In the Interest of A.Q. , 2022 IL App (3d) 210020-U ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 210020-UOrder filed January 12, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
IN THE INTEREST OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
A.Q., M.H., L.H., K.W-E, ) of the Tenth Judicial Circuit,
) Tazewell County, Illinois.
Minors )
)
(PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )
) Appeal No. 3-21-0020, 3-21-0021, 3-
Petitioner-Appellant, ) 21-0022, & 3-21-0023
) Circuit Nos. 19-JA-310, 20-JA-60,
v. ) 19-JA-84, & 20-JA-85
)
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )
CHILDREN SERVICES, )
) The Honorable
Respondent-Appellee). ) James A. Mack,
) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Schmidt and Justice Daugherity concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The State’s appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
¶2 After filing petitions for adjudication of neglect in the cases of A.Q., L.H., M.H., and
K.W., the State filed a motion in each of the cases to remove FamilyCore, Inc. as the agency
designated by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). After an evidentiary
hearing, the juvenile court for Tazewell County denied the motion without prejudice and
instructed the parties that the State could file a new motion in each case if the facts on the merits
had changed since its ruling. The State appeals the court’s denial, requesting that we resolve the
consolidated cases on the merits of the motion. For the reasons that follow, we find we lack
jurisdiction and dismiss this appeal.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 In 2019, DCFS filed petitions requesting A.Q., L.H., M.H., and K.W. be adjudged
neglected and made wards of the court. The juvenile court granted custody of the minors to
DCFS, which in turn assigned FamilyCore, a private social services agency, to provide various
services to the families. In July 2020, the State, joined by the guardians ad litem (GAL), filed
nearly identical motions in each of the cases to remove FamilyCore as the provider. The motion
was based on a May 22, 2020, order that the juvenile court had entered in a separate matter, In re
P.W., 2019-JA-229, removing FamilyCore from that case.
¶5 In the P.W. order, the court found that FamilyCore’s caseworker, Kennedy Netters, had
failed to discharge her duties by: providing inaccurate information and incredible testimony to
the court, neglecting to perform necessary services, maintaining inaccurate and incomplete
records and visitation logs, and improperly scheduling a visitation with the minor. Although it
had ordered Netters’ removal from the case in April 2020, she continued working on the case
and filed a permanency report in May 2020. The court concluded that Michelle Clark, Netters’
supervisor, had failed to supervise her and that FamilyCore’s Child Welfare Director Melissa
Borders indicated that Netters had been removed from the case but denied requests from the
Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) and the GAL to meet with P.W.’s psychiatrist.
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¶6 The court found that FamilyCore failed to (1) respond fully to the State’s subpoena for
documents, (2) oversee mental health services for the minor, (3) respond to issues raised by the
GAL and CASA, (4) provide accurate and timely information to the court and other parties, and
(5) train its employees on DCFS polices and their responsibilities. Based on its findings, the
court cautioned that “without substantial systemic corrective processes being undertaken it
appears FamilyCore’s actions and inactions as brought out in this case may warrant their removal
from all active juvenile abuse and neglect cases in Tazewell County upon proper motion and
notice.”
¶7 In its motions to remove FamilyCore, the State argued that removal was warranted based
on the findings in In re P.W. The State alleged that neither it nor the GAL had received “any
written information or confirmation *** that would substantiate corrective action” from
FamilyCore. DCFS opposed the motion, arguing that the State alleged no facts showing that
FamilyCore had failed to satisfy its duty in these cases. On August 27, 2020, the court held a
joint hearing on the motions in all four cases. After taking judicial notice of the May 22 order in
In re P.W., the court heard testimony and arguments on the motions. On September 21, 2020, the
court issued a single order denying all of the State’s motions to remove FamilyCore from the
neglect cases in Tazewell County, finding that the agency had “provided the framework to make
substantial systemic corrective changes to [its] organization to remedy the issues brought up in
[P.W.].” In particular, the court found that FamilyCore’s chief executive, Ann Lading-Ferguson,
“testified generally about the increased and refocused” training of caseworkers and supervisors,
including ethics training, and increased communication between FamilyCore and other parties.
The court further found that she “explain[ed] how the Action Plan translated into actual practice
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regarding” oversight of casework and compliance with the Juvenile Court Act and DCFS policy
and procedures.
¶8 Regarding the testimony presented at the hearing, the court stated:
“That Family Core’s credibility as an agency has not been completely
rehabilitated and it is incumbent upon Family Core that it be diligent in its
actions going forward. Family Core must ensure that such actions are up to the
expected standards, and that Family Core show that it can be relied on to
provide accurate complete, and truthful information to the court and parties
moving forward.”
The court then stated:
“That at the hearing the movants witnesses brought out several matters that
would make it appear that the desired changes have not yet occurred. There
may be instances such as these that need to be addressed in any number of
cases but cannot sustain the harm that would come to all children involved in
Tazewell County Juvenile Court from a blanket order removing Family Core
from all cases in Tazewell County.”
¶9 The juvenile court issued the order “without prejudice,” allowing the State to file “future
motions to remove an agency or caseworker filed in individual cases, alleging case specific
instance *** occurring after July 2020,” which may require the removal.
