Nichols v. Fahrenkamp , 2019 IL 123990 ( 2021 )

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Supreme Court Date: 2021.01.19
13:58:32 -06'00'
Nichols v. Fahrenkamp, 2019 IL 123990Caption in Supreme ALEXIS NICHOLS, f/k/a Alexis Brueggeman, Appellee, v. DAVID
Court: FAHRENKAMP et al., Appellants.
Docket No. 123990
Filed June 20, 2019
Rehearing denied September 23, 2019
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fifth District; heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, the Hon.
Barbara L. Crowder, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appellate court judgment reversed.
Circuit court judgment affirmed.
Counsel on David L. Antognoli and Kevin P. Green, of Goldenberg Heller &
Appeal Antognoli, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellants.
Roy C. Dripps, Charles W. Armbruster III, and Michael T. Blotevogel,
of Armbruster, Dripps, Winterscheidt & Blotevogel, LLC, of
Maryville, for appellee.
Leslie J. Rosen, of Leslie J. Rosen Attorney at Law, P.C., of Chicago,
for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
Justices JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, Theis,
and Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This appeal asks whether defendant David Fahrenkamp has quasi-judicial immunity from
tort liability for his conduct within the scope of his appointment as guardian ad litem for
plaintiff Alexis Nichols. We hold that he has such immunity. We reverse the appellate court’s
decision and affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in defendant’s favor.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2004 plaintiff Alexis Nichols, formerly known as Alexis Brueggeman, received
$600,000 as part of a settlement for injuries she suffered in a motor vehicle accident. Because
Nichols was only 11 years old at the time of the settlement, the probate court appointed her
mother, Jelanda Miller, as her guardian to administer her estate. Additionally, the court
appointed defendant David Fahrenkamp as guardian ad litem. The court’s order stated only
that “[t]he court being fully advised in the premises does hereby appoint David Fahrenkamp
as Guardian Ad Litem for the minor child, ALEXIS BRUEGGEMAN.”
¶4 In 2012 Nichols sued her mother, claiming that she used $79,507 of settlement funds for
her own benefit rather than for Nichols’s. The trial court ruled in Nichols’s favor but limited
recovery to $16,365, a 2007 Jeep Compass, and $10,000 in attorney fees. The court found that
Nichols’s mother was not liable for the entire $79,507 when Nichols had a “guardian ad litem
who approved the estimates and expenditures.”
¶5 Next Nichols initiated this lawsuit against defendant David Fahrenkamp and his law office,
alleging that Fahrenkamp committed legal malpractice when he approved expenditures that
were not in Nichols’s interests. Nichols alleged that Fahrenkamp acted negligently by failing
to adequately monitor and audit her mother’s requested expenditures and in failing to report
any irregularities to the court. She also claimed that throughout his time as guardian ad litem
Fahrenkamp never met with her, consulted with her regarding her mother’s expenditures, or
even informed her that he had been appointed as her guardian ad litem.
¶6 First in his motion to dismiss and later in his motion for summary judgment, Fahrenkamp
contested these factual allegations. He claimed that he gave Nichols his business card when he
was first appointed and that he met with her on three separate occasions during his
appointment. Apart from his factual claims, Fahrenkamp also asserted that guardians ad litem
have quasi-judicial immunity so he was not liable for any negligence during his appointment.
¶7 The circuit court of Madison County denied Fahrenkamp’s motion to dismiss but granted
his motion for summary judgment. After noting that no Illinois case has specifically held that
guardians ad litem have quasi-judicial immunity, the circuit court surveyed cases that involved
other roles with similar responsibilities. Vlastelica v. Brend, 2011 IL App (1st) 102587, and
Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2009), held that child representatives have
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immunity, and Heisterkamp v. Pacheco, 2016 IL App (2d) 150229, extended immunity to a
court-appointed expert who assisted in a custody evaluation. Based on these cases, the circuit
court determined that if Fahrenkamp acted according to the appointing court’s directions then
he was immune from liability. Because the order appointing Fahrenkamp did not specify
additional responsibilities, Fahrenkamp had the limited role of providing recommendations to
the court regarding Nichols’s best interests. The circuit court concluded that he was immune
from liability for his conduct in this capacity, so it granted summary judgment in Fahrenkamp’s
favor.
