People v. Roddis , 2019 IL 124352 ( 2020 )

2020 IL 124352
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 124352)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RYAN M. RODDIS, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 24, 2020.
JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Burke and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, Theis, and
Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Macon County, defendant, Ryan
Roddis, was convicted of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1),
12-3.3(a) (West 2010)) and sentenced to six years in prison. Defendant filed a
pro se motion for reduction of his sentence that also alleged ineffectiveness of his
trial counsel. That motion was dismissed as untimely.
¶2 On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in dismissing
his pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without conducting a
hearing in compliance with People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). The appellate
court upheld defendant’s conviction and sentence yet remanded to the trial court to
conduct a hearing in accordance with Krankel.
¶3 On remand, the trial court conducted what it deemed a “pre-inquiry Krankel
hearing” to determine if the allegations were founded, at which point the court
would appoint separate counsel and proceed to a “full-blown” Krankel hearing. The
court conducted a hearing with defendant and his previous counsel, giving
defendant the opportunity to elaborate on his allegations and subsequently allowing
counsel to respond based on their representation of defendant. Ultimately, the court
ruled that the allegations did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶4 Defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in addressing the merits
of his claim beyond determining whether to appoint new counsel for further
proceedings. The appellate court, finding that the trial court should not have
decided the merits of defendant’s claim at that initial hearing, reversed and
remanded. 2018 IL App (4th) 170605. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶5 BACKGROUND
¶6 Defendant’s Bench Trial
¶7 In June 2012, the State charged defendant with aggravated domestic battery
(720 ILCS 5/12-3.3 (West 2010)), alleging that he pushed Meghan Collins’s head
into a door and struck her, resulting in a laceration requiring stitches. Defendant,
initially represented by Phillip Tibbs, fired Tibbs six months before trial and
ultimately retained Baku Patel as counsel.
¶8 At the 2013 bench trial, the State called Collins, who testified that in June 2012
she and defendant were living together when an argument ensued. When Collins
asked defendant to leave, he responded by picking up a couch pillow and attempting
to throw it out the apartment’s front door. Collins pushed the cushion out of
defendant’s hands. Defendant then pushed Collins’s head, which struck the corner
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of the apartment door, resulting in a laceration. Collins called the police and was
eventually taken to the hospital, where staples were used to close the head
laceration.
¶9 Decatur police officer Scott Bibby responded to Collins’s apartment the day of
the incident. He testified that defendant told him that, during the argument,
defendant threw a couch cushion at Collins’s head to get her to stop yelling, which
accidentally hit Collins, knocking her head into the door. Collins told Bibby that
defendant punched her in the head.
¶ 10 An emergency room physician testified that she treated Collins with three
staples to close a two-inch laceration to the head, which Collins reported was
caused by someone grabbing her head and hitting it against a door.
¶ 11 Although Collins originally told police that defendant struck her in the head
multiple times, through cross-examination she admitted that was untrue, as
defendant had only pushed her head once. She also testified that, since the incident,
she had communicated with defendant via phone, text messages, and e-mails and
told him she believed that he did not intend to hit her head against the door or cause
her injury. Collins additionally admitted via cross-examination that she was
currently being charged with filing a false police report in an unrelated matter.
¶ 12 Defendant testified that Collins wanted him to leave the apartment and started
throwing his belongings out the front door. In response, he decided to throw his
couch outside and grabbed a seat cushion to toss it out the door. The cushion struck
Collins instead, causing the injury. He testified that he never intended to harm
Collins and he never pushed her head into the door.
¶ 13 Patel asked defendant on direct examination if Collins had contacted him since
the incident. Defendant responded that Collins contacted him “all the time,”
including threatening to testify against him unless he gave her money. Defendant
testified that Collins’s texts also included her admission that she thought the injury
was an accident.
¶ 14 The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated battery, sentencing him to
six years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.
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¶ 15 First Appeal
¶ 16 Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for reduction of sentence that also
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion as
untimely.
¶ 17 Defendant appealed, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred by dismissing his
pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without addressing them.
The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence but remanded for
a hearing on defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in compliance
with Krankel and its progeny. 2016 IL App (4th) 160631-U.
¶ 18 Proceedings on Remand
¶ 19 On remand, the trial court appointed public defender Rodney Forbes to
represent defendant during Krankel proceedings to consider the claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and set a date for a “pre-inquiry Krankel hearing.”
Forbes, however, noted that he was not normally appointed at a pre-Krankel
inquiry. He also notified the court about a potential conflict of interest because he
briefly represented Collins in an unrelated but contemporaneous case. The court
allowed Forbes to withdraw over defendant’s objection, finding it was unnecessary
to appoint counsel until after the court had conducted the preliminary Krankel
inquiry.