¶ 10 On October 16, 2020, the State filed a motion to reconsider the court’s decision and, if
the motion was denied, moved for a finding under Rule 304(a) that there was no just reason to
delay appeal of its decision. On December 3, 2020, while the State’s motions were pending, the
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court issued a dispositional order in In re M.H., 2019-JA-60. On December 15, 2020, after
holding a hearing, the court denied both of the State’s motions. It, however, reaffirmed that the
State could file future particularized motions to remove FamilyCore from specific cases.
¶ 11 The State filed its notices of appeal in the cases before us on January 14, 2020.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, DCFS argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the issue
presented. It asserts that the State’s appeal is premature because the court’s denial of the motions
to remove FamilyCore as the service provider was not a final order and thus was not appealable.
With regard to In re M.H., DCFS argues that the jurisdiction is lacking in In re M.H. because the
notice of appeal was untimely. For the reasons that follow, we agree that we lack jurisdiction and
we dismiss the consolidated cases.
¶ 14 A. Premature Filing of the Notices of Appeal
¶ 15 “Our jurisdiction is limited to review of appeals from final judgments unless otherwise
permitted under Illinois Supreme Court rules or by statute.” In re Marriage of Morgan, 2019 IL
App (3d) 180560, ¶ 9. A judgment (or order) is final if it terminates the litigation between the
parties on the merits, and sets, fixes, or disposes of the rights of the parties, whether upon the
entire controversy or upon some definite and separate part thereof, so that if the judgment is
affirmed, the trial court need only execute it. In re A.H., 207 Ill.2d 590, 594 (2003); In re Curtis
B., 203 Ill.2d 53, 59 (2002). “‘The ultimate question to be decided in each case is whether the
judgment fully and finally disposes of the rights of the parties to the cause so that no material
controverted issue remains to be determined.’” Wilkey v. Illinois Racing Board, 96 Ill.2d 245,
249 (1983) (quoting Cory Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 403 Ill. 409, 415 (1949)).
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¶ 16 The order denying the State’s motions to remove FamilyCore as the service provider does
not terminate the litigation in the cases before us; it merely allows DCFS to proceed with
FamilyCore as the service provider. The order also allows the State to file “future motions to
remove [FamilyCore] in individual cases, alleging case specific instance[s] *** occurring after
July 2020” which may require removal. It does not set, fix, or dispose of the respondents’ rights.
Nor does it resolve the entire controversy or any definite and separate part of the controversy.
Therefore, the order is not final and appealable.
¶ 17 The State argues that appellate jurisdiction is warranted under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 307 because even if the order is not final an interlocutory appeal may be had. However, as
it relates to juvenile cases, Rule 307 specifically grants a right to interlocutory appeals only from
orders “terminating parental rights or granting, denying or revoking temporary commitment in
adoption proceedings.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 307(a)(6) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The order before us does not
terminate the respective parental rights in each of the cases. Nor is this a case involving adoption
proceedings. We also note that rule 307 imposes specific filing requirements for seeking
interlocutory relief pursuant to its terms, none of which the State has satisfied. Rule 307 affords
the State no relief.
¶ 18 B. The Dispositional Order in In Re M.H
¶ 19 On December 3, 2020, after the order regarding FamilyCore was issued and while the
State’s motion for reconsideration was pending, the court issued a dispositional order in In re
M.H. DCFS concedes that the State’s notice of appeal in In Re M.H. was from a final order and,
therefore, was not premature. However, it contends that appellate jurisdiction is still lacking
because the notice of appeal was untimely. “[A] notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of
the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from.” Ill. Sup. Ct.
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R. 303(a)(1). “The timely filing of a notice of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional.” Dus
v. Provena St. Mary’s Hosp., 2012 IL App (3d) 091064, ¶ 10. “[N]either a circuit court nor an
appellate court has the authority to excuse compliance with the filing requirements mandated by
the supreme court’s rules.” Id. An untimely appeal, therefore, must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Id.¶ 20 A post-judgment motion, such as a motion to reconsider, only tolls the time for filing a
notice of appeal under Rule 301 when it is “directed against” the final judgment. Ill. Sup. Ct. R.
303(a)(1). However, to toll—or extend—the time for filing the notice of appeal, the post-
judgment motion “in nonjury cases must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment.” In
re Marriage of Waddick, 373 Ill. App. 3d 703, 707 (2007). As previously noted, the State filed
its motion to reconsider on October 16, 2020, whereas the dispositional order in In re M.H. was
issued on December 3, 2020. “Accordingly, the motion could not extend the time for filing the
notice of appeal.” Id.¶ 21 Moreover, the State conceded that it did not file a post-judgment motion after the
December 3, 2020 dispositional order because that order was not adverse to its interest in In re
M.H. In short, the State contends that its October 16 motion was not directed against the
dispositional order—an indispensable requirement of Rule 303(a). Id. Therefore, the State’s
notice of appeal in In re M.H. remains untimely under Rule 301 and cannot confer jurisdiction on
this court.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal and it must be
dismissed.
¶ 24 Appeal dismissed.
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