¶8 The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment order. 2018 IL App
(5th) 160316. In Stunz v. Stunz, 131 Ill. 210, 221 (1890), this court described the “duty of the
guardian ad litem, when appointed, to examine into the case and determine what the rights of
his wards are, and what defense their interest demands, and to make such defense as the
exercise of care and prudence will dictate.” Based on Stunz, the appellate court concluded that
guardians ad litem have a duty to protect their wards’ assets and interests. The court determined
that defendant Fahrenkamp had “a duty to act as an advocate on behalf of plaintiff.” 2018 IL
App (5th) 160316, ¶ 14. It added that immunizing guardians ad litem from tort suits would be
inconsistent with this duty.
¶9 The appellate court also rejected Fahrenkamp’s reliance on Vlastelica, 2011 IL App (1st)
102587. The appellate court distinguished Vlastelica because that dissolution of marriage case
involved opposing parties who might sue or otherwise harass a guardian ad litem out of
frustration with the results of the proceedings. Id. ¶ 16. The underlying lawsuit here, however,
involved the distribution of assets and only one party. The appellate court characterized the
relationship between this guardian ad litem and ward as “equivalent to the relationship between
a trustee and a beneficiary.” Id. It found that, outside the antagonistic context created by
litigating parents, guardians ad litem do not need protection from unwarranted harassment and
do not require quasi-judicial immunity. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.
¶ 10 Justice Goldenhersh dissented. Relying heavily on Vlastelica, the dissent agreed with
Fahrenkamp that guardians ad litem do not serve as advocates for their wards but act as agents
of the court. Id. ¶ 25 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting) (citing Vlastelica, 2011 IL App (1st) 102587,
¶¶ 21-23). Because they are “arms of the court,” the dissent would find that guardians ad litem
are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Id. The dissent also expressed concern that denying
guardians ad litem immunity would discourage attorneys from accepting appointments as
guardians ad litem. Id.¶ 11 Fahrenkamp petitioned this court for leave to appeal, and we allowed that petition. Ill. S.
Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018).
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s order awarding summary judgment in
Fahrenkamp’s favor. Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735
ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016). This court reviews a summary judgment order de novo.
Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2007). In reviewing the motion, “this court
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will construe the record strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving
party.” Id.¶ 14 The only question on appeal is whether quasi-judicial immunity protects David
Fahrenkamp from civil liability for his conduct within the scope of his appointment as Alexis
Nichols’s guardian ad litem. Quasi-judicial immunity originates in the common-law principle
that judges are immune from liability for the acts they perform as part of their judicial duties.
See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (explaining that “[f]ew doctrines were
more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for
damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it
adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872)”); In re Mason, 33 Ill. 2d 53,
57 (1965); In re McGarry, 380 Ill. 359, 365-66 (1942); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v.
Standidge, 333 Ill. 361, 367 (1928).
¶ 15 This common-law immunity extends beyond the judges themselves to protect other actors
in the judicial process. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2012); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460
U.S. 325, 335 (1983) (finding that trial witnesses have immunity for their testimony because
“the common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all
persons—governmental or otherwise—who were integral parts of the judicial process”); Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (holding that federal administrative law judges have
absolute immunity). In Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985), the United States Supreme
Court applied the “functional test” to determine whether an actor’s role is sufficiently
connected to the judicial process to merit this absolute immunity. That test considers
“(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment
or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages
actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political
influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the process; and
(f) the correctability of error on appeal.” Id. at 202 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
¶ 16 The “functional test” requires the court to look past the title attached to an office or position
and look to that position holder’s role. Fahrenkamp did not either receive or forfeit immunity
simply by acquiring the title “guardian ad litem,” especially because American authorities have
not always used this phrase consistently. See, e.g., Fox v. Willis, 890 A.2d 726, 732 (Md. 2006)
(observing that “there is little uniformity in the case law and statutes of other states with regard
to the functions, duties, and immunities of ‘guardians ad litem’ ”). Rather than looking at the
title “guardian ad litem” to determine whether Fahrenkamp has quasi-judicial immunity, the
court must consider what function he performed. Here, however, the parties do not agree what
that function was.