¶ 20 The trial court scheduled a hearing, at which time it stated it would examine
defendant’s allegations and, if the allegations against counsel were “well-
grounded,” the court would then reappoint Forbes or another attorney to represent
defendant.
¶ 21 January 2017 Hearing
¶ 22 At the “pre-inquiry Krankel hearing,” defendant, Tibbs, Patel, and the State
were present. The trial court again explained that it would allow defendant to
elaborate on his allegations of ineffective counsel, allow either of his attorneys to
respond where appropriate, and then determine the validity of the claims. The court
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noted that, “if the allegations are denied, I’ll probably go ahead and appoint you
counsel” to “deal with the rest of your motion for reduction of sentence.”
Conversely, if the court concluded the allegations had possible merit, it would
appoint separate counsel and “proceed to a full-blown Krankel hearing.”
¶ 23 Defendant primarily alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for failure
to impeach Collins with various text messages. The text messages to defendant
indicated that Collins believed the incident was an accident and offered to speak to
Patel or testify in a certain manner if defendant paid Collins $1000.
¶ 24 Patel responded that he got Collins to admit on cross-examination that she
believed defendant did not knowingly harm her and that she specifically used the
word “accident.” He explained that, once Collins testified that she believed the
degree of harm she sustained was accidental, there was nothing to impeach. He also
noted that he cross-examined Collins about falsely telling police that defendant
punched her.
¶ 25 Defendant also alleged that Tibbs “tricked” him into waiving his jury trial, by
indicating that counsel personally knew the trial judge and could get his charges
lowered once the jury trial was waived. Tibbs denied ever making such
representations.
¶ 26 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that defendant’s
allegations did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel and thus would “not
proceed to a full Krankel hearing.” The court then explained that it would appoint
counsel to represent defendant on his remaining claims in the motion to reconsider
sentence, which it ultimately denied.
¶ 27 Second Appeal
¶ 28 Defendant again appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by addressing the
final merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim instead of determining
whether his case suffered from “possible neglect” and appointing new counsel to
address the merits going forward. The appellate court agreed, finding that a trial
court cannot reach the merits of an ineffective assistance claim in a Krankel hearing
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but can only determine whether it is appropriate to appoint new counsel to
investigate those claims when “possible neglect” has been demonstrated.
¶ 29 The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions to appoint new
counsel. 2018 IL App (4th) 170605, ¶ 102. This court granted the State’s petition
for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018).
¶ 30 ANALYSIS
¶ 31 We are presented with the question of whether, upon a defendant’s pro se
posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel triggering the trial court’s
duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry, the court may properly consider both the factual
and legal merits of the claim in its determination whether to appoint the defendant
new counsel. The State challenges the appellate court’s determination that trial
courts should only consider the factual merits of a defendant’s pro se allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant maintains that the court erred by
considering the legal merits of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim during
the preliminary Krankel inquiry.
¶ 32 Krankel Inquiries
¶ 33 The issue of whether the trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel
inquiry presents a legal question that we review de novo. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL
117142, ¶ 28.
¶ 34 A pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is governed
by the common-law procedure developed by this court in Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181,
and refined by its progeny. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 1. The procedure
encourages the trial court to fully address these claims and thereby narrow the
issues to be addressed on appeal. People v. Jocko, 239 Ill. 2d 87, 91 (2010).
¶ 35 Under the common-law procedure, a pro se defendant is not required to file a
written motion but need only bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention.
Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11. New counsel is not automatically appointed in every
case when a defendant presents a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77 (2003). Rather, when a
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defendant makes such a claim, the court should first examine the factual basis of
the defendant’s claim. Id. at 77-78. If the court determines that the claim lacks merit
or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new
counsel and may deny the pro se motion. Id. at 78. However, if the allegations show
possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed. Id.
¶ 36 New counsel would then represent the defendant at the hearing on the pro se
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Appointed counsel can independently
evaluate the claim and avoid the conflict of interest that trial counsel would have in
trying to justify his or her own actions contrary to the defendant’s position. Id.
(citing People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 230 (2000)).
¶ 37 In arriving at its holding in this case, the appellate court observed that numerous
courts have misinterpreted how to conduct Krankel hearings and the proper
procedures required when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 2018 IL App (4th) 170605, ¶ 43 (“[T]he trial court
misunderstood both the purpose of a Krankel hearing and how one should be
conducted. Because we have seen too many cases in which trial courts suffer from
the same confusion, we believe a thorough discussion of Krankel hearings might
be helpful.”). Both acknowledging this possibility and recognizing the abundance
of this court’s decisions that have contributed to the refinement of the Krankel
procedure, we will limit our analysis to consideration of our opinions applicable to
the matters at issue.
