People v. Alksnis-Dyer , 2023 IL App (3d) 200145-U ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 200145-UOrder filed April 28, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-20-0145
v. ) Circuit No. 18-DT-843
)
NICOLE J. ALKSNIS-DYER, ) Honorable
) Victoria R. Breslan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of DUI. Defendant’s statutory
speedy trial rights were not violated.
¶2 Defendant, Nicole J. Alksnis-Dyer, appeals her conviction for driving while under the
influence (DUI). Defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty of DUI where it did not
introduce evidence as to the accuracy of the hospital laboratory test. Additionally, defendant argues
that her statutory speedy trial rights were violated where the State filed a superseding information
more than a year after the initial charge. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 3, 2018, the Illinois State Police issued defendant a uniform traffic citation for
DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2018)). Defendant filed a written speedy trial demand on
September 26, 2019.
¶5 On November 5, 2019, the State filed a superseding information alleging two counts of
misdemeanor DUI (id. § 11-501(a)(4), (a)(6)). In relevant part, count I alleged that “defendant
drove *** while there was any amount of drug *** in her *** urine resulting from the unlawful
use or consumption of a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act [(Act)
(720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2018))].” The State dismissed count II prior to trial. Defendant
moved to dismiss count I, arguing a speedy trial violation had occurred. The court denied
defendant’s motion, finding that charges brought by uniform traffic citations are not subject to the
compulsory joinder statute.
¶6 The case proceeded to a bench trial on January 10, 2020. Jack Jans, a Bolingbrook
paramedic, testified that he was dispatched to the scene of a single vehicle crash on Interstate 55
at approximately 3:31 a.m. on August 3, 2018. Upon arrival, Jans observed a damaged red Chrysler
and made contact with defendant, who admitted to being the driver. Jans indicated that he did not
observe defendant slurring her speech, stumbling, or having difficulty walking. Jans did not
observe defendant drink or ingest anything. Defendant complained of neck pain, and Jans observed
dried blood around her mouth. He indicated that she was confused and had difficulty answering
questions but was otherwise alert. Jans transported defendant to the hospital, arriving at
approximately 4:19 a.m.
¶7 Illinois State Trooper Kyle Klingen testified that he responded to the scene and observed
the red Chrysler in the ditch. The vehicle appeared to have struck a signpost and weighted crash
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barrels, and rolled over. Defendant was speaking with paramedics when Klingen arrived. She
appeared lucid and did not exhibit any obvious balance issues. Klingen identified defendant in
court as the driver and owner of the Chrysler. Defendant told Klingen that she had been driving
and had been run off the road by another vehicle. Portions of the squad car video were admitted
reflecting these statements.
¶8 At the hospital, Klingen attempted to wake defendant several times before he was able to
speak with her. Klingen did not know whether defendant had been given sedatives during the
course of her treatment. He read defendant the warning to motorist at approximately 6:09 a.m.
Defendant refused to provide blood and urine samples to police. No Illinois State police testing
was completed, and Klingen did not request medical personnel to collect defendant’s blood and
urine for testing.
¶9 Oscar Torres, a registered nurse, testified that he helped provide treatment for defendant at
the hospital on August 3, 2018. He testified that an on-duty physician ordered a urine drug test as
part of defendant’s course of treatment. At approximately 5:15 a.m., a female nurse accompanied
defendant into the bathroom and collected the sample in a clean catch specimen cup. After
collection, specimen labels with the patient’s information are attached to the cups and they are
transported to the on-site hospital laboratory via a tube system. Torres testified that the hospital
only uses its on-site laboratory for urine drug screens. Upon completion, defendant’s test results
were uploaded from the laboratory into the computer system where medical personnel could access
them. Torres recalled that defendant’s urine tested positive for the presence of cocaine.
¶ 10 The State showed Torres a report which included the results of defendant’s urine drug
screen. Torres testified that the report was consistent with the type of report that is generated by
the hospital laboratory. He indicated that the tests were routinely ordered by emergency room
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physicians when providing care to motorists involved in crashes, and the results were used and
relied upon by physicians and nurses “[a]ll the time.” Torres testified that the results were vital to
medical personnel to avoid adverse drug interactions and to determine the correct course of
treatment for patients. Defendant’s test results recorded a positive result for the presence of cocaine
and were admitted into evidence as a business record. The report indicated that the result was
verified by repeat analysis.