¶ 17 Fahrenkamp characterizes the guardian ad litem’s function based on the statutory regime
created by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS
5/101 et seq. (West 2016)). The Marriage Act provides three separate mechanisms for ensuring
that courts adequately consider the interests of minors: a child’s attorney, a child
representative, and a guardian ad litem. Id. It describes those options as follows:
“(1) Attorney. The attorney shall provide independent legal counsel for the child
and shall owe the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent
representation as are due an adult client.
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(2) Guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem shall testify or submit a written report
to the court regarding his or her recommendations in accordance with the best interest
of the child. The report shall be made available to all parties. The guardian ad litem
may be called as a witness for purposes of cross-examination regarding the guardian
ad litem’s report or recommendations. The guardian ad litem shall investigate the facts
of the case and interview the child and the parties.
(3) Child representative. The child representative shall advocate what the child
representative finds to be in the best interests of the child after reviewing the facts and
circumstances of the case. The child representative shall meet with the child and the
parties, investigate the facts of the case, and encourage settlement and the use of
alternative forms of dispute resolution. The child representative shall have the same
authority and obligation to participate in the litigation as does an attorney for a party
and shall possess all the powers of investigation as does a guardian ad litem. The child
representative shall consider, but not be bound by, the expressed wishes of the child. A
child representative shall have received training in child advocacy or shall possess such
experience as determined to be equivalent to such training by the chief judge of the
circuit where the child representative has been appointed. The child representative shall
not disclose confidential communications made by the child, except as required by law
or by the Rules of Professional Conduct. The child representative shall not render an
opinion, recommendation, or report to the court and shall not be called as a witness,
but shall offer evidence-based legal arguments. The child representative shall disclose
the position as to what the child representative intends to advocate in a pre-trial
memorandum that shall be served upon all counsel of record prior to the trial. The
position disclosed in the pre-trial memorandum shall not be considered evidence. The
court and the parties may consider the position of the child representative for purposes
of a settlement conference.” Id. § 506(a).
Of these three options, a child’s attorney is least associated with the judicial process. The
child’s attorney is “independent” and owes the child client “undivided loyalty.” Next is the
child representative, who acts as an “advocate” for the child’s best interests. Like the child’s
attorney, the child’s representative “shall have the same authority and obligation to participate
in the litigation as does an attorney for a party.” Also like a traditional attorney, the child
representative “shall not render an opinion, recommendation, or report to the court and shall
not be called as a witness, but shall offer evidence-based legal arguments.” However, the child
representative “shall possess all the powers of investigation as does a guardian ad litem” and
is not bound by the child’s expressed wishes when determining the child’s best interests. The
role of child representative is “a hybrid of a child’s attorney [(750 ILCS 5/506(a)(1))] and a
child’s guardian ad litem.” Cooney, 583 F.3d at 969.
¶ 18 Among these three positions, guardian ad litem is the most associated with the judicial
process. The guardian ad litem provides the court with a report on the child’s best interests.
That report is available to all parties, and the guardian ad litem may testify as a witness. These
responsibilities clearly indicate that a guardian ad litem under the Marriage Act is not an
“advocate” in the manner of either the child’s attorney or a child representative.
¶ 19 Fahrenkamp contends that he filled the role of a guardian ad litem as it is described in the
Marriage Act. Although he concedes that he was not appointed under the Marriage Act,
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Fahrenkamp claims that the court that appointed him relied on its inherent authority. In In re
Mark W., 228 Ill. 2d 365, 375 (2008), this court concluded that a circuit court had the inherent
authority to appoint a guardian ad litem to report on the best interests of a mentally disabled
parent. In re Mark W. described the guardian ad litem’s role as the “ ‘eyes and ears of the court’
and not as the ward’s attorney.” Id. at 374 (quoting In re Guardianship of Mabry, 281 Ill. App.
3d 76, 88 (1996)). Fahrenkamp argues that his appointment here relied on this authority and
that a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to In re Mark W. fulfills a similar function to a
guardian ad litem under the Marriage Act.
¶ 20 Nichols provides a competing characterization of the guardian ad litem’s function. She
urges the court to ignore the Marriage Act’s framework because this case does not involve any
dissolution of marriage or custody dispute. Instead, the case from which this lawsuit stems
involved the distribution of a minor’s assets. Nichols claims that Fahrenkamp was appointed
under article XI of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/art. XI (West 2016)).
