forensic engineering must be licensed in
    Illinois is not sufficient to establish that a license is a
    prerequisite to qualifying as an expert witness in a civil case in
    Illinois.
    As a final matter, we note that defendants read the
    Thompson II court=s decision as erroneously finding that the
    term Aforensic engineering@ does not include the act of
    testifying at trial. Defendants misunderstand the appellate
    court=s holding in this case. The appellate court did not find that
    Aforensic engineering@ as set forth in the Engineering Act does
    not include testifying in court. The appellate court did not even
    address the definition of the term Aforensic engineering.@ The
    appellate court simply held that licensure pursuant to the
    Engineering Act is not required in order to testify as an expert
    witness in a civil case. 
    356 Ill. App. 3d
    at 459. As discussed,
    this finding is entirely correct based upon this court=s precedent
    concerning expert testimony.
    CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, we find that the appellate court properly
    declined to answer the first certified question in this case. With
    -17-
    regard to the second certified question, the appellate court was
    correct that the decision in Van Breemen does not control and
    that the lack of an Illinois engineering license is not a bar to
    expert testimony in a civil case. The appellate court also did
    not err in going beyond the certified questions to consider the
    propriety of the trial court=s underlying order striking Ramisch=s
    affidavit. The trial court did abuse its discretion in granting
    defendants= motion and striking Ramisch=s affidavit solely on
    the basis that Ramisch was not licensed in Illinois to practice
    forensic engineering. For these reasons, we affirm the
    judgment of the appellate court which remanded the cause to
    the circuit court for further proceedings.
    Affirmed.
    -18-