¶ 11 On cross-examination, defense counsel showed Torres a subsequent page from defendant’s
laboratory report which included a urine chemistry result and contained a series of footnotes.
Defense counsel had Torres read one footnote from the report, which stated: “drug detection limit
300 nanograms per milliliter. Results of this screen assay have not been confirmed. Unconfirmed
screening results should not be used for non medical purposes.” 1 Torres indicated that the
laboratory performed a urine drug screen on defendant, but he was not aware of whether the test
was preliminary or confirmatory as he was not a laboratory employee, and his function in the
process was to collect the specimens and send them to the laboratory for testing.
¶ 12 Defendant moved for a directed finding, arguing that the State did not present sufficient
evidence that defendant had cocaine in her system on August 3, 2018. The motion was denied.
Defendant presented no evidence. The court found defendant guilty of DUI. Defendant filed a
motion for a new trial which argued that the drug testing was insufficient to prove defendant had
cocaine in her system. The motion was subsequently denied. Defendant was sentenced to 18
months’ conditional discharge, 300 hours of community service, and 5 days’ imprisonment, “day
for day with one day credit served, mittimus stayed with motion to vacate.” Defendant appeals.
1
This page is not contained within the record on appeal.
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¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty of DUI where it did
not prove the accuracy of the hospital laboratory test which recorded a positive result for cocaine.
Further, defendant argues that her statutory speedy trial rights were violated when the State filed
a superseding information more than a year after the initial charge.
¶ 15 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 16 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Howell, 358 Ill. App. 3d 512, 528 (2005). It is not the
function of the reviewing court to retry the defendant. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999).
The trier of fact must “resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences from the facts.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. “A criminal conviction will not
be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt
of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).
¶ 17 In Illinois, a person may commit DUI in numerous ways. Some violations of DUI require
the State to prove impairment, whereas others are “ ‘strict liability’ ” offenses. People v. Martin,
2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26 (quoting People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d 38, 42 (1983)). Defendant was convicted
of DUI under section 11-501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6)
(West 2018)). “A driver with controlled substances in his body violates section 11-501(a)(6)
simply by driving.” Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26. Accordingly, to sustain a conviction for DUI
under section 11-501(a)(6) of the Code, the State must prove that defendant drove a motor vehicle
while she had a controlled substance in her system. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2018).
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¶ 18 Defendant does not dispute that she drove a motor vehicle. Defendant only challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence presented to prove that she had cocaine in her system. To prove this
element, the State admitted the results of a urine drug screen which showed defendant’s urine
tested positive for the presence of cocaine. Defendant argues that the accuracy of the test results is
undermined by a lack of evidence regarding the accuracy of the tests performed, the lack of
evidence of confirmatory tests, and the failure to offer competent testimony from a person with
specialized knowledge.
¶ 19 The results of the chemical testing of a defendant’s blood and urine may be admissible as
a business record under section 11-501.4 of the Code (id. § 11-501.4) where such testing was
conducted in the course of emergency medical treatment. The results are admissible where the
State establishes that: (1) the chemical tests were ordered in the course of providing emergency
medical treatment and not at the request of law enforcement, and (2) the tests were performed at
the laboratory routinely used by the hospital. Id. § 11-501.4(a)(1), (2). Here, the evidence showed
that the urine drug screen performed by the hospital was ordered by an emergency room physician
in the course of treatment and was performed at the on-site laboratory that they routinely use.
Further, the evidence establishes that officers did not request that the hospital perform the testing.
Thus, the urine drug screen results were properly admitted as a business record.