Section 11-10.1(b) of the Probate Act provides that “[i]n any proceeding for the appointment
of a standby guardian or a guardian the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
minor in the proceeding.” Id. § 11-10.1(b). Additionally, section 27-3 states that a “guardian
ad litem appointed under this Act shall file an answer, appear and defend on behalf of the ward
or person not in being whom he represents.” Id. § 27-3.
¶ 21 Like the appellate court, Nichols claims that Fahrenkamp’s role as guardian ad litem was
to serve as her “advocate.” 2018 IL App (5th) 160316, ¶ 14. She relies on this court’s decision
in Stunz, 131 Ill. 210. In that case a widow had sought to partition land that was part of her
deceased husband’s estate. The husband’s minor children from a previous marriage lived on
that land, and the court had appointed a guardian ad litem to represent them in the partition
proceedings. Initially the widow succeeded in selling the land, but later the minor children
appealed and accused her of fraud. Id. at 211-15.
¶ 22 During the subsequent court proceedings, this court determined that the minors’ guardian
ad litem had abandoned his responsibilities to the children. The court explained:
“It is the duty of the guardian ad litem, when appointed, to examine into the case, and
determine what the rights of his wards are, and what defense their interest demands,
and to make such defense as the exercise of care and prudence will dictate. He is not
required to make a defense not warranted by law, but should exercise that care and
judgment that reasonable and prudent men exercise, and submit to the court for its
determination all questions that may arise, and take its advice and act under its direction
in the steps necessary to preserve and secure the rights of the minor defendants. The
guardian ad litem who perfunctorily files an answer for his ward, and then abandons
the case, fails to comprehend his duties as an officer of the court.” Id. at 221-22.
The guardian ad litem in Stunz failed to fulfill his obligation to mount a legal defense of the
ward’s interests. Id. at 222. Nichols urges us to apply the same standard to Fahrenkamp.
¶ 23 Nichols also relies on an out-of-state case—Simpson v. Doggett, 156 S.E. 771 (S.C. 1930).
There the Supreme Court of South Carolina provided a similar account of the guardian
ad litem. The South Carolina court described the guardian ad litem’s “duty fully to protect the
infant’s interests in all matters relating to the litigation.” Id. at 773. Moreover, Simpson
explicitly stated that a guardian ad litem “may be punished for his neglect as well as made to
respond to the infant for the damage sustained.” Id.
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¶ 24 Throughout the past 40 years, the duties of the guardian ad litem in Illinois have evolved.
At the time of Stunz (1890), this court first described the guardian ad litem’s duty to raise a
legal defense of the ward’s interest. When the General Assembly enacted the Probate Act and
passed section 11-10.1 of the Probate Act in 1979, it had a similar view of guardians ad litem.
The Probate Act provided for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to “represent” the minor
(755 ILCS 5/11-10.1(b) (West 2016) (added by Pub. Act 80-1415 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979))) and to
“file an answer, appear and defend on behalf of the ward” (id. § 27-3 (added by Pub. Act 79-
328 (eff. Jan. 1, 1976))).
¶ 25 In early cases under the Probate Act of 1975, guardians ad litem acted much like traditional
attorneys. For example, In re Estate of Cohn, 95 Ill. App. 3d 204, 206 (1981), involved a
petition for guardianship under the Probate Act. The court appointed a guardian ad litem whose
law office provided the minor with legal representation before both the trial and appellate
courts. Id. The guardian ad litem in Roth v. Roth, 52 Ill. App. 3d 220, 227 (1977), also acted
as an “advocate” for two children by delivering a closing argument and filing an appeal on the
children’s behalf.
¶ 26 Similarly, In re Estates of Azevedo, 115 Ill. App. 3d 260, 262 (1983), involved a dispute
concerning legal fees for an attorney who, in different court proceedings, acted both as a
minor’s attorney under the then-existing version of the Marriage Act and as the child’s
guardian ad litem under the Probate Act. In 1981, when those proceedings began, section 506
of the Marriage Act did not contain the three-part division of roles that it does now. Instead it
provided:
“ ‘Representation of Child. The court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests
of a minor or dependent child with respect to his support, custody and visitation. The
court may also appoint such attorney to serve as the child’s guardian-ad-litem. The
court shall enter an order for costs, fees and disbursements in favor of the child’s
attorney and guardian-ad-litem, as the case may be. The order shall be made against
either or both parents, or against the child’s separate estate.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
Id. at 263 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, ¶ 506).