¶ 38 The Factual or Legal Merits of a Krankel Claim
¶ 39 The State contends that it is settled law that trial courts may indeed consider the
merits of a defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in
their entirety at the preliminary inquiry stage of the Krankel proceedings. The State
cites various cases that hold that a trial court does not appoint new counsel when
the defendant’s claim “lacks merit.” See Jocko, 239 Ill. 2d at 92 (stating new
counsel need not be appointed if “ ‘the claim lacks merit’ ” (quoting Moore, 207
Ill. 2d at 78)); People v. Simms, 168 Ill. 2d 176, 199 (1995) (stating new counsel is
unnecessary if defendant’s claim “is meritless”); People v. Sims, 167 Ill. 2d 483,
518 (1995) (concluding new counsel need not be appointed if “there is no validity
to the defendant’s claim”).
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¶ 40 The State posits that this terminology necessarily contemplates a court’s
consideration of both the factual and legal merits of the claim prior to the
determination of whether to appoint new counsel. In support, it lists a number of
cases, yet it relies primarily on this court’s decision in Chapman. We agree that
Chapman is particularly illuminating to the present issue. In that case, the
defendant, Reginald Chapman, was charged with first degree murder, aggravated
kidnapping, and concealment of a homicidal death in the killings of Angela Butler,
his former paramour, and Christopher Butler, their shared infant son. Separate
juries found the defendant guilty of first degree murder on each count. Chapman,
194 Ill. 2d at 196-97.
¶ 41 The State’s evidence at trial revealed that the victims’ bodies were recovered
by police floating in the Calumet Sag Channel in Alsip, Illinois, and bound to free
weights of varying sizes by orange and black electrical cord. The last person to see
Angela and Christopher alive testified that the defendant approached their car as
they waited for family in a local grocery store parking lot. After Angela gave the
infant to the defendant, he shoved her into his car. Her companion asked where they
were going and noted that Angela seemed frightened and the defendant seemed
upset. Id. at 198-99.
¶ 42 Pursuant to the murder investigation, police arrived at the defendant’s
apartment, where he was with his current girlfriend. The defendant initially denied
owning any weight-lifting equipment, then told officers he recently sold the
equipment to an individual named “Foy.” The defendant subsequently told police
he had given the equipment to his brother. Id. at 199.
¶ 43 After waiving his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)), the defendant made a statement to an assistant state’s attorney that he and
Angela had argued, culminating with him striking her with his hand, fist, and a
baseball bat. He additionally stated that he put Angela in the Calumet Sag Channel
and cried when asked where Christopher was. At trial, his current girlfriend also
testified that, upon entering the defendant’s apartment the day after Angela’s
disappearance, certain items were missing, including a long orange and black
electrical cord and his weight-lifting equipment. Evidence recovered from the
defendant’s car included a pair of infant shoes and a blanket, both splattered with
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blood, and a baseball bat. The genetic material extracted from the blood matched
that of Angela Butler. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 200-01.
¶ 44 Following the jury’s convictions, the defendant filed a pro se posttrial motion
alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel during both trial and
sentencing. The defendant specifically argued that the attorneys were ineffective in
“ ‘failing to provide competent representation, failing to act with reasonable
diligence, and [for engaging in] conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation.’ ” Id. at 228.
¶ 45 The trial court, after receiving the defendant’s pro se motion, repeatedly
inquired as to the precise allegations of ineffectiveness. Defendant ultimately stated
that trial counsel should have checked his phone and bank records from the day that
Angela and Christopher disappeared. Despite testimony from Angela’s companion
as to what he witnessed firsthand, the defendant contended that his phone and bank
records could show that, on the day of the victims’ disappearance, he was “ ‘at a
cash station *** withdrawing money.’ ” Id. at 229. When the court asked what that
would prove, the defendant replied it would show that “ ‘if I was at a cash station
or the house instead of traveling throughout the whole state searching for someone
and preconceiving a crime to the victim that I don’t even know where they’re at in
the first place.’ ” Id. The court denied the pro se posttrial motion. In reviewing
counsel’s performance and finding it effective, the court stated that the defendant’s
proffered evidence
“ ‘would not alter the *** verdict of guilty in this particular case, because the
evidence was overwhelming in this particular case. And as far as the mitigation
and aggravation, it would not alter my opinion, based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, considering both the aggravation and mitigation, that
the death sentence is the appropriate sentence in this particular case.’ ” Id.
