People v. Yates , 2022 IL App (3d) 180577-U ( 2022 )


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  •             NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
    in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
    
    2022 IL App (3d) 180577-U
    Order filed January 11, 2022
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    THIRD DISTRICT
    2022
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
    ILLINOIS,                                         )      of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
    )      Peoria County, Illinois,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
    )      Appeal No. 3-18-0577
    v.                                         )      Circuit No. 16-CF-797
    )
    MARCUS L. YATES,                                  )      Honorable
    )      Paul P. Gilfillan,
    Defendant-Appellant.                       )      Judge, Presiding.
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
    Presiding Justice O’Brien and Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment.
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    ORDER
    ¶1          Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 22 years’
    imprisonment for aggravated battery.
    ¶2          Defendant, Marcus L. Yates, appeals his conviction for aggravated battery. Defendant
    argues that the circuit court of Peoria County abused its discretion in sentencing him to 22 years’
    imprisonment because it failed to adequately consider his age and familial support. We affirm.
    ¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND
    ¶4          Defendant was charged with three counts of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS
    5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), one count of aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)), and
    unlawful possession of a firearm (id. § 24-3.1(a)(2)). The charges arose from a single incident in
    which defendant allegedly shot Rickey Childs with a handgun. Defendant was 19 years old at the
    time of the incident.
    ¶5          Defendant pled guilty to aggravated battery in exchange for the State’s agreement to
    dismiss the other four charges. The State noted that the mandatory minimum sentences for the
    three dismissed counts of attempted first degree murder were 31 years’ imprisonment, 26 years’
    imprisonment, and 21 years’ imprisonment.
    ¶6          As a factual basis for the plea, the State indicated that police officers would testify that
    they responded to a call outside a residence on the day of the incident. Childs told them that he
    had been in front of a house talking to a neighbor when a younger black male in tan pants and a
    black hooded sweatshirt came around the house next door and fired a gun three times. Childs
    was hit once in the hip. Childs knew the man who shot him, but he did not know his name. The
    State expected that Childs would identify defendant as the shooter.
    ¶7          The State would also present evidence that an eyewitness reported that he saw a man
    wearing a black sweatshirt that had “LA Kings” written on it run through an alley and the yards
    of several homes prior to the shooting. The man stood behind a garage, peered toward the street
    where the shooting occurred, and ran out of the witness’s sight toward the location of the
    shooting. The witness heard three shots fired. After the shooting, the witness saw the man in the
    black sweatshirt run through an alley. The witness saw the butt of a gun in the man’s hand.
    ¶8          Officers apprehended defendant approximately one hour later. Defendant was wearing
    tan pants and a black hooded sweatshirt that had “LA Kings” written on it. Defendant initially
    2
    gave the officers a false name, but an officer familiar with him later identified him by his correct
    name. Defendant was interviewed. He initially admitted that he committed the shooting and
    threw the gun in the river. Defendant later said that an individual named Darious Davis borrowed
    his jacket, committed the shooting, and then gave defendant his jacket back. Officers later
    determined that Davis was in jail at the time of the shooting.
    ¶9              A presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared. The PSI indicated that defendant
    had prior adjudications of juvenile delinquency for the felony offenses of mob action, unlawful
    possession of a motor vehicle, unlawful use of weapons, and unlawful possession of firearms.
    Defendant reported that he used marijuana and ecstasy daily. Defendant stated that he did not
    commit the offense, but he was sorry that the victim was shot. The PSI indicated that defendant
    had an infant child. Defendant’s mother and siblings submitted letters of support. Defendant’s
    mother also filled out a family questionnaire. In the questionnaire, defendant’s mother indicated
    that she believed defendant had a drug problem because he had tried several drugs in an attempt
    to fit in.
    ¶ 10            A sentencing hearing was held. No formal evidence was presented by either party. After
    hearing arguments, the court sentenced defendant to 22 years’ imprisonment. The court indicated
    that it had considered the arguments of the parties, the information contained in the PSI, the
    letters of support submitted by defendant’s family, and the statutory factors in aggravation and
    mitigation. The court reasoned:
    “I’m finding that a lengthy sentence to the Department of Corrections is
    appropriate and is necessary to deter others and is consistent with the ends of
    justice and sending another message, perhaps unheeded again, that gun violence
    in this and any other city is intolerable and has reached the breaking point.”
    3
    The court also noted defendant’s lack of responsibility. The court stated that defendant had
    initially admitted to the offense and then falsely blamed another individual for the offense.
    ¶ 11           The court acknowledged that this offense was defendant’s first adult felony but noted that
    this was because defendant had only recently become an adult before committing the offense.
    The court reasoned:
    “[I]t’s one thing to have an adult before the Court with his or her first felony
    offense at all, ever, and it’s another thing to have such an adult before the Court
    with a track record the type of [defendant’s] here with three prior felony
    convictions. That only gives the Court confidence that if left unchecked and
    unpunished, so to speak, that his behavior would just continue to escalate out of
    control.”1
    ¶ 12           The court stated that it had considered defendant’s young age. Specifically, the court
    said:
    “I have to acknowledge the defendant’s youth. And while he wasn’t a minor at the
    time of this occurrence, it’s pretty commonly accepted that someone of 19 years
    of age certainly hasn’t had full development of his own maturity—and brain
    development for that matter—which would lead a person to succumb to peer
    pressure, as is often seen, lead a person to commit impetuous acts, even as violent