The decision in In re Estates of Azevedo does not even hint that any conflict of interest arose
from an individual contemporaneously acting as both attorney and guardian ad litem, because
at the time these roles were largely coextensive. Instead the appeal concerned which statutory
regime governed who paid the attorney fees. See also Layton v. Miller, 25 Ill. App. 3d 834,
839 (1975) (explaining that “clearly a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent the
minors, and no reason appears why it could not be the same attorney who was originally
appointed as guardian of their estate. However, the court should be careful that there be no
conflicting interests between the minors and the person representing them.”).
¶ 27 A law review article from 1977—Donald C. Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current
Criteria, 26 DePaul L. Rev. 241 (1977)—described how courts at the time utilized guardians
ad litem to determine children’s best interests. Schiller explained that as of 1977 “the guardian
ad litem ha[d] no power greater than any other lawyer involved in the litigation” and that the
guardian ad litem could “employ the same tools of litigation available to the primary parties in
the case.” Id. at 253-54. Those “tools” included depositions, document requests, calling and
examining witnesses, and cross-examining other parties’ witnesses. Id. at 254.
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¶ 28 Schiller also described the then-existing “controversy over whether the guardian ad litem
should make a written report, and if he does, whether the court should be permitted to read and
consider it.” Id. According to Schiller, Illinois courts had not addressed this question as of
1977. Id. He approved of the growing “movement” among states that had passed new
legislation concerning these issues. Those statutes provided minors with attorneys who were
not called “guardians ad litem,” but they also allowed investigators to file reports with the
court. Id. at 255-57.
¶ 29 Although in 1979 article XI of the Probate Act and the Marriage Act shared the Stunz view
of guardians ad litem, the General Assembly has amended section 506 of the Marriage Act
multiple times. In 2000 the General Assembly passed Public Act 91-410, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000).
This bill amended section 506 of the Marriage Act and established the tripartite division
between attorneys, child representatives, and guardians ad litem. That 2000 version of the
statute allowed the court to appoint a “guardian ad litem to address issues the court delineates.”
750 ILCS 5/506(a)(2) (West 2000). In 2006, Public Act 94-640, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006) clarified
the guardian ad litem’s role to “testify or submit a written report.” Now that section draws a
clear distinction between guardians ad litem and children’s attorneys, with child
representatives occupying a middle ground. 750 ILCS 5/506 (West 2016).
¶ 30 While the meaning of “guardian ad litem” in the Marriage Act has changed, article XI of
the Probate Act has maintained its 1979 framework. The text of section 11-10.1(b) has
remained largely unchanged since it took effect in 1979. See Pub. Act 80-1415 (eff. Jan. 1,
1979). Likewise, the General Assembly has not amended section 27-3 since it passed that
statute in 1975 (see Pub. Act 79-328 (eff. Jan. 1, 1976), and that section directly copied a
section of the earlier Probate Act from 1939 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 3, ¶ 338). As Nichols
correctly points out, the text of article XI of the Probate Act continues to allow a court to
appoint a “guardian ad litem” to “represent” a minor. See 755 ILCS 5/11-10.1(b) (West 2016);
Id. § 27-3.
¶ 31 Notably, the General Assembly has amended other sections of the Probate Act to reflect
the newer usage of the phrase “guardian ad litem.” Article XIa of the Probate Act—not to be
confused with article XI—governs the appointment of guardians for adults with intellectual
disabilities. Prior to 1995, section 11a-10 of the Probate Act allowed a court to appoint a
guardian ad litem “to represent the respondent,” just as section 11-10.1 currently provides for
guardianship proceedings involving minors. (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/11a-10(a) (West
1994). However, in 1995 the General Assembly updated article XIa of the Probate Act to
reflect the more common use of “guardian ad litem.” Pub. Act 89-396, § 15 (eff. Aug. 20,
1995). After the 1995 amendment, section 11a-10(a) allowed the court to appoint a guardian
ad litem “to report to the court concerning the respondent’s best interests consistent with the
provisions of this Section.” 755 ILCS 5/11a-10(a) (West 1996); Pub. Act 89-396, § 15 (eff.
Aug. 20, 1995); see also In re Guardianship of Mabry, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 88.