¶ 46 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in evaluating the
merits of his allegations rather than first determining whether to appoint new
counsel to argue his ineffective assistance claim. In rejecting the defendant’s
argument, this court found that the defendant’s assertions were conclusory and that
the trial court thoroughly explored the matters raised in the defendant’s motion.
Like the trial court, this court noted that “the record shows that the fact that
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defendant withdrew money on the day that the victims disappeared would not have
had any bearing on the case. This claim simply has no merit.” Id. at 231.
¶ 47 We find the Chapman trial court’s statement akin to a conclusion that the merits
of the State’s case were so firmly founded and sufficient that, even if the factual
bases for the defendant’s claim were true, they would not have altered the resulting
conviction. The statement evinces a consideration of the final merits of the
defendant’s case, while also recognizing the frivolity of Chapman’s claims. In
subsequently finding the Chapman trial court’s proceedings proper, this court
arrived at the same conclusion.
¶ 48 Defendant’s and the appellate court’s position, however, would require that the
trial court examine only the factual basis in determining whether to appoint new
counsel. Under this proposition, if the trial court in Chapman, for example, had
ascertained that the defendant asked trial counsel to check his phone and bank
records, which counsel declined to do because of its utter lack of utility, defendant’s
position would still require appointing new counsel to address the spurious claim.
We disagree with this proposition.
¶ 49 In support of his argument, defendant relies on the oft-cited passage from
Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-78:
“[W]hen a defendant presents a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the
defendant’s claim. If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or
pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new
counsel and may deny the pro se motion.” (Emphasis added.)
Defendant points out that although numerous cases have cited this passage, this
court has not explicitly defined the term “lacks merit.”
¶ 50 Defendant asserts that a plain reading of this passage indicates that the “lacks
merit” language relates only to the factual merits of a defendant’s claim and not the
end legal merits. We disagree. Moore holds that a trial court first examines the
factual basis of the claim, not that a trial court only examines the facts. A further
examination of Moore in its entirety supports this interpretation.
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¶ 51 In that case, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and then filed
a pro se motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender. The
motion also alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 70. At the posttrial
hearing, noting that a state appellate defender would be appointed on the
defendant’s appeal, the trial court declined to separately consider the defendant’s
pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court had similarly
refused to consider the defendant’s motion for appointment of other counsel based
on ineffectiveness during trial. Id. at 74.
¶ 52 On appeal, this court declared that “the trial court neither ‘denied’ the
defendant’s pro se posttrial motion nor found the allegations therein to be
‘meritless,’ ” rather the trial court conducted no inquiry of any sort into defendant’s
allegations. Id. at 75. We noted that Krankel, at a minimum, required more.
¶ 53 This court went on to explain that during the Krankel inquiry, “some
interchange between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and
circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation is *** usually
necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is warranted on a defendant’s
claim.” Id. at 78. Additionally, the court can “base its evaluation of the defendant’s
pro se allegations of ineffective assistance on its knowledge of defense counsel’s
performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their
face.” Id. at 79.
¶ 54 Rather than placing a limit on what a trial court can consider during the inquiry
into a defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, Moore
establishes a minimum threshold for the court’s Krankel consideration. Instead of
defendant’s suggestion that a court can only consider the factual basis of the claim,
Moore holds that, at the least, a consideration of the facts is necessary.
¶ 55 Again, defendant argues that few courts have specifically examined what the
“lacks merit” language entails. We find it both more accurate and more pertinent to
note that we have never distinguished between factual and legal merits when
discussing whether a claim of ineffective assistance “lacks merit.”
¶ 56 The trial court, most familiar with the proceedings at issue, remains best
situated to serve the interests of judicial economy by extinguishing conclusory
claims. We decline to unduly limit the most effective arbiter between patently
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frivolous claims and those showing possible neglect. The court can “base its
evaluation of the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance on its
knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the insufficiency of the
defendant’s allegations on their face.” Id. Our previous decisions assert the same.
¶ 57 In People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319 (1994), this court examined a trial court’s
preliminary Krankel inquiry where the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder, armed robbery, and home invasion. The defendant subsequently alleged
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for, inter alia, failing to file several pretrial
motions, including a motion to quash arrest, a motion for a preliminary hearing,
and a motion to suppress evidence. Id. at 350. The court conducted a preliminary
investigation and found the arguments to be baseless and spurious. Id. at 350-51.
