People v. Hawkins CA2/8 ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 6/8/15 P. v. Hawkins CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          B254416
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. TA126746)
    v.
    CORDELL HAWKINS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
    Arthur M. Lew, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
    David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Rene
    Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    __________________
    Defendant Cordell Hawkins appeals from a judgment following a jury trial in
    which he was convicted of first degree murder on an aiding and abetting theory. On
    appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the intent element of aiding
    and abetting, in that he had not known his cohort would shoot the victim. We conclude
    the evidence is sufficient and affirm; we also modify the abstract of judgment to properly
    reflect the restitution fine imposed by the trial court.
    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On May 23, 2013, defendant and his two comrades, Marlon Williams and Darnell
    Snell, were charged by information with the murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) of
    Ashton Croswell. It was alleged that the offense was committed for the benefit of a
    criminal street gang, within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b),
    and that a principal discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death, within the
    meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1).
    Williams was tried separately; defendant and Snell were tried together, but with
    separate juries. Defendant was convicted as charged. The murder was found to be in the
    first degree. Defendant was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life for the murder with a
    consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. At sentencing, the
    court imposed both victim restitution and a restitution fine; however, the restitution fine
    was omitted from the abstract of judgment. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
    FACTS
    Defendant, Williams and Snell are all members of the Bounty Hunter Bloods
    gang. The main rival gang of the Bounty Hunter Bloods is the Grape Street Crips.
    According to the prosecution’s gang expert, the rivalry between Bounty Hunter Bloods
    and Grape Street Crips is “the most violent and long lasting feud between two gangs that
    are in the Watts area.”
    On November 6, 2012, Snell was present at a fight between some Bounty Hunter
    Bloods and Grape Street Crips. The fight escalated into a shooting and one of Snell’s
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    companions was shot in the leg. Snell told his companions that they were going to “get”
    the shooter, but not right then.
    Later that night, defendant drove Snell and Williams into known Grape Street Crip
    territory. Defendant drove the wrong way down a one-way street, past where some 8 to
    10 people had congregated, drinking and talking. Defendant parked the car on a nearby
    street. Snell and Williams got out of the car. They were wearing dark clothes, including
    black hoodie sweatshirts, with the hoods pulled up over their heads. Snell and Williams
    walked back toward the Grape Street Crips gang members they had seen earlier. It was
    7:00 p.m., and dark. Williams and Snell approached the group. Williams said, “Where
    y’all from?” and immediately began shooting. Snell also had a gun, and tried to remove
    it from his waistband, but he never got off a shot. Once Williams had begun firing, the
    crowd scattered. When Williams stopped shooting, he and Snell ran back to the car.
    Defendant had the car already running, waiting for their return. After the trio had
    returned to safety, defendant got rid of the gun.
    Ashton Croswell, a Grape Street Crips associate, had been shot in the buttocks.
    The bullet exited his torso and reentered his right arm. He was taken to the hospital,
    where he died eight days later from massive blood loss caused by the shooting.
    No physical evidence or eyewitness testimony tied defendant, Williams, or Snell
    to the crime. However, when Williams and Snell were arrested, they were each placed in
    a jail cell with a former gang member who was working in an undercover capacity for the
    Los Angeles Police Department. The undercover informant recorded his conversations
    with Williams and Snell, in which Williams and Snell each admitted: (1) Williams was
    the shooter; (2) Snell accompanied him; and (3) defendant was the driver.
    DISCUSSION
    1.     Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict
    The jury was instructed that, to find defendant liable on an aider and abettor
    theory, it must find that: (1) the perpetrator committed the crime; (2) the defendant knew
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    that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; (3) before or during the commission of
    the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;
    and (4) the defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s
    commission of the crime. On appeal, defendant concedes the sufficiency of the evidence
    of the first and fourth elements – that is, that Williams murdered Croswell and that
    defendant, by driving the car, aided and abetted the murder. He further acknowledges
    that if there is sufficient evidence that he knew Williams intended to commit a shooting
    (element 2), the jury could rationally infer that defendant intended to facilitate it
    (element 3). Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to
    support the jury’s implied finding that defendant knew Williams intended to commit a
    shooting.