¶ 32 Although the General Assembly has brought section 506 of the Marriage Act and section
11a-10 of the Probate Act into conformity, it has not done the same for section 11-10.1 of the
Probate Act. As a result of this incongruity between different statutory regimes, in recent years
Illinois courts have appointed guardians ad litem to report on children’s best interests, as
described by the Marriage Act, even in proceedings under article XI of the Probate Act. For
example, in In re Estate of M.J.E., 2016 IL App (2d) 160457-U, a child’s grandparents sought
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to be appointed the child’s guardians under the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/11-8 (West 2014)).
The appellate court explicitly noted that the circuit court appointed the guardian ad litem “to
interview the child and make a report.” In re Estate of M.J.E., 2016 IL App (2d) 160457-U,
¶ 15. Similarly in In re Estate of Cadle, 2014 IL App (1st) 131700-U, ¶ 14, a child’s father
moved to terminate an order appointing the child’s aunt as his guardian under the Probate Act.
In recounting the facts of the case, the appellate court summarized the guardian ad litem’s
“report” that “recommended” the court find that the aunt’s guardianship served the child’s best
interests. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14.
¶ 33 Because the texts of the Marriage Act and article XI of the Probate Act do not use the term
“guardian ad litem” in the same way, that title does not dictate what Fahrenkamp’s role was as
guardian ad litem in this case. This problem is particularly acute in this case because the
version of the Marriage Act in effect when Fahrenkamp was appointed provided only that the
court may appoint a “guardian ad litem to address issues as the court delineates.” 750 ILCS
5/506(a)(2) (West 2016).
¶ 34 Nor does the court’s order in this case specify how it intended Fahrenkamp to act. The
court’s order states only that “[t]he court being fully advised in the premises does hereby
appoint David Fahrenkamp as Guardian Ad Litem for the minor child, ALEXIS
BRUEGGEMAN.”
¶ 35 Nevertheless, we may still conclude that Fahrenkamp’s role in this case corresponded to a
guardian ad litem under the current version of the Marriage Act and In re Mark W. Most Illinois
cases in the twenty-first century that involve a guardian ad litem treat that guardian ad litem as
a reporter or a witness and not as an advocate. See, e.g., In re Mark W., 228 Ill. 2d at 374 (citing
In re Guardianship of Mabry, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 88); In re Estate of M.J.E., 2016 IL App (2d)
160457-U; In re Estate of Cadle, 2014 IL App (1st) 131700-U. In contrast, cases in which a
guardian ad litem “represent[ed]” a ward as an advocate date to earlier in Illinois’s history. 755
ILCS 5/11-10.1 (West 2016); In re Estates of Azevedo, 115 Ill. App. 3d 260; In re Estate of
Cohn, 95 Ill. App. 3d 204; Roth, 52 Ill. App. 3d 220; see also Rom v. Gephart, 30 Ill. App. 2d
199, 208 (1961). The more recent cases provide a more fitting context for viewing the court’s
order here than outdated cases like In re Estates of Azevedo or Gephart.
¶ 36 The cases on which the parties rely support our conclusion. Nichols relies on Stunz and
Simpson. Simpson is an almost 90-year-old case from South Carolina that even that state’s
supreme court undermined in Fleming v. Asbill, 483 S.E.2d 751, 756 (S.C. 1997). In holding
that guardians ad litem in custody disputes have quasi-judicial immunity, Fleming described
how guardians ad litem in South Carolina had changed throughout the twentieth century. As
in the above discussion of Illinois law, the South Carolina court explained that
“[t]he role of guardians ad litem in the 1990’s is not the same as the role they played in
the 1920’s. Their role has changed significantly in recent decades. Whereas in the past,
the guardian ad litem served in almost a trustee-like capacity, seeking to specifically
advocate the pecuniary interests of the ward, a present-day guardian ad litem in a
private custody dispute functions as a representative of the court appointed to assist it
in protecting the best interests of the ward.” Fleming, 483 S.E.2d at 754.
¶ 37 Although it is an Illinois case, Stunz, 131 Ill. 210, is an infrequently cited case from the
nineteenth century. At that time the phrase “guardian ad litem” applied to an attorney who filed
an answer on behalf of a minor, determined the ward’s rights, and made legal arguments on
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that ward’s behalf. Id. at 221. In the nearly 130 years since this court decided Stunz, however,
another use of the phrase “guardian ad litem” has developed.
