Beverage v. Shelter Mutual ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    OCT 16 1997
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    PERRY B. BEVERAGE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 97-6104
    SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE                         (D.C. No. 96-CV-471)
    COMPANY, a Missouri Corporation;                     (W.D. Okla.)
    SHELTER GENERAL INSURANCE
    COMPANY, a Missouri Corporation;
    SHELTER LIFE INSURANCE CO., a
    Missouri Corporation; and SHELTER
    FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., a
    Missouri Corporation,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Perry B. Beverage appeals from the district court’s order granting
    defendants’ motion for sanctions for not providing discovery to defendants in a
    timely manner. The dispute turns on whether Mr. Beverage or his lawyer was
    responsible for the delay. The trial court held a hearing at which both Mr.
    Beverage and his counsel testified. The trial court determined counsel to be the
    more credible witness and imposed the sanctions on Mr. Beverage.
    We review the imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion, see Mobley
    v. McCormick, 
    40 F.3d 337
    , 340 (10th Cir. 1994), and defer to the district court's
    evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (“due regard
    shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
    witnesses”). We cannot say the trial court’s credibility determination was clearly
    erroneous or that its order imposing sanctions was an abuse of discretion.
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-6104

Filed Date: 10/16/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021