    and vile as this one, and make poor decisions in general.”
    ¶ 13           The court noted that defendant had the support of family members and had a child. The
    court considered in mitigation that defendant’s imprisonment would cause hardship to his
    1
    Although the court stated that defendant had three prior felony convictions, the PSI showed that
    he had four adjudications of juvenile delinquency for felony offenses.
    4
    dependents, including his child. The court stated that the sentence was lower than it would have
    otherwise been due to his relative youth and family relationship.
    ¶ 14          Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence on the basis that it was excessive.
    The court denied the motion. The court reasoned:
    “[W]e’re dealing with a cold[-]blooded shooting, so to speak, and five very
    serious charges that were reduced down to one, that led to a knowing sentencing
    range of 6-to-30. Given the facts and circumstances of this case, a sentence
    arguably in the upper half of the sentencing range, but just barely, is—well, not
    arguably. Literally, it’s well within the sentencing guidelines and sentencing
    range, and is appropriate considering all of the factors in aggravation, mitigation;
    his character; his history, criminal record; circumstances of the offense; necessity
    to detour [sic] others from committing arbitrary gun crimes. So also exercising the
    Court’s discretion, I’ll respectfully deny the motion to reconsider the sentence.”
    ¶ 15                                             II. ANALYSIS
    ¶ 16          Defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 22
    years’ imprisonment because it failed to adequately consider his youth and familial support. We
    find that the sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
    ¶ 17          “The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing
    decisions are entitled to great deference.” People v. Alexander, 
    239 Ill. 2d 205
    , 212 (2010).
    “The trial court is granted such deference because the trial court is generally in a
    better position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence.
    The trial judge has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s
    credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment,
    5
    habits, and age. [Citations.] Consequently, the reviewing court must not substitute
    its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these
    factors differently.” People v. Stacey, 
    193 Ill. 2d 203
    , 209 (2000).
    ¶ 18          “A reviewing court may not alter a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion by
    the trial court.” Alexander, 
    239 Ill. 2d at 212
    . “[A] sentence within statutory limits will be
    deemed excessive and the result of an abuse of discretion by the trial court where the sentence is
    greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the
    nature of the offense.” Stacey, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 210
    .
    ¶ 19          We find that the 22-year sentence of imprisonment imposed by the circuit court was not
    an abuse of discretion. The sentence was well within the applicable sentencing range of 6 to 30
    years’ imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1), (h) (West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West
    2016). The sentence was appropriate in light of defendant’s criminal history, the serious nature
    of the offense, and the need to deter others. The factual basis presented for the plea agreement
    indicated that defendant snuck up on the victim and discharged a firearm three times, striking the
    victim once in the hip. Defendant then ran away. Although the instant offense was defendant’s
    first adult felony conviction, he was only 19 years old at the time of the offense and had four
    adjudications of juvenile delinquency for felony offenses.
    ¶ 20          Defendant contends that the fact that the court imposed a sentence that was eight years
    below the maximum showed that it did not adequately consider his age, rehabilitative potential,
    and family support. The court explicitly considered defendant’s age and familial support, and we
    may not reduce defendant’s sentence merely because we would have weighed these factors
    differently. See Stacey, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 209
    . Also, while defendant’s young age was indicative of
    rehabilitative potential, other factors tended to show that defendant lacked rehabilitative
    6
    potential. Specifically, defendant had four adjudications of juvenile delinquency for felony
    offenses. Defendant also attempted to avoid responsibility for the offense by falsely accusing
    Davis of committing the offense. Moreover, “[a] defendant’s rehabilitative potential *** is not
    entitled to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Coleman, 
    166 Ill. 2d 247
    , 261 (1995).
    ¶ 21          Defendant notes that there was evidence that he struggled with drug addiction, including
    his statements in the PSI that he used marijuana and ecstasy daily and his mother’s statement in
    the family questionnaire attached to the PSI that she believed he had a drug problem. While the
    court did not expressly consider defendant’s drug use, it indicated that it had considered the PSI.
    Also, it is unclear from the statements in the PSI and family questionnaire whether defendant
    struggled with drug addiction or was merely a drug user. However, even assuming that these
    statements tended to show that defendant was a drug addict, the sentencing court was not
    required to consider drug addiction as a mitigating factor. See People v. Smith, 
    214 Ill. App. 3d 327
    , 339-40 (1991).
    ¶ 22          We note that defendant cites Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
     (2012) and its progeny.
    These cases do not directly apply to defendant’s situation for two reasons: (1) defendant was not
    under the age of 18 years at the time of the offense, and (2) defendant did not receive a natural or
    de facto sentence of life imprisonment. See People v. Buffer, 
    2019 IL 122327
    , ¶ 27.
    Nevertheless, defendant’s age and relative lack of maturity were proper sentencing
    considerations. We find that these factors were adequately considered by the circuit court. See
    supra ¶ 20.
    7
    ¶ 23          Given the facts of this case, we find that the sentence was an appropriate exercise of the
    court’s discretion. We may not reduce defendant’s sentence merely because we would have
    weighed the mitigating factors differently. See Stacey, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 209
    .
    ¶ 24                                           III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 25          The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
    ¶ 26          Affirmed.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3-18-0577

Citation Numbers: 2022 IL App (3d) 180577-U

Filed Date: 1/11/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/11/2022