¶ 38 Fahrenkamp rightly relies on this court’s description of the guardian ad litem in the 2008
case In re Mark W., 228 Ill. 2d at 374. In In re Mark W. we explained that “[t]he traditional
role of the guardian ad litem is not to advocate for what the ward wants but, instead, to make
a recommendation to the court as to what is in the ward’s best interests.” Id. This is entirely
consistent with the function of a guardian ad litem under the current Marriage Act as an
investigator and a “witness” and with the circuit court’s order in this case. 750 ILCS
5/506(a)(2) (West 2016). Fahrenkamp’s involvement in this case was limited to reviewing
Nichols’s mother’s requests for disbursements of funds and reporting to the court whether he
approved or disapproved of each disbursement. Therefore his role as guardian ad litem
corresponded to the use of that phrase in the Marriage Act and In re Mark W.
¶ 39 Nichols insists that the circuit court would not have relied on the Marriage Act or In re
Mark W. because this was not a dissolution of marriage case. She contends that the circuit court
must have intended Fahrenkamp to fill the role of a guardian ad litem under article XI of the
Probate Act because article XI is the section of the Probate Act regarding minors and this was
a probate case involving a minor.
¶ 40 However, this was not a proceeding for the appointment of a guardian. Section 11-10.1 of
the Probate Act does not state that it applies to every proceeding involving a minor’s property
rights. Instead it provides that “[i]n any proceeding for the appointment of a standby guardian
or a guardian the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor in the
proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/11-10.1 (West 2016). This phrase limits the
applicability of section 11-10.1.
¶ 41 In contrast, In re Mark W. allows the court to appoint a guardian ad litem based on its
inherent authority, apart from any statutory provision. 228 Ill. 2d at 374. As exemplified by
In re Estate of M.J.E., 2016 IL App (2d) 160457-U, and In re Estate of Cadle, 2014 IL App
(1st) 131700-U, a court may appoint a guardian ad litem to report on a ward’s best interests,
regardless of whether the underlying proceedings involve the Probate Act or not. Therefore,
we see no reason to presume that the circuit court relied on section 11-10.1 of the Probate Act
when it appointed Fahrenkamp. For these reasons, we find that Fahrenkamp’s role was
analogous to a guardian ad litem under the Marriage Act or In re Mark W.
¶ 42 Although no Illinois court has specifically considered whether this position merits quasi-
judicial immunity, other state supreme courts have granted immunity to actors who fulfill a
comparable function. For example, in Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
applied quasi-judicial immunity to a guardian ad litem who served as a “ ‘best interests
attorney’ ” and made recommendations to the court on the ward’s best interests. 2014-NMSC-
027, ¶ 10, 331 P.3d 915; see Fleming, 483 S.E.2d at 756; McKay v. Owens, 937 P.2d 1222,
1231 (Idaho 1997); Barr v. Day, 879 P.2d 912 (Wash. 1994) (en banc). But accord Collins v.
Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 47-48 (N.M. 1991) (concluding that the guardian ad litem would be
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity if his role was limited to helping the court assess the
reasonableness of a medical malpractice settlement but that additional fact-finding was
necessary to determine whether that particular guardian ad litem acted as an advocate); see also
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335-36 (finding police officers immune from liability for their testimony
as witnesses).
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¶ 43 Federal appellate courts have also found that guardians ad litem are immune when their
function is to report to the court on a child’s best interests. In Cooney, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that child representatives under Illinois’s Marriage Act
have absolute immunity. 583 F.3d 967. In the course of its discussion of child representatives,
the Seventh Circuit accepted that guardians ad litem also have quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at
970.
¶ 44 Partially in reliance on Cooney, the Tenth Circuit observed the “widespread recognition”
that quasi-judicial immunity protects guardians ad litem. Dahl v. Charles F. Dahl, M.D., P.C.
Defined Benefit Pension Trust, 744 F.3d 623, 630 (10th Cir. 2014). This “widespread
recognition” did not involve simply the title “guardian ad litem” but also the guardian
ad litem’s role as witness and reporter. Cooney, 583 F.3d 967; Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1,
3 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding immunity because a “GAL typically gathers information, prepares a
report and makes a recommendation to the court regarding a custody disposition” ); Gardner
v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that, although guardians ad litem are
not immune when they function as advocates, a “guardian ad litem would be absolutely
immune in exercising functions such as testifying in court, prosecuting custody or neglect
petitions, and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the guardian acts as
an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality”);
see also Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437,
1466 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991).