¶ 20 Defendant correctly points out that the mere admissibility of evidence does not mean that
such evidence will be sufficient to sustain a conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320
(1979). Defendant attempts to analogize the facts of this case with that of People v. Hagberg, 192
Ill. 2d 29 (2000). In Hagberg, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, specifically cocaine. Id. at 30. An officer discovered a folded paper with a white
powdery substance while searching the backseat of his squad car where defendant had been. Id. at
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31. The officer who field-tested the substance failed to: (1) name the test he used, (2) describe how
to perform the test, (3) identify what color the substance became when it tested positive for
cocaine, and (4) testify that the substance field-tested positive for cocaine. Id. at 34. Our supreme
court ruled that, while field test results may be sufficient to sustain a conviction in some cases, the
evidence in that case was insufficient to convict. Id. at 33-34.
¶ 21 Here, the chemical test of defendant’s urine was ordered by a physician and tested in the
hospital laboratory. Unlike field tests performed by police officers for the purposes of prosecution,
medical records are inherently reliable “because they are generated by those who have no reason
to prevaricate and must rely on their accuracy.” Troyan v. Reyes, 367 Ill. App. 3d 729, 734 (2006).
“The records contain information supplied to or by health professionals to facilitate diagnosis and
treatment of medical conditions. With proper treatment hanging in the balance, accuracy has an
extra premium.” Cucuras v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, 993 F.2d
1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
¶ 22 Defendant further challenges the reliability of the test results where a footnote on the
laboratory report indicated that the screen assay had not been confirmed and that unconfirmed
results should not be used for nonmedical purposes. However, the exhibit contained within the
record specifically notes that the analysis of the cocaine screen had been verified through repeat
analysis. Where the laboratory report specifically noted that the analysis of the cocaine screen had
been verified and medical professionals relied on these results to treat defendant, we cannot say
that no reasonable trier of fact could have found these test results reliable.
¶ 23 Finally, defendant argues that our holding in People v. Petty, 2020 IL App (3d) 180011,
¶ 21, requires competent testimony from a person with specialized knowledge to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant had cocaine in her system. Defendant argues that such testimony
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was lacking in this case where Torres had little knowledge outside his own participation in the
process. However, Petty is distinguishable from the instant case. In Petty, the State alleged that
defendant had consumed methamphetamine and provided evidence of a positive test for
amphetamine. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. The accuracy of the test results was not at issue in Petty. At issue was
whether the consumption of methamphetamine could be reasonably inferred from the presence of
amphetamine in defendant’s system. Id. ¶ 21. We found that, absent competent testimony from a
person with specialized knowledge, such an inference would be nothing more than “random
speculation regarding the metabolization of methamphetamine in favor of the State.” Id.¶ 24 Here, the State alleged that defendant had a “controlled substance listed in the *** Act” in
her system at the time she drove a motor vehicle. The State presented medical records indicating
that defendant had cocaine in her system. Cocaine is listed as a controlled substance in the Act.
720 ILCS 570/206(b)(4) (West 2018). Nothing about the evidence presented here requires a higher
level of chemical knowledge than the average person possesses.
¶ 25 The evidence at trial established that on August 3, 2018, officers responded to a motor
vehicle crash at approximately 3:30 a.m. Defendant was transported to the hospital for medical
treatment at approximately 4:19 a.m. Defendant provided a urine sample to medical personnel at
5:15 a.m., which was sent to the hospital laboratory for analysis. The results of defendant’s urine
drug screen indicated that she had cocaine in her system and was verified by repeat analysis.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of
fact could have found the test results reliable and the evidence sufficient to prove defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261.
¶ 26 B. Speedy Trial Violation
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¶ 27 Next, defendant argues her speedy trial rights were violated when the State filed a new
charge of DUI more than one year after she was initially charged for DUI. A defendant is
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial both constitutionally and statutorily. U.S. Const., amends.
VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2018). Here, defendant argues a
violation of her statutory right to a speedy trial. The speedy trial statute provides, in relevant part,
that every defendant not in custody in this state for an alleged offense shall be tried within 160
days from the date he or she files a written demand for trial unless delay is occasioned by
defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2018). “If the delay is occasioned by the defendant, the
applicable statutory period is tolled.” People v. Rogers, 2021 IL 126163, ¶ 29. Calculation of the
speedy trial period becomes more complicated where, as here, multiple related charges are
involved. People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191, 198 (2003). Where additional related charges are
added, we must determine whether the compulsory joinder rule applies. Rogers, 2021 IL 126163,
¶ 30.
