Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Prine and Saucier , 179 So. 3d 409 ( 2015 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed November 12, 2015.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D14-2941
    Lower Tribunal No. 08-2130-K
    ________________
    Nationstar Mortgage, LLC,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Steven Prine and Courtney Saucier,
    Appellees.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Sandra Taylor and
    James M. Barton, Senior Judges.
    Akerman, LLP, Nancy M. Wallace (Tallahassee); William P. Heller and
    Henry H. Bolz (Fort Lauderdale), for appellant.
    Jay M. Levy, for appellees.
    Before WELLS, SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
    FERNANDEZ, J.
    Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, appeals a final order denying its motion to
    vacate order of dismissal in this mortgage foreclosure case. We reverse the order
    of dismissal and remand for a new trial because Nationstar had a due process right
    to the notice of trial, which it did not receive when the trial court clerk erroneously
    transmitted the notice for service to an incorrect e-mail address.
    Nationstar sought to foreclose on a mortgage that appellees Steven Prine and
    Courtney Saucier executed. The trial court issued its Order Setting Cause for Trial
    by Court and Directing Pretrial Procedure on June 24, 2014. The court scheduled
    the trial for August 12, 2014. The order directed the court clerk to e-mail copies to
    counsel and correctly designated Nationstar’s counsel’s e-mail address for service.
    The transmittal of the notice, however, effectuated service upon an incorrect e-mail
    address for Nationstar’s counsel.
    Nationstar’s counsel learned of the trial when he reviewed the court on-line
    docket on August 7, 2014, five days before the scheduled trial.              Nationstar
    appeared at trial on August 12, 2014 and requested a continuance, arguing that it
    had not received the court’s order setting the case for trial, and that it was unable to
    produce a witness on such short notice. Nationstar advised the court that it had
    tried to procure a witness, but none was available. The court denied the motion to
    continue the trial and dismissed the action as a result of Nationstar’s failure to
    produce a witness at trial.
    Nationstar moved to vacate the dismissal pursuant to rule 1.540(b), Florida
    Rule of Civil Procedure, alleging that it had no knowledge of the trial until August
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    7, 2014 and did not have adequate time to properly prepare for trial. Opposing
    counsel argued in its response that Nationstar failed to establish mistake or
    inadvertence; and that the notice of trial was e-mailed to Nationstar’s counsel at
    the e-mail address designated on the clerk’s transmittal copy, attached to his
    response, which clearly indicated Nationstar’s counsel’s incorrect e-mail address.
    The trial court summarily denied Nationstar’s motion. This constituted an
    abuse of discretion. See Barco Holdings, LLC v. Terminal Inv. Corp., 
    967 So. 2d 281
    , 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)(stating that “[“o]ur standard of review of an order
    ruling on a motion for relief from judgment filed under Florida Rule of Civil
    Procedure 1.540(b) is whether there has been an abuse of the trial court’s
    discretion.”).
    Nationstar’s failure to adequately prepare for trial constituted excusable
    neglect. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(1) authorizes a trial court to
    relieve a party from a final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding based upon
    mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.        It is undisputed that
    Nationstar’s counsel did not receive the notice of trial. The record reflects, as
    opposing counsel noted in his response to Nationstar’s motion to vacate, that the
    court clerk erroneously transmitted the trial order to an incorrect e-mail address for
    Nationstar’s counsel. Nationstar’s inability to secure a trial witness and thereby
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    adequately prepare for trial was thus plainly excusable. See DeBello v. Faske, 
    668 So. 2d 324
    , 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
    Although a presumption of good service arises from a certificate of service
    on a court order, see World on Wheels of Miami, Inc. v. Int’l Auto Motors, Inc.,
    
    569 So. 2d 836
    , 837 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), the presumption of good service is
    rebuttable where, as here, there was a transmittal error of the trial order and the
    record is devoid of any evidence that Nationstar’s counsel received the trial order.
    See Ciolli v. City of Palm Bay, 
    59 So. 3d 295
    , 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)(stating
    that, “[w]hile proof of mailing normally raises a rebuttable presumption that the
    mailed item was received, no such presumption arises when there is no evidence
    that the mailed item was sent to the correct address”). Nationstar successfully
    rebutted any possible presumption of service.
    The failure of service is tantamount to a due process violation. Due process
    requires fair notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. See
    Schuman v. Int’l Consumer Corp., 
    50 So. 3d 75
    , 76-77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
    Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c) mandates that a trial be set not less than
    thirty days from the service of the notice for trial. Mourning v. Ballast Nedam
    Const., Inc., 
    964 So. 2d 889
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Nationstar’s inability to
    adequately prepare for trial was reasonably attributable to the failure of adequate
    and proper notice of trial. Nationstar’s counsel neither received notice of trial nor
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    adequate time within which to prepare for trial. Nationstar’s counsel learned of the
    trial five days before the start of trial, an obvious inadequate amount of time within
    which to prepare and a clear violation of the underlying principle inherent in rule
    1.440(c).   Nationstar’s counsel nonetheless appeared on the day of trial and
    requested a continuance without any knowledge that his failure to receive the
    notice of trial was the result of the court clerk’s typographical error. It is not
    surprising that Nationstar’s counsel was unable to secure a trial witness.
    We therefore reverse the order of dismissal and remand for a new trial.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
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