¶ 45 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has not specifically ruled that guardians ad litem
have immunity, it has held that child representatives are protected. In Vlastelica, the court cited
Cooney’s discussion of the relationship between guardians ad litem and child representatives.
2011 IL App (1st) 102587, ¶¶ 21-23 (citing 750 ILCS 5/506(a)(2), (3) (West 2010)). The
Vlastelica court then applied the Cleavinger factors to evaluate the child representative’s
function and determined that the representative aids the court in determining the child’s best
interests. Id. ¶¶ 24-26 (citing Golden v. Nadler, Pritikin & Mirabelli, LLC, No. 05 C 0283,
2005 WL 2897397, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2005)). The court concluded that child
representatives need judicial immunity to protect them from potentially litigious parents. See
also Davidson v. Gurewitz, 2015 IL App (2d) 150171 (repeating Vlastelica’s holding that child
representatives are immune from liability for conduct within the scope of their appointment).
¶ 46 As explained above, the case for finding that the Marriage Act’s guardians ad litem have
quasi-judicial immunity is even stronger than the case for child representatives. Whereas child
representatives have some degree of independence from both the child’s wishes and the court,
the guardian ad litem is the “ ‘eyes and ears of the court.’ ” In re Mark W., 228 Ill. 2d at 374(quoting In re Guardianship of Mabry, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 88). The court in Vlastelica could
not conclude that child representatives have immunity unless it also presumed that guardians
ad litem do as well. 1
¶ 47 Nichols urges us to reject all these authorities because they involved custody disputes,
dissolution of marriage proceedings, or similar contexts in which multiple parties engaged in
contested litigation. In contrast, this case involves the distribution of a minor’s assets. Nichols
1
Nothing in this opinion should be construed as holding that child representatives also have quasi-
judicial immunity. This issue is not before the court, and we express no opinion on it.
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contends that when a case involves only one party, guardians ad litem do not face the risk of
lawsuits from unsatisfied parents and, therefore, do not need immunity from liability.
¶ 48 The facts of this case clearly demonstrate the flaw in Nichols’s claim. According to
Nichols, Fahrenkamp’s role as guardian ad litem required him to accuse her mother of
neglecting Nichols’s best interests. Because Fahrenkamp did not challenge her mother’s
expenditures, Nichols accused him of malpractice and filed this lawsuit. Even though the
underlying proceeding here did not involve the adversarial process, the stakes were high, and
the issues were sensitive ones. Courts appoint guardians ad litem in cases “involving the
support, custody, visitation, allocation of parental responsibilities, education, parentage,
property interest, or general welfare of a minor or dependent child.” 750 ILCS 5/506(a) (West
2016). Even without opposing parties, such proceedings are often emotionally fraught and
potentially upsetting. Just as in child custody or dissolution proceedings, in probate cases
“[e]xperts asked by the court to advise on what disposition will serve the best interests of a
child in a custody proceeding need absolute immunity in order to be able to fulfill their
obligations ‘without the worry of intimidation and harassment from dissatisfied parents.’ ”
Vlastelica, 2011 IL App (1st) 102587, ¶ 21 (quoting Cooney, 583 F.3d at 970).
¶ 49 Therefore, we hold that guardians ad litem who submit recommendations to the court on a
child’s best interests are protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Additionally, this case
demonstrates why it is important for lower courts to make abundantly clear what each person’s
role is. Courts, attorneys, and other professionals should strive to avert misunderstandings
before any issues develop. When a circuit court appoints someone to a position like guardian
ad litem, it should specify that appointee’s role in the order of appointment. Finally, we urge
the General Assembly to consider reviewing the Probate Act and Marriage Act to ensure that
those statutes use the phrase “guardian ad litem” consistently. See 755 ILCS 5/11-10.1(b)
(West 2016); id. § 27-3; 750 ILCS 5/506 (West 2016); see also 705 ILCS 405/2-17 (West
2016). Reconciling all these provisions would help prevent further confusion.
¶ 50 CONCLUSION
¶ 51 The circuit court ruled correctly when it granted summary judgment in Fahrenkamp’s
favor. We reverse the appellate court’s decision and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 52 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 53 Circuit court judgment affirmed.
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