¶ 28 The compulsory joinder rule requires the State to join multiple charges against a defendant
into a single prosecution if the charges are: (1) known to the prosecutor at the commencement of
the prosecution, (2) within the jurisdiction of the same court, and (3) based upon the same act.
People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529, ¶ 12. Where the original and subsequent charges
are subject to compulsory joinder, the multiple charges are subject to the same speedy trial period.
People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 10.
“[W]hen the compulsory-joinder rule applies, a delay that occurs on the original
charge (or charges) and that is attributable to defendant will not toll the speedy-
trial period as to a subsequent charge (or charges), if the delay occurred before the
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subsequent charge was filed because the subsequent charge was not before the
court when the delay occurred.” Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529, ¶ 13.
¶ 29 The appellate districts disagree on whether compulsory joinder applies to charges brought
by a uniform citation and complaint form. See People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 130660, ¶ 30;
Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529, ¶ 14. Our Supreme Court recently addressed this conflicting
authority in Rogers, finding that for all trial courts that sit within the Third District, our decision
in Kazenko controls. Rogers, 2021 IL 126163, ¶ 32. The instant case originates from Will County
which sits within the Third District. Accordingly, we find that the compulsory joinder rule “does
not apply to offenses that are charged by a uniform citation and complaint form provided for traffic
offenses because the compulsory-joinder rule does not apply to offenses charged in that manner.”
Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529, ¶ 14. Here, the original charge was brought by a uniform
traffic citation. Thus, compulsory joinder does not apply.
¶ 30 Defendant argues that Rogers did not resolve the conflicting appellate case law regarding
this issue and asks us to depart from our prior ruling in Kazenko and find that compulsory joinder
applies in defendant’s case. However, even if the charges were subject to the same speedy trial
period, no violation occurred. Defendant filed her written demand for trial on September 26, 2019,
starting the 160-day clock. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2018). The added charges were filed
shortly thereafter, on November 5, 2019. The trial was held on January 10, 2020. Only 106 days
had lapsed between defendant’s written demand for trial and the time her trial was held, which is
well within the 160-day period. Accordingly, no speedy trial violation occurred.
¶ 31 Defendant asserts that we should find that the speedy trial period for the new DUI charge
began on the date the original DUI charge was filed, 459 days before its filing on November 5,
2019. Defendant acknowledges that ordinarily the speedy trial clock begins, by operation of
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statute, when defendant is either in custody or files a formal demand for speedy trial. See Hunter,
2013 IL 114100, ¶ 27 (defendant “filed a written demand for trial, which started the 160-day
speedy-trial period”). Defendant contends that it would be unfair to consider the date she asserted
her right to speedy trial against her where she did not know of the State’s planned charges and
could not make an informed decision to assert that right. In support of this, defendant explains that
courts have found, where the related constitutional right to speedy trial was concerned, that when
the defendant did not know about the charges against him, his assertion of that right is irrelevant.
See People v. Chambers, 258 Ill. App. 3d 73, 80 (1994).
¶ 32 We reject this contention. The defendant in Chambers had argued a violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial while defendant, here, has argued a violation of her statutory
right to a speedy trial. Id. at 78, 80. While the constitutional and statutory rights address
comparable concerns, “the rights established by each of them are not necessarily coextensive.”
People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 114 (1998). Unlike the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the
statutory right imposes a duty on defendants who are not in custody to demand speedy trial in
writing. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2018). The speedy trial period does not begin until such a
demand is made. Id.; Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 27. Also, the statutory right may be suspended or
tolled where defendant fails to take affirmative action to prevent the delays. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(f)
(West 2018); People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 70 (2010). Insofar as defendant is attempting to
claim a violation of her constitutional right to a speedy trial, it is forfeited where she has not argued
a constitutional violation, discussed the applicable law, or how it applies to her case. See Ill. S. Ct.
R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
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¶ 35 Affirmed.
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