    “ ‘ “The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in
    a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the
    judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.
    [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Virgo (2013) 
    222 Cal. App. 4th 788
    , 797.)
    “ ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that
    circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt
    and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be
    convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘If the circumstances
    reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
    circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not
    warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Figueroa
    (1992) 
    2 Cal. App. 4th 1584
    , 1587.)
    To be held liable as an aider and abettor, a defendant must have acted with
    knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrators and with an intent or purpose of
    committing, encouraging or facilitating commission of the offense. (People v. Mitchell
    (1986) 
    183 Cal. App. 3d 325
    , 330.) Factors probative on the issue of knowledge and intent
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    include presence at the scene of the crime, failure to take steps to attempt to prevent the
    commission of the crime, companionship, flight, and conduct before and after the crime.
    (People v. Garcia (2008) 
    168 Cal. App. 4th 261
    , 273.)
    There is sufficient evidence of these factors to enable a jury to conclude defendant
    knew Williams intended to commit a shooting. Earlier that day, a Grape Street Crip had
    shot a Bounty Hunter Blood, and Snell had vowed revenge. Under cover of darkness,
    defendant drove Snell and Williams, who were both armed, into known Grape Street Crip
    territory. He first drove them past an area where Grape Street Crip members were known
    to congregate, enabling them to scope out the area. He then parked nearby, where his
    fellow gang members left the car, armed with guns, with their hoodies pulled up over
    their heads, and walked back to their planned victims. Williams’s gunshots could be
    heard where defendant was waiting. He made sure the car was running when the shooter
    and his companion returned to the car. He safely drove them out of the neighborhood,
    and helped to get rid of the evidence.
    On appeal, defendant suggests that the evidence is equally amenable to the
    interpretation that he did not know Williams and Snell were planning on shooting the
    Grape Street Crip members, and he might have believed they were instead planning to
    spray paint their gang’s name in the neighborhood or challenge the Grape Street Crips to
    a fistfight. But defendant had recently driven past the location of the shooting; he knew
    there were 8 to 10 Grape Street Crips (or their associates) in the area. It is extremely
    unlikely that two Bounty Hunter Bloods would intentionally walk into rival gang
    territory, knowing they were vastly outnumbered, simply to paint graffiti or offer a
    challenge. This is particular true in light of the fact that a Grape Street Crip had shot a
    Bounty Hunter Blood earlier in the day. Defendant suggests there is no evidence that he
    knew of the earlier altercation, and that he simply drove the car in response to orders of
    older gang members without knowing their intent. There was no evidence suggesting
    that gangs operate in this manner. On the contrary, the gang expert testified that it was
    important for young gang members to “put in [criminal] work” for the gang, which
    enhances the gang’s reputation in the community and the individual’s standing in the
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    gang. Moreover, gang members act in concert when committing violent crimes, because
    they have faith in each other, which increases their chances of getting away with their
    crimes. Under these circumstances, there is no rational basis to infer that two gang
    members intent on shooting a rival would recruit another gang member as their driver and
    not share their purpose with him.
    2.     The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Modified
    When imposing sentence, the court is required to order both a restitution fine and
    direct victim restitution. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (a)(3).) In this case, the reporter’s
    transcript indicates the court properly ordered direct restitution (in a stipulated amount)
    and a restitution fine in the amount of $280. However, the restitution fine was omitted
    from the court’s minute order and the abstract of judgment. We therefore modify the
    abstract of judgment to include the restitution fine imposed.
    DISPOSITION
    The superior court is directed to modify the abstract of judgment to reflect the
    imposition of a restitution fine, under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), in the
    amount of $280. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
    RUBIN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    BIGELOW, P. J.
    GRIMES, J.
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Document Info

Docket Number: B254416

Filed Date: 6/8/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/8/2015