¶ 58 On review, this court found that a motion to quash arrest would have been
improper because the defendant was not arrested but rather was charged after
turning himself in for a separate murder. No motion for preliminary hearing was
filed because the defendant was indicted via grand jury. Further, a motion to
suppress evidence would have been inappropriate because no evidence was
obtained from the defendant or anywhere he would have had a possessory interest.
Id. at 351.
¶ 59 This court found “that the trial court could properly conclude that defendant’s
claims had no basis and were thus spurious because defendant did not allege
anything of which the trial court did not have firsthand knowledge.” Id. at 352.
¶ 60 As Chapman and Coleman demonstrate, following convictions resulting in
significant sentences, a trial court will oftentimes be confronted with meritless
pro se claims. In Chapman, although the evidence that the defendant effectively
abducted the victims was undisputed, the defendant claimed his counsel’s failure
to investigate phone and bank records evinced constitutionally inadequate
representation. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 228-29. In Coleman, the defendant’s claim
was based upon motions that were not even applicable to his case. Coleman, 158
Ill. 2d at 351.
¶ 61 We find that, even in preliminary Krankel inquiries, a trial court must be able
to consider the merits in their entirety when determining whether to appoint new
counsel on a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This serves
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both the ends of justice and judicial economy.
¶ 62 Appellate Court’s Proposed Framework
¶ 63 In reviewing whether the trial court properly considered the merits in denying
defendant’s pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellate
court seized upon language in this court’s opinion in People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d
97, 126 (1994), to assert that there are four primary ways that a trial court may
conclude that a claim lacks merit when conducting a Krankel inquiry. 2018 IL App
(4th) 170605, ¶ 65. The appellate court held that when the court determines the
ineffective assistance claim is (1) conclusory, (2) misleading, (3) legally
immaterial, or (4) pertaining solely to an issue of trial strategy, it may conclude that
a claim lacks merit. Id.
¶ 64 We now clarify that Johnson did not establish a framework composed of the
four main reasons to deny a defendant’s pro se posttrial claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel without appointing new counsel. In that case, we “scrutinized
the transcript of the *** post-trial motion hearing and we [found] that the trial court
conducted an adequate probe into the allegations of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.” Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d at 126. As this court did in concluding that the
Johnson trial court rightfully found that the defendant’s allegations lacked merit,
we adhere to a case-by-case, fact-specific examination, driven by the record.
Indeed, the four descriptions in Johnson described why that particular claim lacked
merit and therefore did not warrant appointing new counsel. Further, to find
allegations “legally immaterial” implies that a trial court can certainly reach not
only the factual basis, but also the overall merits of an ineffective assistance claim
to decline appointing new counsel for further hearing.
¶ 65 Trial Court Hearing on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 66 In the case at bar, our review of the record reveals that the trial court conducted
an adequate inquiry into defendant’s pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Defendant does not appear to have presented the court with
any valid arguments on the claims. We have examined the transcript of the posttrial
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proceedings, and the trial court addressed each allegation with defendant before
finding the claims conclusory.
¶ 67 The transcript reveals that the trial court inaccurately stated “I will rule as to
whether or not I find that there was ineffective assistance in this situation.” While
Krankel in fact requires a preliminary determination of possible neglect in deciding
whether to appoint new counsel, the outcome was effectively the same. Defendant’s
claims were meritless, and the court appropriately declined to appoint new counsel.
Further, the court did accurately represent the proceedings in stating, “[i]f I find
that the allegations are founded, I’ll have to appoint separate counsel, and we will
proceed to a full-blown Krankel hearing.” It is apparent that the court was referring
to a hearing on the claims with defendant represented by newly appointed counsel
when referring to a “full-blown Krankel hearing.” Although the court’s description
may have contained a few misnomers, this was an appropriately conducted inquiry.
Defendant’s allegations were either matters of trial strategy or unfounded claims.
¶ 68 The record reveals that this trial centered largely on credibility. The court found
defendant’s assertion that a thrown seat cushion resulted in a laceration requiring
staples implausible. On cross-examination, the victim admitted she believed the
incident was an accident. Further impeachment via text messages was thus deemed
unnecessary by counsel. Through our scrutiny of the record, we find that defendant
received effective assistance of counsel and was not prejudiced by his attorneys’
performance. The court rightfully operated within its discretion to decline to
appoint new counsel to address defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
¶ 69 CONCLUSION
¶ 70 For the reasons discussed above, we hold that a trial court may consider both
the facts and legal merits of a defendant’s pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel at the preliminary inquiry stage. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 71 Appellate court judgment reversed.
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¶ 72 Circuit court judgment affirmed.
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